Kentucky Business Organizations “Created” by a Filing with the Secretary of State

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Kentucky Business Organizations “Created” by a Filing with the Secretary of State 

Thomas E. Rutledge* 

Introduction

Under the federal Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”)[2] and the related Reporting Regulations,[3] most business organizations created in the United States[4] are subject, absent the availability of one or more of twenty-three exemptions,[5] to beneficial ownership reporting obligations.[6] Now “most” is not all, so it is important to distinguish between those organizations that at least initially are subject to these reporting obligations with all of the penalties that may attach upon a failure to discharge those obligations from those organizations that are ab initio outside the scope of the CTA and the Reporting Regulations. This differentiation will often be a matter of state law, and the objective of this article is to review Kentucky law against those particular provisions of the CTA and the Reporting Regulations. 

I.      The Gateway Question - Is My ??? a Reporting Company? 

The first step in the CTA analysis of a particular venture is to determine whether it is “reporting company.” A reporting company is obligated to file beneficial ownership reports into the Beneficial Ownership Secure System (“BOSS”) database being set up by FinCEN.[7] But if not a reporting company, then there is no filing obligation. The Reporting Regulations provide:

The term “domestic reporting company” means any entity that is: 

(A)   A corporation;

(B) A limited liability company; or

(C) Created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or any similar office under the law of a State or Indian tribe.[8]

At first blush this provision seems to identify three paths, any of which results in the venture under consideration being a reporting company:[9] (i) if venture is a corporation then it is a domestic reporting company; (ii) if venture is a limited liability company then it is a domestic reporting company; and (iii) if venture is a business entity that is not a corporation or a limited liability company but it is created by “created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state” then it is a domestic reporting company. However, FinCEN has issued a FAQ contradicting that reading, stating:

While FinCEN’s BOI reporting regulations define a domestic reporting company as including a corporation or limited liability company, the inclusion of those entities is based on an understanding that domestic corporations and LLCs are generally created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or similar office. In an unusual circumstance where a domestic corporation or limited liability company is created, but not by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or similar office, such an entity is not a reporting company.[10] 

The second element of the defined term is the use the word “entity.” Recognizing that “entity” is not itself defined (a recurrent problem in this provision and the CTA generally is the utilization of technical, often limiting terms, but without providing a definition), the question is whether the word is employed (i) as a generic equivalent to “any business organization form” or (ii) in its technical sense such that there may be “business organization forms” (to carry over the generic utilization) that are themselves not entities? If the former then “reporting company” is coincident with “created by a filing with the Secretary of State.”[11] Alternatively, if the latter is the correct reading, “reporting company” is the common area in the Venn diagram of (a) an “entity” and (b) “created by a filing with the Secretary of State.” If the first reading is correct, then “entity” may simply be little more than a term of itself denoting noting more than “a something.” If in the alternative “entity” is a second hurdle to classification as a reporting company there arises the significant problem that the term is undefined in the CTA and the Reporting Regulations. Indeed the word, in the context of the law of business organizations, lacks an agreed upon definition in that there is no consistent set of characteristics that follow from “a something” being identified (or not) as an entity.[12] That makes “entityness” a limiting factor unknowable as it does not define of knowable set; “what’s the difference between an orange?”

As that last question is irresolvable, we will here proceed on the basis of the first reading, that “reporting company” is equivalent to “created by a filing with the Secretary of State.” Well, not so fast. The term “created” is not defined in the CTA or the Reporting Regulations, and it is a term not employed in most business organization law. There are clearly defined terms for the “incorporation” of a corporation (business, non-profit, cooperative) and the organization of limited liability companies and other structures such as a cooperative association; they do not discuss how, when or by what mechanism any of those organizational structures are “created.”[13] This is an important issue in a statute with significant penalties, including the possibility of incarceration; ambiguities raise the costs of compliance and unjustifiably raise risk. For that reason, the CTA and the Reporting Regulations should be read as penal statutes in which all ambiguities are interpreted against the government.

But back to the task at hand; if we are to proceed on the basis that “reporting company” is equivalent to “created by a filing with the Secretary of State,” then when an attorney is presented with a particular business organization and needs to advise on whether it is a reporting company and therefore likely subject to the CTA’s reporting obligations[14] it is necessary to investigate the statute under which the organization was “created.”[15] To that end, this article reviews the iterations of the various statutes governing the formation of various business organizational forms to see whether they provide that a particular form is or at least arguably is not “created” by a filing with the Secretary of State.[16] Bear in mind that absent contrary language in the particular statute new legislation becomes effect the summer after then end of a particular General Assembly session. [17] When a law is herein described as being adopted in a particular year the statement speaks to the latter portion of the year. A business organization created earlier in the year, before the revision in the law takes effect is bound as to its organizational procedure by the prior law. For that reason as to business organizations formed in a year in which the law changed, particular attention to formation date and the effective date of new legislation for that year, is necessary.

After considering sole proprietorships, the order in which various forms are considered is based upon the order of the controlling statutes as set forth in KRS. 

II.    Sole Proprietorships

A sole proprietorship is simply a natural person doing business for her or his own account and benefit; there is no business structure separate and apart from the individual.[18] No filing with the Secretary of State is required for an individual to go into business for himself or herself. Even the filing of an assumed name certificate on behalf of a sole proprietorship is not filed with the Secretary of State - those filings are made with the county clerk.[19] Ergo a sole proprietorship is not a CTA reporting company.[20]

III.   Corporations 

Under Kentucky law “corporations” cast a wide net and encompasses traditional for profit and non-profit companies as well as atypical organizational forms such as the cooperative corporation. While some, at least in their current incarnations, “piggy-back” on the organizational model utilized for business corporations, that is not always the case. Hence a review of the particular statute under which an organization was incorporated is necessary.

A.    Corporations - Business

Kentucky’s 1891 Constitution provided that corporations shall not be chartered by local or special acts.[21] In furtherance thereof Kentucky has adopted a series of “business corporation” acts. Those acts are: (i) the current Kentucky Business Corporation Act, initially adopted in 1988 and codified at KRS ch. 271B (the “BCA-1988”);[22] (ii) the Business Corporation Act adopted in 1972[23] and codified at KRS ch. 271A (the “BCA-1972”);[24] (iii) the 1946 adoption of the Uniform Business Corporation Act codified at KRS ch. 271 (the “BCA-1946”);[25] and prior law (the “Pre-1946 BCA”).[26] In addition there were corporate laws in effect before the 1891 Constitution (the “Pre-1892 BCA”). They are each considered below in that order.

 i.         The BCA-1988

Under the Kentucky Business Corporation Act adopted in 1988,[27] it based upon the then recently updated Model Business Corporation Act, it is express that incorporation is accomplished by means of a filing with the Secretary of State[28] with incorporation effected by the Secretary of State filing the articles of incorporation.[29] Ergo, every corporation incorporated under the BCA-1988 is a CTA reporting company. 

ii.         The BCA-1972

Under this act, once articles of incorporation were prepared satisfying the statutory requirements,[30] they were then delivered to the Secretary of State. Assuming they met the statutory requirements and necessary fees were paid, the articles were then endorsed and filed in “his” office.[31] Thereafter, the effect of the certificate of incorporation was defined as:

upon the issuance of the certificate incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions required to be performed by the incorporators have been complied with, and that the corporation has been incorporated under this chapter , except as against this state in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the certification or involuntary dissolution of the corporation.[32]

Ergo, a corporation incorporated under the BCA-1972 is a CTA reporting company.

iii.         The BCA-1946 

Under the 1946 business corporation act, once articles of incorporation satisfying the statutory requirements were prepared and then “signed in triplicate originals by each of the incorporators,”[33] they were then delivered to the Secretary of State.[34] Assuming the requirements were deemed satisfied, the Secretary of State would file the articles and issue a certificate of incorporation.[35] While it remained necessary to file a duplicate copy of the articles of incorporation with the county clerk in which the registered office of the corporation was located,[36] it was upon the Secretary of State’s issuance of the certificate of incorporation that the corporate existence began.[37] Ergo, a corporation incorporated under the BCA-1946 is a CTA reporting company.

iv.         Pre-1946 BCA

The General Assembly, in 1893, no doubt in response to the recently approved state constitution and its numerous provisions directly regulating corporations,[38] adopted a comprehensive corporation statute.[39] Thereunder articles of incorporation, the requirements therefore being detailed,[40] were to be signed and then first “recorded in the county clerk’s office of the county in which its principal office or place of business is to be located” and then thereafter “a copy thereof shall be filed and recorded in the office of the Secretary of State.”[41] The statute is less than clear as to differentiating the effect of the county clerk and Secretary of State filings: 

When the articles are filed and recorded as provided, and the license tax imposed is paid to the State, the corporation shall be deemed to be organized for the purpose of transacting, promoting or carrying on the business or purpose for which it was created; and shall thereupon become a body-corporate, and be known by its corporate name, and as such may adopt and use a corporate seal; and shall have the power to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with; . . .[42] 

Now our inquiry is whether or not a particular organization is “created by the filing of a document with [the Kentucky] secretary of state.”[43] In this instance it would appear that both a state and county level filing were necessary for incorporation to take effect, leaving open the question of whether a mandatory two-office filing is outside the CTA’s definition of what is a reporting company, or in the alternative is the fact that there was a required Secretary of State filing, and “he” got the final word, sufficient to bring corporations formed thereunder within the scope of the CTA? It may be important that the delivery to the Secretary of State was of a “copy” of the document submitted to and filed by the county clerk. A reasonable case may be made that a corporation incorporated under 1893 law is not a CTA reporting company. 

B.     Corporations - Nonprofit

Kentucky initially adopted its current nonprofit corporation act in 1968.[44] Thereunder, incorporation of the corporation is accomplished by first delivering to the Secretary of State articles of incorporation satisfying the statutory requirements, and upon a determination that the articles “have been signed and acknowledged according to law,” then “he” (the Secretary of State) will “record one original in his office and issue a certificate of incorporation.”[45] Ergo, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the Kentucky Nonprofit Corporation Act (1968) is a CTA reporting company.

Previously, the law governing nonprofit corporations was not so straightforward. There was one body of law that governed religious, educational and other charitable organizations. These entities, but for the requirement that they maintain an agent for service of process, were not subject to the rules governing for-profit corporations.[46] The organization of such a corporation required that articles of incorporation be signed, and then “filed in the office of the secretary of state, and recorded in the county clerk’s office of the county where the principal place of business of the corporation is located.”[47] From there, it was provided that “when the articles are filed and recorded, and a certificate of that fact is issued by the Secretary of State, the corporation shall be considered organized….”[48] Ergo, these religious, educational, and other charitable nonprofit corporations are CTA reporting companies.

In addition, there existed separate provisions addressing a nonstock, nonprofit corporation.[49] As was the case above with respect to expressly religious organizations, a nonstock, nonprofit corporation is not subject to the laws governing business corporations.[50] After detailing the required contents of the articles of incorporation,[51] it was provided that “The articles of incorporation shall be filed and recorded, a certificate of incorporation shall be issued, in the same manner and upon payment of the same fees, with the same effect, as provided in KRS § 271.055 for business corporations.”[52] It is further provided that “upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin ….”[53] Ergo, these nonstock, nonprofit corporations are CTA reporting companies.

C.     Corporations - Cooperative

Kentucky law provides for a variety of purposes (marketing, agricultural and livestock) for which a cooperative corporation may be formed. To suggest that the statutes governing these organizations are confusing would be generous, and in any instance it is going to be necessary to undertake a deep investigation of the statute in place at the time a particular cooperative corporation was created. Restricting this review to the statutes in effect since the mid-1960s, with respect to an agricultural cooperative association it is clear that formation was accomplished by the filing of articles of incorporation with the Kentucky Secretary of State.[54] The curious provision requiring that the Secretary of State provide a certified copy of the articles of incorporation to the Dean of the College of Agriculture at the University of Kentucky and the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture[55] is not a condition precedent to the due incorporation of the cooperative corporation. Ergo, an agricultural cooperative corporation is a CTA reporting company.

Another form of the cooperative corporation is a livestock protective association. These organizations are a subset of corporations and are to the extent not modified by KRS 272.360 through 272.510 subject to the business corporation act. Organization of a cooperative livestock protective association is accomplished through the filing of articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State as provided for in the then applicable business corporation act.[56] There is, however, a provision that raises the question of whether the action of the Secretary of State is effective to create the corporation, or whether a further act is required; that provision reads: 

and, in addition, a quadruplicate of the articles, indorsed by the Secretary of State with the fact and time of recording of the articles in his office, shall be filed with the Department of Agriculture within ten (10) days after the articles have been recorded in the office of the Secretary of State. After the articles have been duly filed and recorded, and a certificate of incorporation has been issued, the corporation may proceed to do business.[57] 

Whether the filing of the Secretary of State’s file stamped articles with the Department of Agriculture is a condition precedent to the due incorporation of the livestock protective association, or alternatively whether that is a mere notice filing similar to the filings made for an agricultural cooperative association, is unclear. For that reason, it is not possible to make a definitive statement as to whether a particular cooperative livestock protective corporation was or was not incorporated upon the filing by the Secretary of State of the articles of incorporation; rather this is a question particular to each organization. In consideration of the question, attention should be paid to the applicable statute equivalent to KRS sections 271B.2-030[58] and 14A.2-070.[59] 

D.     Corporations - Professional Service

The “professional service corporation” arose out the efforts by members of the “learned professions” to benefit from the tax treatment, particularly as to tax-favored benefit and retirement plans, available to shareholders in a corporation.[60] After the IRS adopted the so-called “Kintner Regulations,” thereby effectively precluding professionals from structuring formats, examples being the partnership association and the limited partnership association, that would sufficiently mimic a corporation (as contemplated by the tax code), those “learned professionals” convinced state legislatures to amend their respective business corporation acts so as to permit the incorporation of professional firms.[61] The resultant professional service corporations (“P.S.C”s) are in almost every state organized as corporations under the applicable business corporation act[62] with particular language mandatory in the articles and other organizational documents meant to further the professional nature of the services rendered through the firm; in Kentucky those requirements are set forth in what is currently KRS section 274.015(1).[63]In that a PSC pre-supposes the incorporation of a business corporation under the business corporation act,[64] a professional services corporation is ab initio a reporting company.

