The Permissible Scope of Releases Within FELA Claims

The Permissible Scope of Releases Within FELA Claims

Kaylee Secor I

I.  Introduction

The Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), enacted in 1908 and codified as 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, established liability for railroads if the railroad’s negligence causes an employee’s injury or death.[2] Section 5 of FELA provides that “any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter shall to that extent be void[.]”[3] The language in Section 5 creates uncertainty as to whether certain releases of FELA claims are enforceable. A three-way circuit split has developed between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuits concerning whether a release that extinguishes future claims regarding undiagnosed injuries is valid under FELA.[4] The Supreme Court of the United States has failed to rule on this particular issue but has ruled in general that releases are not per se invalid.[5]

This Note discusses the scope of releases and their validity under FELA while arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard for determining whether a release is valid under Section 5.[6] The Third Circuit’s approach seems to allow employers and employees to settle the controversy on their own terms while safeguarding employees from waiving unknown claims. Part II of this Note discusses the history of the Supreme Court’s case law surrounding releases under FELA. Part III analyzes the three-way circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuits and discusses case law that has developed around the split. Finally, Part IV explores why the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard and why it should not adopt the other circuit’s approaches. 

II.  History of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Releases Under FELA

The purpose of FELA, as established by 45 U.S.C. § 51, is to hold every common carrier by railroad liable for the injuries of an employee due to the carrier’s negligence.[7] Also, according to Section 5, any contract that attempts to exempt a common carrier from FELA liability is void.[8]  After FELA was adopted, the Supreme Court of the United States began to set the outer limits of Section 5.[9]

A.  The Supreme Court Upholds the Validity of Section 5 of FELA

In Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartfield R.R. Co., the Supreme Court upheld Section 5 as valid and noted that “if Congress possesses the power to impose that liability … it also possesses the power to insure its efficacy by prohibiting any contract, rule, regulation or device in evasion of it.”[10] Later that same year, in Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington Railroad Co. v. Schubert, the Supreme Court found that an employee’s application for a relief fund membership that stipulated the employee’s receival of benefits constituted a release of all claims against the employer and was invalid under Section 5.[11] The Court reasoned that the stipulation was an attempt by the employer to avoid liability through contract, which violates FELA.[12]

B.  The Supreme Court Determines that Releases are not Per Se Invalid

The Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged an exception to Section 5’s rule against exempting an employer’s liability through contract.[13] In Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the plaintiff brought an action under FELA for injuries that he sustained due to his employer’s alleged negligence.[14] After the plaintiff’s injuries, he signed a release exempting his employer from liability for the injuries he sustained during the accident and in exchange the plaintiff received two hundred and fifty dollars.[15]

In Callen, the Supreme Court held that a release is not a way for an employer to exempt itself from liability but is rather a “means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility.”[16] The Court’s opinion in Callen also acknowledges that when there are controversies surrounding whether liability exists or how much exists, Congress has not said that an employer and its employee cannot settle their dispute without litigation.[17] Thus, a release is not per se invalid and can survive Section 5 if it is executed “as part of a settlement of disputed liability for work-related injuries.”[18]

It is disputed as to what precisely qualifies as “compromising a claimed liability,” but employers and employees can settle their disputes whenever there are controversies surrounding liability.[19] The only “explicit requirement” is that there must be an actual controversy that the employer and employee are trying to settle.[20] The circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and now the Fifth Circuit revolves around what qualifies as a “controversy” as stated in Callen, with each circuit finding the meaning of the word to be slightly different. 

III.  Different Interpretations of the Enforceability of Releases Under FELA

Despite the Supreme Court’s rulings on Section 5 and releases under FELA, there seems to be disagreement on the proper application of this section and what can be included in releases.[21] This disagreement has led to the three-way circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuit.[22] The Sixth Circuit, in Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., created a bright-line rule in which releases are limited to injuries known to the employee at the time the release agreement is signed.[23] The Third Circuit, in Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., rejected the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule and created a “known risk” or “fact-intensive” standard in which releases are limited to “risks which are known to the parties at the time the release is signed.”[24] In an unpublished opinion, Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the Fifth Circuit rejected both standards set forth by the Sixth and Third Circuits and, by looking to the plain language of the release, created a standard with virtually no limits.[25]

A.  The Sixth Circuit’s Bright-Line Rule Allowing for Only Known Injuries Within Releases

In Babbitt, the Sixth Circuit was one of the first circuits to establish a standard to determine whether railroads could absolve themselves from liability of “known or unknown” claims through a general release.[26] The plaintiffs in Babbitt were former employees of Norfolk & Western Railway Company and were seeking damages under FELA.[27] The plaintiffs alleged they experienced hearing loss because of their exposure to excessive noise during their employment.[28]

When the plaintiffs left Norfolk, they signed a “Resignation and Release Agreement,” which was a part of Norfolk’s “Voluntary Separation Program.”[29] The program included early retirement, a “lump sum payment,” and “continuation of health, and other benefits.”[30] Norfolk argued that the Release “was an attempt to settle all claims as part of the cessation of a worker’s employment relationship with the railroad” and that the purpose was for the railroad to “‘buy its peace’” from former employees.[31] Norfolk argued that the Release barred the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs knew of their claims before the Release was signed.[32] On the other hand, the plaintiffs contend that they did not know of their claims until they no longer worked for Norfolk.[33]

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by looking at the language of FELA and, in doing so, the court determined that “the purpose of FELA, as stated in 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 and 55, is to require negligent railroads to assume liability for injuries to employees in the course of their employment.”[34] The court goes on to acknowledge the exception to Section 5, as laid out in Callen, that “FELA claims can have the same effect as any other release, in that it may constitute a settlement or compromise, rather than an attempt to escape liability.[35] Focusing on the release at issue in Callen, the Sixth Circuit found that “the employer and employee executed a contract that settled an actual controversy, i.e., liability for the plaintiff’s specific injuries.”[36]

The Sixth Circuit adopted a rule stating that for a release to be valid it must “reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury,” rather than act as an attempt on the employer’s behalf to extinguish an employee’s future claims arising out of injuries that may be “known or unknown” to the employee.[37] The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Norfolk and remanded the case to the district court because the district court did not determine if the release executed was for the specific injuries regarding the plaintiffs’ hearing loss.[38]

The rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Babbitt is known as the “bright-line rule approach,” meaning that a release can only be valid for “the specific injury at issue and cannot go beyond that specific injury to any other injury or conditions that may later develop.”[39] Other federal circuit courts and lower courts have declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule approach, making this approach one of the least favored outside of the Sixth Circuit.[40]

B.  The Third Circuit’s Fact-Intensive Standard Allowing for Known Injuries and Known Risks Within Releases

Only one year after the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Babbitt, the Third Circuit adopted its own approach in determining whether a release is valid under Section 5 of FELA.[41] In Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the Third Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule and created the initial circuit split by adopting a fact-intensive standard to determine the enforceability of releases.[42] The plaintiffs in Wicker were all injured during their employment at Consolidated Railroad Corporation (Conrail).[43] Most of the plaintiffs signed a release that exempted Conrail from any liability for past or future claims the plaintiffs may have, regardless of whether the claims or injuries were known or unknown by the plaintiffs at the time.[44]

After the plaintiffs signed the releases and left Conrail, they began to experience injuries unrelated to the initial injury for which they signed the release.[45] For example, one plaintiff suffered from a back injury that occurred during his employment and signed a release.[46] The plaintiff testified exposure to toxic chemicals during his employment at Conrail caused him to experience many symptoms, such as “swollen eyes, infected tear ducts, nosebleeds,” etc.[47] The plaintiff claimed that some of the symptoms were present when he signed the release, however, many of the symptoms were developments that occurred after the release was executed.[48]

The plaintiffs each brought a FELA suit against Conrail for alleged exposure to toxic chemicals during the duration of their employment, causing each of them various injuries.[49] Conrail argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred because of the releases that each plaintiff signed.[50] The plaintiffs argued that the releases only barred claims relating to their initial injuries at the time of signing the release and that the releases were not valid under Section 5.[51]

The Third Circuit’s approach involved a compromise between protecting employees’ FELA rights while, at the same time, allowing employers and employees to settle controversies through contracts about potential liability relating to known risks of future injuries.[52] The Third Circuit held that Section 5 is not violated if a release “is executed for valid consideration as part of a settlement, and the scope of the release is limited to those risks which are known to the parties at the time the release is signed.”[53] The Third Circuit goes on to say that claims regarding unknown risks cannot be waived under Section 5 because they “do not constitute ‘controversies,’” as acknowledged in Callen.[54]

The Third Circuit specifies that:

a release that spells out the quantity, location and duration of potential risks to which the employee has been exposed—for example toxic exposure—allowing the employee to make a reasoned decision whether to release the employer from liability for future injuries of specifically known risks does not violate § 5 of FELA.[55]

The court notes, however, that the validity of a release does not turn on the way the release is written, even though a release that specifies the known risks would serve as strong support for the release defense.[56] There was concern that employers could easily write “detailed boiler plate agreements” that “include an extensive catalog of every chemical and hazard known to railroad employment.”[57] In response, the court resorts to an additional “fact-intensive process” that involves discerning the parties’ intent when executing the release.[58] The court goes on to say that “[w]here a specific known risk of malady is not mentioned in the release, it would seem difficult for the employer to show it was known to the employee and that he or she intended to release liability for it.”[59]

The Third Circuit found that the releases in question were not valid because there was no demonstration that the employees knew of the risks that they were exposed to and the releases attempted to settle all the claims against Conrail regardless of whether or not the parties knew about the risks.[60] For example, some of the releases at issue were “short, pro forma waivers,” and did not indicate any negotiation between the parties other than the settlement amount.[61] Other examples of releases that were signed by the plaintiffs were “more detailed, blanket releases” that attempted to exempt Conrail from all potential liabilities.[62] Overall, none of the releases demonstrated that “the employees knew of the actual risks to which they were exposed and from which the employer was being released.”[63]

The court acknowledges that Babbitt’s bright-line rule is more predictable than the fact-intensive standard set forth, however, the court believes that the trial courts are able to apply the fact-intensive process to determine the parties’ intent and whether the release is valid.[64] The standard announced by the Third Circuit in Wicker is known as the “known risk or fact-intensive standard,” meaning that a release is valid if it was a “negotiated settlement of a controversy that is limited to those injuries and risks that are known to the parties’ at the time the release is executed.”[65]

Many lower courts have adopted the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach, making it the more popular standard for determining whether a release is valid under Section 5.[66] Even the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach in Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan.[67] The plaintiff in Sea-Land was an employee who experienced lower back pain while aboard one of Sea-Land’s ships.[68] Sea-Land paid all of the plaintiff's medical expenses, including surgery, however, the plaintiff was deemed permanently disabled and unable to perform his duties.[69] The parties signed a release and a “‘Settlement Agreement Not to Sail or Work’” and in exchange, Sea-Land paid the plaintiff $364,500.[70]

The agreement stated that the plaintiff agreed to “not work, sail and/or navigate, and/or seek to sail, navigate or work, in any capacity, including shore relief, aboard vessels owned, managed, and/or operated by Sea-Land Service, Inc., and/or any of its affiliates and/or subsidiaries, in the future.”[71] If the plaintiff was eventually able to come back to work for Sea-Land, the agreement stated that “he shall do so at his own risk, and the company will bear no responsibility for an illness and/or injuries he may suffer while in service aboard any such vessel.”[72]

Two years later, the plaintiff received a union physical to determine his duty status and was deemed fit for duty, but he did not inform the doctor who performed the physical of his medical history.[73] After the plaintiff returned as an employee at Sea-Land, he reported that he re-injured his back.[74] Sea-Land brought suit to obtain a judgment that declared the agreement between the parties enforceable, so the plaintiff could not seek damages for his re-injured back.[75] The district court found in favor of Sea-Land and ruled that the agreement was enforceable under FELA.[76] Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit arguing that the agreement violates Section 5 of FELA because the agreement “exempts Sea-Land, a common carrier, from liability under the Act by releasing it from future claims.”[77]

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s standard and said that “cases involving the validity of releases are fact-driven.”[78] The court upheld the district court’s decision that the agreement was enforceable because the agreement forbid “future employment by a totally disabled seaman that would expose him to known and unacceptable risks” and since it was a “valid overall settlement of a specific claim of injury,” the agreement does not violate FELA.[79]

C.  The Fifth Circuit’s New and More Expansive Approach to Releases

A new approach has recently emerged from the Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, to determine whether a release is valid, creating a three-way circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuit.[80] In Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pacific Railroad, the plaintiff was a Union Pacific Railroad (Union) employee and alleged that he encountered exposure to toxic substances while employed there.[81] In 2019, the plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis and cancer and, thereafter, filed a FELA suit against Union.[82] Union argued that the plaintiff’s claims were barred because, in 2012, the plaintiff pursued a toxic tort claim against Union and the two parties signed a release to resolve that claim.[83]

The language of the release agreement stated that the plaintiff accepted payment as a “complete compromise” of all claims against Union as a result of the plaintiff's “alleged illnesses, injuries, cancers, future cancers, diseases, and/or death, or any fears or psychological disorders relating to contracting same, as a result of Alleged Exposures while [Mendoza-Gomez] was employed by [Union].”[84] The release included not only claims that the plaintiff knew of at the time of the release, but also ones that could develop after the release was executed.[85] The plaintiff argued that the release was unenforceable under Section 5 because FELA prohibits employers from extinguishing liability through contracts.[86]

The District Court for the Southern District of Texas declined to adopt either of the approaches in Wicker or Babbitt and instead relied on the language of the release agreement finding the release valid.[87] Citing Callen, the district court determined that “[a]greements that allow parties to settle their claims without litigation is a permissible ‘full compromise’ under Section 55.”[88] In determining whether the release was valid under Section 5, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Callen, stating that “‘a release is not a device to exempt from liability but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility.’”[89] The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s claims were barred because of the release’s “plain language” regarding what the release encompassed.[90]

The plaintiff tried to draw the Fifth Circuit’s attention to Hartman v. Illinois Railroad Co., a district court case that involved a release similar to the one in Mendoza-Gomez.[91] Applying Wicker, the district court in Hartman found that the release was a “‘boiler-plate list of hazards’” and did not bar the plaintiff’s claims.[92] The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s case was distinguishable from Hartman.[93] Since the release was specific to the injuries within the plaintiff’s original toxic tort complaint against Union and the injuries he developed years later, including “cancers” and “future cancers,” the court did not find the release to be a “boilerplate list” of injuries unrelated to the plaintiff’s present claims.[94] The Fifth Circuit, instead, found that the release was a contract and the language of the release governed.[95]

Relatively few cases have discussed the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Mendoza-Gomez, however, in Fisher v. BNSF Railway Co., the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth analyzes the district court’s and Fifth Circuit’s approach to determine the validity of a release.[96] The Court of Appeals of Texas states that the district court granted summary judgment to Union “on the face of the release.”[97] Since the release disclosed future risks on its face, such as cancer relating to asbestos, it was “executed as part of a full compromise of litigation.”[98]

Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s approach appears to determine whether a release is valid by turning to the language “on the face of the release.”[99] Unlike Wicker, there seems to be no fact-finding performed by the court to determine if the release is valid or if it was the intent of the parties to release the possible risks.[100] Instead, the Fifth Circuit seems to rely heavily on Callen’s language that “a release is not a device to exempt from liability but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility.”[101] Under Babbitt, the release at issue in Mendoza-Gomez would not be found valid and under Wicker, the release would at least create a question of fact.[102] Under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, however, the release is found to be completely valid.[103]

The Fifth Circuit’s approach creates a new split in the federal circuit courts by citing to Callen and holding broadly that Section 5 imposes very few limits on FELA claims.[104] The plaintiff in Mendoza-Gomez filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States claiming that the case could resolve the circuit split.[105] This could have been the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to shed some light on the controversy surrounding FELA claims and releases; however, the Petition was dismissed.[106]

 

IV.  The U.S. Supreme Court Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s Fact-Intensive Approach to Resolve the Three-Way Circuit Split

The resolution of the three-way circuit split will substantially affect the outcome of FELA cases in the future. If the Supreme Court adopts one of the circuit’s approaches, it will aid workers and common carriers in determining whether or not the release they are trying to execute is valid. Also, the resolution of the three-way circuit split could significantly affect the way common carriers draft releases.[107] By clarifying the proper standard for FELA releases, the Court could “equip the railroad companies with the knowledge of what language they need to include in a FELA release in order for the release to be deemed valid and to protect the employer from liability in additional suits.”[108] Additionally, by adopting one of the three approaches, the Court would finally end the long debate of whether or not the parties are allowed to release only known injuries, known injuries as well as known risks, or even risks that the plaintiff did not intend to release but were found to be included on the face of the release.

Even though the Supreme Court dismissed Mendoza-Gomez’s petition for review,[109] the issue of what standard applies in determining whether a release is valid under Section 5 still exists. The Supreme Court could still choose to rule on this issue if the opportunity presents itself, and if the Court does choose to address the split, it should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach in Wicker. Wicker’s rationale is the best compromise between the three approaches by allowing employers and employees to “negotiate and settle” their claims without litigation[110] and is the most widely adopted approach by a majority of state and federal courts.[111]

A.  Why the Sixth Circuit’s Bright Line Rule Should Not Be Adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court

Although the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule has some advantages, the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard is superior in many ways. Under Babbitt’s bright line rule, “a release must reflect a bargained-for-settlement of a known claim for a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from injuries known or unknown by him.”[112] It is clear, and acknowledged by the Third Circuit itself, that the bright line approach presented in Babbitt may be easier to apply than Wicker’s fact-intensive standard and has the “benefit of predictability.”[113] In other words, Babbitt’s rule appears predictable because it only allows employees to sign a release for a specific injury that has already occurred and the employer will know when a release will or will not be considered valid.[114]

Even though it may appear that the Sixth Circuit’s approach provides an easier resolution to the enforcement of releases, the result may actually be a “more complicated inquiry into the exact nature and scope of the injury compromised” or have “a chilling effect on the resolution by compromise of any claims.”[115] For example, the effects of exposure to asbestos “may be latent for a considerable period of time.”[116] Under Babbitt’s approach, a new claim would be permitted against the employer for every new manifestation of asbestos exposure, “regardless of the extent of the parties’ awareness of such risks.”[117] This would result in a decrease in settlements because “there would be no incentive” for the employer to compromise.[118] Therefore, Babbitt’s bright-line rule would require injured workers to litigate claims against negligent employers, resulting in employees waiting long periods of time to receive compensation for their injuries as well as more attorney’s fees due to extended litigation.

Additionally, it can be argued that Babbitt’s bright line rule is more protective of workers as compared to the Third Circuit’s standard because of the “unequal bargaining power” between the employer and the employees.[119] Employers and their attorneys obviously will try to obtain a cheaper settlement of known injuries and known risks, and it is argued that plaintiff attorneys “will be quick to settle in order to get their cut of the settlement with no regard to the future liability claims they are releasing.”[120] Yet, there are at least two reasons why this argument fails.

First, plaintiff attorneys will usually want to obtain the highest settlement possible for the plaintiff because they will receive a percentage of the settlement amount. Just because the employer and its attorney attempt to obtain the lowest settlement amount for themselves, it does not follow that the plaintiff and their attorney will not be successful in procuring a higher settlement. By allowing for a settlement of future known risks, the plaintiff would be able to bargain for an amount that would compensate them for the potential development of those risks. To determine an appropriate amount of compensation, the parties could take into account the probability of the plaintiff developing injuries from these known risks and the cost of treatment if they do develop. Therefore, the parties will have full knowledge of the probability and costs of the known risks, which would counteract the issue of “unequal bargaining power.”

The second reason this argument fails is because Wicker’s fact-intensive standard allows courts to thwart the issue of “unequal bargaining power” between the employer and the employee. Even though Wicker’s fact-intensive standard looks to whether it was the intention of the parties to release known risks,[121] the fact-intensive process could reveal if the employer used its “unequal bargaining power” over the employee to coerce them into signing a release that they actually did not want to sign. Courts should be able to recognize coercion through the fact-intensive process and not allow the release to bar the plaintiff’s claims. In other words, Wicker’s standard is just as protective of workers as Babbitt’s bright line rule.

The Supreme Court should also not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s bright line rule in Babbitt because it is too restrictive and paternalistic. The Sixth Circuit approach limits the plaintiff’s settlement to only known injuries at the time the release is signed even if both parties would rather settle all future claims.[122] “[I]t is entirely conceivable that both employee and employer could fully comprehend future risks and potential liabilities and, for different reasons, want an immediate and permanent settlement.”[123] The employer obviously would want a permanent settlement to reduce the amount of future liabilities it may be subject to.[124] On the other hand, the employee may want an immediate settlement to get compensation for their potential injuries now, rather than waiting on injuries that may or may not develop in the future.[125]

Other federal and state courts have also adopted the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach over the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule, making it the more popular of the two standards among courts.[126] In Jaqua v. Canadian National Railroad, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Michigan adopted Wicker’s standard and stated that “[t]he rationale in Wicker allows the employer and the employee the freedom to negotiate and settle claims, but protects the employee from releasing the employer for unknown liability that was not considered and resolved in an informed manner.”[127] In Loyal v. Norfolk Southern Corp., the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that an industry “that has a number of known occupational risks and diseases, it is important to both the employer and employee to be able to settle potential claims regarding injuries or diseases prior to actual discovery.”[128] Also adopting the Third Circuit’s standard, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Acuff, found that “Babbitt’s rule barring the release of future claims unfairly restricts the ability of an employer and employee to knowingly and voluntarily settle both current and future claims, should the parties so desire.”[129]

Overall, the Supreme Court should not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule because of its many disadvantages. Babbitt’s ruling is too restrictive of the employees' ability to release known risks if they choose to do so.[130] Allowing releases only for known injuries may also decrease the number of settlements that employers will agree to because there is less of an incentive for them to participate in these settlements.[131] This would result in more litigation, causing the injured plaintiff to wait longer for compensation as well as higher attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court should instead adopt the Third Circuit’s approach because it allows the parties to negotiate while still protecting the employee from releasing the employer from unknown risks.[132]

B.  Why the Fifth Circuit’s New and More Expansive Approach Should Not Be Adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court

While the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule is too restrictive and paternalistic, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is on the opposite end of the spectrum by placing barely any restrictions on what can be included in releases.[133] Rather, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas and Fifth Circuit in Mendoza-Gomez found that the release at issue disclosed the future risks of cancer on its face, so it was deemed valid.[134] The Supreme Court should not adopt the Fifth Circuit’s approach because, as compared to the Third Circuit’s standard, it completely undermines the purpose of FELA.

By looking at the language of the release on its face, there is no fact-intensive process conducted, as in Wicker, to determine if the parties actually intended to include certain future claims in the release.[135] According to the Fifth Circuit, the analysis in determining the intentions of the parties “begins and ends with the contract’s express language.”[136] The result of the Fifth Circuit’s approach will likely find a release valid even if there is no evidence that the parties, specifically the plaintiffs, knew of the specific risks they were exposed to. As long as the “express language” of the release provides that the plaintiff accepts a settlement amount as consideration for “full and complete release of any and all claims” resulting from a specific instance, such as exposure to toxic chemicals, then the release will be found valid and the plaintiff’s future claims for any injuries will be barred against the employer.[137]

The Fifth Circuit’s new approach runs contrary to FELA’s purpose of holding common carriers liable to their injured employees.[138] This approach will result in injured workers’ claims being barred because they signed blanket releases in which they were unaware included certain risks. It will encourage employers to write very broad releases, resulting in boilerplate language. The Third Circuit’s approach conducts a fact-intensive process that seeks to determine the parties’ intent, which combats the issues the Fifth Circuit’s approach creates.[139]

Even though the Fifth Circuit’s approach has the advantage of allowing the parties the freedom of contract, like the Third Circuit’s standard, it does not properly protect workers because it does not specifically disallow releases of unknown risks.[140] Since unknown risks could potentially be released under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, undermining the purpose of FELA, the Supreme Court should instead adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard that provides the parties the freedom of contract while protecting workers at the same time.

V.  Conclusion

In sum, to resolve the three-way circuit split the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard that allows known risks to be included in FELA releases.[141] Wicker’s standard is the proper compromise between the three approaches as it allows employers and employees to negotiate and settle their claims without litigation,[142] and it is the most widely adopted approach by a majority of state and federal courts.[143] The Third Circuit’s standard allows parties the freedom of contract to determine what is best for themselves, while still adhering to FELA’s purpose by protecting workers by not allowing unknown risks to be waived.[144]


I J.D. Expected 2024, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.S. Political Science 2021, University of Louisville

[2] Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (1908).

[3] 45 U.S.C. § 55.

[4] See Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89, 91 (6th Cir. 1997); Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 690 (3d Cir. 1998); Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022).

[5] Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948).

[6] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 696.

[7] 45 U.S.C. § 51; Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 91.

[8] 45 U.S.C. § 55.

[9] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 696.

[10] Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartfield R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1912).

[11] Phila., Balt., & Wash. R.R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 612 (1912).

[12] Id.

