Blog Post | 115 KY. L. J. ONLINE | November 12, 2026
What the Flock? § 1983 Claims Against Municipalities as a Road to Justice for Victims of ALPR Database Stalking
By: Abigail N. Bedard, Staff Editor, Vol. 115
Whether you are driving down the road or reading the news, it’s hard to ignore the ubiquitous presence of Flock cameras, or more accurately, automated license plate readers (ALPRs). These camera systems have been deployed by communities in every state (save Alaska) with the promise of lower crime rates and higher convictions.[1] According to Flock, which is the largest provider and network operator of ALPRs, these cameras are intended to “identify vehicle details that may help generate investigative leads. That includes the license plate, along with attributes like make, model, color, and other visible characteristics.”[2] They “are not designed to search for people, scan faces, or track individuals.”[3] Regardless of the company’s claims, in practice, these cameras and the connected databases have become quite a useful tool for tracking individuals, as evidenced by the number of law enforcement officers who have used them to stalk victims across the country.[4]
While some individual officers have been fired, arrested, or both in relation to these incidents, reports of law enforcement abuse of ALPR databases continue to stream in at an alarming rate.[5] For this reason, combined with the fact that state and local governments “are the deep-pocketed defendants that can pay large money judgments[,]” victims of ALPR database stalking should consider filing claims against the municipalities that deploy these camera systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[6]This statute allows those who have been deprived of their constitutional rights by state and local governmental authorities to bring civil suits against those persons.[7]
A United States Supreme Court case, Monell v. Department of Social Services, provides the groundwork on which to bring these claims.[8] First, the court held that despite earlier debates regarding whether municipalities could be sued as persons under § 1983, they found “Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”[9] Under Monell, a plaintiff must show that a “policy or custom” of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the harm they suffered (aka, the right they were deprived of).[10] In the context of ALPR database stalking by law enforcement, the underlying Constitutional right that we are concerned with is the Fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.[11]
The Fourth Circuit further clarified the Monell test in Wellington v. Daniels, holding that a failure to train or supervise can constitute such a custom and give rise to § 1983 liability; “however, only in those situations in which there is a history of widespread abuse. Only then may knowledge be imputed to the supervisory personnel.”[12] And in City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court emphasized that the inadequacy of police training or supervision may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability “only where [it] amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”[13]
In many cases of ALPR database stalking, the inadequacy of supervision by the municipality demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the rights of the people that came in contact with the police and the history of ALPR database abuse by police officers is widespread enough that knowledge can be imputed to the municipalities.[14]
In many of these stalking incidents, we see the type of deliberate indifference that the Court laid out in City of Canton.[15] In New Bedford, Massachusetts, two officers were found to have abused the ALPR database to stalk former and current romantic partners.[16] After the two officers were terminated, Police Chief Jason Thody confirmed in an interview with a local newspaper that regular audits were not taking place.[17]
In response to the New Bedford incident, an attorney with the Institute of Justice, Michael Soyfer stated, “‘If a department were really interested in doing robust oversight and protecting peoples’ privacy and ferreting out abusive searches, they would be doing audits regularly . . . I would say at least once per month.’”[18] In an interview several months before the database abuse was first reported, Chief Thody stated that he thought audits were taking place twice a year, but that he would have to check with another officer to confirm.[19]
Similarly, five officers in Indianapolis, Indiana were charged with fraud and misconduct for their misuse of an ALPR database after an investigative reporter from the Washington Post began to look into suspicious searches by one of their officers, Michael Rogers.[20] IMPD Police Chief Tanya Terry confirmed to the reporter “they were not really doing any regular auditing of the system up until recently.”[21]
Moreover, ALPR database abuse by police is widespread enough that the municipalities either knew or should have known that ALPRs were being abused. Reporting over the past decade has shown that officer misuse of law enforcement databases generally is a well-documented problem.[22] Additionally, instances of ALPR database abuse specifically have been reported across the country.[23] According to the Institute of Justice’s Database of ALPR Abuse, there have been 255 reported instances of ALPR abuse since April 2021.[24] Of those 255 reports of abuse, 75 were for stalking.[25]
In conclusion, under the Monell theory of municipal liability, victims of ALPR stalking by law enforcement officers may find a § 1983 claim against the municipality to be a meaningful source of recompense. If municipalities would like to avoid paying the cost of that compensation (both literally and figuratively), they should consider changing their policies to provide more robust protections against police misuse of ALPR databases, or perhaps, it’s time to simply push flock out of the nest for good.
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[1] Flock for Law Enforcement, Flock, https://www.flocksafety.com/industries/law-enforcement (last visited Oct. 6, 2026).
[2] What Do Flock Cameras Actually Capture?, Flock (May 22, 2026) https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/what-do-flock-cameras-actually-capture.
[3] Id.
[4] Christopher Ingraham, The IJ Database of ALPR Abuse, Inst. for Just. (August 12, 2026) https://ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/.
[5] Id.
[6] Sun S. Choy & Wesley C. Jackson, Section 1983: Monell Liability: Overview (Dec. 14, 2022) https://content.next.westlaw.com/practical-law/document/I09be0518c08911e79bef99c0ee06c731/Section-1983-Monell-Liability-Overview?viewType=FullText&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default); id; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[7] 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[8] 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
[9] Id. at 663, 665.
[10] Id. at 694.
[11] U.S Const. amend. IV.
[12] 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983).
[13] 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).
[14] See, e.g., Sadie Gurman & Eric Tucker, Across US, Police Officers Abuse Confidential Databases, AP (Sept. 28, 2016, at 12:28 EDT), https://apnews.com/general-news-699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43; Human Rights Watch, US: Police Found to Violate Fellow Officer’s Privacy, Human Rights Watch (June 20, 2019, at 16:00 EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/20/us-police-found-violate-fellow-officers-privacy; Ingraham, supra note 2.
[15] 489 U.S. at 388-89.
[16] Anastasia E. Lennon, Police Chief Recommends Termination of 2 Officers Found to Use Flock to Track Romantic Partners, The New Bedford Light (Sept. 3, 2026), https://newbedfordlight.org/police-chief-recommends-termination-of-2-officers-found-to-use-flock-to-track-romantic-partners.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Dustin Grove, ALPRs Are Designed to Help Police Solve Crimes, but What Happens When Officers Use it the Wrong Way? 13 WTHR (Sept. 24, 2026, at 14:52 EDT), https://www.wthr.com/article/news/crime/alpr-flock-cameras-designed-help-police-solve-crimes-what-happens-when-officers-use-it-the-wrong-way-impd-washington-post/531-0dfffae8-401f-49fe-809b-450619bb5cf6.
[21] Id.
[22] Gurman & Tucker, supra note 12; Human Rights Watch, supra note 12; Ingraham, supra note 2.
[23] Ingraham, supra note 2.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.