E.     Corporations - Rural Electric and Rural Telephone 

Kentucky has had a statute specific to rural electric cooperative corporations since 1937,[65] the statute being declared an emergency and immediately effective.[66] The incorporation of a rural electric cooperative corporation is initiated through the preparation of articles of incorporation,[67] it at one point in time requiring that there be not less than five incorporators.[68] Thereafter: 

The articles of incorporation shall be executed in quadruplicate by the incorporators and each copy shall be acknowledged by each of the incorporators before a notary public or and other officer authorized by the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to take acknowledgements of deeds. When so acknowledged, the four copies of the articles of incorporation, together with the certificate of acknowledgement, shall be filed with the office of the Secretary of State, who, if he shall find the same legal and valid, shall forthwith indorse his approval on each of the said four copies, retain, record and file one of said copies in his office, delivering the other three copies thereof with his approval endorsed thereon to the incorporators, the incorporators upon the receipt of said approved copies of the articles of incorporation, shall thereupon file one of said approved copies of said articles of incorporation in the office of the county court clerk in the county where is to be located the principal office of said corporation and one of said approved copies of said articles of incorporation with the Dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky. As soon as the Secretary of State shall have approved the articles of incorporation and endorsed his approval thereon, the proposed corporation described in the articles of incorporation so filed, shall, under its designated name, be and constitute a body politic and corporate and shall thereupon be fully authorized to transact business in its corporate name.[69]

Essentially the same language as to when the existence of the rural electric cooperate corporation exists in the current law, namely: 

(2) As soon as the Secretary of State has filed the articles of incorporation, the proposed corporation shall be a body politic and corporate and may transact business in its corporate name.[70]

Ergo, whether formed under the statute as first adopted in 1936 or under the more modern statute, a rural electric cooperative corporation is a CTA reporting company.

Turning to rural telephone cooperatives, the statute providing for their creation was approved by the Kentucky General Assembly in 1950.[71] As then provided, articles of incorporation are to be prepared,[72] and once executed by at least the minimum of five incorporators,[73] the articles are delivered to the to the Secretary of State for filing.

The incorporators shall execute four copies of the articles of incorporation, and each incorporator shall acknowledge each copy before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds. They shall then file the four copies, together with the certificate of acknowledgment, in the office of the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State finds the articles to be legal and valid, he shall immediately endorse his approval on each of the copies, retain, record and file one copy in his office, and deliver the three other copies, with his approval endorsed thereon, to the incorporators. The incorporators shall then file one approve copy in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the principal office of the corporation is to be located.[74] 

Thankfully avoiding any ambiguity as to whether the county filing was a condition precedent to the incorporation, the statute went on to provide:

As soon as the Secretary of State has endorsed his approval of the articles of incorporation, the proposed corporation shall be a body politic and corporate and may transact business in its corporate name.[75] 

This same language as to when the corporate existence begins exists in the modern codification of this statute.[76] Ergo, a rural telephone cooperative corporation is a CTA reporting company. It should be noted, however, that each rural electric cooperative corporation and rural electric telephone cooperative almost certainly is exempt from the CTA’s definition of a “reporting company” by reason of the exemption for “public utilities”[77] 

F.     Benefit Corporations

“Benefit corporations” were added to the Kentucky Business Corporation Act in 2017.[78] Rather than a distinct organizational form, a benefit corporation is one that elects in its articles of incorporation to be a benefit corporation, thereby altering the (supposed) rule of shareholder primacy in the operation of the corporation and permitting the Board of Directors to consider the interests of “other constituencies” when making determinations as to the corporation’s path.[79] As a benefit corporation is simply a corporation that has elected a different paradigm for its internal allocation of responsibilities, and pre-supposes the incorporation of a business corporation under the business corporation act, a benefit corporation is ab initio a reporting company.[80]

G.     Legislative Corporations

It is a truism that for every categorical statement there is an exception, and there is one here. As noted above, a corporation, LLC or other business organization not created by a secretary of state filing pursuant to a so-called “enabling statute” such as the Kentucky Business Corporation Act or the Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act but rather by a state or federal legislative or other executive act is not a “reporting company.”[81] Certain corporations including those created by legislative act rather than a secretary of state filing are not subject to the CTA as they are not within the scope of the definition of a reporting company.[82] Those corporations are few and far between, but they do exist.[83]

IV.   Limited Liability Companies

Kentucky first adopted an LLC Act in 1994.[84] While the LLC Act has undergone repeated amendment in order to accommodate the rapidly evolving form,[85] the manner in which they have been organized has remained consistent, namely through articles of organization that become effective either when filed by the Secretary of State or upon an effective date that post-dates the Secretary of State’s filing, thereby causing the LLC to come into existence.[86]

Ergo, for our purposes, an LLC is created by a filing with the Secretary of State. This conclusion is equally applicable to an LLC that has a single member (a SMLLC) that is for tax purposes treated as either a sole-proprietorship (if the sole member is a natural person) or a division (if the sole member is another business organization). Irrespective[87] of tax classification, the venture is an LLC and therefore falls within the definition of what is a reporting company.

 Kentucky permits a general partnership to “convert” into a limited liability company by filing articles of organization that as well as the typical requirements[88] recite additional facts as to the pre-conversion partnership.[89] The conversion is effective upon the Secretary of State’s filing of the articles or organization.[90] So far it would appear we have a CTA reporting company. But then there is the question of the effect of a conversion; the statute provides in part:

A partnership or limited partnership that has been converted pursuant to this chapter shall for all purposes be the same entity that existed before the conversion.[91] 

Does the fact that the now LLC is the “same entity” that was converted impact the CTA analysis when it is remembered that a general partnership (even one that has elected LLP status) is not a CTA reporting company? To date FinCEN has issued no guidance on the question. While it may be argued that the LLC formed via the conversion of a general partnership is not a reporting company, that answer is a stretch, and likely the better answer is to treat the post-conversion LLC as a reporting company.

V.    General Partnerships Including Limited Liability Partnerships

No state requires a secretary of state or other filing in order for a general partnership to come into existence.[92] This rule is elemental in that partnership is a default category; when persons enter into a business relationship that satisfies the terms of what is a partnership then a partnership comes into being[93] unless they elect to structure their relations in another way such as a corporation or LLC.[94]

While some states permit a notice filing of a Statement of Partnership Authority to be made for the purpose of making clear who are (and by implication who are not) the partners therein and who has authority to on the partnership’s behalf convey its property,[95] the partnership making that filing exists by reason of the agreement of the partners to be, inter alia, partners, and that relationship is not altered by the fact of filing a Statement of Partnership Authority. There are certain other optional filings that a general partnership governed by a statute patterned upon RUPA may file such as a Statement of Denial,[96] filed by a person to deny they are a partner as listed in a Statement of Partnership Authority, a Statement of Dissociation,[97] filed by a person to state that they are no longer a partner in the named partnership, and a Statement of Dissolution.[98] None of these filings is necessary for the transaction in question to be effective; for example, a partnership may dissolve without filing a Statement of Dissolution.

In that no Secretary of State filing is required for a general partnership to come into being, a general partnership is not a CTA “reporting company” and is not subject to its reporting obligations.

A “limited liability partnership” (“LLP”), which under the Kentucky enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act is labeled a “registered limited liability partnership,”[99] is generally speaking a general partnership that via a state notice filing has elected to be governed by a special rule as to the vicarious liability of a partner for the partnership’s debts and obligations.[100] In a classic general partnership each partner is on a joint and several basis vicariously liable with the partnership and each other partner for the partnership’s debts and obligations.[101] While this rule had a number of benefits in small ventures including professional firms, the fallout of the Savings and Loan Crisis demonstrated that exposing partners across the country and across practices to personal liability for claims often arising in a distant office was no longer a viable structure.[102] There existed, however, a dearth of viable options as particularly professional firms were stymied by state law limitations on how they could be structured.[103] The LLP arose out of that tension. Continuation of the partnership format was desired as it continued existing management structures and tax treatment as well as the perceived value of identifying the firm’s principals as “partners” while not running afoul of then existing rules limiting professional practices to the forms of a general partnership and in certain instances a professional service corporation.[104] What was no longer desired was the rule of joint and several vicarious liability among the partners; the LLP format addressed that by means of a notice filing made by an existing partnership with a Secretary of State combined with a requirement as to the partnership’s name resulting in the elimination of the rule of joint and several liability. While there are a variety of distinctions under various state laws, if a partnership makes this notice filing and satisfies the name requirements, the partners qua partners are to one degree or another (the distinction is between so-called “partial” and “full” shield LLPs) not subject to joint and several liability for the partnership’s obligations, but rather enjoy limited liability akin to that enjoyed by shareholders in a corporation.[105] Some states require that the partnership periodically renew its LLP filing and that in the absence of that renewal it reverts to a traditional general partnership. Kentucky provides that the partnership that elects LLP status is the same entity that existed before that election was made.[106] Ergo, no business organization is “created” by an election by a partnership to be an LLP. Rather, there was a partnership that was not an LLP, and then there was a partnership that is an LLP, and it may come to pass that there is a partnership that once was but is no longer and LLP - throughout all of those conditions there was a single partnership.

In that a limited liability partnership, whether existing under the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act or the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006), is a general partnership whose organization was not contingent upon a Secretary of State filing, it is not a CTA reporting company. 

VI.   Limited Partnerships Including Limited Liability Limited Partnerships

Kentucky’s laws governing limited partnerships date back to 1849-50, and over the years there have been numerous iterations of these laws, including the adoption in sequence of three uniform acts. Under only the last two are limited partnerships “created” by a Secretary of State filing, so only they are subject to characterization as a “reporting company.”

The most recent statute is the Kentucky Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2006).[107] Under its provisions a limited partnership comes into being through a filing with the Secretary of State.[108]

Under the immediately preceding statute, an enactment of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 with the 1985 Amendments adopted in Kentucky in 1988,[109] a limited partnership came into being through a filing with the Secretary of State.[110]

Previously, under Kentucky’s 1970 adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916),[111] a limited partnership was formed via the preparation and execution of a certificate satisfying the statutory requirements that was then “file[d] for record the certificate in the office of the clerk of the county court in the county in which the principal place of business of the partnership is located.”, formation taking place upon “substantial compliance” with those requirements.[112] While the statute is not express as to whether the county clerk filing was a precondition to formation (i.e., is the only manner of substantial compliance with the filing requirement to effect the filing), the certificate was filed at the county, and not the Secretary of State, level. Ergo, a limited partnership formed under the 1970 limited partnership act is not a reporting company. Well, almost. In 1986 the KRS section 362.420 was amended to provide:

(1)    Two (2) or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall:

….

(b) File for record duplicate copies of the certificate first with the secretary of state, and thereafter file for record one (1) duplicate original of the certificate in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the principal place of business of the partnership is located.[113]

Now what is less than clear is whether that Secretary of State filing was a condition precedent to the formation of the limited partnership as only “substantial compliance” with the laws governing the filing of the certificate (as well as its contents) was required.[114] For our purposes a provision addressing which filing (if any) was necessary for the limited partnership to come into being would be most helpful but alas there is none. While reasonable minds could differ on the point, a solid case may be made that a limited partnership governed by this amendment to Kentucky’s then limited partnership act (i.e., one formed after the effective date of the 1986 amendment and before the effective date of the Act adopted in 1988), while being the first time a Secretary of State filing is provided for in connection with a limited partnership’s formation, is not a CTA reporting company.

Before 1970 Kentucky limited partnerships were covered by a statute codified at KRS 362.010 through 362.160, ultimately having been adopted in 1849-50 and codified at ch. 82. Thereunder, irrespective of the iteration, the certificate of limited partnership was filed with a county level office and not with the Secretary of State.[115] Ergo, a limited partnership formed under the pre-1970 limited partnership law is not a reporting company.

A limited liability limited partnership (“LLLP”) is a limited partnership that has as to the general partner component thereof elected LLP status. There are, however, for purposes of this inquiry, important distinctions between a limited partnership electing LLLP status and a general partnership electing LLP status. Unlike a general partnership/LLP in which a pre-existing partnership makes the LLP election, under Kentucky’s most modern limited partnership law, namely the Kentucky Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2006), the election by a limited partnership to be an LLLP is made in the certificate of limited partnership to the effect that there was never a time in which the LLLP was not a limited partnership created by a filing by the Secretary of State of a certificate of limited partnership.[116] While it is conceivable that a limited partnership created under a pre-2006 statute could elect LLP status under the LLP amendments to the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act,[117] which at the time of their adoption were not limited to general partnerships,[118] such organizations are at best few and far between. Still, it is possible that they exist, and if they do they are not CTA reporting companies. Other LLLPs existing under the 2006 Limited Partnership Act are CTA reporting companies. 

VII.  Business and Statutory Trusts 

Kentucky has two statutes governing the business organizations generically referenced as “business trusts,” one utilizing the common law concept and the second a statutory model. Both are fully in effect, business trusts organized under the common law model have not been subsumed into the statutory paradigm, and it is possible today to form under either option.

The statute addressing the common law model was adopted in 1966, and under it a business trust[119] comes into being by the declaration of a trust relationship.[120] In 2012 Kentucky adopted a modified form of the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act[121] under the name the Kentucky Uniform Statutory Trust Act (2012).[122] In contact to the common law mechanism used under the other statute, under the Statutory Trust Act formation is accomplished by means of a filing with the Secretary of State.[123]

Ergo, whether a “business trust” organized in Kentucky is a CTA reporting company depends upon under which statute it was organized; if under the common law formula it is not while if formed under the Statutory Trust Act then it is a reporting company. 

VIII.    Limited Cooperative Associations

Kentucky adopted a modified form of the Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act in 2012.[124] The formation of a limited cooperative association is accomplished via a filing with the Secretary of State.[125] The creation of a Kentucky limited cooperative association being premised upon a Secretary of State filing, a Kentucky limited cooperative association is a reporting company under the CTA.

IX. Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations

Kentucky adopted a version of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act in 2015,[126] thereby creating a statutory form for what are often informal nonprofit organizations that do not fall within the scope of one of the other organizational forms.[127] Initially, a UNPA comes into being by the agreement of the participants therein and does not require a Secretary of State or other filing.[128] An existing UNPA may file a certificate of association with the Secretary of State, whereupon the otherwise applicable rule of vicarious liability of the participants in the venture for its debts and obligation[129] is set aside, and those persons are no longer vicariously liable for the UNPA’s debts and obligations.[130] Therefore, irrespective of whether an UNPA has filed a certificate of association with the Secretary of State, a UNPA is not created by a Secretary of State filing and is therefore not a CTA reporting company.