[13] Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89, 92 (6th Cir. 1997); Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948). 

[14] Callen, 332 U.S. at 626.

[15] Id. at 626–27.

[16] Id. at 631.

[17] Id.

[18] Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 92.

[19] Callen, 332 U.S. at 631.

[20] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1998).

[21] Id. at 698.

[22] See Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 89; Wicker, 142 F.3d at 690; Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022).

[23] Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 93.

[24] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[25] See Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 4:19-CV-4742, slip op. at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2021); See Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022).

[26] Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 91, 93.

[27] Id. at 90.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 91.

[35] Id. at 92.

[36] Id.

[37] Id. at 93.

[38] Id.

[39] Brooke Granger, Known Injuries vs. Known Risks: Finding the Appropriate Standard for Determining the Validity of Releases Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1463, 1476 (2015).

[40] Id. at 1477; See e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan, 231 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998) (Third Circuit creates its own standard); Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886–88 (Tex. App. 2022) (declines to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s standard but does not decide on whether to adopt the Third Circuit’s or Fifth Circuit’s approach because the result would be the same regardless of which standard the court chooses to apply).

[41] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[42] Id.

[43] Id. at 692–93.

[44] Id. at 693–94.

[45] Id. at 692–93.

[46] Id. at 692.

[47] Id.

[48] Id. at 692–93.

[49] Id. at 694.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id. at 700–01.

[53] Id. at 701.

[54] Id. (citing Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948)).

[55] Id.

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] Id.

[60] Id. at 701–02.

[61] Id. at 701.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 700–01.

[65] Granger, supra note 39, at 1481–82.

[66] See e.g., Murphy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 574 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Loyal v. Norfolk S. Corp., 507 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ward v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 So. 3d 466, 472–73 (Miss. 2019) (applying the Third Circuit’s standard); Cole v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 803 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Va. 2017) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Sinclair v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 200 P.3d 46, 59 (Mont. 2008) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., v. Acuff, 950 So.2d 947, 960 (Miss. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach); Oliverio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach).

[67] See 231 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2000).

[68] Id. at 849.

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] Id. at 850.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id. at 849.

[78] Id. at 852.

[79] Id. at 852–53.

[80] See Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022).

[81] Id. at *1.

[82] Id.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id.

[86] Id. at *2.

[87] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 4:19-CV-4742, slip op. at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2021).

[88] Id. (citing Callen v. Pa. R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948)).

[89] Mendoza-Gomez, No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3; Callen, 332 U.S. at 631 (1948).

[90] Mendoza-Gomez, No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *2.

[91] Id. at *4 n.1.

[92] Id. (citing Hartman v. Ill. R.R. Co., No. 20-1633, slip op. at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2022).

[93] Id.

[94] Id.

[95] 2022-7061 Mealey’s Daily News Update 3.

[96] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886–88 (Tex. App. 2022).

[97] Id. at 887.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998).

[101] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (citing Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948)).

[102] 2022-7061 Mealey’s Daily News Update 3.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.

[105] Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (No. 22-225); 2022-7061 Mealey’s Daily News Update 3.

[106] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14), cert. dismissed, 143 S. Ct. 420 (2022).

[107] Granger, supra note 39, at 1483.

[108] Id.

[109] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14), cert. dismissed, 143 S. Ct. 420 (2022).

[110] Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).

[111] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. App. 2022).

[112] Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1997).

[113] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1998).

[114] Granger, supra note 39, at 1493.

[115] Oliverio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701–02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).

[116] Id. at 702.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Granger, supra note 39, at 1491.

[120] Id.

[121] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1998).

[122] Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Acuff, 950 So. 2d 947, 960 (Miss. 2006).

[123] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 700.

[124] Id.

[125] Id.

[126] See e.g., Murphy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 574 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Loyal v. Norfolk S. Corp., 507 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ward v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 So. 3d 466, 472–73 (Miss. 2019) (applying the Third Circuit’s standard); Cole v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 803 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Va. 2017) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Sinclair v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 200 P.3d 46, 59 (Mont. 2008) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., v. Acuff, 950 So. 2d 947, 960 (Miss. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach); Oliverio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach).

[127] Jaqua, 734 N.W.2d at 229.

[128] Loyal, 507 S.E.2d at 502.

[129] Acuff, 950 So. 2d at 960.

[130] Id.

[131] Oliverio, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 702.

[132] Jaqua, 734 N.W.2d at 229.

[133] Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Mendoza-Gomez, Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (No. 22-225).

[134] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 887 (Tex. App. 2022).

[135] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998).

[136] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (citing Huckaba v. Ref-Chem, L.P., 892 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2018)).

[137] Id.

[138] 45 U.S.C. § 51.

[139] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[140] Compare Mendoza-Gomez, No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3 (acknowledging that the analysis “begins and ends with the contract’s express language,” which does not involve the fact-intensive process of determining whether the risk was known or unknown to the plaintiff), with Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701 (stating that “[c]laims relating to unknown risks do not constitute ‘controversies,’ and may not be waived under § 5 of FELA”).

[141] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[142] Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).

[143] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. App. 2022).

[144] Wicker, 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d. Cir. 1998).

“Objective Falsity” in Healthcare Fraud and Abuse

“Objective Falsity” in Healthcare Fraud and Abuse  

Adriel E. Wilson I 

Introduction 

There is currently a circuit split on the meaning of “falsity” under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).[2] This paper aims to demonstrate why the Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsity standard in which “a clinical judgment of terminal illness warranting hospice benefits under Medicare cannot be deemed false, for purposes of the False Claims Act, when there is only a reasonable disagreement between medical experts as to the accuracy of that conclusion.”[3] The Supreme Court should adopt this theory for several reasons: (1) the courts actually seem to agree on whether a medical opinion can be deemed untrue, (2) they mainly disagree on the purpose of the documentation requirements and its effect on a falsity determination, (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior because the Supreme Court has explicitly held the FCA is not there to punish garden-variety regulatory infractions,[4] and (4) the presence of uncertainty in medical sciences.[5]

I.  False Claims Act

The civil FCA is located at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 through §3733.[6] This statute aims to protect the “Government from being overcharged or sold shoddy goods or services.”[7] “[N]o specific intent to defraud is required,” thus “knowing” under the statute includes “not only actual knowledge” but also “deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”[8] Additionally, there is a criminal FCA located at 18 U.S.C. § 287.[9] Under this statute, criminal penalties for false claim submissions include fines and imprisonment for a period of up to five years.[10]

Violating the FCA can result in substantial consequences, as the statute permits treble damages, a penalty for each false claim, and exclusion from participation in both Medicaid and Medicare[11]—a possibility that can be ruinous to most medical practices.[12] The aim is to deter these unsafe and abusive practices as much as possible.[13]

II.  “Objective Falsity” under the FCA 

The judicial “objective falsity” standard “requires a false claim to be based on objectively verifiable facts to establish liability under the FCA.”[14] Circuit courts, however, are split as to “whether a difference in expert medical opinion that certain health services are medically necessary”—and therefore payable by the government—is sufficient to establish that the claim for services provided is false or fraudulent under the statute.[15]

       In February 2021, the Supreme Court rejected, without comment, two petitions presenting that exact issue of “whether an expert medical opinion that differs from the defendant’s clinical judgment” is sufficient to establish liability under the FCA’s falsity definition.[16] These petitions are Care Alternatives v. United States et al. and RollinsNelson LTC Corp. v. United States ex rel. Winters.[17]

III.  Circuit Split 

For purposes of clarity throughout this paper, the Eleventh Circuit’s theory will be termed the “objective standard,” meaning there must be a flagrant abuse of the defendant’s medical judgment in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a FCA claim, and reasonable disagreement between medical experts is insufficient.[18] Alternatively, the opposing theory will be termed the “reasonable disagreement standard,” meaning a reasonable disagreement between medical experts is sufficient to support a plaintiff’s FCA claim.[19]

A.  Reasonable Disagreement Standard 

The Third Circuit rejected the objective falsity standard last year in United States ex rel. Druding v. Druding (which became Care Alternatives on appeal).[20] In that case, former employees sued Care Alternatives for allegedly “admit[ing] patients who were ineligible for hospice care and direct[ing] employees to alter patient records to allow for eligibility.”[21] The court focused on whether Care Alternatives’s physicians correctly assessed that their patients were terminally ill (meaning expected to die within six months) and therefore eligible for Medicare and Medicaid to cover their hospice care.[22] The issue presented was whether a physician’s clinical judgment can be considered a legal falsity if it is later challenged by a medical expert with a different judgment.[23] The Third Circuit found that the difference in opinion did create a “genuine dispute of material fact as to falsity” and ruled in favor of the former employees.[24]

B.  Analysis of Care Alternatives Opinion

In Druding, the plaintiffs retained an expert who opined that, based on the forty-seven patient records he examined, the patients were inappropriately certified for hospice care thirty-five percent of the time.[25] He also found “that the medical records were incomplete for at least three patients.”[26] However, Care Alternatives’s expert disagreed and testified that a reasonable physician would have found all of those patients eligible for hospice.[27]

Care Alternatives is a hospice facility, and the Medicare provisions for hospice benefits provide payment for individuals considered terminally ill.[28] The statute requires the individual to be certified accordingly by at least one physician,[29] and regulations promulgated by the Secretary add another requirement for that certification to be accompanied by “clinical information and other documentation that support the medical prognosis” of terminal illness in the medical record.[30]

Care Alternatives sought summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs could not prove the prima facie elements of an FCA claim: “falsity, causation, knowledge, and materiality.”[31] Namely, Care Alternatives contended the plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient evidence of “falsity.”[32] The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that “a mere difference of opinion” between experts regarding the accuracy of the prognosis was insufficient to create a triable dispute of fact as to the element of falsity, which reflected the Eleventh Circuit’s standard.[33] It instead required the plaintiffs to produce evidence of an “objective falsehood, that the physicians’ prognosis of terminal illness was incorrect, in order to prevail on the element of falsity.”[34]

On appeal to the Third Circuit, the main issue was “whether a hospice-care provider’s claim for reimbursement can be considered ‘false’ under the FCA on the basis of medical-expert testimony that opines that accompanying patient certifications did not support patients’ prognoses of terminal illness.”[35] The Third Circuit held the answer is yes, thereby rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s “objective falsity” standard from the previous year.[36] Instead, the court found the plaintiffs’ expert medical testimony created “a genuine dispute of material fact as to the element of falsity.”[37]

The Third Circuit came to this conclusion for two reasons: (1) the district court’s standard “is at odds with the meaning of ‘false’ under the” statute’s text; and (2) the “‘objective’ falsity standard improperly conflates the elements of falsity and scienter.”[38]

First, because Congress did not define “false” under the FCA, the Supreme Court looked to common law for guidance in Escobar, stating that “[a]bsent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.”[39] The Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests “an opinion may be false when the speaker makes an express statement contrary to the opinion he or she actually holds.”[40] Thus, the Third Circuit found that the lower court’s premise—that an opinion is subjective, and a difference of opinion is therefore not enough to show falsity—is inconsistent with the meaning of “false” under the FCA.[41]

The Third Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s determination that “clinical judgments cannot be untrue.”[42] The Third Circuit reasoned that an “opinion…will be deemed untrue…if it is issued without reasonable genuine belief or if it has no basis.”[43] Thus, the court found that “a physician’s judgment may be scrutinized and considered false.”[44] Therefore, a difference of medical opinion is enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding FCA falsity.[45]

Second, the Third Circuit found that the lower court’s “objective falsity” standard conflates the elements of scienter (“knowledge”) and falsity under the statute.[46] The court reasoned that scienter helps limit the possibility that providers would be exposed to FCA liability anytime the government found an expert who disagreed with the certifying physician’s medical prognosis.[47] The Third Circuit wrote, “By requiring ‘factual evidence that Defendant’s certifying doctor was making a knowingly false determination,’ the District Court’s ‘objective’ falsity standard conflates scienter and falsity.”[48]

Thus, the Third Circuit stated that a claim can be proven “false” in two ways: (1) “factually, when the facts contained within the claim are untrue”; and (2) legally, “when the claimant…falsely certifies that it has complied with a statute or regulation the compliance with which is a condition for Government payment.”[49] For legal falsity, the Medicare Health Benefit regulations state two requirements: “(1) that a physician certifies the patient as terminally ill and (2) that clinical information and documentation supporting the prognosis accompany the certification.”[50] The Circuit Court reasoned that the District Court’s standard only found an expert medical opinion to be false when there is a showing proving a violation of factual falsity under avenue (1), while the Circuit Court advanced a standard that finds liability when there has been a violation of either factual falsity under avenue (1) or of legal falsity under avenue (2).[51] Under avenue (2), legal falsity is found, meaning an FCA violation has been committed, when clinical information and other documentation that support the medical prognosis do not accompany the certification.[52] Based on this theory, the Third Circuit held that “disagreement between experts as to a patient’s prognosis may be evidence of [element (2)]; its relevance need not be limited to the accuracy of another physician’s judgment.”[53]

The Third Circuit found support in the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Polukoff, where that court held that FCA falsity can be based on legal falsity, where “falsity is simply a question of whether the claim is reimbursable, that is, compliance with the Medicare reimbursement instructions.”[54] That circuit found the defendant cardiologist’s procedures were “false” due to failure to follow Medicare procedures.[55] Those procedures require certification of the necessity of services and, in some instances, recertification of the continued need for those services that are reasonable and necessary.[56] However, it is worth noting that the facts in that case made the defendant’s conduct appear to be more obviously egregious: the plaintiff physician alleged (1) the defendant performed an unusually large number of the specific cardiac procedure at issue; (2) these procedures violated industry and hospital guidelines; (3) other physicians had objected to defendant’s practice; (4) the medical center (Intermountain) eventually audited the defendant’s practice and reached the conclusion that the guidelines were violated in many of the cases reviewed; and (5) the defendant knew that Medicare and Medicaid would not pay for this cardiac procedure to treat migraines, and he “chose to represent that the procedures had been performed based on indications set forth” in the American Heart Association and American Stroke Association guidelines.[57]

In summation, according to the Third Circuit, “[u]nder a legal falsity theory, a medical opinion that differs from the certifying physician’s opinion is…relevant evidence of the latter requirement, whether there was documentation accompanying the certification that supported the medical prognosis.”[58] The court continued: “[A] difference of medical opinion is enough evidence to create a triable dispute of fact regarding FCA falsity. This does not mean that objectivity is never relevant for FCA liability…[h]owever, we find that objectivity speaks to the element of scienter, not falsity.”[59] Thus, according to the Third Circuit, “scienter” pertains to factual falsity under avenue (1) while “falsity” pertains to legal falsity under avenue (2) when a defendant fails to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements.[60]

Hence, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs’ expert report challenging the defendant’s hospice certifications created a triable issue of material fact for a jury regarding falsity.[61] Again, it is worth noting this does not seem to rise to the level of egregious conduct in the Tenth Circuit case, which the Third Circuit relied upon.

C.  Objective Falsity Standard

In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found the opposite in United States v. AseraCare, Inc.[62] This court determined that a “difference of reasonable opinion” alone is insufficient to establish falsity under the FCA’s objective falsity standard.[63] AseraCare involved nearly identical facts to Care Alternatives, but this court instead adopted an objective standard of falsity, which was affirmed on appeal: “[A] clinical judgment of terminal illness warranting hospice benefits under Medicare cannot be deemed false, for purposes of the False Claims Act, when there is only a reasonable disagreement between medical experts as to the accuracy of that conclusion.”[64]

D.  Analysis of AseraCare Opinion 

Similar to Care Alternatives, in AseraCare, the government alleged the defendants certified patients as “eligible for Medicare’s hospice benefit, and billed Medicare accordingly, on the basis of erroneous clinical judgments that those patients were terminally ill.”[65] The government’s contention depended upon its expert witness’s opinion that the patients at issue were not terminally ill at the time they were certified.[66] The district court granted summary judgment to defendant AseraCare “on the issue of falsity.”[67]

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination “that a clinical judgment of terminal illness warranting hospice benefits under Medicare cannot be deemed false, for purposes of the False Claims Act, when there is only a reasonable disagreement between medical experts as to the accuracy of that conclusion, with no other evidence to prove the falsity of the assessment [italics added].”[68]

After a review of the statute and implementing regulations, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that certification for terminal illness “will be based on the physician’s or medical director’s clinical judgment regarding the normal course of the individual’s illness.”[69] This subjective clinical judgment in light of the patient’s complete medical picture lies at the center of the eligibility inquiry.[70] In fact, the Centers for Medicate and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) has recognized that “predicting life expectancy is not an exact science,” so the prognosis does not have to be proven as a matter of medical fact.[71] Thus, CMS expects “that the certifying physicians will use their best clinical judgment.”[72]

The Government argued that their expert’s testimony created a factual dispute as to whether clinical information and other supporting documentation supported the medical prognosis of the terminally ill.[73] However, the Circuit Court explained that the statutory and regulatory requirements for supporting documentation to accompany the claim is meant to address the CMS mandate that “there must be a clinical basis for a certification.”[74] Therefore, “the physician’s clinical judgment dictates eligibility as long as it represents a reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical records…[and] Congress said nothing to indicate that the medical documentation presented with a claim must prove the veracity of the clinical judgment on an after-the-fact review [by plaintiff’s expert].”[75] The Eleventh Circuit decided CMS’s commentary indicates that well-founded clinical judgments be granted deference.[76]

To support this view further, CMS removed the term “criteria” from a proposed regulation which defined requirements for certification, wishing “to remove any implication that there are specific CMS clinical benchmarks” that must be met to constitute terminal illness.[77] This law is designed to give physicians “meaningful latitude to make informed judgments without fear that those judgments will be second-guessed after the fact by laymen in a liability proceeding.”[78] This does not, as the Government suggests, allow a physician to disregard the patient’s underlying medical condition when making a determination.[79] In fact, CMS retains a “well-established right” to review claims and deny those “it does not consider reasonable and necessary under the statutory standard.”[80]

This begs the question: When can a physician’s clinical judgment regarding a patient’s prognosis be deemed false?[81] The Eleventh Circuit explained that falsehood “can be shown in a variety of ways.”[82] For instance when: (1) “a certifying physician fails to review a patient’s medical records or otherwise familiarize himself with the patient’s condition before” determining he is terminally ill; (2) a plaintiff proves the physician did not subjectively believe his patient was terminally ill; and (3) expert evidence proves that “no reasonable physician could have concluded that a patient was terminally ill given the relevant medical records.”[83] The reason for using this objective falsehood standard is because, “in each of these examples, the clinical judgment on which the claim is based contains a flaw that can be demonstrated through verifiable facts.”[84]

In contrast, a reasonable difference of opinion among physicians that review medical documents after the fact, alone, is insufficient to suggest that the certifying physician’s judgments (or claims based on them) are false under the FCA.[85] The court went on to say that “[a] properly formed and sincerely held clinical judgment is not untrue even if a different physician later contends that the judgment is wrong.”[86] Accordingly, the rule laid down by this circuit is that, in order to properly state a claim under the FCA in the hospice reimbursement context, a plaintiff alleging a patient was falsely certified must show facts and circumstances surrounding the certification “that are inconsistent with the proper exercise of a physician’s clinical judgment.”[87] Where such facts are not shown, the FCA claim must fail as a matter of law.[88]

The court distinguished the hospice context here from Paulus, in which the physician-defendant was convicted of healthcare fraud based on his performance of allegedly unnecessary heart procedures.[89] The difference in that case was that the Government was able to produce expert testimony that the physician blatantly lied.[90] This testimony specifically disputed that the level of blockage displayed by the angiogram test was at the level the defendant claimed that it was.[91] Therefore, opinions are not entirely insulated from scrutiny, as they can trigger liability for fraud “when they are not honestly held by their maker, or when the speaker knows of facts that are fundamentally incompatible with his opinion.”[92] The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this instance was distinct from the situation presented in AseraCare, where the Government’s experts reached differing conclusions merely by weighing certain medical benchmarks differently than the defendants did.[93] In other words, a good-faith medical diagnosis cannot be false, whereas an assertion regarding the degree of a blockage can be “objectively true or false.”[94] Thus, the defendant in Paulus was convicted for a misrepresentation of fact, not for providing an opinion.[95] Essentially, the Government’s expert testimony in that case “suggest[ed] that no reasonable doctor could [have] interpret[ed] the scan” as the defendant-physician did, which indicated Paulus was actually lying.[96] Therefore, it was up to the jury to decide the reliability of the cardiology expert’s testimony attempting to prove his colleague was lying about the scans.[97]

Although the Government expressed concern in AseraCare that an objective falsehood standard would be too difficult for plaintiffs to meet, the court concluded if this is a problem, it is one for Congress or CMS to resolve—not the courts.[98] CMS and Congress could have imposed criteria for eligibility determinations to minimize the role of clinical judgment, but they were instead careful to position the clinical judgment of the physician at the core of the inquiry.[99] Thus, the Eleventh Court held, “absent a showing of an objective and knowing falsehood, the FCA is an inappropriate instrument to serve as the Government’s primary line of defense against questionable claims for reimbursement of hospice benefits.”[100]

However, because the Government was precluded from presenting evidence about some questionable certification practices that AseraCare utilized, the case was remanded.[101] Nine witnesses testified AseraCare had an intentional practice of failing to give physicians accurate, relevant, and complete information regarding patient certifications for hospice when requesting doctors to sign the certifications.[102] For example, one physician had a habit of signing off on certifications prior to reviewing any medical documentation at all.[103] These facts and circumstances presented triable issues of fact regarding the falsity of the specific claims at issue.[104] 

IV.  Supreme Court Guidance 

One previous Supreme Court decision may offer some guidance for the lower courts, but there is still ambiguity since the Court rejected the two more recent petitions.[105] In the 2016 Supreme Court case, Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the Court held that an alleged false claim requires that the claim be “material” to the payment decision made by the government to establish liability under the FCA.[106] It specifically noted that “materiality” is defined in the statute as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”[107] It also held that the FCA is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute,” nor is it a “vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations.”[108]

The Supreme Court’s decisions to deny certiorari are, arguably, consistent with the Escobar decision—and likely with an explicit objective falsity standard—in order to avoid multitudes of “garden variety” claims jamming up the courts.[109] Despite this, the circuits remain split as to their respective approaches to objective falsity, and it is not hard to see why, as the decision did not overtly address this particular question.[110] Thus, it may be worth the Supreme Court hearing the issue.

V. Reconciling the Third and Eleventh Circuits

There are three notable points for reconciling the two circuits and in determining the Eleventh Circuit has the superior analysis: (1) the courts actually seem to agree on whether a medical opinion can be deemed untrue, (2) the courts mainly disagree on the purpose of the documentation requirements and its effect on a falsity determination, and (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior because the Supreme Court has explicitly held the FCA is not there to punish garden-variety regulatory infractions.

First, regarding what the Third Circuit refers to as “factual falsity,” the two circuits seem to agree. Both courts determined medical opinions are not shielded from scrutiny, although the Third Circuit suggested the Eleventh Circuit thought otherwise.[111] Specifically, both circuits determined that an opinion is “false” if it is not genuinely held by the speaker.[112]

Second, the courts seem to mainly disagree on the role the documentation requirements play in the Medicare Hospice Benefit. The Third Circuit found it is evidence of a violation of legal falsity, while the Eleventh Circuit held it is merely there to provide documentation of the doctor’s rationale[113] and address the requirement that a medical basis exist for certification.[114]

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior to the Third Circuit’s because it promotes the considerations addressed in the Supreme Court’s Escobar decision. Akin Gump wrote:

In Escobar, the Court made clear that the FCA is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute…” [or] a “vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations…” Instead, as one recent court summarized… “Escobar rejects a system of government traps, zaps, and zingers that permits the government to retain the benefit of a substantially conforming good or service but to recover the price entirely–multiplied by three–because of some immaterial contractual or regulatory non-compliance.”[115]

Reflecting this sentiment, according to the Eleventh Circuit, “absent a showing of an objective and knowing falsehood, the FCA is an inappropriate instrument to serve as the Government’s primary line of defense against questionable claims for reimbursement of hospice benefits.”[116]

This analysis could even be taken beyond the hospice context for FCA liability to the medical field at large regarding FCA claims. This would work in other contexts for the same reasons it works in the hospice realm. Furthermore, objective falsity is a superior standard because it offers safeguards against patient abuse but also allows leeway for physician autonomy and good-faith clinical judgments, especially in light of medical uncertainties. 

VI. Uncertainty of Medical Sciences and the “Two Schools of Thought” Doctrine

Another reason the objective standard of falsity is preferable is the uncertainty of medical sciences.[117] In an ancillary legal field, medical negligence liability, some states have adopted the “two schools of thought” doctrine.[118] In their article, “Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing, and Legal Liability,” Eric E. Fortress and Marshall B. Kapp wrote: “Health care cost considerations exert[] increasing influence today over clinical decisionmaking. One way to help contain costs while maintaining the quality of health care may be to increase among both physicians and patients an acknowledgment of, and tolerance for, a reasonable degree of medical uncertainty.”[119] Due to the ubiquity of patient-initiated medical malpractice lawsuits, many physicians resort to “defensive medicine,” which is the practice of over-testing and overtreating in order to avoid the threat of liability of this kind.[120] One problem with this, however, is that it can obviously lead to another danger: billing for medically unnecessary tests, which is another type of FCA violation.