Conclusion

The application of the Corporate Transparency Act is a watershed event in business law, it requiring answers to a variety of new questions including the one here reviewed, namely what is a “reporting company” as that term is applied to business organization formed in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Hopefully these thoughts will guide the assessment of particular organizations.

Post-Script

In late 2024 and through the first months of 2025 there was a flurry of judicial, legislative and executive action as to the validity and application of the Corporate Transparency Act.[131] While the authority to do so has been challenged,[132] on March 26, 2025, the Department of the Treasury published an Interim Final Rule[133] amending the Final Rules to the effect that a “reporting company” does not include a business venture created in the U.S. and that the beneficial owners of the remaining “reporting companies,” they being formed outside of the U.S. and then qualified to transact business under the laws of one of the states, will not include any persons who are U.S. citizens.[134] What is most important for this analysis is that the statutory definition of what is a reporting company has not been altered by this regulatory change.


* * * * * * * * * *

*I am a member of Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC resident in its Louisville, Kentucky office where my practice is focused on the law of business organizations. In addition, I am a frequent commentator on the law of business organizations and am an elected member of the American Law Institute. In 2018 I joined Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies as a co-author in place of the late Professor Ribstein. I would be remiss to not thank William A. Hilyerd, librarian at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, for his cheerful assistance in tracking down some of the law herein discussed.

[2] The Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”) was adopted as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, it being part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (the “NDAA”). The full name of the NDAA is the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. (2021). Congress’ override of the President’s veto was taken in Record Vote No. 292 (Jan. 1, 2021). The anti-money laundering provisions are found in §§ 6001-6511 of the NDAA. The CTA consists of §§ 6401-6403 of the NDAA. Section 6402 of the NDAA sets forth Congress’ findings and objectives in passing the CTA, and § 6403 contains its substantive provisions, primarily adding § 5336 to Title 31 of the United States Code.

[3] The Reporting Regulations appear at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380 (2023). The “final” beneficial ownership report regulations were released in Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498 (Sept. 30, 2022).Those “final” regulations were as to certain due dates amended by Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Deadline Extension for Reporting Companies Created or Registered in 2024, 88 Fed. Reg. 66730 (Sept. 28, 2023) and supplemented as to the use of FinCEN Identifiers by the release Use of FinCEN Identifiers for Reporting Beneficial Ownership Information of Entities, 88 Fed. Reg. 76995 (Nov. 8, 2023).

The most recent change to the Reporting Regulations took place on October 17, 2024, when FinCEN altered the definition of what is a “public utility” able to utilize a particular exemption from the CTA’s definition of what is a “reporting company.” See Update of the Public Utility Exemption Under the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 83782 (Oct. 18, 2024) (collectively the “Reporting Regulations”).In interpreting and applying the Reporting Regulations, reference should be made as well to the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting - Frequently Asked Questions (the “FinCEN FAQs”) and the FinCEN Small Entity Compliance Guide - Reporting Requirements (the “FinCEN Guide”). See also infra notes 131 through 134 and accompanying text.

[4] There is under the CTA and the Reporting Regulations a series of reporting requirements applicable to entities “formed” outside the U.S. and qualified to transact in one or more of the states. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(1)(ii) (2023) (outlining the reporting requirements for foreign reporting companies under the Reporting Regulations). As this article is focused on business organizations organized in Kentucky those non-U.S. organizations are excluded from this discussion.                                      

[5] An organization that is a “reporting company” may be excised from that classification by the application of one or more of twenty-three exceptions. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B) (“The term ‘reporting company’ . . . does not include”); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2) (2023) (“Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the term ‘reporting company’ does not include:”). The exemptions, as set forth in the Reporting Regulations, appear at 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.380(c)(2)(i) - (xxiii) (2023).

[6] For a review of the CTA and the Reporting Regulations generally, see Allison J. Donovan and Thomas E. Rutledge, The Corporate Transparency Act Is Happening To You and Your Clients: Dealing with the Tsunami, Kentucky Bar Ass’n (July 30, 2024) (hereinafter “Donovan & Rutledge, Tsunami”) https://www.skofirm.com/news/the-corporate-transparency-act-is-happening-to-you-and-your-clients-dealing-with-the-tsunami/ [https://perma.cc/FX9K-SQ27]. See also 1 Larry E. Ribstein, Robert R. Keatinge and Thomas E. Rutledge, Ribstein & Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies ch. 4A 293 – 460 (2024).

[7] See generally Donovan & Rutledge, Tsunami, supra note 6, at 9.

[8] 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.380(c)(i)(A)-(C) (2023).

[9] Technically a “domestic reporting company,” but as this article is discussing only reporting companies formed in Kentucky the “domestic” is hereinafter being dropped.

[10] See Frequently Asked Questions, C.9, FINCEN (Apr. 18, 2024), https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2] (emphasis added). This emphasis upon creation by a Secretary of State filing is consistent with certain commentary released in connection with the release of the final Reporting Rules. See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498, 59538 (Sept. 30, 2022) (“FinCEN . . . notes that the core consideration for the purposes of the CTA’s statutory text and the final rule is whether an ‘entity’ is ‘created’ by the filing of the document with the relevant authority.”); Id. (“We emphasize again that the only relevant issue for the purposes of the CTA and the final rule is whether the filing ‘creates’ the entity.”).

[11] Under the CTA and the Reporting Regulations there is not a defined term that encompasses all filing offices in the states including those such as Virginia where the filing is with the Corporations Commission and the equivalent offices of for example the various Indian Tribes, although there is a FAQ on point. See Frequently Asked Questions, C.17, FINCEN (Oct. 3, 2024), https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2]. Again, as we are here concerned only with Kentucky the label Secretary of State is accurate.

[12] See Thomas E. Rutledge, External Entities and Internal Aggregates: A Deconstructionist Conundrum, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 655 (2009) (exploring the characteristics of business organizations identified as being an “entity” and determining the label has no inherent meaning); see also J. William Callison, Indeterminacy, Irony and Partnership Law, 2 Stan. Agora 73–76 (2001), http:// agora.stanford.edu/agora/libArticles2/agora2v1.pdf [permalink unavailable]; David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 Stan. Agora 38, 58 (2001), http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/libArticles2/ agora2v1.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[13] See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.2-030 (West 2024) (“. . . the corporate existence shall begin . . .”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 272A.3-010(2) (West 2024) (“The limited cooperative association is formed when . . . ”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.2531 (West 2024) (“. . . [T]he corporate existence shall begin when . . .”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.020(2) (West 2024) ([T]he existence of the limited liability company shall begin when . . .”).

[14] Under the CTA and the Reporting regulations, a reporting company may be exempt from the reporting obligations if it meets one or more of twenty-three exemptions. Relatively few companies will fall within the scope of the exemptions; one of them, that for financial market utilities (see 31 C.F.R. 1010.380(c)(2)(xvii) (2023), applies to eight companies (listing available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm [https://perma.cc/XW85-R2T5]).                        

[15] A great many of the citations to Kentucky’s statutes governing various business organization forms have been “repealed,” but the references herein do not recite a history of, for example, “repealed effective July 15, 2024.”That is intentional because herein the consideration of what was the law governing the organization of a particular form at a particular date - it is the procedure dictated by the law of the time of formation that determines whether a particular company is a CTA reporting company. That a particular statute was subsequently repealed and replaced does not retroactively alter the manner in which a particular organization came into being.

[16] The “arguably” qualification acknowledges that notwithstanding the statutory language as carried forward in the Reporting Regulations, FinCEN could by fiat declare what is not a reporting company to indeed be a reporting company. The likelihood of a lawsuit challenging that determination must be recognized as being low, but still, it is not impossible. In Massachusetts a lawsuit was brought by a (common law) business trust seeking a determination that it and other business trusts are not reporting companies, but it was quickly dismissed for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs asserted that a Massachusetts Business Trust is not a reporting company in that it is not formed by a filing by a Secretary of State or similar officer, an assertion with which FinCEN agreed. There being no controversy as to the non-application of the CTA to the plaintiff its broader challenge to the CTA’s constitutionality was set aside for lack of standings. See Trustees of the Lewis Wharf Condominium Trust v. Yellen, No. 24-11679-LTS, (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2024) (order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice).

[17] See Ky. Const. § 55 (“No act, except general appropriation bills, shall become a law until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed”).

[18] As to the characteristics of a sole proprietorship, see Sparkman v. CONSOL Energy, Inc., 470 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Ky. 2015) (citations omitted):

A sole proprietorship is defined as a business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A sole proprietorship, therefore, differs greatly from other business organizations such as corporations or limited liability companies (LLCs), even in cases where a business organization has only one shareholder or member. For example, the sole member of an LLC or sole shareholder of a corporation is not entitled to assert in his or her individual capacity the rights of the business organization. An owner of a sole proprietorship, on the other hand, is liable in his or her personal capacity for the liabilities of the sole proprietorship and may assert the rights of the sole proprietorship in his individual capacity.

Keep in mind that the “sole proprietor” here being discussed is a state law concept; a single member LLC that is for tax classification purposes a “disregarded entity” is under the CTA, absent one of the twenty-three exemptions discussed below, a reporting company. See also Frequently Asked Questions, C.8, FINCEN (Apr. 18, 2024) (clarifying pass-through tax treatment of an S-corporation does not exempt it from characterization as a reporting company) https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2].

[19] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.015(3) (West 2024).

[20]See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498, 59537 (Sept. 30, 2022) (“In general, FinCEN believes that sole proprietorships, . . . would not be a reporting company under the final rule.”); Frequently Asked Questions, C.6, FINCEN (Dec. 12, 2023), https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2].  

[21] See Ky. Const. § 59 (“The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely: . . . Seventeenth, To grant a charter to any corporation, or to amend the charter of any existing corporation . . .”).

[22] See 1988 Ky. Acts, ch. 389; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.1-010 (West 2024) (“This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Kentucky Business Corporation Act’.”).

[23] See 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274 (H.B. 178), see also id., § 1 (codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.005 (“This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Kentucky Business Corporation Act.”) (repealed 1988).

[24] This act was based upon the 1972 edition of the Model Business Corporation Act. See James C. Seiffert, Kentucky Corporation Law with Forms, in Kentucky Practice Series § 3.1 (June 2022).

[25] See 1946 Ky Acts, ch. 141 (S.B. 6) (repealed 1972). This statute was one of the few adoptions of the Uniform Business Corporation Act (1928) written and promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), now known as the Uniform Law Commission (the “ULC”). Still, it was not adopted without sometimes questionable modification. See Willburt D. Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L. J. 125, 128 (1961). Not long after promulgating this Act NCCUSL abandoned corporate law to the American Bar Association and its Committee on Corporate Laws (the “ABA”). This is the source of the division of labor between the two groups with the ULC being charged with the unincorporated laws (e.g., the Uniform Partnership Act, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act) and the ABA taking as its charge the Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. The crafting of the Uniform Commercial Code is governed by different rules.

[26] See generally 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171.

[27] See 1988 Ky. Acts, ch. 23 (H.B. 323), codified at KRS ch 271B.

[28] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.2-010 (West 2024) (incorporation accomplished by delivering articles of incorporation to the Secretary of State for filing); id. § 271B.2-020 (required contents of articles of incorporation).

[29] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.2-030(1) (West 2024) (“Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence shall begin when the articles of incorporation are filed by the Secretary of State.”).

[30] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.270 (1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274, § 54).

[31] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.275 (1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274, § 55).

[32] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.280 (1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274, § 57).

[33] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.035 (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 383).

[34] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.055(1) (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 385).

[35] Id.

[36] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.055(2) (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 385).

[37] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.065 (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 386).

[38] See, e.g., Ky. Const. § 207 (repealed 2002) (requiring that corporations utilize cumulative voting in the election of directors).

[39] See generally 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171.

[40] See 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 2 (detailing the requirements to properly effectuate articles of incorporation).

[41] See 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 3.

[42] 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 5.

[43] 31 U.S.C.A. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i).

[44] See 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 165 (S.B. 254); id. § 1 (“This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Kentucky Nonprofit Corporation Act.’”).

[45] See 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 165, § 29.

[46] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.010 (repealed 1968) (“Unless expressly included, corporations organized under KRS 273.020 shall not be subject to any statutes relating to corporations having a capital stock or organized for pecuniary profit, except KRS 271.385, requiring an agent for service of process, but shall at all times, be subject to visitation by the legislature.”).

[47] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.020 (repealed 1968).

[48] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.030 (repealed 1968).

[49] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.160 (repealed 1968).

[50] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.160(4) (repealed 1968) (“except as specifically provided in KRS 273.160 to 273.290, corporations organized under KRS 273.160 to 273.290 are not subject to any of the statues relating to corporations having capital stock or organized for pecuniary profit . . . .”).

[51] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.170 (repealed 1968).

[52] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.190 (repealed 1968).

[53] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.200 (repealed 1968).

[54] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 272.131(3) (repealed and reenacted 2010) (The articles of incorporation “shall be filed and recorded in accordance with the statute relating to corporations generally; and when so filed, the articles of incorporation, or certified copies thereof, shall be received in all the courts of this state, and other places, as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, and of the due incorporation of the association . . . .”).

[55] See Id. (“A copy of the articles of incorporation, indorsed by the Secretary of State with the fact and time of recording in his office, shall be filed with the dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky and with the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture.”).

[56] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 272.410 (amended 1980) (“The articles of incorporation shall be signed, acknowledged, filed and recorded in accordance with the provisions of the general corporation law of this state, . . . .”).

[57] See Id.

[58] Currently, KRS § 271B.2-030 provides:

(1) Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence shall begin when the articles of incorporation are filed by the Secretary of State.

(2) The Secretary of State's filing of the articles of incorporation shall be conclusive proof that the incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to incorporation, except in a proceeding by the state to cancel or revoke the incorporation or involuntarily dissolve the corporation.

[59] Currently, KRS § 14A.2-070(1) provides:

(1)  Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section and KRS 14A.2-090(3), a document delivered to the Secretary of State for filing shall be effective:

(a)  On the date and at the time of filing, as evidenced by such means as the Secretary of State may use for the purpose of recording the date and time of filing; or                                          
(b) At the time specified in the document as its effective time on the date it is effective.

[60] See Thomas E. Rutledge and Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentuckys New Organizational Option, 83 Ky. L. J. 1 at 59 - 61 (1994-95).

[61] See T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553. This path greatly irritated the IRS, and it attempted to deprive these newly minted corporations of classification as “corporations” under the Internal Revenue Code. See Rutledge & Booth, supra note 60, at 74 (“Those efforts were unavailing and ultimately abandoned by the Service”). Professional service corporation provisions were first added to Kentucky law in 1962. See 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 236 (H.B. 97).                        

[62] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.015:

(1) One (1) or more individuals, … may incorporate and form a professional service corporation by filing articles of incorporation in the office of the Secretary of State.….

(2) A professional service corporation formed under the provisions of this chapter, except as this chapter may otherwise provide, shall have the same powers, authority, duties, and liabilities as a corporation formed under, and shall be otherwise governed by, KRS Chapter 271B. 

[63] See also 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 236 (H.B. 97) § 2(1) (referencing then in effect KRS ch. 271).

[64] See also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.015(2); 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 236, § 2(2).

[65] See 1936 Ky. Acts, 4th Ext. Sess. ch. 6, § 1 (“This act may be known, cited and referred to as the ‘Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation Act.’”).

[66] See 1936 Ky. Acts, 4th Ext. Sess. ch. 6, § 32 (“Whereas, many Rural Electric Cooperative Corporations are now ready to be organized and delay in their organization will endanger their receiving the federal funds appropriated for that purpose, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall become a law and be effective from and after it’s approval by the Governor.”).

[67] See Baldwins (1939 supp.) § 833j-4 (Setting forth the required contents of the articles of incorporation); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.030 (repealed and reenacted 2010).

[68] See Baldwins (1939 supp.) § 833j-3; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.020 (Under current law the required number of incorporators has been reduced to three).

[69] See Baldwins (1939 supp.) § 833j-5.

[70] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.040(2) (amended 2010).

[71] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147 (S.B. 69).

[72] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 3 (detailing required and optional provisions of articles of incorporation).

[73] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 2.

[74] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 5(1).

[75] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 5(2).

[76] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.350 (amended in 2010).

[77] See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xvi); see also Update of the Public Utility Exemption Under the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 83782 (Oct. 18, 2024).

[78] See 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 28, § 7(8) (H.B. 35); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.8-300(8) (amended in 2017).

[79] See also Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2017 Amendments to Kentuckys Business Entity Statutes, 56 Lou.                         L. Rev. 55 (Fall 2017). Amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act to provide for benefit corporations were approved in 2020. See Proposed Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act - New Chapter 17 on Benefit Corporations, 74 Bus. L. 819 (Summer 2019); Proposed (Revised) Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act - New Chapter 17 on Benefit Corporations, 74 Bus. L. 1177 (Fall 2019).

[80] The CTA and the Reporting Regulations provide an exception from classification as a reporting company for a “tax exempt entity.” See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xix). This exemption is not applicable to a benefit corporation in that a benefit corporation is a for-profit venture that ipso facto is not a non-profit organization able to qualify under Code § 501(c).

[81] See FinCEN FAQ C.9 (Apr. 18, 2024) (emphasis added) https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2]. This focus upon creation by a Secretary of State filing is consistent with certain commentary released in connection with the release of the final Reporting Rules. See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59538 (“FinCEN … notes that the core consideration for the purposes of the CTA’s statutory text and the final rule is whether an “entity” is “created” by the filing of the document with the relevant authority.”); id. (“We emphasize again that the only relevant issue for the purposes of the CTA and the final rule is whether the filing “creates” the “entity.”) (emphasis added).                        

[82] See FinCEN FAQ C.9 (Apr. 18, 2024) https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2].

[83] See, e.g., 2021 Ky. Acts. ch. 203, § 3 (HB 321) (creating a corporation under the name the “West End Opportunity Partnership”); 2024 Ky. Acts ch. 171, § 4 (SB 299) (repealing and reenacting KRS § 230.225(1) to establish a corporation under the name the “Kentucky Horse Racing and Gaming Corporation.”). See also Mark Harris, The Government Corporation in Kentucky, 29 Ky. L. J. 288 (1941). At the federal level, the Boy Scouts of America is a corporation created through federal law passed by Congress. See 36 U.S.C. § 30901(a). The same applies to the Girl Scouts of the United States of America. See 36 U.S.C. § 80301. Indian tribal corporations may be formed under federal law through the issuance of a charter of incorporation by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (25 U.S.C. § 477) while in Oklahoma the same action is accomplished under section 3 of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 503. See also U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Tribal Economic Development Principles at a Glance Series - Choosing a Tribal Business Structure, (last visited Aug. 13, 2024) https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/ieed/bia/pdf/idc1-032915.pdf [https://perma.cc/52QC-6TPW]. As such, these are not “reporting companies” as defined under the CTA. Alternatively, corporations may come into existence pursuant to Indian tribal law or through a state corporation act; in either of those instances the company so created is absent an applicable exemption subject to the CTA as a reporting company.

[84] See 1994 Ky. Acts, ch. 389; see also Rutledge & Booth, supra note 60 at 4.

[85] By way of example, under the LLC Act as originally adopted, it was required that the articles of organization recite that the LLC would have at least two members. This requirement was put in as a bulwark against the accidental creation of a single member LLC, an organizational structure that, in 1994, was significantly unknown as the tax code did not contemplate a single-member limited liability organization that was not a corporation. See also Rutledge & Booth, supra note 60 at 9–10. In December 1996, the IRS modified its classification rules, abandoning as to unincorporated entities the “Kintner Regulations” and adopting the current “Check the Box” rules and as well providing for the tax treatment of what was referred to therein as a “disregarded entity.” In response this provision of the LLC act was repealed, allowing there to be organized in Kentucky single-member limited liability company. See 1998 Ky Acts, ch. 341, § 23 (amending KRS § 275.025).

[86] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.025(7) (2011); id. §§ 14A.2-070(1), (2) (2011).

[87] And not “irregardless.”

[88] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.025 (2011).

[89] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 275.370(3)(a)-(e) (2010).

[90] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.370(4) (2010).

[91] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.375(1) (2010).

[92] I cannot address the laws of any of the Indian Tribes or of any of the U.S. Territories.

[93] See, e.g., Unif. P’ship. Act (1914) § 6(1); Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 202(a); 6 Del. Code § 15-202(a); Ala. Code § 10A-8A-1.01; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.175; id. § 362.1-202(1); Va. Code § 50-73.88(A); see also In re: Copeland, 291 B.R. 740, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003); Flying Phx. Corp. v. Sinclair, 2024 WYCH 3, 40–41, 2024 Wyo. Trial Order LEXIS 4 (Wyo. Chan. Ct. April 25,2024) (“A partnership is formed when ‘two or more persons’ associate ‘to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,’ ‘whether or not the persons intended to form a partnership.’ The determinative intent is not the parties’ subjective intent to be characterized (or not characterized) as partners, but their ‘intent to do things that constitute a partnership.’ This means that absent a partnership agreement, or even when the parties express their subjective intent not to form a partnership, the parties may inadvertently create a partnership through their conduct.”) (citations omitted); William Mead Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 20 (1917) (“A partnership is created by mere agreement between the partners. The approval of the state is not necessary.”); John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, vol. II, Partnership, 228 (1839) (“Partnerships are created by mere act of the parties; and in this they differ from corporations which require the sanction of state authority, either express or implied.”) (Law Book Exchange, 2003, at p. 294).

[94] See Unif. P’ship. Act. (1914) § 6(2); Rev. Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 202(b); 6 Del. Code § 15-202(b); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.175 (2011); id. § 362.1-202(2); Va. Code § 50-73.88(B).

[95] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 303; 6 Del. Code § 15-303(b); Ala. Code § 10A-8A-3.03; Calif. Corps. Code § 16105; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-303 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.93.

[96] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 304; Ala. Code § 10A-8A-3.04; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-304 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.94.

[97] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 704; 6 Del. Code § 15-704(a); Ala. Code § 10-8A-7.04; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-704 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.115.

[98] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 805; 6 Del. Code § 15-805; Ala. Code §10-8A-8.05; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-805 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.121.

[99] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.555(1) (2011); id. § 362.155(7).

[100] In certain states including Delaware a limited partnership may as well make this filing, but for purposes of simplicity and to retain our focus upon Kentucky law this discussion is in the context of a general partnership. Under the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006), a limited partnership may not elect LLP statute. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-931 (2013) (LLP election made in a statement of qualification which may be filed by a “partnership,” a class that does not encompass a limited partnership); id. § 362.1-202(2) (an organization created other than under the partnership act is not a partnership).

[101] See Unif. P’ship. Act § 15; Revised Unif. P’ship. Act § 306(a); 6 Del. Code § 15-306(a); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.220 (2007); id. § 362.2-306(1).                        

[102] See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge and Robert R. Keatinge, LLPS Are Not Reporting Companies, Bus. L. Today (Oct. 10, 2024); Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at Birth (Nearly), 66 Colo. L. Rev. 1065, 1069 (1995); Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 Bus. L. 147, 147–49 (Nov. 1995). See also Harwell Wells, The Unexpected Origins of the US Limited Liability Partnership, in The Origins of Company Law (eds. Victoria Barnes and Jonathan Hardman 2024).

[103] See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, The Place (If Any) of the Professional Structure in Entity Rationalization, 58 Bus. L. 1413, 1419–21 (Aug. 2003) (discussing several states’ partnership laws, with a focus on the leniency of some states compared to others). Please note as well that from 1982 through 1997, S-corporation status was limited to firms with 75 or fewer shareholders, greatly reducing the utility of S-corporation classified PSCs for the organization of professional firms. Further, because of the requirement to accelerate recognition of accounts receivable upon conversion from Subchapter K to either Subchapter C or Subchapter S, there existed significant impediments to the conversion of an existing firm from a general partnership to a professional service corporation.

[104] Through 1992 the AICPA provided that CPAs could practice as sole proprietorships, as general partnerships and as professional service corporations. See also Rutledge and Keatinge, supra note 102.

[105] See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.220(2) (2007); id. § 362.555 (a partial shield statute); id. 362.1- 306 (full shield); Rev. Unif. P’ship. Act § 306(c) (full shield); 6 Del. Code § 15-306(c); Ala. Code § 10-8A-306(c); Va. Code §50-73.96(C).

[106] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 362.1-201(2)(2006); see also Revised Unif. P’ship. Act § 201(b) (“A limited liability partnership continues to be the same entity that existed before the filing of the statement of qualification under Section 1001.”); 6 Del. Code § 15-201(b); 805 ILCS 206/201(b); Va. Code § 50-73.132(E) (“A partnership that has been registered as a limited liability partnership under this chapter is, for all purposes, the same entity that existed before it registered.”); Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. Pickett, 11 F.Supp.2d 449, 452 at fn. 12 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (commenting in footnote that the New York LLP statute “clearly enunciates that a general partnership that is registered as a RLLP is for all purposes the same entity that existed before registration and continues to be general partnership under the laws of New York”) (citation omitted); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 657 fn.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d 173 F.3d 844 (2nd Cir. 1999) (upon a partnership becoming a limited liability partnership, “The partnership was not dissolved and continued without interruption with the same partners, principals, employees, assets, rights, obligations, liabilities and operations as maintained prior to the change. Thus, Peat Marwick LLP is in all respects the successor in interest to Peat Marwick.”); Sascki v. McKinnon, 707 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio App. 1997) (“Those two entities, E&Y and E&Y LLP are, but for the corporate change to a limited liability partnership designation, the same entities for all practical intents and purposes.”); Maupin v. Meadow Park Manor, 125 P.2d 611 (Mont. 2005) (LLP is “same entity that existed before registration”); Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 699 (Ala. 2005) (A LLP “is for all purposes, except as provided in Section 10-8A-306 [not relevant to our inquiry], the same entity that existed before the registration and continues to be a partnership under the laws of this state . . . .” (citing Ala. Code § 10-8A-1001(i)); Riccardi v. Young & Young, LLP, 74 Misc.3d 911, 915 (City Court of New York, Cohoes, Albany County 2022) (“An LLP is a general partnership which acquires limited liability characteristics upon registration with the Secretary of State.”) (citation omitted).

[107] Codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 362.2. See also Thomas E. Rutledge & Allan W. Vestal, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) Comes to Kentucky: An Owner’s Manual, 34 N. Ky. L. Rev. 41, 411–121 (2007); Thomas E. Rutledge and Allan W. Vestal, Rutledge & Vestal on Kentucky Partnerships and Limited Partnerships (2010).

[108] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.2-201(1) (2011) (“In order to form a limited partnership, a certificate of limited partnership shall be delivered to the Secretary of State for filing.”); see also id. § 14A.2-010 (2015); id. § 14A.2-070 (2012).

[109] See 1988 Ky Acts, ch. 284 (HB 582), codified at KRS §§ 362.401 through 550.

[110] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.415(1) (“In order to form a limited partnership, a certificate of limited partnership shall be executed and filed with the Secretary of State.”); id. § 362.415(2) (“A limited partnership shall be formed at the time of the filing of the certificate of limited partnership with the Secretary of State or at any later times specified in the certificate of limited partnership …”).                        

[111] See 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 97 (S.B. 172).

[112] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.420(b).

[113] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.420 as amended by 1986 Ky. Acts 342 (SB 224) (newly added text underlined and italics).

[114] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.420(2) (“A limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial compliance in good faith with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section.”).

[115] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.020 (“The persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall sign a written statement, showing the name and place of residence of each partner, the name or style of the firm, who are the general and who are the special partners, ….”); id. § 362.030 (“The statement and affidavit shall be acknowledged or approved before and recorded by the county clerk of each county in which a place of business of the firm is situated, in the same manner as deeds are acknowledged, approved and recorded. No limited partnership shall be deemed to have been formed until such record has been made and the statement has been published once a week for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper printed in each of the proposed places of business”); see also Baldwins 3769, GS ch. 82, § 4.

[116] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.2-201(2).

[117] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.555.

[118] See 1994 Ky. Acts, ch. 389, § 102(1) (not containing the “that is not a limited partnership” language subsequently added in 2006).

[119] What is a “business trust” under this statute is defined as:

A business trust is an express trust created by a written declaration of trust whereby property is conveyed to one (1) or more trustees, who hold and manage same for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be or become, the holders of transferable certificates evidencing the beneficial interest in the trust estate. For the purposes of KRS 386.370 to 386.440, business trusts shall include but are not limited to "Real Estate Investment Trusts" as defined by and which comply with the Federal Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended or such section or sections of any subsequent Internal Revenue Code as may be applicable to real estate investment trusts.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 386.370(1) (2010).