The two schools of thought doctrine was articulated in Jones v. Chidester.[121] The main proposition of the doctrine is that if there are two bona fide schools of thought among physicians, then a physician cannot be held liable in negligence for choosing one school of thought over another.[122] The rationale for this theory is if there are two legitimate schools of thought, then a jury of lay persons should not have to decide the better alternative.[123] The jury simply determines whether it believes there are two legitimate schools of thought sufficient to insulate the defendant from liability.[124] Although this is in the medical negligence field, its rationale is applicable to the objective falsity issue for the FCA as well: lay persons are not qualified to determine liability when there are differing opinions between trained medical experts.[125] However, because this is a claim based on a federal statute as opposed to state tort law, the issue should be decided in the preliminary stages by the judge instead as a matter of law, as the Eleventh Circuit explained in AseraCare.

VII. Uniformity Considerations 

Third and finally, the Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s objective standard to promote simplicity and uniformity among the lower courts. The extent to which reasonable minds differ regarding medical opinions can be easily determined with medical experts. If the defendant can find a reputable medical provider who would have followed the defendant’s course of action as well, then this standard allows a judge to resolve the issue before presenting it to a jury—a jury which, as mentioned above, is not qualified to determine which of two medical professionals is “correct.” In contrast, in the egregious situations (such as those discussed above in Polukoff) when it is not possible to find reputable expert medical testimony or other evidence that the defendant’s course of action was reasonable, this would become a triable issue that is better suited for a jury of laypersons. This is much simpler than trying to hash out which of two “reasonable minds” were more reasonable at trial. Furthermore, by decisively laying down this standard, the Supreme Court would provide clarity and uniformity among the lower courts. This would be beneficial for potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and even the courts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s explicit objective falsity standard. This will finally resolve the confusion among lower courts in applying an important federal Act. Furthermore, it is the superior theory for several reasons: (1) the courts actually seem to agree on whether a medical opinion can be deemed untrue, (2) the courts mainly disagree on the purpose of the documentation requirements and its effect on a falsity determination, (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior because the Supreme Court has explicitly held the FCA is not there to punish garden-variety regulatory infractions,[126] and (4) the presence of uncertainty in medical sciences.[127]


I J.D., University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law, Class of 2023; Master of Health Administration (MHA), University of Kentucky College of Public Health, Class of 2023.

[2] Foley Hoag LLP, ‘Objective Falsity’ and the FCA: An Ongoing Circuit Split, JD Supra (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/objective-falsity-and-the-fca-an-2164689/ [https://perma.cc/7CTM-DDKW].

[3] Id.; United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. AseraCare Inc.,176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1286 (N.D. Ala. 2016).

[4] Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 194 (2016).

[5] Mark A. Hall, David Orentlicher, Mary Anne Bobinski, Nicholas Bagley, & I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Liability and Treatment Relationships 363–64 (4th ed. 2018).

[6] False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.

[7] Fraud & Abuse Laws, Off. of Inspector Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. (last visited Feb. 15, 2022), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/fraud-abuse-laws/ [https://perma.cc/BC5D-3A5N].

[8] Id.

[9] Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 287.

[10] 18 U.S.C. § 287.

[11] False Claims Act Prevention, Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr. (last visited Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/compliance-office/education-tools/false-claims-act-prevention.aspx [https://perma.cc/A3UV-MRB3].

[12] See Robert L. Vogel, The False Claims Act and its Impact on Medical Practices, Vogel, Slade & Goldstein, LLP (last visited Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.vsg-law.com/blog/the-false-claims-act-and-its-impact-on-medical-practices/ [https://perma.cc/539Q-LDVW].

[13] See THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT & WHY IT MATTERS TO HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, Lewis Brisbois (Oct. 23, 2019), https://lewisbrisbois.com/newsroom/legal-alerts/the-false-claims-act-why-it-matters-to-healthcare-providers [https://perma.cc/JL24-AXUF].

[14] Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Care Alts. v. United States, et al. ex rel. Druding, et al., No. 20-371 (Sep. 16, 2020); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, RollinsNelson LTC Corp., et al., Petitioners v. United States, ex rel. Jane Winters, No. 20-805 (Dec. 3, 2020).

[18] See Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[19] See Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[20] Id.; see United States v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 89–90 (3d Cir. 2020).

[21] Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2; see Care Alt., 952 F.3d at 92.

[22] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 92.

[23] See id. at 95.

[24] Id. at 91, 95.

[25] Id. at 94.

[26] Id.

[27] See id.

[28] Id. at 91–92.

[29] Id. at 92; 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A).

[30] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 93; 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2) (2011).

[31] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 94.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 95.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. (citing United Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999–2000 (2016)).

[40] Id.

[41] See id. at 97.

[42] Id. at 100.

[43] Id. at 95 (citing Herskowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., (857 F.2d 179, 184) (3d Cir. 1988)).

[44] Id. at 100–101.

[45] Id. at 101.

[46] Id. at 96.

[47] Id.

[48] Id. (citing Druding v. Care Alternatives, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 669, 688 (D.N.J., Sept. 26, 2018)).

[49] Id. at 96.

[50] Id. at 100.

[51] See id. at 97.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] Id. (citing United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 742–43 (10th Cir. 2018)).

[55] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 97–98.

[56] Polukoff, 895 F.3d at 735.

[57] Id. at 743.

[58] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 100.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id. at 101.

[62] 938 F.3d 1278,1278 (11th Cir. 2019); see Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[63] AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1278.

[64] Id. at 1281.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Id.

[69] Id. at 1293.

[70] See id.

[71] Id.

[72] Id. at 1294.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id.

[76] Id. at 1295.

[77] Id.

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80] Id.

[81] Id. at 1296.

[82] Id. at 1297.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. 

[86] Id.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2018).

[90] See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1299–1300.

[91] Id. at 1299.

[92] Id. at 1300.

[93] Id.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id. at 1301.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id. at 1305.

[102] Id. at 1303.

[103] Id. at 1305.

[104] Id. at 1304.

[105] See Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[106] Id.; Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 181 (2016).

[107] Universal Health Servs., 579 U.S. at 192–93 (emphasis added).

[108] Id. at 194.

[109] Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[110] Id.

[111] United States v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 100 (3d Cir. 2020).

[112] Id. at 95; See United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1300 n.13, 1301 n.15 (11th Cir. 2019).

[113] See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1296.

[114] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 99.

[115] Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 9th Circuit Makes Mandatory Escobar’s Implied False Certification Test, but Fails to Faithfully Follow Escobar’s Directives, Akin Gump (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/9th-circuit-makes-mandatory-escobar-s-implied-false.html [https://perma.cc/P89F-28M3].

[116] AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301.

[117] See Hall, supra note 5, at 363–64.

[118] Id. at 338–40.

[119] Id. at 363–64.

[120] Id. at 364.

[121] 610 A.2d 964, 965 (Pa. 1992); Hall, supra note 5, at 338.

[122] Hall, supra note 5 at 338.

[123] See id. at at 339–40.

[124] Id. at 340.

[125] See id.

[126] Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 194 (2016)

[127] See Hall, supra note 5 at 363–64.

No Such Thing as a Child Prostitute State Lawmakers Need to Enact Safe Harbor Laws to Protect Victims of Child Sex Trafficking

NO SUCH THING AS A CHILD PROSTITUTE

State Lawmakers Need to Enact Safe Harbor Laws to Protect Victims of Child Sex Trafficking

Blair Johnson Stevens I 

Abstract

      The fastest-growing and second-largest criminal enterprise in the world is the buying and selling of people — especially children.[2] Child sex trafficking has been reported in every state in America.[3] The average age of entry into the sex trade is 12–14 years old for females, and it is believed to be even younger for boys and transgender children.[4] Although it is not allowed, in any state, for a child under the age of consent to consent to any type of sexual activity, the majority of states still criminalize sex-trafficked children as prostitutes.[5] Some states have developed Safe Harbor Laws to address the inconsistencies with how children who are exploited for commercial sex are treated in the United States.[6] “A complete Safe Harbor Law (1) prevents minors…from being prosecuted for prostitution and (2) directs juvenile sex trafficking victims to non-punitive specialized services.”[7] These services can range from providing food and shelter to offering mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance with educational opportunities and finding employment.[8]

      States’ child sex trafficking statutes should aim to treat trafficked youth as survivors of trauma rather than perpetrators of the crimes they were made to commit. State lawmakers need to enact Safe Harbor Laws that provide minors with criminal protection from being prosecuted for prostitution, prostitution-related offenses, and status offenses committed as a result of being trafficked. In addition, state lawmakers must address the rate at which minority children are trafficked and arrested. Due to disparate economic situations coupled with the rate at which minority children are disproportionately arrested, Black and Latino children are far more likely to fall victim to being trafficked for commercial sex and subsequently arrested for child prostitution than white children.[9] In short, attitudes and stereotypes about minority children make it so that they are more vulnerable to sex trafficking but less likely to be identified or seen as victims.

Introduction: What Are Safe Harbor Laws?  

       A Safe Harbor Law is a condition of a statute or regulation that indicates that a specific circumstance of behavior will be deemed not to violate a given rule.[10] In other words, a Safe Harbor Law is a provision that grants “protection from liability or penalty if certain conditions are met” and may be included in legislation to “give peace of mind to good-faith actors who might otherwise violate the law on technicalities beyond their reasonable control.”[11] This note will focus specifically on Safe Harbor Laws as they apply to victims of child sex trafficking.

       Every day in the United States, minor children (any child under the age of eighteen) are forced, induced, or coerced into providing commercial sex.[12] “Human trafficking has surpassed the illegal sale of firearms,” and it is expected to surpass the illegal sale of drugs in the coming years.[13] Nevertheless, a staggering amount of child sex trafficking, and human trafficking in general, goes undetected due to the fact that tracing this illegal practice is very challenging.[14] It is estimated that less than half of a percent of cases of human trafficking get identified or reported.[15] In 2018, over half of the active sex trafficking cases in the United States involved only children.[16] In fact, children are four times more likely to be trafficked for sex than adults.[17]

       A trafficked child may be compelled to engage in prostitution and often many other illegal activities.[18] In most states, instead of being treated as a victim, this child is treated as a criminal and faces prosecution.[19] Being arrested and prosecuted undoubtedly further traumatizes child sex trafficking victims. This type of treatment may also cause them to form a deep distrust of law enforcement and the justice system. Additionally, the criminal record that a child victim of sex trafficking incurs serves as a barrier to future educational opportunities, employment, and other prospects. Thus, due to the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the United States, coupled with the harsh punishments minor victims currently face, it is necessary for all states to enact Safe Harbor Laws that protect and assist children who have been exploited for sex. It is also extremely necessary to take into consideration the disproportionate amount of minority children and groups who are trafficked and subsequently prosecuted.

The Federal Law 

       Over the past few decades, the United States has nationally recognized and addressed the need for protecting victims of sex trafficking. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), first enacted in 2000, is the national framework for the federal response to human trafficking, and the law has been reauthorized and updated five times — most recently in January 2019 with bipartisan support.[20] It is now referred to as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).[21] In the 2019 fiscal year, Congress purportedly appropriated $250 million toward these efforts.[22] The TVPRA is based on a three-pronged approach to fighting trafficking— prevention, prosecution, protection.[23] In addition to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, there is the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015.[24] This bill increases compensation and restitution under the federal criminal code for victims of human trafficking and classifies producers of child pornography as engaged in illicit sexual conduct involving human trafficking.[25] Most importantly, for the purposes of this analysis, the bill awards funding to states that combat trafficking and provides protection and assistance for victims of trafficking.[26] Yet, the bill does not offer any sort of general framework or guideline for how this initiative is supposed to be carried out by the states.

       According to the United States Code, when a minor is involved in sex trafficking, Section 1591 of Title 18 does not require proof that the defendant used force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, or any combination of those means, to cause the minor to engage in a commercial sex act.[27] This means that as long as the trafficker is an adult and the victim being trafficked is under the age of eighteen, the intent or ‘willingness’ of the minor does not matter. Thus, according to federal law, minor victims who are involved in sex trafficking cannot be held responsible for their so-called actions, nor should they be prosecuted as criminals. Unfortunately, this does not mean that minor victims cannot be arrested and prosecuted for prostitution at the state level.[28] For example, in 2019, Texas Governor Greg Abbott vetoed a bill “prohibiting minors from being arrested or going to jail for prostitution.”[29] In 2019, the state with the most minors arrested for prostitution-related offenses was Nevada with approximately 110 minors arrested.[30]

The Most Common Judicial Protections Applied to Minor Victims  

       Some state lawmakers “have legislated several criminal protections and civil remedies” in the judicial system for victims of child sex trafficking.[31] “Measures have provided immunity to, diversion from, and affirmative defenses against, criminal prosecution for actions victims were forced to commit by their traffickers.”[32] Some lawmakers have also created mechanisms to vacate or expunge “previous criminal convictions and provide for civil standing and restitution procedures that enable survivors to recover financially from their traffickers.”[33] While civil relief should be granted to survivors, this analysis is a review of the criminal protections granted to minors.

A. Vacation & Expungement  

       Offering the least amount of protection, some states offer child victims of sex trafficking the opportunity to vacate or expunge their criminal record as it relates to them being trafficked. Many trafficked survivors have criminal records as a result of the actions they were forced to commit by their traffickers. At least twenty-nine states have created procedures for trafficking survivors to vacate or expunge criminal records, however, many of these state laws have strict provisions and processes and are limited to specific crimes.[34] Still, some states have less harsh stipulations. For example, the Florida law governing expungements applies to all arrests, charges, and convictions if they occurred when a minor was a victim of trafficking.[35] The Florida law “does not limit the number of arrests or convictions.”[36] Another state, New Mexico, “enables a trafficked survivors’ record to be sealed for non-homicide crimes if their involvement was due to duress, coercion, use of force or fraud.”[37] As mentioned previously, clearing a survivor’s criminal record removes significant barriers to obtaining housing, gaining employment, pursuing education, and restoring certain civic rights.

B.  Affirmative Defense  

       Next, there are affirmative defenses. Most states enable child victims of sex trafficking “to assert an affirmative defense to criminal charges they face as a result of actions they were forced to commit by their traffickers.”[38] An affirmative defense is evidence that, if found credible, negates criminal liability even if it is proved the defendant (more correctly in the cases at hand, the minor victim) committed the acts at issue.[39] Statutes differ in the crimes for which an affirmative defense can be raised, but many only cover prostitution, loitering, and solicitation. Wisconsin allows a victim of sex trafficking to assert an affirmative defense for “any crime he or she committed as a direct result of the trafficking without regard to whether anyone was prosecuted or convicted for trafficking.”[40]

C. Diversion 

       Diversion is a form of pretrial sentencing in which a criminal offender joins a rehabilitation program to help remedy the behavior leading to the arrest, allow the offender to avoid conviction and, in some jurisdictions, avoid a criminal record.[41] Diversion programs often frame these requirements as an alternative to further prosecution.[42] Successful completion of the requirements laid out by the diversion program may result in a dismissal or reduction of charges. Unsuccessful completion of the program may bring back the charges or heighten the penalties involved. Diversion programs have specifically played a key role in rehabilitating youthful offenders.[43] “The concept of [juvenile] diversion is based on the theory that processing certain youth through the juvenile justice system may do more harm than good.”[44] Nevertheless, for child victims of sex trafficking diversion can sometimes mean re-traumatization and further suffering as will be discussed below. As of today, twenty-five states offer some form of a diversion program to child sex trafficking victims.[45]

D. Immunity  

       “Immunity from prosecution,” or full legal immunity, is a status in which an individual cannot be held liable for violating legal obligations of the law.[46] Full immunity from prosecution is not common, and its main purpose is to facilitate societal aims that outweigh the value of imposing liability. Only three states in the country — Montana, New Hampshire, and South Carolina — grant full immunity to child victims of sex trafficking.[47]

The Diversion Debate & Human Trafficking Court  

       As public awareness of human trafficking has increased over the past few decades, human trafficking diversion courts have emerged in the United States.[48] While the title, “human trafficking court”, may sound like a court that’s purpose is to prosecute traffickers, the defendants in these particular courts are not child sex traffickers.[49] The defendants in these courts are the minor victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation whom the government has charged with prostitution and other offenses related to their exploitation.[50] While human trafficking diversion courts may help some survivors heal, other survivors are re-traumatized as a result of the requirement of participation.[51]

       On one hand, there are some glaringly obvious benefits to youth diversion programs. Sex traffickers often target runaway and homeless youth, as well as children who have been abused or neglected. When minors are forced to engage in commercial sex, it places them at risk for prosecution under prostitution laws. By enrolling in a diversion program, children have the opportunity to be provided with their basic needs like food and shelter, and some diversion programs offer mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance with educational opportunities and finding employment.[52]

       On the other hand, there are some pretty harmful consequences of requiring a survivor to enroll in a diversion program. Some programs seem to criminalize the wrong actor, the victim, rather than the trafficker, possibly by requiring an admission of guilt or the entering of a conditional plea.[53] This criminalizes the wrong actor, the survivor, rather than the trafficker. Diversion programs also require the victim to continuously show up in court and appear in front of a judge.[54] Courtrooms can be frightening to some people, especially children.[55] Almost all diversion programs employ rehabilitation courses that the minor victim must complete in order to have their charges removed or reduced. These courses are designed to teach the victim how to change their behavior so that they are not brought into the justice system again. Once again, this philosophy is criminalizing the wrong actor and could easily be equated to victim blaming. Although the recidivism rate for women with prostitution-related offenses nationwide is eighty percent, survivors often do not need to be re-educated in order to leave the sex trade.[56] In reality, most survivors report needing a stable environment, housing, and steady employment.[57]

       In addition, most diversion programs require survivors to participate in random drug screening.[58] While survivors’ issues with substance abuse should definitely be assessed and treated, it is very harmful to require that survivors automatically be drug-free or that they pass random drug screenings to remain enrolled in their respective programs. The reality is that for numerous victims of child sex trafficking, addiction to illegal substances or alcohol was their trafficker’s main source of control over them.[59] In many states’ diversion programs, child victims of sex trafficking are expected to successfully complete the program.[60] If a child victim of sex trafficking does not successfully complete their court-mandated program, possibly due to a failed drug test, they can be removed from the diversion program and prosecuted for their alleged crimes.[61]

Opposition to Safe Harbor Laws

       It is no surprise that society stigmatizes child victims of sex trafficking. Members of society do not always see or consider all of the trauma, hardship, and abuse child victims have endured. Consider the following instance showcasing how a minor girl was treated by law enforcement:

A 13-year-old runaway was gang raped by 10 men for several hours in a Texas apartment last year. When she was rescued, authorities took her to a hospital where she was given a rape kit, which was used along with her account to quickly find two of her assailants, who were charged with felony sexual assault of a child.[62]

Andrea Powell continues:

Now consider the story of another 13-year-old girl, who was sold by a pimp to dozens of men throughout Washington, D.C. She experienced the same pain, fear, trauma, and abuse as the first child. But when an undercover officer, posing as a John, encountered her in a hotel room, she was arrested for prostitution and sent to juvenile jail. The men who bought her (or, more correctly, raped her) walked away free.[63]

Our society labeling one of these girls as a criminal and the other a victim is shameful. No 13-year-old child should face prosecution for prostitution. Ultimately, both children in the above examples were sent to treatment centers.[64] In contrast, though, the second child “had the added trauma of going through the penal system and carrying an arrest record.”[65] Andrea Powell explained:

This difference is based in a deeply rooted misunderstanding that the second girl made “a choice” because she was paid. Since she has a pimp, she is no longer considered a victim of statutory rape and sexual abuse. This misguided notion leads police to arrest more than 1,000 victimized children a year for prostitution – a crime they aren’t even capable of committing.[66]       

     In 2021, the University of Kentucky conducted a study about the state’s current Safe Harbor Laws which revealed that while Kentucky’s Safe Harbor Laws have helped decriminalize sex-trafficked youth in the state, there is still a lack of training and resources for child welfare personnel and judges who work with these youth.[67] The child welfare personnel noted in their interviews that all victims received services including “mental health and trauma counseling, medical evaluations, anti-trafficking victim services, residential placement, placement with alternative caregivers, drug treatment, language services, legal services, and basic needs.”[68] In addition, “40 of the 55 juvenile and family judges from the state replied that they observed “positive changes in practices consistent with the intent of the laws, including: decriminalization of youth; increased penalties for traffickers and buyers; … increased collaboration between service providers; increased training of judges and court personnel; and improved processes for screening and identifying youth victims.”[69]

      Unfortunately, not all responses were in support of Kentucky’s Safe Harbor laws. The findings showed that “[m]ore male judges agreed with statements that criminalized minors involved in commercial sex while more female judges agreed with less punitive interventions for these minors and harsher penalties for buyers and traffickers.”[70] Opposition to Safe Harbor Laws is a prevalent issue among numerous states across America.[71] Not only are child victims of sex trafficking faced with a special type of vulnerability when it comes to being trafficked, but they are also viewed as criminals by the system that is supposed to be in place to help them seek justice. The opposition, subliminally identified in the University of Kentucky study’s findings, is often rooted in racist, sexist, and classist ideologies which will be further examined below.

Race, Class, Gender, and Sexual Orientation  

       When it comes to the demographics of a child who is sex trafficked, those living in poverty are far more likely to succumb to this fate as they may not have any economic option aside from their trafficking situation, or they may be psychologically vulnerable to false promises which could lure them into trafficking.[72] These instances become even greater when it comes to those children who are African American and Latino.

       While the data from child sex trafficking is not exceptionally definitive, we still know it is a prevalent issue affecting American children. We also know it is very prevalent among minority children. For example, “we know that in Louisiana, Black girls account for nearly 49 percent of child sex trafficking victims, though Black girls comprise approximately 19 percent of Louisiana’s youth population ….”[73] Similarly, in King County, Washington, “84 percent of child sex trafficking victims are Black while Black children and adults together only comprise 7% of the general population”.[74]

       Likewise, there is strong evidence from the United States National Human Trafficking Hotline that Latinos are disproportionately represented among child sex trafficking victims, and survivors, in general.[75] The most likely explanation is a broken immigration system that makes immigrants vulnerable to trafficking, whether it be due to their status as undocumented or the feeling that they are indebted to their trafficker if they are here on a temporary work visa, and the reality is that today more than ever before, immigrants that come to the United States are likely to come from Latin America.[76]

       The underlying scheme in both of these situations is racism and power. These factors manifest as discrimination, particularly, but not solely, economic discrimination. Racism has historically and presently fueled policies that stunt the economic opportunity and upward mobility of minority people in the United States for generations.[77] This coupled with the fact that there have always been children who are, for a variety of disturbing reasons, far more likely to be targeted by trafficking operations than others, make minority children an easy target for commercial sex trafficking. For example, homeownership is a primary driver of family wealth in the United States.[78] Racist “redlining” has “kept minority families out of majority-white neighborhoods that might have grown in value by keeping them from getting mortgages.”[79] The resulting poverty and the general unequal protection of minorities under the law have been key risk factors in determining what demographic of children in America are most trafficked.