[120] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 386.380 (1966) (“A business trust may be established by a declaration of trusts, duly executed by one (1) or more trustees, for any full purpose . . . .”).

[121] For a review of this uniform act, see Thomas E. Rutledge & Ellisa O. Habbart, The Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act: A Review, 65 Bus. L. 1055 (Aug. 2010).

[122] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386A.1-010 (2012). For a review of this act as adopted in Kentucky, see Thomas E. Rutledge, The Kentucky Uniform Statutory Trust Act (2012): A Review, 40 N. Ky. L. Rev. 93 (2012–13) (explaining how at the time of the work’s publication, Kentucky was at the forefront of states by enacting the USTA).

[123] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386A.2-010(1) (2012) (“A statutory trust is formed when a certificate of trust that complies with subsection (2) of this section and filed by the Secretary of State is effective as determined under KRS 14A.2–070.”).

[124]See Thomas Earl Geu and James Dean, The Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act: An Introduction, 13 Drake J. of Agric. L. 63 (2008) (reviewing the Uniform Act); Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2012 Amendments to Kentucky’s Business Entity Statutes, 101 Ky. L.J. Online 1 (2012) (reviewing the act as adopted in Kentucky including the departures from the uniform act). The Kentucky Limited Cooperative Associations Act is codified at chapter 272A of KRS.

[125] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 272A.3-010(2) (2012) (“To form a limited cooperative association, an organizer of the association shall deliver articles of association to the Secretary of State for filing. The limited cooperative association is formed when articles of association that comply with subsection (3) of this section are filed by the Secretary of State, and are effective as determined under KRS 14A.2-070.”).

[126] See Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 273A.

[127] See generally Thomas. E. Rutledge, The 2015 Amendments to the Kentucky Business Entity Statutes, 42 N. Ky. L. Rev. 128 at 160 et seq. (2016) (explaining the formation process).

[128] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273A.005(11) (2015) (“‘Unincorporated nonprofit association’ means in unincorporated association consisting of two (2) or more members joined under an agreement that is oral, in a record, or implied from conduct, for one (1) or more common, nonprofit purposes.”).

[129] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273A.040 (2017).

[130] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273A.030(1) (2015).

[131]See Christina M. Houston, Robert R. Keatinge, Thomas E. Rutledge & James J. Wheaton, The Corporate Transparency Act: Are Rumors of its Death Exaggerated?, Bus. L. Today (March 17, 2025); Christina M. Houston, Robert R. Keatinge, Thomas E. Rutledge & James J. Wheaton, The Corporate Transparency Act Is Still on Pause, but Less So, Bus. L. Today (Feb. 7, 2025); and Christina M. Houston, Robert R. Keatinge, Thomas E. Rutledge & James J. Wheaton, The FinCEN That Stole Christmas: The Corporate Transparency Act Year 1, Bus. L. Today (Jan. 13, 2025).

[132] See Letter from Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Charles E. Grassley to Scott Bessent, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury (Mar. 10, 2025).

[133] See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirement Revision and Deadline Extension, 90 C.F.R. 13688 (Mar. 26, 2025); see also FinCEN, Interim Final Rule: Questions and Answers, available at Interim Final Rule: Questions and Answers. FinCEN.gov.

[134] See also Nikki McCann Ramirez, Exciting News’: Trump Brags About Gutting Anti-Money Laundering Law, Rolling Stone (March 3, 2025); Casey Wetherbee, The United States of Money Laundering, MSN.com (March 8, 2025).

State Executive Impeachment – We Need to Know More

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State Executive Impeachment – We Need to Know More

Gerald L. Neuman*

Impeachment in the legislature provides an important method of accountability for the abuse of executive office in the states, although the political character of the forum also creates risks. At the highest level of state government, impeachment enables state legislators to oust a transgressive governor. Over the years, eight state governors have been impeached and removed,[2] and others have resigned to avoid impeachment.[3] Resignations can be as important a result of an impeachment inquiry as a completed conviction.

Impeachment also reaches lower levels of the executive branch, most importantly the various executive officers who are independently elected and not freely subject to removal by the governor during their terms. State government structure contrasts with the federal government in the multiplicity of elected executive officials. No federal executive officer has ever been impeached and convicted, while quite a few state officers have been.[4] Kentucky recently witnessed its first impeachment conviction in over a century, of an elected prosecutor who extorted nude photos from a criminal defendant.[5] The last preceding conviction involved state treasurer James W. “Honest Dick” Tate, who embezzled vast sums and fled the country.[6] Other Kentucky officials have resigned after efforts began to impeach them.[7]

Consistent with the focus in the Journal’s recent Symposium on legislative/executive interactions, I emphasize here impeachment of executives, not judges. Impeachment does apply to judges, and in fact the only federal officers whom Congress has removed by impeachment have been life-tenured Article III judges.[8] However, impeachment of judges raises distinct issues of judicial independence, and the need for impeachment of state judges has decreased with the advent of modern systems of judicial discipline.[9]  Nonetheless, threats of impeachment and occasional removals do still occur.[10]

Impeachment talk is notoriously common. Reportedly, the past few decades saw a rise in demands for impeachment and the current extremely polarized political environment has resulted in a further increase.[11] Nonetheless even today the impetus for impeachment of an abusive official may come from the official’s own party.[12] We need more data to understand better the factors that make impeachment efforts at the state level succeed, and how the relevant factors may change over time.

Unfortunately, scholars have not given commensurate attention to the operation of state legislative impeachment, particularly on a nationwide comparative basis. The documentation of these lower profile events is dispersed, even for actual convictions, let alone for impeachment efforts that produce resignations. In 1895, the prolific treatise-writer Roger Foster included an avowedly incomplete survey of state impeachment trials in his Commentaries on U.S. constitutional law.[13] He also observed that the “fear of the disgrace [of impeachment] has caused the resignation of many corrupt judges, State and Federal, who shall here remain nameless.”[14] Just over forty years ago, Professors Peter Charles Hoffer and Natalie Hull published a volume analyzing the origins of U.S. impeachment practice and its application in the early Republic.[15] There are occasionally studies of particular states or of particularly significant state impeachments.[16]

Fuller knowledge of the facts could facilitate comparative studies of the dynamics of impeachment efforts and their effects. Impeachment now exists in all the states, after a 2024 ballot measure adopted it for Oregon.[17] Modern impeachment procedures in most states resemble the federal model, with accusation voted in the lower house, and trial in the state senate.[18] The percentage of legislators required at each stage can vary from the federal practice. Several states (now including Oregon) require 2/3 of the lower house to vote for impeachment instead of a majority.[19] Massachusetts requires only a majority of the upper house to convict instead of two-thirds, and has actually removed an official using this rule.[20]  One might expect that the varying percentages of votes required at each stage of impeachment proceedings affect the likelihood of initiation or of conviction, but there appears to be no study examining this question.                                                                                                                                              

In normative terms, it must be recognized that the impeachment process is subject to abuse for purposes foreign to its ostensible rationale. Allowing groups of politicians to judge claims of misconduct by a government official opens opportunities for partisanship and arbitrariness. Nonetheless, legislative authority provides an ultimate check on official wrongdoing that executive authority cannot or will not prevent. The need for running the risk may depend on the availability of other methods of removing the officials who are subject to impeachment.

Undoubtedly, impeachment has been abused in the past. A notorious set of examples arose after the Civil War, when the resurgent ex-Confederates used various types of law and violence to drive Blacks and their allies out of state governments. The impeachment of North Carolina Governor William Woods Holden, and the resignations of Mississippi Governor Adelbert Ames[21] and of the distinguished Black jurist Jonathan Jasper Wright,[22] are prominent illustrations. The early 20th century impeachment of New York Governor William Sulzer, as the Tammany Hall machine’s revenge after he turned to reform, offers another object lesson.[23]

In empirical terms, it seems reasonable to assume that impeachment competes with other removal options, and that one of the factors making impeachments or convictions less likely to occur would be the availability of easier alternatives. On the other hand, in most states (as in the federal government) impeachment can lead not only to removal but to disqualification from future office, which may be important to legislators in particular cases.[24] Without better data, the interaction among alternatives is difficult to explore.

One alternative mechanism for removal is a recall election. Nineteen states (not Kentucky) provide for recall of statewide officials.[25] Successful recalls of governors are rare – only two so far, one in North Dakota in 1921, and Gray Davis of California in 2003, who was replaced by Arnold Schwarzenegger.[26]

In a small minority of states certain executive officials may also be subject to removal by legislative “address,” a procedure originally created in England for removal of royal judges by Parliament, and adapted in state constitutions as a form of removal for state judges or executive officials or both. (Kentucky’s 1792 constitution authorized address for removal of state judges,[27] and the 1891 constitution extended it to railroad commissioners,[28] but these provisions have since been repealed.) As the Delaware Supreme Court explained in a 2022 opinion, removal by address can respond to less serious causes of unfitness for office than impeachment would legally require.[29] Different state constitutions frame the legislature’s address as a request to the governor to remove the individual, or as obliging the government to remove the individual.[30] Depending on the purpose of the analysis, the obligatory version of address might be viewed as a variant form of impeachment, while the nonbinding version of address might be viewed as a separate procedure that makes impeachment unnecessary if a larger set of actors agrees on removal.

Unlike U.S. presidents,[31] state governors who commit crimes, including some forms of corruption, may be subject to federal prosecution while in office. Independent state attorneys general or prosecutors may also be able to investigate or indict governors in ways that provoke resignation. State constitutions or statutes often provide that an executive official who is convicted of certain crimes shall be removed from office, or that the office automatically becomes vacant.[32] Nonetheless, the state legislature may be unwilling to leave an abusive official in power while awaiting the outcome of the criminal process, especially if the office remains occupied pending appeal.[33]

Thus, the greater independence that elected state officials have creates more occasions for state legislative intervention, and to varying degrees the need for intervention is counterbalanced by the availability of other methods for removal.

In short, the prevailing concentration of scholars on federal impeachment has distracted from a larger body of evidence regarding state-level impeachment. Our understanding of state practice would benefit from a variety of qualitative and quantitative studies, and to that end from the collection and publication of relevant data for all states. Both historical and contemporary projects would be useful here. As a starting point, I provide below a listing of the state-level impeachment convictions from 1776 to 2023 that I have found in the course of my own reading and research. We need to know more.

List of State Executive and Judicial Impeachment Convictions

(not necessarily complete) 

State and Year

Name

Office (or former office)

New Jersey 1778

Thomas Denny

Judge

New Jersey 1779

William Miller

Judge

New Jersey 1784

Peter Hopkins

Judge

Vermont* 1785

John Barret

Judge

Vermont* 1785

Matthew Lyon

Clerk of Court

Massachusetts 1788

William Greenleaf

Sheriff

Georgia 1791

Henry Osborne

Judge

South Carolina 1793

Alexander Moultrie

Attorney General

Massachusetts 1794

William Hunt

Judge

New Jersey 1799

Elijah Godfrey

Judge

Massachusetts 1800

John Vinal

Judge

Kentucky 1803

Thomas Jones

Surveyor

Ohio 1805

William Irvin

Judge

Pennsylvania 1805

Alexander Addison

Judge

Tennessee 1806

Isaac Philips

Judge

Ohio 1807

Robert Slaughter

Judge

South Carolina 1807

Daniel D’Oyley

Treasurer

South Carolina 1812

John Clark

Sheriff

Tennessee 1812

William Cocke

Judge

South Carolina 1814

Matthew O’Driscoll

Clerk of Court

Massachusetts 1821

James Prescott

Judge

Indiana 1821

Aaron Vandever

Judge

Tennessee 1822

Samuel Williams

Surveyor

Indiana 1825

Isaiah Cooper

Judge

Indiana 1826

Nathaniel Marks

Sheriff

Missouri 1826

Richard Thomas

Judge

New Jersey 1830

Henry Miller

Judge

Indiana 1832

Young Hughes

Judge

Louisiana 1844

Benjamin Elliot

Judge

California 1857

Henry Bates

Treasurer

California 1862

James Hardy

Judge

Kansas 1862

George Hillyer

Auditor

Kansas 1862

John Robinson

Secretary of State

Missouri 1867

Walter King

Judge

Tennessee 1867

Thomas Frazier

Judge

Louisiana 1870

George Wickliffe

Auditor

North Carolina 1871

William Woods Holden

Governor

Nebraska 1871

David Butler

Governor

New York 1872

George Barnard

Judge

Minnesota 1853

William Seeger

Treasurer

West Virginia 1875

John Burdett

Treasurer

Mississippi 1876

Alexander Kelso Davis

Lieutenant Governor

Georgia 1879

Washington Goldsmith

Comptroller General

Minnesota 1881

E. St. Julien Cox

Judge

New Jersey 1886

Patrick Laverty

Prison Warden

Kentucky 1888

James Tate

Treasurer

New Jersey 1895

Patrick Connelly

Judge

New York 1913

William Sulzer

Governor

Oklahoma 1915

A.P. Watson

Corporations Commissioner

Tennessee 1916

Jesse Edgington

Judge

Tennessee 1916

Z. Newton Estes

District Attorney

Texas 1917

James Ferguson

Governor

Montana 1918

Charles Liebert Crum

Judge

Oklahoma 1923

John Walton

Governor

Montana 1927

Charles Stewart

Secretary of State

Oklahoma 1929

Henry Johnston

Governor

Massachusetts 1941

Daniel Coakley

Governor’s Council

Michigan 1943

Michael Nolan

Judge

Tennessee 1958

Raulston Schoolfield

Judge

Oklahoma 1965

Napoleon Johnson

Judge

Texas 1976

O.P. Carrillo

Judge

Florida 1978

Samuel Smith

Judge

Arizona 1988

Evan Mecham

Governor

Pennsylvania 1994

Rolf Larsen

Judge

Missouri 1994

Judith Moriarty

Secretary of State

Nevada 2004

Kathy Augustine

Controller

Nebraska 2006

C. David Hergert

Regent

Illinois 2009

Rod Blagojevich

Governor

South Dakota 2022

Jason Ravnsborg

Attorney General

Kentucky 2023

Ronnie Goldy Jr.

Prosecutor

(*Vermont was not admitted as a state until 1791)


* J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School.

[2] The eight were William Woods Holden, North Carolina (1871); David Butler, Nebraska (1871); William Sulzer, New York (1913); James Ferguson, Texas (1917); John Walton, Oklahoma (1923); Henry Johnston, Oklahoma (1929); Evan Mecham, New Mexico (1988); and Rod Blagojevich, Illinois (2009). See Becky Little, 8 US Governors Who Were Impeached and Convicted, History (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/us-governors-impeached-convicted-left-office [https://perma.cc/9F9T-G659].

[3] Such as Andrew Cuomo in New York (2021), and John G. Rowland in Connecticut (2004). See Luis Ferré-Sadurní and Jeffery C. Mays, Cuomo Is Resigning, but Some Legislators Still Want to Impeach Him, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/12/nyregion/cuomo-impeachment-investigation.html [permalink unavailable]; Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709, 712 n.1 (Conn. 2004). At the federal level, Richard Nixon resigned to avoid impeachment. See Ron Elving, Half a century ago, Nixon became the only president to resign, NPR (Aug. 9, 2024), https://www.npr.org/2024/08/09/nx-s1-5068704/nixon-resign [https://perma.cc/93RP-PFLX].

[4] How federal impeachment works, USA.Gov (last accessed Feb. 24, 2025), https://www.usa.gov/impeachment [https://perma.cc/7ADF-AHKR].

[5] See Kentucky Senate convicts ex-prosecutor in impeachment trial, Associated Press (Mar. 20, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/impeachment-prosecutor-nude-photos-kentucky-senate-f5e6774d8622739e8842ede5777a431e [permalink unavailable]. The prosecutor, Ronnie Goldy, Jr., had resigned amidst the impeachment proceedings, but the legislators still went forward, and Goldy was convicted and disqualified from future office in Kentucky. See In re Articles of Impeachment against Ronnie Lee Goldy, Jr., 2023 Sess. (Ky. 2023) https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/23rs/RLGJ_ImpeachmentResult.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3M-QMBJ].

[6] See Robert Schrage & John Schaaf, Hidden History of Kentucky Political Scandals, ch. 3 (2020).

[7] In 1991, Commissioner of Agriculture Ward Burnette resigned after impeachment and before Senate trial. See Jailed Kentucky Official Quits, N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/07/us/7-arizona-lawmakers-charged-with-corruption.html [permalink unavailable]. Also in 2023, prosecutor Richard Boling resigned after the introduction of an impeachment resolution against him. See Andrew Wolfson, Western Kentucky prosecutor to resign rather than face impeachment, Louisville Courier J. (Jan. 9, 2023), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2023/01/09/rick-boling-resignation-kentucky-commonwealth-attorney/69792238007/ [https://perma.cc/C7SU-QHJP].

[8]  See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives Archive, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/ [https://perma.cc/8HNY-VV2F] (listing all impeachments passed by the House and their outcomes).

[9]  See, e.g., Hon. R. David Proctor, An Overview of Judicial Independence from Impeachment to Court-Packing, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1147, 1152-59 (2017); See also Gerald L. Neuman, Impeachment as Cause or Cure of Human Rights Violations, in Impeachment in a Global Context: Law, Politics, and Comparative Practice 3 (Chris Monaghan, Matthew Flinders & Aziz Z. Huq eds. 2024).

[10] See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1217, 1229-30 (2019) (discussing 2018 impeachment of the entire supreme court of West Virginia); In re Larsen, 812 A.2d 642, 644-46 (Pa. Spec. Trib. 2002) (discussing 1994 impeachment and removal of Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen).

[11] See, e.g., Peter Baker, Inside Impeachment’s Rise as a Weapon of Partisan Warfare, N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2024) https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/us/politics/impeachments-weapon-partisan-warfare.html. [permalink unavailable]; Bruce Schreiner, Impeachment fever hits Kentucky with efforts to oust leaders, Associated Press (Jan. 31, 2021) https://apnews.com/general-news-f9ebaa25985fee93634e1f28500536c1 [permalink unavailable].

[12] Recent examples include the impeachment and removal of South Dakota Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg, and the impeachment but acquittal of Texas Attorney General Robert Paxton. See Julie Bosman, South Dakota Removes Its Attorney General After Fatal Crash, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/us/jason-ravnsborg-impeachment-south-dakota.html [permalink unavailable] (discussing the impeachment and conviction of South Dakota’s Republican Attorney General, Jason Ravnsborg, by a Republican dominated state Senate); Zach Despart, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton acquitted on all 16 articles of impeachment, The Tex. Tribune (Sept. 16, 2023) https://www.texastribune.org/2023/09/16/ken-paxton-acquitted-impeachment-texas-attorney-general/ [https://perma.cc/JC9N-NSW9] (discussing the impeachment of Texas Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton by House Republicans and acquittal in state Senate). As prominent examples from earlier times, Governors Butler, Sulzer and Ferguson were removed by opponents from their own party. Supra note 2.

[13] See 1 Roger Foster, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Historical and Juridical, with Observations upon the Ordinary Provisions of State Constitutions and a Comparison with the Constitutions of Other Countries 633-713 (Boston, The Boston Book Co.1895) (describing acquittals and abandoned proceedings as well as convictions).

[14] Id. at 630.

[15] See Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull, Impeachment in America 1635-1805 (1984).

[16] See, e.g., Cortez A.M. Ewing, Early Tennessee Impeachments, 16 Tenn. Hist. Q. 291 (1957) (surveying Tennessee impeachments); Impeached: The Removal of Texas Governor James E. Ferguson 14 (Jessica Brannon-Wranosky & Bruce A. Glasrud eds. 2017) (chronicling the impeachment of Texas governor James E. Ferguson); Hannah Haksgaard, Tyler Moore, & Gabrielle Unruh, Making South Dakota History: An Introduction to the Special Impeachment Issue, S. D. L. Rev. 159 (2023) (issue focused on the impeachment of Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg).

[17] See Dianne Lugo, 3 of 5 statewide ballot measures fail in Oregon, Salem Statesman J. (Nov. 9, 2024), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/09/oregon-election-results-2024-ballot-measures-approve-fail/76091373007/ [https://perma.cc/687D-GKAY] (discussing the passing of Ballot Measure 115, granting Oregon lawmakers impeachment power); Or. Const. art. IV, §34. Previously the Oregon Constitution had dispensed with impeachment. See Foster, supra note 13, at 528; Or. Const. 1857, art. VII, §19.

[18] Alaska Const. art. II, § 20 (The Alaska Constitution reverses the roles of the house and senate); Mo. Const. art. VII, § 2; Neb. Const. art. III, § 17 (Missouri and Nebraska provide for trial in the state supreme court, after accusation by the house in Missouri, and by the unicameral state legislature in Nebraska).

[19] E.g., Fla. Const. art. III, §17; Utah Const. art. VI, §17.

[20] See Mass. Const. of 1780, part II, ch. I, §2, art. VIII; 1941 Mass. Sen. J. 1535-52 (1941) (giving count-by-count votes on conviction and removal by majority of Daniel Coakley, an elected member of the Governor’s Council).

[21] See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 441, 562 (1988) (on Holden and Ames).

[22]  See Richard Gergel & Belinda Gergel, “To Vindicate the Cause of the Downtrodden”: Associate Justice Jonathan Jasper Wright and Reconstruction in South Carolina, in At Freedom’s Door: African American Founding Fathers and Lawyers in Reconstruction South Carolina 36 (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke Jr. eds. 2000).

[23] See e.g., Matthew L. Lifflander, The Only New York Governor Ever Impeached, 85(5) N.Y. State Bar Assn. J. 11 (2013).

[24] See Gerald L. Neuman, Impeachment, Disqualification, and Human Rights, 54 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 627, 652 (2023); In re Goldy, supra note 5; John R. Lundberg, The Great Texas “Bear Fight”: Progressivism and the Impeachment of James E. Ferguson, in Brannon-Wranosky & Glasrud , supra note 16, at 44-45.

[25] Recall of State Officials, National Conference of State Legislatures, (last updated Sep. 15, 2021) https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials [permalink unavailable].

[26] See Shaun Bowler, Recall and Representation: Arnold Schwarzenegger Meets Edmund Burke, 40 Representation 200 (2004); Id. at 207-08 (Bowler also reported a figure of 15 successful recalls of statewide officials (not including Davis), and many more at the municipal level).

[27]  Ky. Const. of 1792 art. V, para. 2; see also Ky. Const. §§ 112, 129 (repealed 1975).

[28]  Ky. Const. § 209 (repealed 2000).

[29]  Opinion of the Justices, 274 A.3d 269, 278-79 (Del. Supreme Court 2022) (Although the opinion was sought and given in general terms, the legislature’s request was prompted by improprieties attributed to the elected state auditor, Kathy McGuiness, who subsequently resigned after being convicted of misdemeanors); Melissa Steele, General Assembly Seeks Guidance on Removing Elected Officials, Cape Gazette, (Nov. 5, 2021) https://www.capegazette.com/article/general-assembly-seeks-guidance-removing-elected-officials/230000 [https://perma.cc/W23C-KQ49]; Ryan Mavity, Del. Auditor McGuiness Sentenced to Probation, Fined, Cape Gazette, (Oct. 19, 2022) https://www.capegazette.com/article/del-auditor-mcguiness-sentenced-probation-fined/247818?source=rs [https://perma.cc/WSB9-768Y]; See N.H. Const. art. 73 (In some states, the constitutional provision on address expressly targets the process at causes that would not be sufficient to justify impeachment).

[30]  See S.C. Const. art. XV, § 3 (obligatory: “shall” remove); Del. Const. art. III, § 13 (discretionary: may remove).

[31]  See Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).

[32] See , e.g., Cal. Const. art. XX, § 11; Del. Const. art. XV, § 6 (“The Governor shall remove…”); for Kentucky, see Troy B. Daniels, Dawn L. Danley-Nichols, Kate R. Morgan, & Bryce C. Rhoades, Kentucky’s Statutory Collateral Consequences Arising From Felony Convictions: A Practitioner’s Guide, 35 N. Ky. L. Rev. 413, 425-28 (2008) (for Kentucky); Ky Const. art. 150.

[33] See State ex rel. Olsen v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (N.D. 1934) (finding that office of governor was immediately vacated upon federal fraud conviction, despite pendency of appeal); City of Pineville v. Collett, 172 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1943) (finding that office of city clerk was not vacated upon conviction for voluntary manslaughter until appeal had been decided).

Navigating Intoxicated Parenting: A Call for Clear Guidelines in Kentucky Law

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Navigating Intoxicated Parenting: A Call for Clear Guidelines in Kentucky Law

Emily Prince*

Introduction

While no specific age is provided in Kentucky law for when a child may stay home alone, in certain circumstances, Child Protective Services (CPS) will substantiate neglect against parents who leave their child unattended.[2] This occurs if the child is, for whatever reason, incapable of meeting their immediate needs while unattended in such a way “that the physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected.”[3] Similarly, if the child is of sufficient age and mental capacity so that the child is not placed at risk of harm by being alone, CPS will not substantiate a finding of supervision neglect against the parents or legal guardians.[4] CPS social workers often piggyback off of supervision neglect to substantiate findings of neglect against parents who are physically present but too intoxicated to care for the basic needs of their children, thereby negatively affecting the physical health and safety of the child.

An interesting conundrum occurs when the child is sufficiently capable of providing for their own immediate needs, yet the parent is physically present and intoxicated. In instances such as these, I, a former Kentucky CPS social worker from 2021 to 2022, was advised by different supervisors in different cases to do different things. In the first case, I was advised to unsubstantiate the allegation of neglect because there was no proof that the parental substance use affected the child. In the second case, I was advised to substantiate the allegation of neglect because the parental substance use alone does negatively affect the child. The reasons given were that in the case of an emergency, a parent would be unable to transport the child to a hospital or give consent to treatment, parental substance abuse places the child at greater risk of other abuse and neglect, and it places the child at risk of accidental ingestion or other exposure to drugs and drug paraphernalia. In both cases, the children were sufficiently competent such that a finding of supervision neglect would have been unsubstantiated should the child have been alone for the same amount of time.

Currently, Kentucky leaves significant room open for CPS and trial courts to find supervision neglect against a parent solely due to a parent’s misuse of substances, even though the parent did not expose the child to increased risk in other ways. Such a finding of neglect can lead to the child being removed from the home and placed with relatives or in foster care. While parental substance abuse may increase the risk of environmental hazards[5] and is correlated with negative social-psychological effects,[6] when these risks are not present or are minimized, the child’s interest in stability and maintaining family bonds and the state’s interest in preserving resources should be predominant. Unfortunately, the ambiguities in Kentucky’s statutory and administrative guidelines have proven ripe for CPS social worker discretion and inconsistency in finding parental substance misuse as child neglect. In response, Kentucky rule–makers should amend statutory and administrative guidelines to make clear that parental substance abuse alone, without more, is not grounds for substantiating neglect, but may be grounds for other interventions aimed at strengthening families and reducing the associated risks. 

     I.         Current Kentucky Law Leaves Too Much Room for Inconsistent Application 

A.     Existing Kentucky Legislation Leaves Significant Discretion for the Cabinet 

Kentucky Revised Statutes defines “abused or neglected child” in relevant part as:

(1) [A] child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when:

(a) His or her parent, guardian, person in a position of authority or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child: . . .

2. Creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury as defined in this section to the child by other than accidental means;

3. Engages in a pattern of conduct that renders the parent incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child, including but not limited to parental incapacity due to a substance use disorder as defined in KRS 222.005;

4. Continuously or repeatedly fails or refuses to provide essential parental care and protection for the child, considering the age of the child; . . .

8. Does not provide the child with adequate care, supervision, food, clothing, shelter, and education or medical care necessary for the child's well-being when financially able to do so or offered financial or other means to do so . . .  [.][7]

Three points are noteworthy. First, parental substance abuse is mentioned only in subsection three. Second, to satisfy subsection three, the phrase, “[e]ngages in a pattern of conduct . . .” indicates that abuse or neglect in this instance requires a pattern of offenses, not just an isolated incident. Third, substance use disorder alone is insufficient to meet the criteria of abuse or neglect—the parent must also be incapable of meeting the child’s needs. In other words, the parent’s substance use must have an effect on the child.  

B.     Administrative Regulations Leave Significant Discretion for Worker 

922 KAR 1:330(2)(4) provides, in relevant part, that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) shall: 

(b) Investigate or conduct an assessment upon receipt of a report that alleges neglect of a child perpetrated by a caretaker that may result in harm to the health and safety of a child in the following areas: . . .