       Child sex traffickers take full advantage of economic disparity and minority discrimination to entice and bait children into trafficking rings and, ultimately, trap them there, often promising glamorous, or even just comfortable, lives.[80] They will convince children whose families have been cut off from economic opportunity that commercially selling sex is the way to a better future for themselves; traffickers are able to manipulate children into thinking commercially selling sex is the only way to a better future.[81]

       While the economic consequence of racism is the most explicit link between why children of color and minority children are more likely to be trafficked and arrested for prostitution than their white counterparts, it is definitely not the sole reason. The way minorities are treated by American law enforcement also needs to be taken into consideration. In 2018, an examination of arrest data reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by thousands of police departments revealed that “in 800 jurisdictions, black people were arrested at a rate five times higher than white people…”[82] “In 250 jurisdictions, black people were 10 times more likely to be arrested than their white counterparts.”[83] The examination, conducted by ABC News in collaboration with other ABC-owned stations, covered a three-year period that ended in 2018.[84]

      Thus, due to their disparate economic situations coupled with the rate at which they are disproportionately arrested, Black and Latino children are far more likely to fall victim to being trafficked for commercial sex and subsequently arrested for child prostitution than white children. In short, attitudes and stereotypes about minority children make it so that they are more vulnerable to sex trafficking but less likely to be identified or seen as victims.[85]

      This experience of being less likely to be seen as a victim also exists among young boys who are victims of child sex trafficking. In Massachusetts, there is one program that focuses solely on helping male youth and trans females who are sexually exploited.[86] The program’s revenue last year was less than half of the revenue of its sister program for female youth.[87] Both programs were run by the same nonprofit, Roxbury Youthworks, Inc.[88] Prosecuting those who exploit and traffic boys presents another, more difficult challenge. The Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General has only had one case that includes a male victim out of the 62 sex trafficking cases that have been filed since 2012.[89]

    While we know that trafficking affects all demographics, we also know that traffickers frequently target specific individuals. This includes those lacking support from their community, those experiencing financial hardships, those who have experienced violence, and those marginalized by society. “Without adequate community support, youth who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or questioning (LGBTQ) may be at particular risk for sex trafficking.”[90] Individuals who have been trafficked often find it hard to reach out for assistance, especially individuals who fear that “they will be mistreated or not believed because of their gender identity or sexual orientation.”[91] Additionally, “[s]tudies have found that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in detention for prostitution-related offenses and report higher levels of police misconduct than their straight peers.”[92] In Massachusetts alone, since 2018, more than 411 boys, who were concerned to have been victims of commercial sexual exploitation, have been referred to the Department of Children and Families of Massachusetts — this accounts for about 15 percent of the total number of referrals the Department has received.[93] In addition to the 411 boys identified, 109 more youth were identified as trans or non-binary.[94] Jennifer McKim and Phillip Martin indicate that “The state just started collecting this data in 2016, and it is widely considered to be an undercount.”[95] While definitive data is lacking, recent studies show boys are being exploited at much higher rates than what was originally understood.[96]

Argument for Full Legal Immunity from Prostitution, Prostitution-Related Offenses, and Status Offenses  

       One of the key considerations that states assess when it comes to legislating Safe Harbor Laws is whether that state will create full legal immunity from prosecution or create a diversion program. While there is disagreement among experts and variation in the studies reported, Polaris believes that the combination of legal immunity and unrestricted services provides the most legal protection and goes the furthest to ensure that a victim of child sex trafficking receives the benefits and care they require.[97]

       In 2011, the Uniform Law Commission and the American Bar Association urged the American Bar Association delegates to draft a resolution advising states not to charge child sex trafficking victims with prostitution or prostitution-related offenses, and to instead provide them with rehabilitative services.[98] This means unrestrictive services — not those acquired only through successful completion of a diversion program. The preference for the immunity model for child victims of sex trafficking is clearly and unequivocally reflected. Language from the Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act is as follows:

Section 15. Immunity of a Minor

(a) An individual who was a minor at the time of the offense is not criminally liable or subject to [juvenile delinquency proceeding] for [prostitution] and [insert other non-violent offenses] committed as a direct result of being a victim of human trafficking.[99]

       Based on the examination of the evidence gathered, and the discernment of how re-traumatization due to diversion proceedings and requirements can affect a child victim of sex trafficking, state lawmakers should enact Safe Harbor Laws that will provide minors with full legal immunity from being prosecuted for prostitution; prostitution-related offenses such as loitering and solicitation; and status offenses related to conduct arising from being trafficked. In juvenile cases, a "status offense" involves conduct that would not be a crime if it were committed by an adult.[100] Some examples include truancy, violating a city or county curfew, underage possession or consumption of alcohol, and running away or being beyond the control of parents or guardians.[101] These types of offenses are far less likely to present a danger to society than ordinary public offenses.[102] Therefore, child victims of sex trafficking should not be penalized for status offenses committed while under the undue influence and control of their trafficker.

       When child trafficking victims are convicted of prostitution, they are often transferred from the control of a trafficker to the control of the criminal justice system. The right Safe Harbor Laws protect child victims of sex trafficking from unjust criminalization.

Protection From Other Crimes

       Another position some advocates push for is protecting child sex trafficking victims from other types of prosecution for the crimes they commit while under the control of their trafficker. These crimes could range from petty theft, robbery, and grand theft auto — all the way up to crimes such as serious physical assault and homicide. A recent case in which a child victim of sex trafficking was ultimately granted protection from being further punished for the crimes she committed while being trafficked is the case of Cyntoia Brown.[103] Cyntoia Brown, who was a young girl at the time of the alleged murder, spent roughly 15 years in prison for killing and robbing a man in what most have determined to be self-defense.[104] In 2019, she was finally granted clemency by Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam.[105] This was an unusual occurrence in America as black Americans are nearly four times less likely than white criminals to be granted a pardon — even when the type of crime and the severity of the sentence are taken into account.[106] Protection from other crimes has not been heavily researched or reviewed. Further, protection from crimes outside of prostitution-related offenses and status offenses, especially violent crimes, is considered by some to be extreme or dangerous. Still, minor victims of sex trafficking should never be punished for acting in self-defense.

Conclusion

       While some state lawmakers have successfully passed legislation that serves to provide child sex trafficking victims with judicial protections from prosecution for prostitution and various other related offenses, there is still a long way to go. As noted, only some states in America currently grant full legal immunity to child victims of sex trafficking from prosecution for prostitution.[107] There should be no such thing as a child prostitute in America. State lawmakers must enact Safe Harbor Laws that provide child victims of sex trafficking not only with protections from prosecution but also unrestricted services that serve to assist them in rising out of the circumstances that made them susceptible to being sex trafficked in the first place. The providing of these services should not be made contingent upon successful participation in a diversionary program. Rather, rehabilitative services should be offered freely and non-contingently to all sexually exploited youth who wish to receive them. These services should range from providing food and shelter to offering mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance with educational opportunities and finding employment. It is also extremely necessary for state lawmakers to take into consideration the disproportionate amount of minority children and groups who are trafficked and subsequently prosecuted. Ultimately, the combination of legal immunity and unrestricted victim services provides the most legal protection and goes the furthest to ensure that a victim of child sex trafficking receives the benefits and care they require. When child sex trafficking victims are convicted of prostitution, they are often transferred from the control of a trafficker to the control of the criminal justice system. The right Safe Harbor Laws protect child victims of sex trafficking from unjust criminalization.

I J.D., University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law, Class of 2023

[2] See The Statistics, Tabitha’s House, https://tabithashouseint.org/resources/statistics/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V4QJ-FQ7X].

[3] Sex Trafficking Statistics, Guardian Grp., https://guardiangroup.org/sex-trafficking-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D4RY-F98H].

[4] Heather J. Clawson et al., Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature 1, 8–9, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Hum. Servs. (Aug. 29, 2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//43241/index.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5YF-XCP8].

[5] See Safe Harbor: Does Your State Arrest Minors for Prostitution?, Hum. Trafficking Search (Oct. 18, 2018), https://humantraffickingsearch.org/safe-harbor-does-your-state-arrest-minors-for-prostitution/ [https://perma.cc/R3FJ-EZ6F].

[6] See Human Trafficking State Laws, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-trafficking-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7HZB-GEFK].

[7] Fact Sheet: Safe Harbor Laws, Nat’l Council of Jewish Women (Sept. 2016), https://www.ncjw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Fact-Sheet_Safe-Harbor_Updated-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFC2-PE4K].

[8] See Continuum of Services for Pre-arrest Diversion Programs, Cmty. Catalyst, https://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/Continuum-of-Services-FINAL-2.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8VGP-M3RK].

[9] See Bradley Hardy & Trevon Logan, Race and the lack of intergenerational economic mobility in the United States, Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth (Feb. 18, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/race-and-the-lack-of-intergenerational-economic-mobility-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/PUZ5-TAPT]; The Latino Face of Human Trafficking and Exploitation in the United States, Polaris (Apr. 27, 2020), https://polarisproject.org/press-releases/the-latino-face-of-human-trafficking-and-exploitation-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T2S5-M5E5]; Pierre Thomas, John Kelly & Tonya Simpson, ABC News analysis of police arrests nationwide reveals stark racial disparity, ABC News Internet Ventures (June 11, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/abc-news-analysis-police-arrests-nationwidereveals-stark/story?id=71188546 [https://perma.cc/A937-BXVH].

[10] Legal Information Institute, Safe harbor, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/safe_harbor (last visited Nov. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6KY7-8BR5].

[11] Id.

[12] See Child Trafficking Statistics, Child Liberation Found., https://liberatechildren.org/child-trafficking-statistics (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9VVX-AB4P].

[13] Id.

[14] See Priscilla Alvarez, When Sex Trafficking Goes Unnoticed in America, The Atlantic (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/how-sex-trafficking-goes-unnoticed-in-america/470166/ [https://perma.cc/6JY4-HN87].

[15] Child Trafficking Statistics, supra note 12.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] See Human Trafficking of Children in the United States-A Fact Sheet for Schools, Off. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., https://oese.ed.gov/human-trafficking-of-children-in-the-united-states-a-fact-sheet-for-schools/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2022) [https://perma.cc/FG5V-CPSH].

[19] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[20] Kristen Wells, The 2019 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act: A Topical Summary and Analysis of Four Bills, Polaris (2019), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Polaris-TVPRA-2019-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYC5-MHR7].

[21] Id.

[22] See id.

[23] See id.

[24] Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, H.R. Res, 181, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] See Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coercion, 18 U.S.C § 1591 (2020).

[28] See Chelsea Parsons et al., 3 Key Challenges in Combating the Sex Trafficking of Minors in the United States, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/3-key-challenges-in-combating-the-sex-trafficking-of-minors-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/CFD4-L3PU].

[29] Child Victims of Sex Trafficking Can Be Arrested for Prostitution, Neal Davis L. Firm (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.nealdavislaw.com/blog/sex-crimes/child-prostitution-victim-arrests [https://perma.cc/G6TL-3LTL].

[30] Jessica Contrera, Sex-trafficked kids are crime victims. In Las Vegas, they still go to jail., Wash. Post (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/interactive/2021/vegas-child-sex-trafficking-victims-jailed/ [https://perma.cc/8HPV-T4NZ].

[31] Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] See Legal Information Institute, Affirmative Defense, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/48SX-TYMU].

[40] Human Trafficking Statute § 940.302, https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/ocvs/vawa/wcasa-human-trafficking-resource-card-statutes-web.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8XHB-MDBX].

[41] See Legal Information Institute, Diversion, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/diversion (last visited Dec. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/YF6D-C5Y9].

[42] See id.

[43] See What Is Diversion in Juvenile Justice?, Annie E. Casey Found. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.aecf.org/blog/what-is-juvenile-diversion [https://perma.cc/H3T4-7A5U].

[44] Detention Diversion Advocacy, Diversion Programs: An Overview, The Ctr. on Juvenile and Crim. Just. (Sept. 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html [https://perma.cc/MH3J-KX6P].

[45] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[46] See Legal Information Institute, Immunity, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/immunity (last visited Dec. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D2ZD-65DL].

[47] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[48] See Human Trafficking Courts, Off. of Just. Programs, https://www.ovcttac.gov/taskforceguide/eguide/6-the-role-of-courts/64-innovative-court-responses/human-trafficking-courts/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5BVV-5ZEK].

[49] See id.

[50] See id.

[51] Elise White et al., Navigating Force and Choice: Experiences in the New York City Sex Trade and the Criminal

Justice System’s Response, Ctr. for Ct. Innovation (Dec. 2017), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2018-03/nyc_sex_trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVE3-8BPY].

[52] Continuum of Services for Pre-arrest Diversion Programs, Cmty. Catalyst, https://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/Continuum-of-Services-FINAL-2.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RK5R-WTBV].

[53] See Emmylou Manwill, Human Trafficking Courts: Diversion To Or From Justice?, Hum. Trafficking Inst., (Apr. 1, 2020) https://traffickinginstitute.org/human-trafficking-courts-diversion-to-or-from-justice/ [https://perma.cc/XZH4-ENUC].

[54] See Gail S. Goodman, Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 Soc’y for Rsch. in Child Dev., no. 5, 1992, at 40–43.

[55] See id. at v.

[56] Paige Pfleger, A Pioneering Ohio Courtroom Helps Trafficking Victims Find Hope, Nat’l Pub. radio (Oct. 7, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/07/767850332/a-pioneering-columbus-courtroom-helps-trafficking-victimsfind-hope [https://perma.cc/P37G-PBPV].

[57] Brendan M. Conner, In Loco Aequitatis: The Dangers of ‘Safe Harbor’ Laws for Youth in the Sex Trades, Wm. & Mary L. Sch. Scholarship Repository 43, 58–61 (2016).

[58] Diversion Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/diversion-programs (last updated Mar. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/BD8P-WAE2].

[59] See Marc O’Neill & Jeremie Barclay, Combating Drug-Facilitated Sex Trafficking of Runaway Youth, Police Chief Mag. (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/combating-drug-facilitated-sex-trafficking-of-runaway-youth/ [https://perma.cc/A7VW-4JTD].

[60] See Manwill, supra note 53.

[61] See id.

[62] Andrea Powell, Children who are prostituted aren’t criminals. So why do we keep putting them in jail?, Wash. Post (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/05/child-prostitutes-arent-criminals-so-why-do-we-keep-putting-them-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/3TA2-4LPH].

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Study Revealed Safe Harbor Laws Increased Protections for Sex-Trafficked Youth, Identified Needs for Agency Support and Judicial Training, Nat’l Inst. of Just. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/study-revealed-safe-harbor-laws-increased-protections-sex-trafficked-youth [https://perma.cc/6JAP-SXSM].

[68] Id.

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] See Powell, supra note 62.

[72] Racial Disparities, COVID-19, and Human Trafficking, Polaris (July 29, 2020), https://polarisproject.org/blog/2020/07/racial-disparities-covid-19-and-human-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/KK5W-8RRG].

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] See The Latino Face of Human Trafficking and Exploitation in the United States, Polaris (Apr. 27, 2020), https://polarisproject.org/press-releases/the-latino-face-of-human-trafficking-and-exploitation-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/5VM9-DUL8].

[76] See id.

[77] See Hardy & Logan, supra note 9.

[78] Homeownership Remains Primary Driver of Household Wealth, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders (Feb. 18, 2021), https://nahbnow.com/2021/02/homeownership-remains-primary-driver-of-household-wealth/ [https://perma.cc/YQ6U-GPD8].

[79] Racial Disparities, COVID-19, and Human Trafficking, supra note 72.

[80] See Human Trafficking in Youth-serving Programs: A Blueprint for Organizations Working with Street Youth, Homeless Youth, and Youth at Risk 9­–11, Fam. & Youth Servs. Bureau, https://www.rhyttac.net/assets/docs/Resources/HumanTraffickingBlueprint-508.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E5S7-UQ65].

[81] See id.

[82] Pierre Thomas, John Kelly, & Tonya Simpson, ABC News analysis of police arrests nationwide reveals stark racial disparity, ABC News Internet Ventures (June 11, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/abc-news-analysis-police-arrests-nationwidereveals-stark/story?id=71188546 [https://perma.cc/NCS9-4SR2].

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] See Racial Disparities, COVID-19, and Human Trafficking, supra note 72.

[86] Jennifer B. McKim & Phillip Martin, Unseen, part 1: The boy victims of the sex trade, GBH (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.wgbh.org/news/national/2021-04-05/unseen-the-boy-victims-of-the-sex-trade-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/8UMN-KQ8N].

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] Id.

[90] Sex Trafficking and LGBTQ Youth, Polaris, https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/LGBTQ-Sex-Trafficking.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V2LY-E5B4].

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] McKim & Martin, supra note 86.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] See Human Trafficking Issue Brief: Safe Harbor Fall 2015, Polaris, https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2015-Safe-Harbor-Issue-Brief.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LB9Y-URLF].

[98] See id.

[99] Id.

[100] See What Are Status Offenses and Why Do They Matter?, The Annie E. Casey Found. (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.aecf.org/blog/what-are-status-offenses-and-why-do-they-matter [https://perma.cc/CEU7-GSC4].

[101] Id.

[102] See id.

[103] Bobby Allyn, Cyntoia Brown Released After 15 Years In Prison For Murder, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 7, 2019, 12:24 PM) https://www.npr.org/2019/08/07/749025458/cyntoia-brown-released-after-15-years-in-prison-for-murder [https://perma.cc/UW36-VV55].

[104] Id.

[105] Id.

[106] See Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons: Presidential Pardons Heavily Favor Whites, ProPublica (Dec. 3, 2011, 11:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/shades-of-mercy-presidential-forgiveness-heavily-favors-whites [https://perma.cc/C4SW-S8DA].

[107] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

The Reciprocity of Conservation and Hunting: Improving Kentucky’s North American Model of Wildlife Conservation 

The Reciprocity of Conservation and Hunting: Improving Kentucky’s North American Model of Wildlife Conservation 

Dustyn Sams I

Introduction

      Some people consider conservation and wildlife management (hunting, fishing, trapping, etc.) divergent practices.[2] Yet, the two of them embrace an intricate theme of reciprocity.[3] In America, dollars from hunter and angler license sales are a major, if not the most significant, source of conservation funding.[4] This inextricable link between conservation and management warrants the reasonable preservation of both practices, not one without the other. The Commonwealth of Kentucky is a great place to start.

        The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife successfully maintains its conservation and management model, but it does articulate a need for additional funding.[5] Further, Kentucky’s existing model emphasizes the preservation of game species but neglects the preservation of non-game species.[6] Hunters are also arguably declining,[7] and the Department’s conservation and management funding is volatile as hunter dollars are its cornerstone.[8] Therefore, Kentucky should adopt a “dual-payer” model of funding that combines its current model with additional funding sources of redistributed agency funds and reallocated taxes.

         In 2001, the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (AFWA) formally adopted the “North American Model of Wildlife Conservation.”[9] One of the AFWA’s key tenants is, “hunters and anglers pay for wildlife conservation and management.”[10] This is called a “user-pays” model.[11] All states employ some form of a user-pays model, including Kentucky.[12] The Commonwealth’s current model includes more than one “user,” a “dual-payer” model, comprised of money from license fees and money from federal and other sources. This model is precarious because it relies heavily on any user-pays model’s largest weakness: that there will always be as many hunters as there are now.

     This article proposes several feasible improvements to Kentucky’s model. One improvement calls for the Kentucky Legislature to amend the Department of Parks enabling statute with express authority to redistribute funds toward activities closer linked to conservation and management efforts. Another improvement calls them to reallocate a portion of the sales tax collected on outdoor equipment to the Department of Fish and Wildlife by statutory amendment. A stronger dual-payer model would ensure a healthy future for Kentucky’s ecosystems and pave the way for other states to adhere to a similar plan. Part II provides an overview of America’s history of wildlife impositions, conservation, and management. Part III uncovers the need for a more stable wildlife conservation and management model in Kentucky. Part IV proposes the details of two amendments to create a strengthened dual-payer model.

I.  America’s History of Wildlife Impositions, Conservation, and Management

       A review of America’s history of wildlife impositions, conservation, and management efforts illuminates its current flavor of wildlife conservation and management. One can divide America’s wildlife conservation and management history into three eras.[13] First, America’s wildlife roamed comparatively undisturbed before America’s birth. Second, human encroachment on wildlife was prevalent at America’s origin. Third, state and federal actors combated exploitation.

A.  Early, Primal Impositions

      Before the colonization of North America, wildlife roamed arguably freer than today.[14] A variety of life inhabited the continent, from wolves, bison, and other fauna to a guild of flora.[15] Scholars often employ one theory, Pleistocene Overkill, to explain the demise of these species.[16] It suggests that native people preyed on these animals to a noticeable detriment.[17]

      From the 1500s to the mid-1600s, North America’s wildlife species were much like those present today.[18] On one hand, scholars believe Native Americans embodied a culture that encouraged minimal wildlife impositions. On the other, though, recent scholarship reveals Native Americans impacted wildlife on a larger scale than previously thought. Regardless, their interference was nominal and primal when compared to the effects of today’s rural municipalities and cityscapes.

B.  Decimation of America’s Wildlife

      The Colonial Age and Westward Expansion fostered a new age of wildlife impositions. Europeans found America rich in wildlife.[19] Deer, elk, moose, and beavers inhabited eastern forests;[20] Bison, antelope, bears, elk, sheep, and moose inhabited the west.[21] Scholars believe colonialists’ arrival to North America initially spiked wildlife populations due to the transmission of diseases to Native Americans, the preeminent cause of wildlife decimation at the time.[22]

       Colonial settlers exploited America’s wildlife by commercializing hunting and fur trapping.[23] As early as 1650, beavers were nearly eliminated from the eastern coast.[24] In 1748, South Carolina records account for a shipment of about 160 thousand deer pelts to Great Britain.[25] Passenger pigeons initially numbered between three and five billion, but by the 1850s, settlers sometimes killed over fifty thousand birds daily.[26]

       Western Expansion created further opportunities for exploitative professions. Forty to seventy million bison and about ten million pronghorns then roamed the western plains.[27] In 1833, the American Fur Company exported over forty thousand bison hides overseas.[28] In 1865, commercial hunters killed about one million bison.[29] By 1871, the number increased five million per year.[30] Around 1900, a census recorded only 540 remaining bison.[31] The onslaught of passenger pigeons progressed too.[32] By then, no pigeons remained in the wild, and passenger pigeons became extinct fourteen years later.[33] The government and public sentiments began recognizing the exploitation of America’s wildlife.[34] This “laid the foundation for the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation.”[35]

C.  Increase in Government Efforts to Conserve and Manage Wildlife

     After taking notice of the country’s unsustainable practices, the federal government and state governments addressed America’s wildlife exploitation.[36] First, the states and Supreme Court addressed conservation and management at a large scale.[37] Later, Congress acted through several statutes.[38]

i.  Rise of State Conservation and Management Efforts and the Supreme Court

       The States and people were the first to address wildlife exploitation. In 1844, the New York Sportsmen’s Club was formed.[39] New York also drafted some of America’s first management laws. Subsequently, state legislatures passed similar laws. Many hunting, conservation, and scientific organizations formed.[40] Some lobbied for stricter exploitation laws and bans on wasteful hunting.[41] In response, states created wildlife commissions and agencies.[42] These entities implemented the practice of collecting money for hunting and angler licenses, thereby establishing user-pays models.[43]

       Kentucky was among the first states to recognize the need for proper conservation and management.[44] As early as 1738, deer-harvest laws applied to the territory that would become the Commonwealth.[45] From the mid-1700s to around the last half of the century, Kentucky’s efforts to conserve wildlife were sporadic.[46] In 1912, The Kentucky Game and Fish Commission was born, which later became the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife.[47]

      The Supreme Court answered challenges regarding wildlife management too.[48] In Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, a seminal natural resource law authority, the Court recognized the public trust doctrine, where the government holds the land under navigable waterways in trust for the public.[49] There, the Court denied a property owner’s attempt to prevent others from taking oysters he claimed.[50] The doctrine bolstered the user-pays model by tacitly encouraging use of wildlife and natural resources by the layperson.

       The Court next affirmed the States’ authority to regulate wildlife. In Geer v. Connecticut, it held the citizens’ common ownership of wildlife imposes a duty of state legislatures to enact laws that will best preserve nature held in trust.[51] There, the defendant challenged a Connecticut penalty for illegally transporting animals to another state.[52] The Court upheld the penalty.[53] This fortified the state ownership doctrine, which emphasizes the states’ sovereignty to conserve and manage wildlife within their borders.[54]

       Later, a new line of cases eroded the state ownership doctrine’s muscle. In Missouri v. Holland, the Court held that States cannot usurp federal statutory authority.[55] There, Missouri challenged the Migratory Bird Act for infringing on its power over wildlife within its borders.[56] This permitted the federal government to implement wildlife management laws within the States. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, the Court held New Mexico’s challenge of the Wild and Free-Roaming Burros Act was invalid because the federal government can govern animals on federal land.[57] In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court held an Oklahoma law that prohibited transporting minnows out of state violated the Commerce Clause, extending federal control further.[58]

      Each of these cases fashioned a canvas for states to implement functional dual-payer models with a user-pays prong. But these states relied heavily on the user-pays license fees. Thus, many states like Kentucky became more, and still are, dependent on hunter and angler dollars than before to support conservation and management efforts.

ii.  Rise of Congress and the President’s Conservation and Management Efforts

      Congress and the President became heavily concerned with exploitation at the turn of the twentieth century. This created the bedrock for many federal wildlife impositions today.

     Congress first addressed habitat protection. In 1891, Congress passed the Forest Reserve Act to prevent exploitative logging.[59] The forests reserved by the Act eventually became the national forests Americans recognize today. For example, the Shoshone National Forest was America’s first federally managed forest service.[60] In 1905, the United States Forestry eventually took over managing reserves from the General Land Office.[61]

       Congress then addressed exploitation of wildlife. In 1900, Congress enacted the Lacey Game and Wild Birds Preservation and Disposition Act.[62] The Act made it unlawful for one to import, export, sell, acquire, or purchase wildlife, fish, and plants transported or sold in violation of U.S. law, or in interstate commerce in violation of state law.[63]

       Congress also turned its attention to wildlife harvesting regulations. In 1918, it passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.[64] Congress believed the measure would increase the “sustainability of populations of all protected migratory bird species.”[65] This Act eliminated the ability of Americans to hunt “migratory birds,” and offered protection to migratory birds’ nests and eggs.[66]

      Although the Act only pertains to birds, its passage was a first domino to subsequent legislation concerning regulating America’s wildlife by federal means.

       President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration pressed a robust wildlife conservation agenda.[67] Roosevelt’s early involvement with the Boone and Crockett Club translated into his presidency years later.[68] By the end of Roosevelt’s presidency, his administration set aside over 230 million acres of American soil as federally protected land, established fifty-five wildlife refuges, and five national parks.[69] Some scholars criticize Roosevelt for usurping power not delegated to the president,[70] but others praise his efforts for reversing America’s wildlife exploitation. Nevertheless, Roosevelt shaped American conservation and management efforts for the long haul.