2. Supervision neglect if the individual reporting has reason to believe that the physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected by lack of necessary and appropriate supervision; . . .

8. Neglect due to a caretaker's use of drugs or alcohol that results in:

a. A child born exposed to drugs or alcohol, as documented by a health care provider pursuant to:

(i) 42 U.S.C. 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii); and

(ii) KRS 620.030(2);

b. A child's facilitated access to and use of drugs or alcohol that may result in a life-threatening situation for the child . . . [.][8] 

As substance abuse is only specifically mentioned regarding children’s access or exposure to drugs, social workers typically rely on supervision neglect when confronted with allegations of parental substance abuse.[9] The theory is that intoxication renders the parents unable to appropriately supervise their children. Although statutory and administrative guidance comes short in answering what constitutes “necessary and appropriate supervision,”[10] it nevertheless remains clear that the child must be detrimentally affected by the failure of the parents to supervise their child.[11] Inconsistency arises in practice concerning whether the “physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected” when the only potential for abuse arises from parental substance abuse in otherwise self–sufficient children. 

C.     Case Law Gives Rise to Unanswered Questions

M.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services[12] almost squarely addresses the problem presented in the introduction.  Although the father regularly consumed alcohol around his three children, who were thirteen and fifteen at the time, he maintained that his drinking did not “have an effect on his ability to parent and care for his children” and refused to attend intensive outpatient treatment.[13] When he drank, the children observed a change in the appearance of his eyes and his words would be slurred.[14] He only drank at night and always drank away from the children on the deck.[15] When he drove the children to school in the morning, he was sober.[16] One child was bothered by his drinking and it sometimes led to arguments between the child and her father.[17] The children had good school attendance and were excelling in school.[18] The social worker had “no concerns about them being properly fed, clothed, or otherwise provided for.”[19] The home was described as “extremely cluttered” but not dirty, and there was no indication that anything in the home posed “a threat to the children’s health or well-being.”[20]

The trial court “found that the children were neglected under KRS 600.020(1)(a)2, 3, 4, and 8.”[21] Finding that there were no means available to leave the children inside the home due to the father’s refusal to stop drinking or attend intensive outpatient treatment, the trial court removed the children from the home.[22] The Cabinet changed the permanency goal of the family to adoption and abandoned reunification efforts.[23] The father, M.C., “appealed the family court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed” the family court’s decision.[24]

M.C. appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, and the Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s finding of neglect.[25] The Supreme Court acknowledged that KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2) allows a neglect finding where “a risk of abuse exists and does not require actual abuse prior to the child’s removal from the home or limitation on the contact with an abusive parent,”[26] but nevertheless held that “‘the risk of harm must be more than a mere theoretical possibility,’ it must be ‘an actual and reasonable potential for harm.’”[27] The Court relied on the children’s age and abilities in overturning the neglect finding but declined to create a categorical age in which a child cannot be subjected to neglect from a parent’s substance use.[28] The Court distinguished this case from one in which the child was a newborn and required care “nearly twenty-four hours a day.”[29] The Court also emphasized that the record was devoid of evidence indicating that the father’s alcoholism impacted the needs of the children in any detrimental way.[30] The Court stated that, while “M.C. would be well-advised to continue to seek substance use treatment,” his substance use had not rendered him neglectful of his children.[31]

The case of M.C. was somewhat unique in two respects. First, M.C.’s success can be attributed to his ability to appeal the trial court’s ruling and overcome the discretion afforded to trial courts’ determinations of fact. In neglect and abuse cases, the Cabinet must prove neglect or abuse only by a preponderance of the evidence.[32] “A family court’s finding of fact in [an abuse or neglect] action ‘shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.’”[33] Trial courts have broad discretion in finding whether a child has been neglected or abused[34] and significant leeway in safekeeping their determinations from being overturned on appeal.[35] M.C. went through two appeals before the Supreme Court of Kentucky overturned the trial court’s finding of neglect.[36] Not all parents deemed neglectful due to a substance abuse disorder will be fortunate enough to have the resources to appeal once, let alone twice.[37]

Second, in M.C., the father was using alcohol, not illegal substances. Although M.C. did not address the distinction, it leaves open the question of whether the illegal nature of other substances places the children at higher risk of not having their needs met. Whether through causation or correlation, parental alcohol use appears to have better outcomes for those in the child protection systems than parental use of illegal drugs.[38] The Court also leaves open the question of what abuse or neglect due to substance abuse would look like for children who are self–sufficient and able to be on their own without supervision for extended periods.

In Cabinet for Health and Family Services on behalf of C.R. v. C.B.,[39] which the appellate court heavily relied on and the Supreme Court of Kentucky distinguished in M.C.,[40] the Court found that substance use alone can be the basis of a neglect finding without additional finding of harm to the particular child when the substance use has been the basis for a prior involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR).[41] In C.B., the father of a newborn who tested positive for suboxone at birth due to the mother’s prenatal substance use “admitted to using heroin, Percocet, and off-street suboxone.”[42] The father had previously had his parental rights to other children involuntarily terminated.[43] In upholding the trial court’s finding of neglect and reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that the father’s “prior history of drug abuse was found to have created a risk of harm in the prior TPR proceeding” and “the family court certainly does not have to wait for actual harm to occur before taking protective measures.”[44] The Court reiterated that “[KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2)], as written, permits the court’s finding where a risk of abuse exists and does not require actual abuse prior to the child’s removal from the home or limitation on the contact with an abusive parent.”[45] 

What exactly constitutes “a risk of abuse” is left undefined and subject to interpretation. The Court has insisted that “risk of harm must be more than a mere theoretical possibility” but “an actual and reasonable potential for harm.”[46] Surely, an alcoholic father of teenagers increases some risk of harm, yet M.C. found that it did not. While C.R. focused mostly on the prior TPR of the father,[47] the Court in M.C. made clear that the children’s ages were a predominant factor for the distinction.[48] M.C. also made clear that the fact that the children’s needs had not gone unmet was a motivating factor,[49] but no evidence was presented in C.R. that the newborn’s needs had gone unmet due to the father’s substance use.[50] What is left after these two cases is confusion, and confusion is a ripe breeding ground for inconsistent application of the law.

     II.         Supervision Neglect as a Basis for Finding Neglect Due to Parental Substance Abuse 

Given that no separate category of neglect exists for situations in which a parent is present but intoxicated, Cabinet workers must find that a case meets the criteria for supervision neglect before substantiating an allegation of neglect in such situations. The question becomes, then, whether, with all else being equal, the criteria for evaluating whether a child can be left unattended should be the same for when a child can be left alone with an intoxicated parent. Kentucky does not have a set age for when a child is permitted to stay alone.[51] Instead, Kentucky will accept a report for supervision neglect “if the individual reporting has reason to believe that the physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected by lack of necessary and appropriate supervision.”[52] Beyond this, workers are given a high level of discretion in how they determine whether a child may be left alone. One Cabinet worker, Misty, reported that she bases her discretion on “age, maturity, cognitive ability, etc.”[53] Misty assesses the child’s ability to respond appropriately in case of an emergency by providing the child with emergency scenarios and asking the child how they would respond, and also determining whether the child has access to emergency numbers.[54] Other workers will likely use similar criteria, but each worker will evaluate the information obtained differently.

Evaluating whether other factors should be considered beyond the age and abilities of the child when determining whether the child may be left with an intoxicated caregiver requires asking whether adding an intoxicated caregiver increases the risks that would otherwise exist if the child were left alone. The answer to this is in the affirmative—a present but intoxicated caregiver does pose potential risks to a child that would not be present if the child were alone.  A caretaker using substances exposes children to the risk of coming into contact with environmental hazards such as alcohol, drugs, or drug paraphernalia, which may lead to accidental overdose or physical injury to young children[55] and experimental drug use in older children.[56] These additional risks, however, fall under the Cabinet’s category of environmental neglect and could be charged as such if the parent exposes the child to a dangerous environment by leaving alcohol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia unsecured.[57]  These are distinct categories that must be separately satisfied. Fully or partially meeting the criteria for one does not substitute for fully meeting the criteria of another.

Another potentially added risk of an intoxicated parent versus an absent parent is that, in the case of an emergency, the parent would be unable to consent to treatment. Medical practitioners must gain the informed consent of a patient or their representative before providing treatment[58] and failure to do so can be considered malpractice.[59] Informed consent requires that the person giving the consent is able “to understand relevant medical information and the implications of treatment alternatives and to make an independent, voluntary decision.”[60] Depending on the level of intoxication, a parent may not have the requisite mental capacity to understand these risks and provide informed consent.[61] Fortunately, the Kentucky legislature has anticipated times when medical treatment should be given without pause.[62] In such cases, there is an exception to the requirement of informed consent for emergencies[63] and when “in the professional's judgment, the risk to the minor's life or health is of such a nature that treatment should be given without delay and the requirement of consent would result in delay or denial of treatment.”[64]

Of course, should these provisions fail to accommodate the situation and the child be forced to go without medical care based on the parent’s inability to consent, this potentially could be considered medical neglect. However, the criterion for medical neglect makes this scenario unlikely if not impossible. Medical neglect requires that the child not receive treatment for injury, illness, or disability that may be life threatening, “result in permanent impairment,” “interfere with normal functioning and worsen,” or “be a serious threat to the child’s health due to the outbreak of a vaccine preventable disease, unless the child is granted an exception to immunization pursuant to [statute].”[65] The statutory exceptions to informed consent discussed above ensure that consent is not a hurdle to seeking treatment for the sorts of ailments that would be considered medical neglect if gone untreated. Transportation to the hospital in the case of an emergency could still be a barrier to treatment when the driver is too intoxicated to drive, but limited transportation is not always considered neglect, such as when it is due to poverty.[66] Ambulatory services are capable of transporting children to the hospital in situations such as these.  Therefore, although intoxicated parents do increase risks, these risks are either considered neglect under a separate category or are sufficiently minimized to not constitute neglect.
 

III.         Considerations and Competing Interests

Determining how to address parental substance abuse in a child abuse or neglect context requires a weighing of multiple factors including parental rights, the best interests of the child, and the state’s interests in conserving its resources.

A.     Preserving Parental Rights 

Parents have a long–established fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children,[67] meaning that “a parent has a basic and fundamental right to be free from governmental interference when parenting a child.”[68] This is true even if the parents “have not been model parents.”[69] The Court has recognized a parent’s “‘desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an interest far more precious than any property right.”[70]  Before a parent can be deprived of this fundamental liberty interest by the state, the parent is entitled to procedural safeguards.[71]

In state–initiated abuse or neglect proceedings, the Cabinet must prove abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020[72] by a preponderance of the evidence.[73] In K.H. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky refused to uphold neglect findings where the risk of harm to the child was a “mere theoretical possibility” and where the conclusion was merely speculative and “based upon the compounding of inferences upon inferences.”[74] In so deciding, the court stressed the dangers of “wide-reaching intrusion by the state into the parent-child relationship” and warned that allowing the Cabinet to find neglect based on attenuated circumstances would give the state too much power in imposing its views about proper parenting.[75] A parent against whom neglect is found is placed on a registry and barred from working many jobs involving children and other vulnerable populations.[76] Given what a parent has at stake in abuse and neglect proceedings, it is crucial that a court ensure that the parent placed the child at risk of actual harm and not merely at risk of violating social norms.[77] 

B.     Preserving State Resources 

The state has “a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden” of neglect and abuse proceedings.[78] In 2016, Kentucky spent an estimated $560 million on child neglect and maltreatment.[79] It is nearly impossible to estimate how much money Kentucky spends on instances similar enough to the introductory scenario to be meaningful and thus determine how much Kentucky would save by constraining the criteria in which this sort of neglect is found. Nonetheless, a natural inference is that a narrower definition of abuse or neglect would result in fewer cases of neglect and less money expenditure by the state for investigating allegations and funding foster homes. Given that the state pays between $27 and $108.64 per day per child in foster care just to reimburse the foster parents, not factoring in other costs such as Medicaid coverage or food assistance[80], minimizing the number of children that go to foster care is a logical way to reduce financial expenditure by the state.

C.     Mitigating Harm to Children

Parental substance abuse poses dangers beyond inadequate supervision. CPS workers are highly aware that parental substance abuse is associated with an increased risk of child abuse and neglect.[81] Of course, correlation doesn’t necessarily mean causation. Many factors contribute to both substance abuse and child maltreatment, including parental mental illness, lower socioeconomic status, lower education, higher levels of stress in the home, and residential and caretaker instability.[82] Interestingly, child abuse rates are the same for parents with a current diagnosis of substance abuse as parents with a prior diagnosis of substance abuse, suggesting that sobriety does not mitigate the likelihood of committing abuse.[83] This implies that substance abuse itself is not the cause of child abuse but rather another symptom of a complex interplay between social, biological, and environmental factors.

Perhaps, then, the most efficient way to address child abuse through the lens of parental substance misuse is to broaden the scope of the inquiry to include other risk factors associated with parental substance misuse. In this vein, perhaps the state should consider making parental mental illness, lower socioeconomical status, lower education, higher levels of stress in the home, and residential and caretaker instability child abuse or neglect. Of course, this idea would shock the conscience of the average citizen, who would balk at the idea by saying that children are always exposed to risks, and such is part of life. There is some risk in giving a child a deadly weapon, yet school aged children all across the country are armed every year with bows and arrows in the name of archery. There is always a risk that a child will choke on solid foods, yet no pediatrician would advise the parents to maintain a liquid diet until the child is an adult. For that matter, parental cigarette smoking poses risks to children without benefiting them in any way, yet Kentucky does not make cigarette smoking by parents child abuse.[84]

This creates an interesting quandary about which risks society is willing to tolerate and which risks cross the line into abuse or neglect. The answer to this seems to focus not on the amount of risk but on the social acceptance of the act leading to the risk. For example, in my experience as a social worker and observing other workers, I noticed that the parent’s reasons for leaving a child unsupervised influenced whether the worker substantiated the neglect allegation. If the parents left the child home alone to go to work, the outcome would be more favorable to them than if they had left the child to visit a paramour. The risk to the child was the same but the outcomes of the cases were different. A similar bias seems to be at play regarding the “risk” of parental substance use and inadequate supervision. When discussing this topic with my former supervisor and coworkers, I was advised that if the parent is incapacitated due to drugs, this is neglect because the parent is unavailable should the child need medical treatment. At the same time, if the parent is sedated for surgery, this would not be neglect because it is for medical reasons. Again, the risk to the child is the same but the cases have different outcomes.