       Other presidents left their mark on American wildlife. In 1872, President Ulysses S. Grant established the three thousand square mile Yellow Stone National Park.[71] In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson backed the Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.[72]

      Entering the twentieth century, the States, Congress, Supreme Court, and President had created the framework for the world’s leading wildlife conservation and management model, the North American Model. Kentucky still lies at Model’s core. How to retain adequate funding in specific states became a different question.[73]

II.  Current Funding for Kentucky Wildlife Conservation and Management

       Unpredictable revenue streams currently fuel the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife.[74] If reasonable conservation and management is the desired end, then it only helps if funding derives from principles of stability and predictability. Understanding the intricacies of the Department’s funds unveils that it lacks, to a noticeable extent, stabilityand predictability.

        As stated before, Kentucky’s Department of Fish and Wildlife is formally financed through a dual-payer model. Yet, its user-pays component is a dominant source of funding upon which Kentucky relies. In 2005, over 50% of the Department’s budget, excluding federal funding, came from hunting and angler licenses.[75]

      The Department of Fish and Wildlife has expressed their need for more funding to achieve their goals of conserving and managing all of Kentucky’s wildlife, as opposed to species just desirable to take.[76] If funding of the department most closely associated with Kentucky’s wildlife is inadequate, then one cannot expect a status quo of nourished ecosystems. This, combined with the number of arguably declining hunters, is enough to provoke concern. While scholars debate the accuracy of hunter-decline statistics, evidence supports that outdoorsmen and outdoorswomen are becoming older, and a younger generation is not taking their place.[77] Therefore, Kentucky’s wildlife conservation and management efforts are subject to volatility, because such relies too much on hunter and angler dollars. The chance is not worth taking.

       States like Wyoming are prime examples of a working dual-payer model that Kentucky can look to. Wyoming is known for its natural sites, healthy wildlife populations, and prominent state and federal parks.[78] Wyoming’s dual-payer model funds its renowned system of wildlife conservation and management. One prong of its model is a user-pays prong.[79] Like Kentucky, this prong has proved a viable method for funding wildlife conservation and management.[80] Wyoming employs a second prong of robust, diverse funding measures.[81] It includes hefty federal funding, grants, donations, and revenue from state-owned property.[82] It is important to note that Kentucky and Wyoming are distinct states with distinct natural landscapes, politics, and needs. But the states are not so different as to render any ideas Kentucky draws from Wyoming valueless. The proposed Kentucky dual-payer model is less about the specific categories of additional funds and more about establishing several robust sources that fund wildlife conservation and management.

III. The Proposed Kentucky Dual-Payer Model

          For any agency to raise additional funds is difficult alone, and pushback from legislators and voters add to that difficulty. For these reasons, the dual-payer model should derive its funding not from new money but through reallocated and redistributed money. These transfers of money will serve as one “payer” of the dual-payer model, and the money from outdoorsmen licenses, fees, and other contributions will serve as the other “payer.” There are two feasible ways to improve Kentucky’s conservation and management model: (A.) redistributing how portion of the Department of Parks budget is spent; (B.) redirecting tax money already collected from outdoor equipment sales.

A.  Redistributing Money from the Department of Parks to the Department of Fish and Wildlife

        The Department of Fish and Wildlife assumes hands-on conservation and management of Kentucky wildlife, while the Department of Parks is involved more in the administrative side of state parks.[83] The Department of Parks devotes significantly less money each year directly attributable to conserving and managing wildlife than the Department of Fish and Wildlife.[84] Rather, most of the Department of Parks expenditures are allocated toward tourism and outdoor recreation.[85] The Department of Parks has the authority and ability to make more financial contributions in closer relation to Kentucky’s wildlife, but a noticeable portion of its expenditures goes towards projects in closer relation to tourists’ pastimes.[86]

       Tourism is predicated on tourists having something to see. In Kentucky, this means seeing its natural landscapes, fauna, and flora.[87] If the General Assembly passed a law that funneled more of the Department of Parks’ activity into endeavors closer related to conservation and management, it could ensure a more stable future for both nature and tourism.

         The Department of Fish and Wildlife comprises a little under half of Kentucky’s expenditures in the Tourism, Arts, and Heritage Cabinet.[88] The Department currently runs on around 250 million dollars a year.[89] This budget is comprised of state, federal, and other funding sources.[90] The Department spends over 57 million dollars a year.[91] Of that 57 million dollars in expenditures, it spends over half on wildlife management and fisheries management.[92] The Department focuses its other half of expenditures on administration and support, information and education, law enforcement, marketing, engineering, infrastructure, and technology resources.[93] A significant portion fosters a close relationship with Kentucky’s wildlife.[94]

         The Department of Parks comprises a little under half of Kentucky’s expenditures on Tourism, Arts, and Heritage.[95] Currently, the Department of Parks runs on around 100 million dollars a year.[96] This budget is comprised of state, federal, and other funding sources.[97] The Department spends almost its entire budget.[98] Of that 100 million dollars in expenditures, it spends about 64 million on Resort Parks with the vast amount of the money used for the resorts inside the parks.[99] This spending includes golf carts, upgrading fitness equipment, painting buildings, upgrading electric services, and pool repairs.[100] The other portion of the Department’s expenditures supports state cafeterias, administration and staff, recreation parks, and historic sites.[101] Although these improvements are not inherently valueless, the susceptibility of Kentucky’s wildlife conservation and management model outweighs the negatives of this exact allocation. More efficient use of the Department’s funds would not only benefit Kentucky’s wildlife, but sow benefits that the Kentucky natural tourism industry could reap from in the near future.

       The Department of Fish and Wildlife and the Department of Parks are inextricably linked. Although they are their own entities with separate funding and purposes, each department shares many similarities in their day-to-day operations. Each department finds intrinsic value in Kentucky’s nature. The Department of Fish and Wildlife largely manage the fauna and flora within their habitats.[102] The Department of Parks largely maintains the parks where many of Kentucky’s fauna and flora claim habitat.[103] Although their statutory purposes are different, their broader goal of protecting Kentucky’s wildlife renders each department a companion agency to the other.

       In all fairness, there are key distinctions within each Department’s enabling acts. The Department of Fish and Wildlife’s enabling act, KRS § 150.015, emphasizes principles of management and conservation.[104] Section 150.015 lists several of its purposes.[105] First, its purpose is to “protect and conserve” state wildlife.[106] Second, its purpose is to ensure a “permanent and continued supply of the wildlife resources” to “furnish[ ] sport and recreation.”[107] Third, its purpose is to “provide for the prudent taking and disposition of wildlife within reasonable limits.”[108]

         The Department of Parks’ enabling act, KRS § 148.021, hinges on principles of conservation and improving Kentucky state parks.[109] Section 148.021 lists several of its functions and powers.[110] First, the Department “may improve [state] parks by constructing and equipping improvements of facilities in said parks.”[111] Second, the Department “shall exercise all administrative functions of the state relating to the operation of state parks.”[112] Third, the Department has the power to collect fees and acquire more land for state parks.[113]

         Innate in § 148.021’s nature is the legislature’s concern for improving many of the habitats in which wildlife lives.[114] That wildlife is protected by the Department of Fish and Wildlife.[115] Because § 148.021 authorizes the Department of Parks to “improve” state parks,[116] this language could yield the creation of more wildlife research centers than resorts. For example, because the Department must exercise “all administrative functions” relating to the operation of state parks,[117] those efforts could aim towards operation of endangered species advancement projects. Section 148.021 permits the Department to collect land and acquire land for state parks. [118] It should use that authority to acquire such resources for projects like habitat expansion endeavors. The broad language of § 148.021 leaves room for the Department’s funding to be directed toward more meaningful undertakings than its current expenditures reflect. The statute’s vagueness arguably is one of the reasons why the Department of Parks and Department of Fish and Wildlife already have numerous, functional similarities.

       The language of § 148.021 appears broad enough for the Department to funnel expenditures toward more of the activities listed in the previous paragraph. Still, funneling expenditures in this way faces several obstacles. First, the Department of Parks might be hesitant to redistribute money towards tasks that do not fit their traditional responsibilities. Second, the Department might misunderstand a redistribution of expenditures as a “pay cut.” The Department might also face pushback from its constituents. Such obstacles prompt the Department’s need for an explicit statutory trigger to make redistributions more feasible.

        So, tying the Department of Parks’ expenditures closer to wildlife conservation and management efforts first requires the state legislature to amend § 148.021. The amendment will provide a standard to guide the Department. While the legislature might balk at including the standard in a new statute, amending § 148.021, rather than begetting a new creature of authority, might suffice.

        There are many ways to amend § 148.021. First, the legislature could add the phrase “improvement, and perpetuation” to section (1) of the statute: “the Department of Parks shall exercise all administrative functions of the state relating to the operation, improvement, and perpetuation of state parks.” Second, the legislature could add the phrase “and related auxiliaries” to section (3) of the statute: “[t]he [D]epartment may improve [state] parks by constructing and equipping improvements of facilities and related auxiliaries in said parks.” Finally, the legislature could add a third subsection in section (4) that permits the Department to use collected money from fees and charges for use of the parks toward endeavors “directly attributable to the improvement and perpetuation of such state parks.”

           Each amendment would bridge the hurdles legislators might face in promoting wildlife management and conservation with the current act. This is not an exhaustive list of amendments but just a few illustrative references. Moreover, these examples do not cross into the authority of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, as they still cater to the administration of state parks. Yet, the amendments would give the Department of Parks authority that is not so attenuated to render its fiscal resources hopeless, in terms of conservation and management. This explicit authority would be akin to that of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, nonetheless distinct.

           If a statutory standard is not feasible, there are other avenues to provide a more stable future for Kentucky’s wildlife. The governor could issue an executive order to allocate or distribute funds to the Department of Fish and Wildlife to remedy the most direct ecological issues in Kentucky. It might, however, face pushback from legislators, voters, scholars, and/or lawyers. These potential problems might politically force the governor to leave the state budget and expenditures as is.

          Further, Kentucky agencies and executive offices could promulgate their own regulations and govern their expenditure habits to promote wildlife conservation and management. In terms of their authority, some agencies might be better for the job, but any efforts at the agency level could be beneficial. Agencies like the Department of Kentucky Fish and Wildlife and Kentucky Parks could promulgate regulations that create expenditure targets. Relevant government offices, such as the Department for Environmental Protection, Division of Conservation, Office of Consumer and Environmental Protection, and Office of Civil and Environmental Law can also affect Kentucky’s wildlife.[119] However, incentivizing agencies and executive offices would require internal consensus or some other impetus to overcome any hint of agency capture.

         Another way to impact Kentucky’s wildlife is to advocate for the Department of Fish and Wildlife to distribute more funding towards efforts like endangered species rehabilitation programs, population studies, and habitat restoration. The Department currently has a budget of about 250 million but spends only around 57 million a year.[120] Kentuckians and government officials could petition for a change in this spending pattern. Still, changing a department’s spending habits may be easier said than done.

       Even though many avenues for promoting conservation and management of Kentucky’s wildlife exist, it appears an amendment to § 148.021 would face the least, or close to the least, scrutiny. The easier a positive change can be implemented, the faster Kentucky’s wildlife encounters a brighter future. Changing the law is a first step.

      Grassroots movements within Kentucky already espouse initiatives with similar goals to the proposed amendments. Groups like the Audubon Society, Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Iroquois Hunt Club, Kentucky Waterways Alliance, and several others would likely support efforts to better conserve Kentucky wildlife.[121] The groups might differ in their opinions on whether to promote the taking of wildlife, but the amendments this article proposes would prioritize conservation efforts, something they all agree on. At the end of the day, it is prudent to recognize that this amendment only vests authority to the Department of Parks to redistribute funds; that does not mean they will do it. Pressure from constituents, grassroot movements, and government agents will serve as the impetus to implement the reallocation of funds. This is not a foolproof plan, but among the most feasible of plans for the bluegrass state.

       Thus, a stronger dual-payer model would brighten the future of Kentucky’s wildlife. By expanding the scope of § 148.021, the legislature can ensure the Department of Parks works even closer with the Department of Fish and Wildlife. Harmonizing the efforts of both departments would benefit Kentucky’s wildlife, tourism, and the state as a whole.

B.  Diversion from Sales Tax Collected on Outdoor Equipment

       Another way to generate revenue for Kentucky’s wildlife is to divert a portion of taxes the state already collects from outdoor equipment. By diverting outdoor equipment sales tax, the state can circumvent the issues accompanying raising taxes or other revenue collection methods. This money would also mitigate the volatility of Kentucky’s current model.

      Several states have employed different methods to raise additional revenue to fund wildlife conservation and management.[122] Arizona, Colorado, and Maine required their state lotteries to allocate a portion of their revenue to wildlife conservation and management.[123] This model is not viable for Kentucky, as the majority of its lottery funds go towards aiding students pursuing education.[124] Georgia and Pennsylvania allocate a portion of the proceeds from specialty license plate sales toward wildlife conservation and management, a model Kentucky already replicates.[125] Arkansas and Missouri created an additional sales tax which allocates money toward their fish and wildlife agencies.[126] Kentucky’s traditional resistance towards additional taxes, however, makes this particular model unrealistic.[127]

          A diversion of tax money from outdoor equipment sales is more likely to survive political muster than other revenue collection methods employed by other states. Those who use outdoor equipment are arguably more likely than others to be proponents of wildlife conservation and management, as their livelihoods and hobbies rely on healthy Kentucky ecosystems.[128] This suggests they might be more likely to support a redistribution of the taxes they already pay.[129]

       Texas and Virginia have employed models that impose a sales tax on outdoor equipment that returns to specified wildlife conservation and management programs.[130] Those programs embrace the essence of the North American Model, “since [those who purchase outdoor equipment] are likely wildlife users in either the traditional hunting or fishing sense, or as part of an indirect use such as camping, hiking, [and] photographing.”[131] The General Assembly should adopt a model like Texas and Virginia’s. Kentuckians spend millions each year on outdoor activities, many of which likely include the purchase of outdoor equipment.[132] The state imposes a six percent sales tax on such sales.[133] Although the necessary statistics and information are not available to produce an estimated revenue figure, it is feasible that outdoor equipment sales tax would help protect Kentucky’s wildlife.

         The proposed tax distribution would best be imposed through an amendment to KRS § 139.200, Kentucky’s sales tax statute.[134] For many of the reasons listed in part IV section A, an amendment through the legislature would fare better than any alternative. Yet, several challenges follow. The biggest challenge is the Kentucky legislature seems to frown upon earmarking general fund dollars, as compared to other states.[135] In 1954, Kentucky earmarked 46% of its general funds.[136] That percentage dwindled to 16% in 1984 and 12% in 2005.[137] The General Assembly’s engrained hesitancy to earmark general funds[138] might threaten earmarking a portion of the tax collected on outdoor equipment sales. Also, agency directors and voters could raise concerns “that diverting these general fund dollars . . . will negatively impact their ability to function as mandated.”[139]

           Thus, redistributing outdoor equipment tax money yields a benefit to the Commonwealth.

          Any benefit is better than none. America’s historic toil in exploiting its wildlife and natural resources is a reminder of the progress it has made. Kentucky, however, must not forget that America’s complacency with society and technological development has put its nature at risk several times before. Therefore, a redistribution of tax dollars from outdoor equipment sales would give Kentucky’s wildlife another leg up.

IV.  Conclusion

           Most people do not realize the reciprocal, intimate nature of wildlife conservation and management. This misconception especially pertains to how states fund their conservation and management efforts. America has a long history of imposing on its wildlife, which caused many federal and state actors to remedy exploitation. Now, every state employs some version of the North American Model, but funding issues arise in certain states, like Kentucky.[140]

        The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife has indicated a need for more funding to conserve, protect, and manage all wildlife.[141] Although most agencies “need more funds,” the magnitude of importance in conserving and managing Kentucky’s wildlife overrides any hesitancy. Kentucky can employ a similar model to Wyoming’s in creating multiple reliable sources of funding for conservation efforts.[142] Legislative amendments to § 148.021[143] and § 139.200[144] would direct more of Kentucky’s efforts toward conserving and managing its wildlife.

            The goal of this article is to solve foreseeable issues before they gain traction; it is a prophylactic measure. Like with every proposal, there are positives and negatives to Kentucky’s proposed dual-payer model. Not only would a stronger dual-payer model suit Kentucky well, but it would ensure an efficient, stable, predictable, and feasible system of conservation and management for all species, not just game species. After all, an improved model for wildlife conservation and management is better than just an existing good one.

I Dustyn is a Senior Staff Editor of the Kentucky Law Journal. At the time of this article’s publication, Sams is a third-year law student at the University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law. Sams thanks Dr. Nathan A. Coleman, a professor of America’s Founding Era at the University of the Cumberlands, Sams’ former professor, and one of his mentors, for assisting him in revising this article.

[2] See Teresa M. Telecky, Hunting is A Setback to Wildlife Conservation, 29 EARTH ISLAND J. 45, 45–46 (2014).

[3] See generally John F. Organ, Valerius Geist, Shane P. Mahoney, et al., The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation: Technical Review 12-04, THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y & THE BOONE & CROCKETT CLUB 1–5 (Dec. 2012) (demonstrating the reciprocity of hunting and conservation).

[4] Bill O’Brian, Hunters as Conservationists, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.fws.gov/story/hunters-conservationists [https://perma.cc/G8BB-32LR]; Mike Harmon, Examination of Certain Operations and Financial Activity of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, KY. OFF. AUDITOR OF PUB. ACCTS. 6 (Dec. 18, 2018); Division of Fish & Wildlife Funding, IND. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (2021), https://www.in.gov/dnr/fish-and-wildlife/about-us/funding-and-license-sales/#American_System_of_Conservation_Funding_Infographic_text_ [https://perma.cc/68MY-C76Z].

[5] Jonathan Gassett, Wildlife Action Plan, KY. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE RES. (Feb. 5, 2013), https://fw.ky.gov/WAP/Pages/Wildlife-Action-Plan-Full.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZL87-Y7NY].

[6] Id.

[7] David Willms & Anne Alexander, The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation in Wyoming: Understanding It, Preserving It, and Funding Its Future, 14 WYo. L. REV. 659, 684 (2014).

[8] Harmon, supra note 3, at 7.

[9] Willms, supra note 6, at 659–60; Organ, supra note 2, at 1–2.

[10] Willms, supra note 6, at 660.

[11] Id.

[12] Organ, supra note 2, at 6–8.

[13] Willms, supra note 6, at 662.

[14] Id.

[15] Peter Moyle & Mary A. Orland, Humans and Wildlife in America, THE MARINEBIO CONSERVATION SOC’Y, https://www.marinebio.org/creatures/essays-on-wildlife-conservation/3/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4RDF-5LF6].

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] See Robert Brown, A Conservation Timeline: Milestones of the Model’s Evolution, THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y 28–29 (2010), http://wildlifehabitat.tamu.edu/Lessons/Habitat-Concepts-1/Readings/A-Conservation-Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM34-RMKK].

[19] Id. at 28.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 30.

[22] Id. at 28.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] The Passenger Pigeon, SMITHSONIAN INFORMATION, https://www.si.edu/spotlight/passenger-pigeon [https://perma.cc/DQ5H-24EM].

[27] Brown, supra note 17, at 28.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 29.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] The Passenger Pigeon, supra note 25.

[34] Id.

[35] Organ, supra note 2, at 6–10.

[36] See generally Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (demonstrating an instance of state and federal consideration of wildlife exploitation).

[37] See Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[38] 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (1971); 16 U.S.C. § 47 (1906) (repealed 1976).

[39] Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Brown, supra note 17, at 30; Willms, supra note 6, at 660.

[44] See History of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources from Settlement Through 1944, KY. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE RES., https://fw.ky.gov/More/Pages/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/7395-RBNS].

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).

[49] Martin, 41 U.S. at 411.

[50] Id. at 407–18.

[51] Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.

[52] Id. at 519–20.

[53] Id. at 529.

[54] The opinion also articulated dicta, which many scholars use to employ an extended public trust doctrine that applies to property other than land under navigable water. Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (“[T]he power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good”).

[55] Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).

[56] Id. at 417–20.

[57] Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–41, 546 (1976).

[58] Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

[59] 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1891) (repealed 1976); How the United States Started Saving its National Forests, THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, https://www.wilderness.org/articles/article/how-united-states-started-saving-national-forests (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/N663-YA8M].

[60] Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (1918).

[65] Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS., https://www.fws.gov/law/migratory-bird-treaty-act-1918 (last visited Mar. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6GER-2LNB].

[66] Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (1918).

[67] Brown, supra note 17, at 29–30.

[68] Id.

[69] Id.

[70] Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1993).

[71] Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[72] Id. at 30.

[73] Willms, supra note 6, at 660.

[74] Gassett, supra note 4.

[75] Id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Cynthia Levy, 10 Best National Parks to Visit in the USA, THE TRAVEL (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.thetravel.com/10-best-national-parks-in-usa/ [https://perma.cc/5TSM-N3H4].

[79] Wyoming Game and Fish Commission FY 2022 Budget, JOINT APPROPRIATION COMM. 4–6, https://www.wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2021/02-20211213040-102-GandF-WGFCFY22Budget.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/T7TJ-LDWR].

[80] See generally id. (demonstrating how Wyoming’s funding is dispersed throughout its programs).

[81] Id. at 4–6.

[82] Id. at 1–15.

[83] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[84] Kentucky Spending Search: Search of Current Fiscal Year Spending, KY. TRANSPARENCY (2022), https://transparency.ky.gov/search/Pages/spendingsearch.aspx#/spending [https://perma.cc/6GAJ-V7Q5].

[85] Kentucky State Park’s Improvements: Park Projects, KY. STATE PARKS, https://parks.ky.gov/park_improvements (last visited Mar. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5KMZ-2NTA].

[86] Id.

[87] Kentucky – Nature and Scientific Wonders, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 6, 2007), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/kentucky-nature-and-scientific-wonders-177754574/ [https://perma.cc/2KBF-MDZ6].

[88] Kentucky Spending Search: Search of Current Fiscal Year Spending, supra note 83.

[89] Andy Beshear & John Hicks, 2022-2024 Executive Budget, 1 Team Kentucky 1, 335, https://osbd.ky.gov/Publications/Documents/Budget%20Documents/2022-2024%20Executive%20Budget%20Recommendation/2022-2024%20Executive%20Budget%20-Volume%20I%20(Full%20Version).pdf [https://perma.cc/8452-TTUJ].

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] Id.

[94] See generally id. at 335–36 (explaining the roles of each unit and how it relates to Kentucky’s wildlife).

[95] Kentucky Spending Search: Search of Current Fiscal Year Spending, supra note 83.

[96] Id.

[97] Beshear, supra note 88, at 328.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Kentucky State Park’s Improvements: Park Projects, supra note 84.

[101] Beshear, supra note 88, at 328.

[102] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006).

[103] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[104] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006).

[105] Id.

[106] Id.

[107] Id.

[108] Id.

[109] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[110] Id.

[111] Id.

[112] Id.

[113] Id.

[114] Id.

[115] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006).

[116] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] See generally Executive Branch, Transparency, https://transparency.ky.gov/accountability/Pages/executive.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) (listing other cabinets that contain agencies supporting Kentucky’s wildlife) [https://perma.cc/2GVL-ESQN].

[120] Beshear, supra note 88.

[121] See generally Bird-Friendly Communities, AUDUBON SOC’Y, https://www.audubon.org/bird-friendly-communities#:~:text=Audubon%27s%20Bird%2Dfriendly%20Communities%20strives,and%20Bird%2Dfriendly%20Buildings%20programs (last visited March 24, 2022) (showing efforts to conserve habitats and bird populations) [https://perma.cc/YLQ7-8KES]; History, KENTUCKIANS FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH, https://kftc.org/#history (last visited March 24, 2022) (showing work throughout Kentucky communities) [https://perma.cc/9MKM-XMUW]; A Kentucky Tradition in Animal Welfare, Community and Conservation, IROQUOIS HUNT CLUB, iroquoishunt.com (last visited March 24, 2022) (demonstrating a Kentucky organization devoted to conservation of historic fox hunting) [https://perma.cc/5T6P-CLXJ]; Who We Are, KY. WATERWAYS ALL., https://www.kwalliance.org/who-we-are.html (demonstrating an organization concerned with preserving Kentucky waterways) (last visited March 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3JPM-3R8J].

[122] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.

[123] Id.

[124]Where’s the Money Go?, KY. LOTTERY, https://www.kylottery.com/apps/about_us/where_the_money_goes.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/6WR4-FRKR].

[125] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.; E.g., Kentucky DU License Plate, DUCKS UNLIMITED, https://www.ducks.org/kentucky/kentucky-license-plate-program (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/N882-CU4Y].

[126] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.

[127] See Teacher Victory: Kentucky House Overrides Tax Increase Veto, CBS NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-house-overrides-tax-increase-veto/ [https://perma.cc/N3FW-VKQJ].

[128] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.

[129] Id. at 695–96.

[130] Id. at 695.

[131] Id.

[132] David Knopf, Scott Lemmons & Barry Adams, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., Kentucky Agricultural Statistics 2020 Annual Bulletin 5–6 (Dec. 2020).

[133] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 139.200 (West 2023).

[134] Id.

[135] See Arturo Pérez, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Earmarking State Taxes 5 (Sep. 2008).

[136] Id.

[137] Id.

[138] See id.

[139] Willms, supra note 6, at 696.

[140] Organ, supra note 2, at 24–25.

[141] Gassett, supra note 4.

[142] Willms, supra note 6, at 694.

[143] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[144] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 139.200 (West 2023).

 All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Mergers and Acquisitions

 All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Mergers and Acquisitions

Amanda Guillen[I]

The office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances.[2]

Introduction

      In 2021, “the overall value of Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) stood at $5.8 trillion,” an increase of 64% from 2020.[2] Not only did 2021 have a scorching increase from the prior year, but the sheer dollar amount of $5.8 trillion of M&A activity is worth mentioning as well. $5.8 trillion is the equivalent to the market value of Apple ($3 trillion), Microsoft ($2.5 trillion), and Disney ($0.3 trillion) combined.[3] With the headwinds faced moving into 2022, such as inflation, rising cost of capital, supply chain issues with Ukraine, and geopolitical tensions from US-China[4]… 2022 will still likely reach $4.7 trillion in deal value by year-end, which would make it one of the strongest markets of the past 20 years.

      “Firms engage in mergers because they see a profitable opportunity.”[5] If a firm can purchase another company in the hopes of reducing costs, “the result can be lower prices for consumers and improved overall economic welfare.”[6] This is just one example of how a firm can meet the goal of a profitable opportunity. One of the most significant mergers that impact life today is the growth of the American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T).[7] In 1883, AT&T “adopted a strategy of merging local telephone companies into a national system.[8] The resulting network reduced the costs of interconnecting large numbers of users, and the telephone quickly replaced the telegraph as the communications technology of choice.”[9] Ultimately generating long-term value for shareholders, who provide the capital that allows companies to invest, and innovate, is a fundamental reason for firms engaging in a merger.[10] Bringing us back to present day, with the trending highest volume of M&A activity in history… is this activity still generating value for shareholders?

      It is too early to tell if the flurry of activity from 2021 to 2022 will lead to successful business outcomes. However, data for previous years’ M&A activity is available.[11] Per Harvard Business Review, typically “70%-90% of acquisitions are abysmal failures.”[12] Failure is the state or condition of not meeting a desirable or intended objective and may be viewed as the opposite of success[13]—and it seems a bit harsh to put M&A activity in that category. Because failure may seem fatal, as if it is impossible to climb out of this state of failure. But failure is not fatal. The failure to recognize change to meet the intended objective is fatal.

      This Note begins in Part I with an overview of M&A. This section discusses the original goal of M&A which is to maximize shareholder value. In theory, the shareholder wealth maximization norm[14] is the north star that guides business executives and the law. The shareholder wealth maximation norm sets the intended objective as—the pursuit of increasing share price maximizes the wealth of actual shareholders.[15] Moreover, Part I sets the stage for what is a corporation and M&A. In Part II, this section builds on a case study of recent M&A transactions. Further, this Part goes into the factors that may contribute to challenges seen in M&A. In Part III, this Part proposes using earnout provisions in M&A contracts as a solution for leaders to implement.

 

                              I.              The Measure for Successful M&A—Shareholder Wealth Maximization

      U.S. Corporate law gives control of the corporation in the board of directors and those executives to whom the board properly delegates decision-making authority.[16] The discretionary powers conferred on directors and officers, are to be directed towards a single end; the maximization of shareholder wealth.[17] “Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.”[18] In the landmark Michigan Supreme Court case Dodge v. Ford Motor, Co.:

A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.[19]

“The shareholder wealth maximization norm exerts tremendous influence on both business practice and corporate legal scholarship.”[20] Per eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., corporate management is legally required to pursue profit; it must also seek to maximize the shareholders’ financial interests.[21] As such, publicly traded companies place great importance on their stock share price, which reflects a corporation’s overall financial health. The higher a stock price is, the more ideal a company’s prospects are. The norm and the related focus on share prices rest on two key assumptions: (1) that the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization, as measured by share price, effectively maximizes the wealth of actual shareholders and (2) that the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization, as measured by share price, is socially beneficial.[22] If the share price is not increasing, then the practice should be to change course.

          With the proliferation of M&A activity in recent years, it would be safe to assume that share prices are also increasing. But is all this huge influx of M&A activity providing increased shareholder value or is all that glitters is not gold? 

 

A.         Background

      A corporation is a legal entity.[23] One of the main advantages of a corporation is the benefit of centralized management.[24] Shareholders elect a corporation’s directors, who have the power to manage and oversee the corporation’s business.[25] Shareholders play only a limited governance role, in part because the directors have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation.[26] The directors typically delegate responsibility for daily decisions to corporate officers.[27] The separation between shareholder ownership and managerial control is one of the distinctive features of modern corporations.[28]

      Centralized management has allowed individuals to partake in a comparative advantage. Comparative advantages describe a situation in which an individual can produce a service at a lower opportunity cost than another.[29] Here, a shareholder elects a corporation’s directors so that they can best utilize their time as they see fit. The corporation’s directors produce a more significant financial benefit in the best interests of the corporation. In theory, the corporation’s directors manage a corporation at a lower opportunity cost, compared to an individual shareholder given their knowledge and expertise. 

      While a corporation has many advantages, there are also corresponding disadvantages—agency issues. The corporation, a legal construct, can act only through the agency of human beings.[30] Agency is a consensual relationship between two parties, the “principal” and the “agent.”[31] The principal selects the agent, who agrees to act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.[32]

      In regard to mergers and acquisitions, agency implications could be value destroying when managers engage in opportunistic acquisition reasons for self-interest.[33] Empire building motives, managerial myopia, overconfidence, misaligned incentives, and poor corporate governance can all exacerbate the agency problem.[34] For example, there are various ways that managers can build empires so as to increase the size of their firm, also known as their sphere of control.[35] When managers have larger companies to manage, they are seen as having more power.[36] Managers’ empire building incentives can also be related to their compensation packages, which are often tied to a larger firm size measured by its combined market value.[37] Therefore, mergers and acquisitions are often considered a good candidate for rapidly and effectively increasing firm size.[38] Studies also show that where managerial compensation is based on the acquisition of profits, with no emphasis on long-term incentives, that this would provide managers with perverse incentives to acquire companies so as to increase the size of their firm, despite ultimately leading to deterioration in shareholder value.[39]  

      Another issue between “agents” and “principals” are misuse of resources. “Agents” can use their position to divert the corporation’s funds towards initiatives that the “agent” personally wants to achieve. Breaching fiduciary duties[40], a manager could have the desire to acquire a company as a “pet project,” which may have diminishing returns.[41] The desire to acquire this “pet project” company would devote millions, potentially billions of dollars of financial and human resources that belong to the corporation, but in essence, funds that belong to the shareholders. For example, AOL’s CEO hatched Patch in 2007 while an executive at Google, then convinced AOL to purchase Patch after he took over in 2009.[42] AOL shareholders felt the CEO cling to Patch with a blind paternal love.[43] Over five years, Patch is estimated to cost AOL between $200 million and $300 million to run.[44] “It is easy to see how an agent, having the power to exercise control over assets belonging to the principal, may be tempted to use those assets in a way that benefits the agent’s ego”.[45]  

      This challenge between “agents” and “principals,” it might seem as though the ability to maximize value may never be achieved.[46] Even with the agency issues, the ability to maximize value has been achieved—historically, the stock market has provided around 6% of annual returns over the long term.[47] For most Americans, 6% sounds pretty good. And for most Americans, how much they have to invest is singularly a function of how much they can make from their labor. The American people who owe almost all their wealth to their ability to hold a job and to secure gains in wages—"is true for 99% of Americans”.[48] After putting in a minimum 40 hours of work a week, the fruits of American labor are spent on a house and car payment, student loans, wedding debt, and the leftover cash is put towards a new air conditioner or an on-call plumber. The remainder is invested in a 401(k) plan where the funds are out of reach until the investor reaches the age fifty-nine and a half.[49] It is not a surprise that “…nearly half of all working-age families have zero retirement savings…”[50] For these reasons, it makes sense to question whether this hard-earned money is earning the biggest bang for your buck. If these agency issues were nailed down, could the new normal average returns be 12% or 24%? The sky is the limit.

 

B.         M&A

      M&A involves the buying and selling of corporations.[51]  M&A deals are done from the direction of executives, “who also largely run the deal-making process”.[52] The acquiring company is called the “bidder” or “acquirer”. The “target” is the company that is about to be acquired. Historically, the United States has had a relatively pro takeover regulatory environment.[53]

      With the general economic outlook relatively stable, executive confidence is at an all-time high to pursue acquisitions they have long considered.[54] “Management teams have been dusting off corporate playbooks for potential deals”[55] and to do—acquire companies—than do not. Based on the converging factors, dealmakers find themselves in a sweet spot between the optimism of the market and the bountiful economic landscape. M&A will continue as a central feature of the global corporate landscape. But, the question still remains whether the flurry of activity continues to increase shareholder wealth.[56]

 

II.            Analysis

      This Part examines why M&A activity may not be as valuable as initially intended—increasing shareholder wealth. The first Section discusses M&A impact on shareholder prices by case studies. The second Section discusses inherent finance and legal challenges inherent in M&A deals.

A.       Profitability Analysis of Companies Engaging in M&A

Many scholars have examined the impact of M&A and whether there have been profitable results. In theory, these studies have inherently had several limitations. The main limitation is truly understanding the source of merger gains or losses and gathering this data systematically across companies in similar industries, sizes, and goals. The challenge is clearly correlating that M&A activity is the source of increased share price or if there are other factors involved. Perhaps there could be a new marketing scheme that propelled the stock price, or a competitor left the industry, in which both instances could increase the share price—neither having to do with increased M&A activity. Correspondingly, the reverse is true. Companies could neglect their marketing teams and a competitor enter the market, causing cause share price to decrease—again, these activities would have nothing to do with M&A activity. Because of the difficulty of acquiring the necessary data, scholars have typically taken a case study approach, examining a few mergers within the same of comparable industries.[57]

Studies have been completed over the years conveying evidence that mergers cut deep into the financial red. In general, many large-scale acquisitions of public companies by other public companies result in significant losses for shareholders of acquiring firms.[58] Not only do bidder shareholders lose, but the losses from these deals can be staggering.[59] For example, a study of deals from 1998 to 2001, finds that bidder shareholders lost 12% for every dollar spent on acquisitions, for a total of $240 billion.[60] A study on law firm mergers performed analysis to contradict the conventional wisdom that mergers enhance profitability through increased revenues and reduced costs.[61] The study showed that law firms post-merger revenues were lower relative to competitor firms that than the sum of predecessor firms’ revenues, and cost per lawyer increase markedly.[62] Further, a study of Asian bank mergers found no observable efficiency effects.[63] Another example in the electric power industry, evidence suggests there are no net efficiency gains from M&A.[64] Ultimately, a significant body of recent finance literature finds evidence that many, although not all, acquisitions destroy value for long-term [Bidder] shareholders.[65]

In contrast, there is data showing that mergers suggest that there are efficiency gains. One review suggests that efficiency gains predominated in North American and European bank mergers.[66] Another study reviewed forty-nine studies and found that nearly three-quarters of them showed mergers resulted in price increases.[67] In 2016, Bruce Blonigen and Justin Pierce studied U.S. manufacturing industries that covered companies from the timber to electronics to printing services.[68] Blonigen’s and Pierce’s research demonstrated that the average merger increased market power.[69] These studies contradict the initial case study on companies in the healthcare industry.

Overall, the infamous lawyerly response to whether mergers increase or decrease shareholder value is—it depends. It depends various circumstances that vary according to market composition, industry, geographic location,[70] economics, and available data. Evidence supports each view and the effects of mergers remain in dispute.[71] The idiosyncrasies of the specific companies and sectors limit the ability to generalize the data.[72] Evidence exists that routinely show stock market event studies that find shareholder gains from mergers, at least in the short term.[73] On the other hand, there are studies of actual operating effects that tend to show that gains from mergers are the exception rather than the rule.[74] The best example of the ambivalent results is an economist who attempted to study the effects of all mergers in the world occurring over fifteen years.[75] The result of the study found that only 29.1% of mergers appear to result in efficiency gains, with approximately the same number actually reducing efficiency.[76]

Although the data can be inconclusive as to whether mergers increase or decrease share price, it is important to recognize that the conventional wisdom that mergers enhance profitability should not be assumed.

 

B.      Legal and Finance

This section assesses the factors that may have an impact on shareholder returns for M&A: Legal and Finance.

  i. Legal—Limited Liability for failed M&A Transactions

      In 2015, Microsoft wrote off 96% of the value of the handset business it had acquired from Nokia for $7.9 billion the previous year.[77] If an executive were forced to clear out $7.9 billion from their savings account for a failed business acquisition, would the executive have purchased it in the first place? Likely, not. Instead, the present law shields decision-makers from a potential liability through the business judgment rule leaving shareholders, who are—besides employees—typically harmed the most by failed M&A transactions, largely unprotected.[78] Directors of public corporations are seldom held personally liable for their decision making.[79]

      As part of the common law for at least one hundred and fifty years, the business judgment rule protects directors from liability for business decisions, even those that were ill-chosen and resulted in losses to the corporation.[80] In Wrigley, the Chicago Cubs’ president refused to install field lights for night games at Wrigley Field against the wishes of a shareholder.[81] The shareholder claimed that because the president refused to install field lights for night games leading to lower profits for shareholders.[82] The court held that the judgment of the directors of the corporation enjoys the benefit of a presumption that it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best interests of the corporation they serve.[83] If the decisions are within the “realm of reason,” it generally will be protected.[84]

      The underlying consideration behind the business judgment rule is that the courts’ role is inherently different than a business decisionmaker for a variety of reasons. For example, a judge deciding on a decision after the fact is plagued with hindsight bias.[85] Thus, judges tend to be ill-equipped for reliably second-guessing the quality of business decisions.[86] Additionally, substantive judicial review of business decisions would require significant resources.[87] As a manager in Corporate America, imagine if every time a poor decision was made, the courts were looming close by, reprimanding every step. The business judgment rule expresses a balance between embracing economic freedom and informed risk-taking.[88] It presumes the benefits from entrepreneurial risk-taking exceeds the cost resulting from wrong business decisions.[89] Essentially, the business decision makers at Microsoft, although writing off $7.9 billion in 2015, have led to revenue growth of $800 billion in three years.[90]

          Despite the risks that directors and officers contribute to the failure of M&A transactions, they cannot be held liable under current law. The courts understand that there is no reward with no risk and, as such, shareholders can be rewarded nicely or inadequately. The business judgment rule protects directors and officers from liability which effectually makes acquiring companies a “win-win” because there is minimal risk to the directors but a maximum reward to shareholders.

ii. Finance— 2+2 = 5?

This section begins with the following observation made by an experienced M&A lawyer:

A major merger or acquisition can be a company-defining moment. The right business combination at the right price, with good execution, can reposition the company, accelerate growth and shareholder return, and even change the game for an industry. But a bad deal—whether the failure is rooted in the concept [i.e., the “logic of the deal,” that is, the business justification for the proposed acquisition], the price, or the execution—is probably the fastest legal means of destroying shareholder value.[91] 

      Thus, in order to create shareholder value, the acquirer must purchase the target for a fair price.[92] When an acquirer overpays for a target, spending resources on trying to meet unattainable financial goals can be unsalvageable. If each company A and B is worth $2, then after the merger transaction, per the shareholder wealth maximization theory, it should be worth $5. If A purchases B for $2.5, but the benefits fail to materialize over several years, this acquisition is doomed for failure. Because each year is spent trying to climb out of the financial hole it initially dug itself in. However, zealous business executives continue to search for profitable opportunities in the hopes of increasing shareholder value. But all too often, as seen in the popular press,[93] bidder overpayment and poorly performing corporate acquisitions strike out.

      An example is when Hewlett Packard (“HP”) purchased a British company, Autonomy, for $10.3 billion—a decision that was controversial with HP shareholders who claimed HP was overpaying for Autonomy.[94] A year later, HP announced a write-down of $8.8 billion related to the acquisition due to accounting irregularities.[95] HP was unable to realize the gains it expected from the acquisition.[96] Not only was there no added benefit to the acquisition, but the cherry on top was a large securities class action suit.[97]

      A crucial component that can lead to the success of an M&A transaction begins at the initial due diligence. Due diligence is a thorough analysis and investigation of the target company.[98] A company usually has a corporate development team that provides decision-makers with financial information and assesses the risk and opportunities of engaging in a M&A transaction. Besides risk assessment and valuation, it typically prepares for the composition of the contractual representations and warranties[99] and assesses whether the target company is a profitable opportunity. In complete secrecy, the target provides information to the acquirer about the business, finances, tax, legal, and human resources.[100] Due to the small window for providing this information, acquirer decision-makers rarely receive the information they need to make an informed decision from the target. Additionally, another challenge for the acquirer is the mass of information that would need to be digested in a short timeline to make a well-informed decision, not to mention ensuring that the right questions are asked of the target.

          After collecting information in the due diligence phase, the acquirer uses this information to make a well-informed purchase price for the target. One of the most common methods to assess the value of a company is the discounted cash flow (DCF).[101] DCF models rely on estimates and discounting all future cash flows to determine net present value.[102] The offer amount largely depends on the quality and extent of the available data.[103] The models use assumptions provided by the target and market data to form a purchase price.[104]  The assumptions are the greatest weakness in valuation models because essentially these assumptions predict the future[105]—something that is very challenging to do.

      With a mix of time pressures and assumptions to value the target, this could lead to negative financial consequences in which the acquirer overpays for the target.[106] With the legal and financial challenges at play in an M&A transaction, is there a potential solution for management to engage?

 

III.  An Opportunity for More Shareholder Wealth—A Call to Action

          Part III reflects on the challenges discussed in Part II and provides a solutions to the legal and financial challenges presented, by using earnout provisions to align compensation incentives.

      As shadows cannot exist without light, the corporation’s advantage of a centralized management cannot exist without agency issues.[107] In M&A deals, executive compensation is generally issued for “closing the deal”[108] rather than the financial success of the deal which can often take years. On average, about a quarter of executives in acquired top management teams leave within the first year, a departure rate about three times higher than in comparable companies that haven’t been acquired.[109] An additional 15% depart in the second year, roughly double the normal turnover rate.[110] All too often, after the close of the deal, target executives are either mentally out the door or forcibly ushered out the door by the acquirer. Target executives leave voluntarily after an acquisition for a variety of reasons. A couple of reasons are that target CEOs receive golden parachutes at the time the merger is approved, [111] need a break, or don’t feel needed in the new company.[112] Limited liability, as discussed in Part II, could be a hindrance to shareholder profitability when combined with executives that have no skin in the game.

      During the deal negotiation between the acquirer and target, an earnout provision can create incentives that encourage management to stay after the acquisition. An earnout provision is a contractual payment mechanism in M&A where a relatively large part (often around a third) of the deal consideration is deferred and payable at multiple stages, contingent upon observable measures of the target firm’s future performance.[113] Another benefit of an earnout provision is that it provides continuity for the success after the acquisition. Target leaders can guide the integration of the two companies, rather than leaving abruptly after the close of the transaction. Instead of incentivizing target executives to successfully complete the transaction, the acquirer can negotiate incentives tied to the future success of the integration of the two companies.

An earnout provision emphasizes more skin in the game when it comes to spending the corporations, or shareholders’, assets for an acquisition. Target managers are motivated to remain in the firm and maximize its performance (to receive the deferred payments).[114] Studies convey that earnouts reduce the underlying valuation gap between the merging firms by explicitly linking the target firm’s payment in the acquisition to its future performance.[115] This, in turn, is associated with an increased overall likelihood of merger success (and higher merger synergies).[116] Additionally, the findings suggest higher acquirer gains relative to counterpart M&As without earnouts.[117]

      The financial blinders of overpaying for a company[118] can be reduced when earnout provisions are introduced. The leaders of the target corporation will be incentivized to integrate the two companies successfully when their bonus is tied to completion milestones. Integration is the phase after the transaction closes where employees from the target and acquirer work together to combine the companies. The integration involves constant and cross-communication between all functions in the target and acquirer corporation—legal, human resources, finance, information technology, R&D, and more. The integration phase is a people-intensive activity, and the corporation cannot have a successful conclusion unless they are fully sourced and managed by empowered leaders.

      So, why is it that only 27% of companies utilize an earnout provision?[119] It is quite risky for the acquirer and target—it represents real dollars.[120] An earnout provision could result in the acquirer paying more for the target than the buyer may have originally intended to pay.[121] Additionally, the buyer and seller are at risk for litigation when it comes to the earnout formulae for the acquired business, leading to more expenses.[122] For example, the allocation of overheard costs is a common challenge.[123] Or consider potential disputes over what numbers are included in financial metrics to earn the earnout bonus. Further, goals may not be aligned.[124] For instance, the target’s management may be motivated to maximize earn-out payments, but not necessarily to advance the buyer’s business strategy or interests.[125]

      Unfortunately, earnout provisions are often heavily negotiated and fact specific.[126] In 2013 to 2019, the percentage of transactions with earnouts have been 25% to 27%.[127] This is a steep decline from the upward trend in 2007 to 2011, where the percentage of transactions with earnouts increased from 19% to 38%, respectively.[128] An earnout forces the parties to think about the future, which is a good thing.[129] But, the earnout also keeps an acquisition attorney asleep with one eye open because of the possible dreary outcomes. Lawyers negotiating earnouts on behalf of their clients must have a keen eye for the relative risks and rewards of earnout provisions. As a result, the inclusion of earnout provisions in M&A tends to be the exception rather than the rule.[130] However, using an earnout provision is a tool to provide leadership a tangible action toward climbing an upward mountain of improving insatiable shareholder growth.

 

Conclusion

      This Note uses M&A activity as a lens to examine the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Part I provides the background on corporate M&A and the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Part II examines case studies on M&A activity and trends in share price, and some of the financial and legal reasons for some lackluster deals. Part III provides tangible solutions to improve shareholder wealth—earnout provisions. Overall, this Note reveals that the traditional shareholder wealth maximization is limited and problematic. This Note does not attempt to prove that M&A activity does not further shareholder wealth. But instead, whether shareholders could benefit from leadership decisions that execute on the plans they initially intended. If shareholders are receiving a benefit from M&A activity, could shareholders be receiving more of a benefit?

      When AT&T merged with local telephone companies into a national system, the company changed America and, more importantly, the world.  The ability to receive and send instant communication in this day has propelled our society to a new level of efficiency. Although 1883 was a much simpler time with less globalization and fewer legal rules, one thing remains the same: creating value for shareholders. M&A should be more than just romantic; it should produce a more efficient and valuable product. The idea that M&A could be just romantic rather than real begs the question—is M&A providing a real benefit to shareholders? If not, how can we make it better? Or is M&A activity capped at maximum efficiency?

      For now, the law recognizes shareholder wealth maximization as the only game in town.[131] It is not about to change.[132] Further research could persuade leaders, lawyers, and all those involved with M&A—to do the right thing—for the benefit of shareholders. If these questions are not asked, shareholders will bear the brunt of the loss.        


[ I ] J.D. & M.B.A. Candidate 2023, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.B.A. 2012, University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business. Grateful for the support from my husband Roy Guillen. Special thanks to Professor Alan Kluegel, PhD for guidance and comments.    

[1] Ralph Waldo Emerson, The American Scholar, in Ralph Waldo Emerson Essays & Lectures 51, 63 (Joel Porte ed., 1983).

[2] Niket Nishant, Global M&A Volumes Hit Record High in 2021, Breach $5 Trillion For First Time, Reuters (Dec. 31, 2021, 12:44 AM ), https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/global-ma-volumes-hit-record-high-2021-breach-5-trillion-first-time-2021-12-31/ [perma.cc/J79F-L4W6].

[3] Jack Nickas, Apple Becomes First Company to Hit $3 Trillion Market Value, New York Times (Jan. 3, 2022),  https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/technology/apple-3-trillion-market-value.html.

[4] Les Baird, David Harding, Suzanne Kumar & Andrei Vorobyov, Global M&A Report Midyear 2022, Bain & Co. (Jul. 7, 2022), https://www.bain.com/insights/global-m-and-a-report-midyear-2022/ [https://perma.cc/9ZZ9-CK5X].

[5] Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Mergers May Be Profitable, But Are They Good For The Economy?, Harvard Business Review (Nov. 15, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/mergers-may-be-profitable-but-are-they-good-for-the-economy [https://perma.cc/7BUJ-AXYD].

[6] Id.

[7] David Besanko, David Dranove, Mark Shanley & Scott Schaefer, Economics of Strategy 107 (5th ed. 2010).

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019).

[11] Roger L. Martin, M&A: The One Thing You Need to Get Right, Harvard Bus. Rev. (June 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/ma-the-one-thing-you-need-to-get-right [https://perma.cc/PC7G-M54V].

[12] Id.

[13] Failure, Merriam Webster (1st ed. 2016).

[14] Infra note 15—note 21.

[15] See generally Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 48 Tex. J. Bus. L. at 71 (2019).

[16] See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, 141(a) (2001) (the corporation’s business and affairs “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directions”). All state corporate codes likewise provide for a system of nearly absolute delegation of power to the board of directors, which in turn is authorized to further delegate power to subordinate firm agents. See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 8.01 cmt. (1995) (reviewing statutes).

[17] See Infra note 15 and accompanying text; See supra note 18.

[18] Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1423 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 141 (2d ed. 2009) (“It is well-settled that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.” (citing Dodge for the assertion that corporations should have a “profit-maximizing purpose”).

[19] Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis added); See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (suggests that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder value).

[20] Griffin, supra note 15, at 71.

[21] See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 Bus. Law. 1, 10 (2014).

[22] Id.

[23] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman, Business Organizations: A Contemporary Approach 74 (3rd ed. 2019).

[24] See id. at 77.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] See James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Structure 64 (5th ed. 2009). Comparative Advantage is generally used in terms of goods. In advanced economies, individuals specialize in producing goods where they have a comparative advantage; they then trade to acquire other goods. Specialization enhances the standard of living of a society.

[30] Palmiter, supra note 23, at 220.

[31] Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006); Palmiter, supra note 23,  at 903.

[32] Id.

[33] Scott Fung, Hoje Jo, Shih-Chuan Tsai, Agency Problems In Stock Market-Driven Acquisitions, Emerald Insight, (Oct. 30, 2009) https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/14757700911006958/full/html.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Palmiter, supra note 23,  at 22. “Fiduciary duties seek to protect those who delegate authority against the negligence, disloyalty, or worse of those who exercise this authority on their behalf.”

[41] Net present value is the present value of cash flows at the required rate of return of your project compared to your initial investment. In practical terms, it is a financial metric used to evaluate whether you proceed with a project or not. Generally, a positive net present value means the project is worthwhile. Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Net Present Value, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Nov. 19, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/11/a-refresher-on-net-present-value [https://perma.cc/YXC8-9F9V].

[42] Jeff Brown, Latest CEO Pet Project to Fail: AOL’s Patch, CNBC (Dec. 16, 2013, 3:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/12/16/latest-ceo-pet-project-to-fail-aols-patch.html [https://perma.cc/E27F-ALT5].

[43] Id.

[44] Matt Burns, Patch Hit with Sweeping Layoffs as New Owner Hale Global Restructures, Tech Crunch (Jan. 29, 2014, 11:58 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/01/29/patch-hit-with-sweeping-layoffs-as-new-owner-hale-global-restructures/ [https://perma.cc/8L6D-72V7].

[45] Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928); Max Stul Oppenheimer, Fame: Ownership Implications of Intellectual Property and Agency Law, 30 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 447, 477 (2020).

[46] Solutions to these overarching agency issues are discussed see infra Part III.

[47] Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, A Roadmap to Your Financial Security Through Saving and Investing, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-savings-and-investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2L8-26QU].

[48]  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bit?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1876 (2017).

[49] I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i)(2012). Also applies to IRAs. Id. § 408A(d)(2)(A)(i).

[50] Leo E. Strine, Jr., Supra note 41, at 1880.

[51] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman at 903.

[52] Afra Afsharipour, Bias, Identity and M&A, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 471 (2020).

[53] James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, & Jerold L. Zimmerman at 589. For example, between 1993 and 1999 the value of corporate mergers represented 8.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).

[54] David Gelles, Hostile Takeover Bids for Big Firms Across Industries Make a Comeback, N.Y. Times, (Jun. 12, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/hostile-takeover-bids-for-big-firms-across-industries-make-a-comeback/ [https://perma.cc/FQ2G-9HYP].

[55] See generally Michael J. De La Merced, Mergers Hit a 7-Year High, Propelled by a Series of Blockbuster Deals, N.Y. Times (Jul. 1, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/propelled-by-a-series-of-blockbuster-deals-mergers-hit-a-7-year-high/.

[56] See infra Part II.

[57] Griffin, supra note 15 at 71, 83.

[58] Afra Afsharipour, Revaluating Shareholder Voting Rights in M&A Transactions, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 127, 129 (2017).

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Hugh A. Simons & Nicholas Bruch, Do Mergers Increase Profitability?, L. J. Newsletters (Jan. 2018), https://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2018/01/01/do-mergers-increase-profitability/ [https://perma.cc/5LGR-EMZY].

[62] Id.

[63] Griffin, supra note 15 at 85.

[64] Id.

[65] Theresa H. Maynard, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases, Materials, and Problems 25 (5th ed. 2021).

[66] Griffin, supra note 15 at 84—85.

[67] Id. at 84.

[68] Id. at 86.

[69] Id. at 84.

[70] Id. at 83.

[71] Griffin, supra note 15 at 84.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id. at 85—86.

[76] Id.

[77] Roger L. Martin, M&A: The One Thing You Need to Get Right, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Jun. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/ma-the-one-thing-you-need-to-get-right [https://perma.cc/LY3B-LVWV]; See infra note 111.

[78] Gerrit M. Bechaus, “Comply or Explain”—A Flexible Mechanism to Countervail Behavioral Biases in M&A Transactions, 21 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 183, 187 (2013).

[79] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman at 545.

[80] Id.

[81] Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).

[82] Id. at 777.  

[83] Id. at 779.

[84] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman, supra note 23, at 546.

[85] Bechaus, supra note 71, at 202.

[86] Id.

[87] Id. at 202—203.

[88] Id. at 203.

[89] Id.

[90] Trefis Team, How Microsoft Created $800 Billion in 3 Years—Can it Repeat?, Forbes (Jul. 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/07/06/how-microsoft-created-800-billion-in-3-years--can-it-repeat/?sh=18276507dd1c [https://perma.cc/LVT5-7E5X].

[91] See Ken Smith, The M&A Buck Stops at the Board, 41 Mergers and Acquisitions 48, 49 (Apr. 2006); Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Over-payment Problem, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1018, 1028 (2012); Maynard, supra note 58, at 26 [emphasis added].

[92] See John Callaham, Google Made Its Best Acquisition Nearly 16 Year Ago: Can You Guess What It Was?, Android Authority (May 2021), https://www.androidauthority.com/google-android-acquisition-884194/ [https://perma.cc/9GJB-48FF] (Admittedly, there are exceptions. For example, Google purchased Android for what was considered an exorbitant price at the time. Years later, Google was able to capitalize on the purchase of Android and turn it into a profitable mobile line).

[93] See Robert F. Bruner, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons That Rise Above the Ashes, N.Y. Times 265—291 (2005) (For example, America Online and Time Warner reported a $45 billion write-down in 2003 and then a $100 billion yearly loss.); See also Strife of Brian, Economist (Sep. 7, 2011), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2011/09/17/strife-of-brian [https://perma.cc/V2SY-GSWH] (Countrywide acquisition by Bank America that led to $30 billion in legal settlements and mortgage-related losses.); See, e.g. infra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Fools Rush In: 37 of the Worst Corporate M&A Flops, CBI Insights (Oct. 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/merger-acquisition-corporate-fails/ [perma.cc/MGC4-STT8].

[94] See Afra Afsharipour, Revaluating Shareholder Voting Rights, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 127, 128 (2017).

[95] See id.

[96] See id.

[97] See id.

[98] See Maynard, supra note 58, at 35.

[99] Bechaus, supra note 71, at 195.

[100] Id.  

[101] Id. at 196.

[102] Id.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.

[105] Id.

[106] Id.

[107] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman, supra note 23,  at 28. 

[108] Robert Fields, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ISSUES IN M&A SITUATIONS, RMF (2021), https://www.rmfieldslaw.com/post/executive-compensation-and-employee-benefits-issues-in-m-a-situations [https://perma.cc/NQV6-DUCT].

[109] Jeffrey A. Krug, Why Do They Keep Leaving?, Harvard Bus. Rev. (2003), https://hbr.org/2003/02/why-do-they-keep-leaving [https://perma.cc/PY3G-KUUM].

[110] Id.

[111] See Afra Afsharipour, supra note 45, at 481.

[112] See Jeffrey A. Krug, supra note 102.

[113] Jo Danbolt, The Real Effects of Earnout Contracts in M&As, J. of Fin. Research 607 (2021).

[114] Id. at 608.

[115] Id.

[116] Id. at 608—609.

[117] Id. at 609.

[118] Infra Part II.A.ii.

[119] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, Earnout Provisions, BL 2 (2020) (referring to a study completed by the American Bar Association’s Private Target Mergers and Acquisitions Deal Point Studies. Interestingly, 60%-70% of earnout provisions used earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) or revenue as the principal earnout metric).

[120] Id.

[121] 1 M&A Practice Guide § 9.10 (2021).

[122] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, supra note 112 at 5.

[123] 1 M&A Practice Guide § 9.10 (2021).

[124] Id.

[125] Id.

[126] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, supra note 112 at 5.

[127] Id. at  4.

[128] Id.

[129] 1 M&A Practice Guide § 9.10 (2021).

[130] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, supra note 112 at 5.

[131] Jay Coen Gilbert, What eBay’s Court Fight with Craigslist Reveals, Forbes: Corp. Soc. Resp (Sep. 2010), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2010/09/21/what-ebays-court-fight-with-craigslist-reveals/?sh=6db8dccb2dd8 [https://perma.cc/886R-854Q].

[132] Id. 

Not so Lucky in Kentucky: Constitutionality of Kentucky's Slot Machines

Download a PDF Below:

 NOT SO LUCKY IN KENTUCKY: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF KENTUCKY’S SLOT MACHINES 

Ryan Roark [1]

Introduction

                If you ask the average American what Kentucky is known for, the words “horse racing” are a likely answer to follow. Along with “bourbon” and “fried chicken,” Kentucky is interconnected with the horse racing industry and is commonly known as the “Horse Capital of the World.”[2] Gambling has always been an integral part of horse racing in Kentucky ever since tracks began to open in 1875.[3] Fans flock to the betting windows at Churchill Downs, Keeneland, and Red Mile to bet on the races they are spectating, or even other races at different tracks through simulcasting.[4] Patrons pick horses for a multitude of reasons, such as recent horse performance, favorite trainer or jockey, or their favorite color worn by the horse and jockey.[5] The overall economic impact the industry has on Kentucky is extensive, accounting for thousands of jobs and millions in revenue, with wagering revenue accounting for a substantial amount.[6] Wagering is the main appeal for horse racing fans, and it is what has kept the sport alive in an age where professional team sports dominate the sporting industry.[7] With that said, horse racing wagering is the only type of gambling that is legal in the state of Kentucky (excluding charitable gaming and the state lottery) and is regulated by section 528 of the Kentucky statutes and the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission (KHRC).[8]

                While these gambling laws of Kentucky have been explicitly clear, the lines have been blurred recently due to horse racing tracks introducing the Historical Horse Racing Machines (HHR machines) beginning in 2011.[9] These HHR machines resemble the classic “slot machines” that are found in a typical Las Vegas casino with flashing lights, action-themed games, and instant-type betting[10] —the very type of casino-like gaming of chance that is illegal in Kentucky.[11] In fact, in 2020, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled these HHR machines are illegal and do not qualify as pari-mutuel wagering—the cornerstone of what is required for horse racing wagering to be considered legal under Kentucky statutes.[12] In response, the legislature, ignoring the Court’s criteria for what constitutes pari-mutuel wagering, simply adopted a new statutory definition for pari-mutuel wagering, one not shared by anyone outside Kentucky, to allow for the powerful horse industry to continue to exclusively run their slot-like gaming systems.[13] This legislation, Senate Bill 120 (commonly referred to as the “slots bill”), allowing this type of gambling was also passed without a Constitutional Amendment.[14] In other words, Kentuckians did not have any say in the implementation of these highly addictive gambling machines.

                This Note concludes the legislation passed redefining the term “pari-mutuel wagering” is unconstitutional because it defies section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution, it is special legislation benefitting only a special interest, and it violates the separation of powers clause. Part I clarifies the factual definition of pari-mutuel wagering and why the HHR machines do not fall under this category. Part II outlines the language of the bill that redefined pari-mutuel wagering and its implications. Part III discusses how this act of legislation violates both section 226, and the separation of powers clause, of the Kentucky Constitution. Part IV addresses the inferior tax structure and clear favoritism of the horse industry. Lastly, Part V examines solutions in terms of why a constitutional amendment is required for expanded gaming such as this, and how legalized gaming should be taxed.

I. What is Pari-Mutuel Wagering? 

                In the state of Kentucky, any wagering on horse racing must be based on a pari-mutuel system.[15] Section 226 of the State Constitution says that “lotteries and gift enterprises are forbidden, . . . and none shall be exercised, and no schemes for similar purposes shall be allowed.” meaning, as Kentucky courts have interpreted, gambling is generally outlawed in the state of Kentucky.[16] There are key exceptions, however, such as the state lottery, charitable gaming and of course, pari-mutuel horse racing.[17]

                Pari-mutuel wagering differs significantly from typical casino or sports wagering in that a bettor is betting against other bettors rather than against the association (“house”), like in a blackjack game, for example.[18] In other words, at any given horse race, there is a pool of money that consists of every bet that has been placed on that current race.[19] This pool of bets also dictates the odds and potential payout of each horse, which provides transparency to every bettor.[20] When the race ends, the pool of money is then disbursed to those with winning bets, and the payout to the winners depends on the final odds just before the race began with lower final odds resulting in a higher payout for the winners.[21]

                If the bettors are only betting amongst themselves, what is in it for the racetrack owners, the horsemen, and horse owners? This is referred to as the “takeout,” which is a percentage of the winnings (usually 10-20% depending on the state and track) distributed among these participants of the race itself and to taxes.[22] Because the rates of the takeout do not change, the winning bettors are essentially paying a cut to the racetrack for putting on the race.[23]

A.      Common Meaning 

                Given that KRS Chapter 230, which regulates pari-mutuel horse racing, does not define the term “pari-mutuel,” Kentucky courts have used a variety of sources to ascertain the commonly understood meaning of the term.[24] For example, the federal Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, which was designed to standardize the practice of off-track betting, described pari-mutuel wagering as "[a]ny system whereby wagers with respect to the outcome of a horserace are placed with, or in, a wagering pool conducted by a person licensed or otherwise permitted to do so under State law, and in which the participants are wagering with each other and not against the operator.”.[25]

                The term “pari-mutuel” comes from the French language with “pari” meaning “to bet” and “mutual” meaning “mutual” or “reciprocal.”[26] In Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky described pari-mutuel as:

[t]he operator of the machine does not bet at all. He merely conducts a game, which is played by the use of a certain machine, the effect of which is that all who buy pools on a given race bet as among themselves; the wagers of all constituting a pool going to the winner or winners. The operator receives 5 per cent. of the wages as his commission. But in selling ordinary pools on horse races the seller does not operate a “machine or contrivance used in betting.” Neither does he bet on a horse race.[27]

In addition, the KHRC’s regulatory definition matches squarely with these historic definitions in providing that it is: “wagering among themselves and not against the association and amounts wagered are placed in one or more designated wagering pools and the net pool is returned to the winning patrons.”[28]

                The Kentucky courts, KHRC, and federal government agreed on the uniform definition. Thus, before the year 2021, “pari-mutuel” inarguably had a factual, universal meaning.

B.      HHR Machines are not Pari-Mutuel Wagering 

                Despite the well-understood meaning of pari-mutuel, Kentucky horse tracks began to push the envelope (or simply throw the envelope away) by introducing the HHR machines in 2011.[29]  “Triple Action Dragons”, “The Enforcer” and “Tiger Lord” are just a few of the hundreds of various HHR slot gaming themes.[30] The machine itself resembles that of a slot machine exactly. Money is inserted. The patron hits a button. Spinning wheels, lights and sounds stimulate each patron.[31] The horse tracks and KHRC justified the inception with the fact that the results produced by the machines were based on previously run races.[32] The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission disagreed, however, and in a 7-0 ruling held the HHR machines did not constitute a pari-mutuel system of wagering.[33]

                In the ruling Justice VanMeter explained that there are two essential elements that must be in place for pari-mutuel wagering, being “patrons are wagering among themselves and not against the association,” and “amounts wagered are placed in one or more designated wagering pools.”[34] 

                In order for patrons to be able to bet among themselves, there must be a discreet, individual event on which wagers are made.[35] For example, all horse races are discrete in that thousands of bettors are able to wager among themselves at the same time, which is absolutely necessary for pari-mutuel wagering to take place. The biggest key to this—as the court explained—is reciprocity.[36] Reciprocity, translated from the French word mutuel, means mutual dependence on another.[37] In wagering, this is the requirement for bettors to have dependence on each other’s bet or to “bet amongst themselves.”[38] In describing this reciprocity, Justice VanMeter stated, “Without providing simultaneous access to one historical horse race to the same group of patrons, no pari-mutuel pool can be created among the patrons in which they are wagering among themselves, setting the odds and the payout.”[39]

In addition to reciprocity, the second prong is that there must be one or more designated wagering pools for the given event.[40] In Family Trust, KHRC contended that because there was an “initial seed pool” created by the racetracks, the pool designation prong was satisfied.[41] The Supreme Court again disagreed stating:

“The betting pools are required to be established only by the patrons. And, as found by the trial court, based on testimony, a possibility exists that one patron could win all of the net pool, which would then require the association to step back in and replenish the seed pool. At such points, the pools are not created by the patrons as required by pari-mutuel wagering.”[42]  

In other words, when it comes to HHR machines, the association is the opposition on the other end of a given bet by a patron, making it impossible for pari-mutuel wagering to exist. Regardless of how the money lost by patrons is organized, the bottom line is that there cannot be a common pool among patrons when only the association establishes the “pool”—which is unavoidable with HHR machines.[43]

II. The “Slots Bill” 

                In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling that HHR machines did not constitute pari-mutuel wagering, the Kentucky General Assembly immediately passed Senate Bill 120 that simply redefined the term “pari-mutuel” under KRS Chapter 230 to fit the KHRC and keep the horse industry’s exclusive slot gaming business alive.[44] The “new” definition provided in KRS Chapter 230 is as follows:

“Pari-mutuel wagering”… means any method of wagering previously or hereafter approved by the racing commission in which one (1) or more patrons wager on a horse race or races, whether live, simulcast, or previously run. Wagers shall be placed in one (1) or more wagering pools, and wagers on different races or sets of races may be pooled together. Patrons may establish odds or payouts, and winning patrons share in amounts wagered including any carryover amounts, plus any amounts provided by an association less any deductions required, as approved by the racing commission and permitted by law. Pools may be paid out incrementally over time as approved by the racing commission.[45] 

It is immediately apparent that the General Assembly completely ignored the factual definition of pari-mutuel. In the paragraph-long definition there is no mention of “patrons wagering among themselves and not against the association” or “wagering generated only by the patrons”—the two key requirements of pari-mutuel wagering the Supreme Court of Kentucky laid out just months prior to this bill.[46] As Martin Cothran for the Family Foundation put it, “the legislature…simply wrote a new definition for pari-mutuel wagering, one not shared by anyone outside Kentucky…rather than the horse tracks and their allies on the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission changing their actions to bring them into alignment with the law, lawmakers simply changed the law to suit a very wealthy and influential special interest.”[47]

                Not only did the legislature disregard the Supreme Court’s requirements of what constitutes pari-mutuel wagering, the substance of the new definition does not resemble what actual pari-mutuel wagering is.[48] Breaking down the first sentence, the statute states, “any method approved by the KHRC in which one or more patrons wager on a horse race.”[49] The key here is that it states “one or more.” [Opposite of what pari-mutuel actually means (wager among others, dependence on each other, reciprocity, etc.), allowing one person to make a bet against the association is exactly what it sounds like—a slot machine bet.[50]]

                The second half of the definition attempts to address the “wagering pool” concept that is necessary for wagering to be pari-mutuel.[51] Remember, it must be a pool established only by the patrons on a discrete, finite event.[52] The legislature completely does away with this requirement as well. Instead of requiring patrons to establish the odds and pool, the bill states the “patrons may establish odds or payouts” giving leeway to the association to establish it themselves.[53] Also, pools “being paid out overtime” are the opposite of a pool created for a discrete event. Essentially, this gives the association authority to handle the wagers however it pleases with zero transparency to the patrons. Even though the legislature uses the term “pool,” this is simply a façade. Just as a typical casino does, the “house” keeps the money lost by patrons and pays that money out over time to their discretion.[54]

                The implication of the bill is that it allows the horsetracks to run casinos (at the discretion of the KHRC, who has every incentive to only bolster the horsetracks) without fear of competition or consequences.[55] Prominent spokesperson of the Kentucky faithful and Kentucky Sports Radio founder, Matt Jones, has recognized the absurdity of the bill. Just after the bill was passed Jones stated, “In Kentucky we now have legal lottery and slot machines, the two worst forms of gambling that are the hardest to win, most regressive and addictive. Meanwhile sports gambling, poker, etc where you actually can win are still illegal. Logic and reason is not our strong suit.”[56] Kentucky voters thought they were electing representatives who would act in their constituents’ best interest—yet, what they got was the legalization of slot machines, which are a regressive tax on lower income individuals and more addictive than any other form of gambling.[57]

III. Section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Separation of Powers 

A.      HRR Machines Violate Section 226.               

 Any proposed expanded form of gambling in Kentucky must pass the scrutiny of section226 of the Kentucky Constitution, which states, “lotteries and gift enterprises are forbidden, and none shall be exercised, and no schemes for similar purposes shall be allowed.”[58] At the time of its adoption the framers of the current Kentucky Constitution understood the term “lottery” to mean a system in which players wager that a particular number will be selected in a random drawing.[59] The seminal case Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club,[60] delineated the scope of the provision and the definition of the term lottery in saying:

A lottery, it is said, is a species of gambling, described as a scheme for the distribution of prizes or things of value, by lot or by chance, among persons who have paid, or agree to pay, a valuable consideration, for the chance to share in the distribution…[61]

The court summarized this definition as comprising four elements “consideration, chance, prize, and means of disbursement.”[62] While pari-mutuel horse race betting clearly involves these four elements, the court still allowed for the exception of this type of gambling.[63] The essence of the holding was the element of skill rather than chance in horse race wagering.[64] The court found that “the clear weight of authority does not sustain the position . . . that the result of a horse race depends on mere chance within the meaning of that term in the definition of a lottery.”[65] At the core of this reasoning was the distinction between gaming, betting, and lotteries. As the court stated, “Gaming, betting, and lotteries are separate and distinct things in law and in fact, and have been recognized consistently as calling for different treatment and varying penalties. The distinctions are well developed, clearly marked, and in most instances rigidly maintained.”[66] To truly understand why the court allowed for pari-mutuel wagering, a dissection of these terms must be done.

                The term “lottery,” as stated before, requires there be consideration, chance, prize, and means of disbursement.[67] Kentucky courts have interpreted this term broadly as any game distributing a prize predominately by chance for consideration.[68] In determining whether a device or system constitutes a lottery, the element of chance is most debated. Kentucky courts have ruled where chance is the “dominant factor” in deciding the outcome, the scheme is deemed a lottery and thus prohibited.[69] This dominant factor approach has prohibited numerous gambling schemes in Kentucky, including pinball machines,[70] promotional enterprises based on theater ticket sales,[71] pyramid schemes,[72] and numbers games.[73] All of these are lotteries in that chance is the predominant factor producing the result.

                Historically, “gaming” refers to individuals participating in playing a game such as cards or dice, with a wager involved, and where chance is the controlling factor of the outcome.[74] The term “has a rather restricted meaning, and applies only to betting upon the result of some game played with cards, dice, machine, wheel, or other contrivance.”[75] Gaming and lotteries are often used interchangeably in that both involve a predominant factor of chance.[76] The term “lottery” is broader in that it encompasses all games of chance, including drawings, raffles, etc.[77] The bottom line is that both lotteries and gaming, because of their predominant factor of chance, are prohibited under section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution.[78]

                The term “betting,” includes all forms of gambling, both legal and illegal in the state of Kentucky.[79] “To bet is to put to hazard a sum ascertained on a future happening of some event then uncertain; to gamble or game for money or other stakes; or to stake or pledge money or property on an event of a contingent issue, or to wager.”[80] The court in McDevitt v Thomas seemed to distinguish the wagering done under a lottery versus that of betting on horses:

[T]he words “betting” and “wagering” have a much broader and more comprehensive meaning than the word “gaming.” They are unrestricted in their scope, and it is immaterial whether the subject of the wager is one denounced or prohibited by statute or not. The subject of a wager may be, and frequently is, a perfectly innocent pastime, or a legally authorized act; such as the test of speed of animals or men, or the result of an election, or it may be based upon a mere matter of opinion or the exercise of judgment, such as the height of a mountain, the width of a river, the distance of an object, or the weight of a given article.[81]

Years later, in Kentucky Jockey Club, the court legally authorized betting on horses, revolving around the idea that a wager is placed on the basis of an exercise of opinion or judgment.[82] That is to say, the betting that is legal under section 226 may not be on the basis of mere chance.[83] Precedent after Kentucky Jockey Club expanded on this concept as the courts began to view these issues under the light of a dominant factor approach.[84] This approach stipulates, “the test of the character of the game is not whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which is the dominating element that determines the results of the game.”[85] This approach was used in the case of Commonwealth v Allen, where the court held that “chance permeated the entire scheme,” rendering it a lottery.[86]

                Applying the holding of Kentucky Jockey Club and its precedents to the present day issue of the HHR machines, it is clear the machines do not constitute legal wagering under section 226.[87] The only way the machines pass the scrutiny of section 226 is if they constitute pari-mutuel horse betting.[88] As discussed in Part I, the 7-0 ruling from the Kentucky Supreme Court answered the question of whether the machines use a pari-mutuel system.[89] The HHR machines do not work under a pari-mutuel system because there is no reciprocity and the patrons do not establish the wagering pools.[90]

                In addition to not being under a pari-mutuel system, the very nature of wagering the HHR machines administer is unlawful under the holding of Kentucky Jockey Club, because the machines constitute a lottery prohibited by section 226.[91] The machines are a lottery as they operate on the basis of chance rather than an exercise of a patron’s judgment, opinion, or skill.[92] To place a bet on an HHR machine a patron merely approaches the machine, inserts money, presses a button, and within seconds either wins or loses.[93] There is no judgment or skill involved and the user experience is the same as playing a slot machine at a casino.[94]

                The KHRC and horse tracks contend that because the machines produce results based on past races they are different from the standard casino slot machine.[95] However, while the mechanism may be different, the effect on the patron wagering is still the same—that is, randomness.[96] HHR machines generate numbers by selecting at random three different races from a database of historical races.[97] Whether or not a machine uses a random number generator or past races does not matter to the patron playing because the end result is that it is still random. There is no opportunity for skill or judgment. In actual horse racing or simulcasting a bettor has the chance to study statistics of each horse, see the horses in real time and learn the tendencies of jockeys and trainers.[98] In HHR gaming, however, these factors are not relevant, nor are they known to the bettor.[99] Ironically, Kentucky horse tracks such as Red Mile, even refer to the HHR system as “gaming”—a word narrowly used for casino games of chance, as previously mentioned.[100] Jordan Scot Flynn Hollander of the UNLV Gaming Law Journal addressed the issue of instant horse machines as it pertains to New Jersey in saying:

The random races that determine the outcome of games played on these devices are based on previously run races, not live races, nor are they based on actual-time simulcasting of those races…while instant horse wagering devices may be based on historical horse races, they are simply not the same as live and simulcast pari-mutuel wagering. They are slot machines with a different kind of random number generator.[101]

The essence of the issue is that the mechanism, in which HHR machines operate, relies on a system of mere chance.[102] The same nature of mere chance that Kentucky Jockey Club distinguished as a lottery that is prohibited under section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution.[103] Despite the HHR machines being in clear violation of this provision of the Kentucky Constitution, the General Assembly decided to circumvent this constitutional restriction on games of chance by redefining the word “pari-mutuel wagering” to include HHR machines.[104]

B.  Violation Of The Separation Of Powers Clause 

                Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution states, “The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.”[105] The idea of separation of powers has always been an integral part of the federal government and national constitution.[106] At the state level, “it is well settled law in the state of Kentucky that one branch of Kentucky’s tripartite government may not encroach upon the inherent powers granted to it by any other branch.”[107] The powers of each branch are also plainly delineated, being that, the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law.[108]

                In the case of the HHR machines, the legislative branch of Kentucky completely ignored the powers of the judiciary. As discussed in Part II, under the slots bill, the General Assembly wrote an entirely new definition for “pari-mutuel,” only months after the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling that HHR machines did not constitute pari-mutuel wagering.[109] Not only does the new definition allow for wagering against the house, instead of among patrons (as required under a pari-mutuel system), it also allows for wagering on previously run races.[110] This provision was for the HHR machines. Even though they use “previously run races” simply as a random number generator, the inclusion of this provision and the elimination of reciprocity and patrons establishing the pools, are all the horse tracks needed to keep the HHR machines running.[111] While the legislature’s job is to make the law, the General Assembly in Kentucky decided it was also under their power to construe, and define it.[112]

                Each branch of government is responsible for their duties and the courts’ deference to the legislative branch has its limits.[113] These limits are in place for the protection of the people and for the courts to be able to construe the law as to it what it means in reference to the Constitution.[114] There is perhaps no better example of these limits on legislative deference in the state of Kentucky than the seminal case in 1989 of Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.[115]

                In Rose, the Supreme Court of Kentucky interpreted section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution which states,  “The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State."[116] The court ruled that the General Assembly did not satisfy the constitutional requirement because it did not provide an efficient school system throughout the state.[117] Representatives of the General Assembly argued that they should have the sole discretionary power to determine whether the school system is constitutionally sufficient.[118] But the Supreme Court stood its ground. Chief Justice Stevens made it clear to the legislature that while the opinions of the legislature are given some weight and deference, the ultimate duty of enforcing the Constitution lies with the judiciary—“it is our sworn duty, to decide such questions when they are before us by applying the constitution.”[119] As Justice Stevens stated the court is charged with the responsibility of holding the legislature accountable to the Constitution and to protect the rights of the people.[120] Expanding on this idea, Justice Stevens stated, “to avoid deciding the case because of ‘legislative discretion,’ ‘legislative function,’ etc., would be a denigration of our own constitutional duty.[121] To allow the General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are constitutional is literally unthinkable.”[122]

                Rose is now viewed as a landmark case because it truly shows how the separation of powers is supposed to work.[123] Immediately after the ruling, the General Assembly acted with tremendous speed, reforming the educational system providing funding across the Commonwealth to public schools.[124] The legislature listened to the judiciary and Kentucky “sustained the most long-lasting, comprehensive education reforms in the nation.”[125]

                Why is this relevant to the case of HHR machines in Kentucky? The holding of Rose revolved around the definition of one word—“efficient.”[126] Before Rose, the legislature thought they had the power to interpret what the word meant in the public school system.[127] Due to incentives such as reelection and seeking to please interest groups, the politicians’ definition of what “efficient” meant did not align with the purpose of section 183 and most importantly, the interest of the people.[128] That is where the judiciary steps in. Where the legislature fails to align with the values, purpose, and interest of the Constitution and its people, the judiciary’s role is to step in and enforce these interests.[129]

In concluding the role of the judiciary in Rose Justice Stevens ended with these powerful words:

The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely the function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be exercised even when such action serves as a check on the activities of another branch of government or when the court's view of the constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the public.[130]

In the case of HHR, the Supreme Court unanimously defined “pari-mutuel” as it applies to section 226 of the Constitution.[131] The purpose of section 226 was to prevent the proliferation of gambling on mere chance throughout the state of Kentucky.[132] Just like in Rose, the court defined what the law meant, protecting the purpose of the Constitution and the interest of the people.[133] Instead of allowing the court to construe what the law means, the legislature took it upon themselves to do just that.[134] The General Assembly decided they had the power to define and construe the law and implemented the new definition—a definition that is not shared by anyone outside the state of Kentucky.[135] A definition that goes against the very purpose of section 226.[136] A definition that allows for the most addictive and regressive form of gambling to be spread throughout the Commonwealth.[137]

IV. The Legislature’s Favoritism of the Horse Racing Industry   

                After the legislature executed the slots bill, the floodgates have opened for the expansion of  gaming in Kentucky. Various gaming machines, referred to as “gray machines” have already begun to show up across the state at gas stations, convenient stores, and bars.[138] Operators of the machines argue they operate just the same as the HHR machines, and in fact, allow for an opportunity of judgment and skill, unlike HHR machines.[139] Instead of merely pressing a button, a player wins a game by tapping the screen on an icon, to match three of the same icons in a row.[140] After all, if the horse racing industry can run machines of chance, why can another company not do the same with games of skill? 

                This is where the true interest of the legislature shows itself. Lawmakers have already began to speak on the issue of gray machines simply because they do not support the horse racing industry like the HHR machines.[141] In fact, the legislature has already proposed a bill outlawing the gray machines.[142] Senate Majority Floor Leader, Damon Thayer, justified his position in opposing the gray machines saying they do not serve a “higher purpose.”[143] Just what is the higher purpose Senator Thayer is referring to? That would be the purpose of HHR, which is to benefit the horse industry, and a very small percentage actually going to the coffers of the state of Kentucky.[144] While the gray machines provide benefits to small business and proceeds to the Fraternal Order of Police, that does not seem to be the “higher purpose” Senator Thayer is looking for.[145] As Linda Blackford of Kentucky’s Herald Leader put it, “Damon Thayer and his allies showed how easy it is to make some formerly illegal slot machines legal and now the gray machine advocates want a shot. The horse people showed them a really good model: Shower your legislators with attention and donations and they will make your slot machines legal, too.”[146]

                The small percentage of HHR going to Kentucky’s General Fund is a result of the appalling tax structure.[147] The tax structure of HHR is the most blatant evidence of the legislature catering to the whims of the horse industry. Currently, the state of Kentucky tax on HHR machines is only 1.5% of the handle, the total amount wagered on the machines by the public.[148] With this minute tax, the actual percentage that is then converted to the Kentucky General Fund is a mere 8% of the gross commission.[149] This is grossly lower than what relative states tax on their slot machines. Slots are taxed at 55% in Pennsylvania, 53.5% in West Virginia, 33% in Ohio, 40% in Indiana, and 50% in Illinois.[150]

Conclusion 

                Putting aside the issue of the constitutionality of HHR machines, the first step Kentucky must take is to tax them. Between the years 2016 to 2021, betting on HHR machines in the state of Kentucky grew 463% with the total amount of $3.6 billion being bet in the year 2021.[151] That is twice what Kentuckians bet on the lottery and live horse racing combined.[152] Yet, the General Fund collected only $15 million in tax revenue in 2020, compared to $274 million from the lottery.[153] As Democratic Representative Tina Bojanowski put it:

Through the backdoor of HHR slot machines, we now have slots in Kentucky. But because of the egregiously low tax rate, we are not seeing the tax revenue we should. We’re paying the social costs of gambling but receiving almost none of the benefit.[154]

If Kentucky simply raised the tax rate to be in the range of other states, $100 million would be raised annually for public investment, like health care and education.[155] The Kentucky legislature needs to act now and get Kentucky its fair share.

                With that being said, the law the legislature passed allowing slot machines explicitly violates section 226 of the Constitution.[156] If this law is here to stay, there is no bound to how far the legislature may go in expanding gaming in the state. As recently as March of 2022, lawmakers have introduced a bill to legalize sports betting that would be regulated by the KHRC.[157] If enacted, this bill would violate section 226, without giving a voice to the people, just as the slots bill did.

                In order to solve this issue, Kentucky should introduce expanded gambling the proper way via a constitutional amendment. Whether it is slot machines in the form of HHR, sports gambling, or casino gambling in general, the only way these forms can be introduced without violating section 226 is through a constitutional amendment.[158] This would put the issue of expanded gambling to a vote, putting it in the hands of the people, rather than the legislature. Stan Cave, a Lexington-based attorney with the Family Foundation, is a proponent of this idea with any form of expanded gambling in Kentucky: “the plain language in Section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution, an opinion of the highest court in Kentucky at the time and two attorney general opinions make clear that a constitutional amendment is required to legalize sports wagering of the types being considered.”[159] A constitutional amendment is also how Kentucky legalized the state lottery in 1988.[160] Even though the lottery was clearly prohibited by section 226, a referendum by the people allowed this narrow exception, and the Kentucky Constitution was amended.[161] It is well founded that the legislature of a state cannot legalize any form of gambling that is within the scope and meaning of a prohibition in the constitution of the state, unless there is an amendment to the state constitution.[162] A look how a similar state has expanded gambling can be used as a model for Kentucky.

                One of Kentucky’s neighboring states, Ohio, is a great example of using a constitutional amendment for casino gambling. Ohio’s gambling laws under the Ohio Constitution were almost identical to that of Kentucky’s in that “[l]otteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, for any purpose whatever, shall forever be prohibited in this State.”[163] In 2009, however, a constitutional amendment was put to a vote and the people in Ohio elected to allow casino gaming.[164] Features of the bill included a tax rate of 33% of all gross casino revenue (with details regarding how the money will be distributed), a requirement of $50 million fee for any casino to open, and creating an Ohio gaming commission whose sole responsibility is to regulate casino gaming in Ohio.[165] Putting the issue of expanded gambling to a vote incentivizes the legislature to provide citizen-focused policies in the bill, as they did Ohio, because its passage is dependent on the peoples’ approval (as a change to the state constitution should be). If the people of Kentucky elect to allow HHR slots, sports gambling, or casinos--vices they know will have great cost to Kentuckians—they no doubt will want their fair share of taxes and an independent gaming commission regulating it. A monopolistic horse racing industry having an entire gambling market to themselves, with the aligned horse racing commission regulating it, is not in the interest of the public. If gaming is going to enter the state, Kentuckians should have the ability to choose if it is done, and how it is done.

 

 


[1] J.D. Expected 2023, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.S. Economics 2019, University of Kentucky

[2]See Horse Capital of the World, Lexington Visitor Ctr., https://www.visitlex.com/ things-to-do/horses/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/5XTM-4U3Q].

[3] John Isaac, Guide to Online Casinos in Kentucky: The Best Kentucky Casino Sites for 2022, Online-Gambling, https://www.online-gambling.com/us/kentucky/casinos/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/WU9M-GAQY].

[4] M. Shannon Bishop, And They're Off: The Legality of Interstate Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Its Impact on the Thoroughbred Horse Industry, 89 Ky. L.J. 711, 712 (2001).

[5] Id.

[6] Economic Impact of the EQUINE INDUSTRY in Kentucky, Kentuckybred.org, https://www.kentuckybred.org/kentucky-equine-industry-impact/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9CRH-6DZU]; J. Shannon Neibergs, Kentucky Parimutuel Revenue Policy Simulator, Gaming Rsch. & Rev. J. 17 (2000).

[7] Horse Racing History, Winning Ponies.com, https://www.winningponies.com/horse-racing-history.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/WW2G-9CYR].

[8] See Kentucky Online Casinos & Real Money Gambling, Lets Gamble USA (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.letsgambleusa.com/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/4CSE-MSPL].

[9] Adam K. Raymond, How decades-old horse races saved a signature kentucky industry, Spectrum News 1 (Apr. 23, 2021), https://spectrumnews1.com/ky/louisville/news/2021/ 04/21/the-rise-of-historical-horse-racing-in-kentucky [https://perma.cc/E253-ZFTG]; Mike Murphy, Kentucky Supreme Court Rules Against Historical Horse Racing, BettingUSA.com (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.bettingusa.com/supreme-court-kentucky-hhr-case/ [https://perma.cc/742C-QDRL].

[10] Id.

[11] Ky. Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).                                                        

[12] Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595, 600–03 (Ky. 2020).

[13] Ky. Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[14] Joe Sonka, Kentucky Senate Passes Bill to Legalize Slot-Like Historical Horse Racing Machines, Louisville Courier J. (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/ news/politics/ky-general-assembly/2021/02/09/senate-passes-bill-legalizing-historical-horse-racing-machines/4455009001/ [https://perma.cc/CR7G-6EAT].

[15] 811 Ky. Admin. Regs. 2:060 (2021).

[16] Ky. Const. § 226, Bishop, supra note 4, at 603.

[17] Jane Block, Legal Betting, Poker & Casinos in Kentucky, Gambling Online (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.gamblingonline.com/laws/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/3N5J-XJ6W].

[18] Pari-Mutuel Betting—What It Is and How It Works, New York Sports Betting https://www.nysportsbetting.com/guide/pari-mutuel/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3MKR-8VEB].

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] What is a Takeout in Horse Betting, Ezhorsebetting (June 16, 2017), https://www.ezhorsebetting.com/what-is-takeout-in-horse-betting/ [https://perma.cc/HVZ6-MZXM]; Paul Bergeron, Why Horse Bettors Should Eye Takeout Rates and Bet Accordingly, PlayUSA (June 2, 2021), https://www.playusa.com/why-horse-bettors-should-eye-takeout-rates/ [https://perma.cc/2XVS-PWRX].

[23] Id.

[24] Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, 620 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Ky. 2020).

[25] International Horseracing Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–515 § 3, 92 Stat. 1811, 1812 (1978).

[26] Pari-Mutuel, Online Etymology Dictionary (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.etymonline.com/word/pari-mutuel [https://perma.cc/UQ4H-YU55].

[27] Commonwealth v. Ky. Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d 987, 991 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931).

[28] 811 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:005 (effective May 31, 2019, the Commission revised its regulations).

[29] Raymond, supra note 9;  Murphy, supra note 9.

[30] Themed Games, Red Mile Gaming & Racing, https://redmileky.com/gaming/themed-games (last visited Oct. 26, 2022) [https://perma.cc/96N6-BCZR].

[31] Brief for Appellant at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-000630-TG).

[32] Id.

[33]  Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, 620 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Ky. 2020).

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 601.

[37] Reciprocal, Interglot Translation Dictionary, https://www.interglot.com/ dictionary/en/fr/search?q=reciprocal (last visited Oct. 26, 2022) [https://perma.cc/VJJ9-KGW2].

[38] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[39] Id. at 601.

[40] Id. at 600.

[41] Id. at 599.

[42] Id. at 601.

[43] Id.

[44] S. 120, (2021) https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/21RS/sb120.html [https://perma.cc/6S6W-MXXL].

[45] Id.

[46] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[47] SB 120—The Slots Bill Was an Unconstitutional Millionaire’s Stimulus Bill, The Family Foundation (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.kentuckyfamily.org/sb-120-the-slots-bill-was-an-unconstitutional-millionaires-stimulus-bill/ [https://perma.cc/XS5F-6RWZ].

[48] S. 120 § 15, supra note 45 (current/final version).

[49] Id.

[50] WILLSTN-CN § 17:7.

[51] S. 120 § 15, supra note 45.

[52] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[53] S. 120, supra note 45.

[54]  WILLSTN-CN § 17:7.

[55] Jon Friedl, Kentucky Slot Machine Casino Gambling, Professor Slots (Sep. 22, 2021), https://professorslots.com/kentucky-slot-machine-casino-gambling/ [https://perma.cc/9687-M299].

[56] Jennifer Newell, PokerStars Settles with Kentucky After SCOTUS Petition, Legal US Poker Sites (Sep. 27, 2021), https://www.legaluspokersites.com/news/pokerstars-settles-with-kentucky/28193/ [https://perma.cc/3SC8-E84A].

[57] Joseph Bentivegna, Sports Gambling is Another Tax on the Poor and Minorities, CT Viewpoints (Apr. 1, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/category/ct-viewpoints/sports-gambling-is-another-tax-on-the-poor-and-minorities [https://perma.cc/G29L-34T6].

[58] Ky. Const. § 226.

[59] Op. Att’ys Gen. 05–003 (2005).

[60] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id. at 1009.

[64] Id.

[65] Id.

[66] Id. at 994.

[67] Id. at 992.

[68] Otto v. Kosofsky, 476 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Ky. 1971).

[69] Ky. Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[70] A. B. Long Music Co. v. Com., 429 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1968).

[71] Commonwealth v. Malco-Memphis Theatres, Inc., 169 S.W.2d 596 (1943).

[72] Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (1966).

[73] Gilley v. Commonwealth, 229 S.W.2d 60 (1950).

[74] Kimberly C. Simmons, Definitions of "Gambling" and "Gaming", 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 5 (2022).

[75] McDevitt v. Thomas, 114 S.W. 273, 274 (1908).

[76] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[77] Id.

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80] Kimberly C. Simmons, Definitions of "Gambling" and "Gaming"—terms Descriptive of Related Acts, 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 6 (2022).

[81] McDevitt, 114 S.W. at 274.

[82] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[83] Id.

[84] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[85] Kimberly C. Simmons, Definitions and Distinctions Regarding Games of Skill and Games of Chance, 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 2 (2022).

[86] Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1966).

[87] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[88] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[89] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[94] Id.

[95] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[96] Id.

[97] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[98] Factors to Consider When Betting on Horse Racing, The Plaid Horse (July 7, 2021), https://www.theplaidhorse.com/2021/07/07/factors-to-consider-when-betting-on-horse-racing/ [https://perma.cc/5EZH-H5M4].

[99] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[100] Themed Games, Red Mile Gaming & Racing, https://redmileky.com/gaming/themed-games (last visited Dec. 12. 2022) [https://perma.cc/Y8F7-BNVZ].

[101] Jordan Scot Flynn Hollander, And They're Off! Would Instant Horse Wagering in New Jersey Require Voter Approval?, 6 UNLV GAMING L.J. 239 (2016).

[102] Id.

[103] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[104] S. 120, supra note 45.

[105] Ky. Const. § 27.

[106] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).

[107] Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Bevin, 575 S.W.3d 673, 681 (Ky. 2019).

[108] Id.

[109] S. 120, supra note 45.

[110] Id.

[111] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[112] S. 120, supra note 45.

[113] Sonja Ralston Elder, STANDING UP TO LEGISLATIVE BULLIES: SEPARATION OF POWERS, STATE COURTS, AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS, 57 Duke L.J. 755 (2007).

[114] Id.

[115] Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

[116] Ky. Const. § 183.

[117] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.

[118] Id. at 205.

[119] Id. at 209.

[120] Id.

[121] Id.

[122] Id.

[123] Elder, supra note 114.

[124] Id.

[125] Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & Educ. 485 (1999).

[126] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.

[127] Id.

[128] Elder, supra note 114.

[129] Id.

[130] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209.

[131] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[132] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[133] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209.

[134] Martin Cothran, SB 120 – THE SLOTS BILL – WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MILLIONAIRE’S STIMULUS BILL, The Family Foundation (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.kentuckyfamily.org/sb-120-the-slots-bill-was-an-unconstitutional-millionaires-stimulus-bill/ [https://perma.cc/DC45-8T4Y].

[135] Id.

[136] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[137] Joseph Bentivegna MD, Sports Gambling Is Another Tax on the Poor and Minorities, CT Viewpoints (Apr. 1, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/2021/04/01/sports-gambling-is-another-tax-on-the-poor-and-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/26VR-8Y3A].

[138] Janet Patton & Bill Estep, Unregulated Slot Machines Are Flooding Kentucky. and Police Are Helping, for a Cut, Lexington Herald Leader (Feb. 6, 2022), https://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/article257134862.html.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] H. B. 606 (2022), https://legiscan.com/KY/text/SB213/2022 [https://perma.cc/4482-5K4L].

[143] Patton & Estep, supra note 139.

[144] Linda Blackford, New Slot Machines Show Confusion of Ky’s Gambling Laws. the Answer: Legalize Everything., Lexington Herald Leader, https://www.kentucky.com/ opinion/linda-blackford/article257654873.html ( Feb. 6, 2022).

[145] Patton & Estep, supra note 139.

[146] Blackford, supra note 145.

[147] Jason Bailey, Letter to the Kentucky House of Representatives on Raising the Inadequate Tax Rate on HHR Slot Machines, Kentucky Center for Economic Policy (Feb. 20, 2021), https://kypolicy.org/letter-to-kentucky-house-raising-hhr-slot-machine-tax-rate/ [https://perma.cc/5544-263P].

[148] Id.

[149] Id.

[150] Id.

[151] Tina Bojanowski, Kentucky Lawmakers Must Fix a Tax-Rate Mistake While Protecting Historical Horse Racing, Courier Journal (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2021/02/05/historic-horse-racing-kentucky-should-raise-tax-rate-machines/4412150001/ [https://perma.cc/DS9V-UR4Z].

[152] Id.

[153] Id.

[154] Id.

[155] Id.

[156] S. 120, supra note 45.

[157] H. B. 606 (2022), https://legiscan.com/KY/text/SB213/2022 [https://perma.cc/N2BJ-7RRS].

[158] Legislative Research Commission, House Votes to Take a Gamble on Sports Betting, Times Tribune (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.thetimestribune.com/news/local_news/house-votes-to-take-a-gamble-on-sports-betting/article_20379d67-fd44-5358-bf8d-596e5a23b148.html [https://perma.cc/9XJF-TKLS].

[159] Kentucky: Sports Betting Would Not Require Constitutional Amendment, Yogonet, https://www.yogonet.com/international/news/2019/12/19/51914-kentucky-sports-betting-would-not-require-constitutional-amendment (last visited Dec. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/DE5M-438K].

[160] Kentucky Lottery History, Lottery-tickets.net (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.lottery-tickets.net/kentucky-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/32WY-YZHQ].

[161] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[162] Kimberly C. Simmons, Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Regarding Gaming, Generally, 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 18 (2022).

[163] Ohio Const. art. XV, § 6.

[164] Ohio Casino Approval and Tax Distribution, Amendment 3, Ballotpedia (2009), https://dev.ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Casino_Approval_and_Tax_Distribution,_Amendment_3_ [https://perma.cc/E8AJ-FW4X].

[165] Id.