It is thus fair to conclude that, for better or for worse, in the abuse and neglect arena, the “risks” of parental substance abuse encompass more than just the risks to the child. The “risks” include at least some amount of social judgment of the proprieties of the parent’s actions. This is particularly relevant when contemplating whether to distinguish M.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services[85] (discussed above) from the introductory scenario. M.C. involved parental alcohol abuse.[86] Studies estimate between 12% and 70% of child abusers are alcoholics.[87] This overlaps significantly with the estimated 40% to 80% increase in child abuse brought on by parental substance misuse other than alcohol.[88] This indicates that there may not be a meaningful distinction drawn between the effects of parental substance abuse and parental alcohol abuse regarding child abuse sufficient to justify differential treatment of them in the dependency, neglect, and abuse courts. 

D.     Preventing Further Harm to Children by Removal

When the Cabinet believes there is sufficient evidence for the court to find neglect or abuse and the court agrees, the child may be removed from their family home and either placed with relatives, fictive kin, or put in foster care.[89] While removing a child from an at–risk home may intuitively seem to be in the best interests of the child, it is often the case that removing the child from their parents causes more psychological trauma than if the child had been left in the home.[90] In addition to the trauma associated with removal, children are frequently exposed to abuse and neglect in their foster homes.[91]

IV.         Balancing Risk and Intervention: The Argument for ‘Services Needed’ Approach 

Kentucky implemented its juvenile code to protect children and maintain family bonds by adopting effective policies and practices that are supported by empirical evidence and “offering all available resources to any family in need of them.”[92] Clearly, parental substance abuse is a real issue of concern for those concerned about child safety and welfare. While this Note argues that the current state of the law does not call for a finding of neglect for parental substance use beyond what is appropriate for such a finding under supervision neglect (or the narrow circumstances defined in 922 KAR 1:330(2)(4)(b)(8)),[93] it would be naïve to ignore the increased risk that accompanies such behavior. Parents that use substances expose their children to an increased risk of educational delays; insufficient dental and medical attention; mental, behavioral, and emotional issues; injury due to dangerous home environment; and substance abuse issues for the child themselves as they grow older.[94] Even if these risks are not sufficient to justify classifying the root behavior as neglect or abuse, perhaps other routes can be taken to improve outcomes.

Instead of substantiating or unsubstantiating an allegation of abuse or neglect, the Cabinet can instead make a “services needed” finding.[95] This finding is appropriate when the family has high risk factors but “the child was found to be safe during the child protection intervention” and the risk factors are at an insufficient level to open a protection case.[96] The goal of such a finding is to reduce these risk factors and provide services to the family.[97] If the Cabinet makes a “services needed” finding, the Cabinet would open an ongoing case and work with the family to provide empirical and strengths based preventative services, such as substance abuse treatment and mental health counseling.[98] These services are voluntary and the family is free to refuse them.[99] Should the family refuse and the Cabinet lacks the evidence to make a finding of abuse or neglect, the case is closed without providing further services.[100]

This avenue is the appropriate avenue for the introductory scenario. It recognizes that substance abuse raises the risk of maltreatment but isn’t in itself maltreatment. It allows the family the opportunity to receive services before the issues turn into abuse but abstains from encroaching on the parents’ fundamental rights. It also allows the state to conserve its resources and spend them wisely by investing them in those willing to make meaningful changes. 

Conclusion 

Understandably, the Kentucky legislature has given room to the Cabinet to decide what constitutes abuse or neglect. Also understandably, the Cabinet has attempted to give its workers wide enough latitude to deal with real life situations as they arise. These situations are varied, complex, and hard to predict. It would be impossible to exhaustively anticipate and provide guidance on all potential scenarios. One scenario, nonetheless, is reoccurring and demands more thorough guidance: the situation in which a child that would otherwise be competent to be unsupervised is left to the sole care of an intoxicated parent and no other associated risk is present. The law as it stands seems to indicate that this situation would not encompass neglect, but experience indicates a variety of approaches by differing workers and supervisors and results in different outcomes for materially equal cases. To prevent such inconsistency, Kentucky lawmakers should provide more guidance about how to address this situation. The most logical approach is to unsubstantiate claims of neglect in such a scenario and instead offer a “services needed” finding. This approach recognizes that risks are present when parents abuse substances but honors the parent’s constitutional rights, considers the best interests of the child, and takes into account the state’s interest in ensuring stability for the child and familial unity while also managing state resources efficiently. Kentucky lawmakers should update relevant laws to reflect these goals and remove discretion inconsistent with this recommendation.



* J.D Expected 2025, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law; BS Criminal Justice 2020, Eastern Kentucky University.

[2] Ana Rocío Álvarez Bríñez, At What Age Can You Leave Children Home Alone in Kentucky?, Louisville Courier J., https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2023/06/09/planning-on-leaving-your-kids-alone-this-summer-get-ready/70271092007/ [https://perma.cc/DT8M-ZV9X ] (June 10, 2023, 5:45 PM).

[3] See 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330 (2023).

[4] See id.

[5] Vincent C. Smith & Celeste R. Wilson, Families Affected by Parental Substance Use, 138 American Acad. of Pediatrics e2, e4 (Aug. 2016), http://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article-pdf/138/2/e20161575/1507458/peds_20161575.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[6] See Jessica M. Solis, Julia M. Shadur, Alison R. Burns & Andrea M. Hussong, Understanding the Diverse Needs of Children Whose Parents Abuse Substances, 5 Current Drug Abuse Rev. 135, 135 (2012).

[7] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022) (emphasis added).

[8] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330(2)(4)(b) (2023).

[9] Email interview with Misty Adkins, Social Service Worker, Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. (Jan. 31, 2024, 8:49 AM EST) (on file with author).

[10] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.020 (West 2019); 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330 (2023).

[11] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330(2)(4)(b) (2023).

[12] M.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 614 S.W.3d 915 (Ky. 2021).

[13] Id. at 919.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 919–20.

[20] Id. at 920.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 917.

[26] Id. at 923 (citing Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Ky. 2018)).

[27] Id. (citing K.H. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 358 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011)).

[28] Id. at 924–25.

[29] Id. at 924 (distinguishing Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Ky. 2018)).

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 929.

[32] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.100(3) (West 2021).

[33] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 921 (citing Ky. R. Civ. Proc. 52.01).

[34] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Ky. 2018) (citing Dep’t for

Human Res. v. Moore, 552 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)).

[35] See id. at 574.

[36] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 920.

[37] See Maia Szalavitz, Addictions Are Harder to Kick When You’re Poor. Here’s Why, Guardian (June 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/01/drug-addiction-income-inequality-impacts-recovery?CMP=share_btn_fb [https://perma.cc/HRN9-3NG8] (“addiction . . . is far less likely to hit people who have stable, structured lives and decent employment than it is those whose lives are marked by uncertainty and lack of work.”).  

[38] Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Parental Substance Use: A Primer for Child Welfare Professionals, 4 (2021), https://www.childwelfare.gov/resources/parental-substance-use-primer-child-welfare-professionals [permalink unavailable].

[39] C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568.

[40] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 923–25.

[41] C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 576.

[42] Id. at 570.

[43] Id.

[44] Id. at 576.

[45] Id.

[46] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 923.

[47] C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 575–76.

[48] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 924–25.

[49] Id. at 924.

[50] See C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 576 (illustrating that the Court bases its holding on the father’s condition and drug use without evaluating whether the needs of the children were going unmet).

[51] Compare Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-801 (West 1986) (stating that a caretaker may not leave a child eight years of age in a building or vehicle unless someone thirteen years of age or older is with them), and Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.545 (West 1991) (stating that a custodian or caregiver may be charged with neglect if they leave a child under 10 years of age unattended), with Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022) (failing to include any age restriction on leaving children unattended under neglect parameters).

[52] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330 (2023).

[53] Email interview with Misty Adkins, supra note 9.

[54] Id.

[55] See Sofie Kuppens, Simon C. Moore, Vanessa Gross, Emily Lowthian & Andy P. Siddaway, The Enduring Effects of Parental Alcohol, Tobacco, and Drug Use on Child Well–Being: A Multilevel Meta–Analysis, 32 Dev. Psychopathology 765, 765 (2019). For a discussion regarding the causes of accidental overdose in children, see Brian C. Kelly, Mike Vuolo, & Laura C. Frizzell, Pediatric Drug Overdose Mortality: Contextual and Policy Effects for Children Under 12, Pediatric Rsch. 1258, 1259 (May 21, 2021).

[56] How Do Teens Find Drugs?, Recovery Village, https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/teen-addiction/drug/how-teens-get-drugs/  [https://perma.cc/K3HU-3QRL] (Aug. 30, 2024).

[57] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practice Manual: 2.3 Acceptance Criteria (effective Oct. 1, 2022), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter2/Pages/2-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/SBJ9-BNYL].

[58] Opinion 2.1.1: Informed Consent, AMA Code of Ethics, https://code-medical-ethics.ama-assn.org/ethics-opinions/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/7MR2-VWQP] (last visited Apr. 12, 2025).

[59] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.167(4) (West 2019); Informed consent in Kentucky, Gray L., PLLC (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.dgraylaw.com/blog/2019/09/informed-consent-in-kentucky/#:~:text=Physicians%20must%20get%20

informed%20consent,informed%20consent%20constitutes%20medical%20malpractice [permalink unavailable].

[60] Opinion 2.1.1: Informed Consent, supra note 58.

[61] See Catherine A. Marco, Does Patient Autonomy Outweigh Duty to Treat?, 5 Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics 37, 39 (2003).

[62] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.40–320 (West 1976).

[63] Id. § 304.40–320(3).

[64] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.185(5) (West 2021).

[65] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., supra note 57.

[66] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020(1)(a)(8) (West 2022).

[67] Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

[68] Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 33 (Ky, Ct. App. 2008).

[69] Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.

[70] Id. at 758–59 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).

[71] Id. at 753–54.

[72] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022).

[73] K.H. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 358 S.W.3d 29, 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

[74] Id. at 32 (overturning neglect finding against mother who refused to keep her children away from their father who had substantiated sexual abuse findings against a different child because the risk of harm to her children was too attenuated to constitute neglect).

[75] Id. at 31.

[76] See National Background Check Program (NBCP), Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., https://www.chfs.ky.gov/agen

cies/dcbs/dcc/Pages/nationalbackgroundcheck.aspx [permalink unavailable] (last visited Apr. 12, 2025).

[77] See K.H., 358 S.W.3d at 31. (“It is not enough for the Cabinet to show that K.H. would be well–advised to agree to the terms of the Aftercare Plan. The applicable statutory definition requires a finding that K.H. created or allowed to be created a risk that an act of sexual abuse will be committed upon the children”).

[78] Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).

[79] Prevent Child Abuse Kentucky, Primary Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, Prevent Child Abuse Am., https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/CommitteeDocuments/320/12791/7%2022%202020%20Primary%20Prevention%20KY.pdf [https://perma.cc/K83C-43WW ].

[80] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 12.24 Per Diem rates (Including Specialized Foster Care) (effective Feb. 15, 2024), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter12/Pages/12-24.aspx#Practice_Guidance [https://perma.cc/GW3T-P3KY].

[81] See Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 7.4 CPS Prevention Planning (effective June 29, 2020), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter7/Pages/7-4.aspx [permalink unavailable]; Kuppens, Moore, Gross, Lowthian & Siddaway, supra note 55.

[82] Solis, Shadur, Burns & Hussong, supra note 6.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] M.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 614 S.W.3d 915 (Ky. 2021).

[86] Id. at 918.

[87] Effects of Parental Substance Abuse on Children and Families, Am. Acad. of Experts in Traumatic Stress, https://www.aaets.org/traumatic-stress-library/effects-of-parental-substance-abuse-on-children-and-families [https://perma.cc/4NNY-4S7D ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2025).

[88] Solis, Shadur, Burns & Hussong, supra note 6.

[89] See Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 5.1 Relative and Fictive Kin Placement Consideration (effective Oct. 4, 2023), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter5/Pages/5-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/63XK-8RCH]; Ct. Improvement Program State Team, Dependency, Neglect and Abuse Cases: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities 5–8 (Oct. 2020), https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/CommitteeDocuments/17/13364/July%207%

202021%20Vanover%20Dependency%20Neglect%20and%20Abuse%20Booklet.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[90] Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 523, 527–41 (2019).

[91] Id. at 542–44.

[92] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.010(2)(a) (West 2014).

[93] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330(2)(4)(b)(8) (2023).

[94] Solis, Shadur, Burns & Hussong, supra note 6.

[95] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 2.22 Making a Finding, Notifications, and Court Involvement (effective Oct. 19, 2022), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter2/Pages/2-22.aspx [permalink unavailable].

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

Blank Space: Film and Television’s Missing Statute

Download a PDF Version

Blank Space: Film and Television’s Missing Statute

Meghan Goins*

Introduction

Artists and consumers alike are currently grappling with rapidly changing technology. As digital media grows in popularity and prominence, some art forms, such as music, may be more harmonious with copyright law than others. Copyright law should be applied more evenly across various art forms and streaming platforms to better incentivize creativity and make art more easily accessible to consumers. Recognizing that music copyright needed to be updated, Congress has recently acted to further those interests for the music industry. The passage of the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA)[2] was a legislative response to the significant changes in the music industry.[3] To best achieve the goals of copyright law while balancing the interests of copyright holders and consumers, a statute analogous to the MMA should be passed for the film and television industries.

It will be important to first conduct a brief overview of the MMA and the history of the evolving vehicles for the consumption of copyright works. Rather than analyzing every major streaming platform, this Note will examine a few platforms which hold the most consumer attention regarding the specific art forms the platform provides access to. This Note will explore recent litigation and new developments within copyright law to determine how to achieve the goal of greater consumer accessibility to art. Ultimately, that discussion will lead to the recommendation that copyright standards for music should be adapted to visual media through a statute similar to Title I of the MMA.

I.      Background

Copyrights are automatically created when an artist (also called the “author” for purposes of copyright law) generates a creative work in a fixed medium.[4] Beyond the copyright automatically generated when a work is created, artists may also seek a copyright registration, which functions as a “public record of . . . ownership” and gives artists “access to federal courts in the case of infringement.”[5] To obtain copyright registration for a musical composition, artists may register “an individual sound recording or musical work,” “up to ten unpublished works all by the same author,” or “up to twenty musical works or twenty sound recordings if the works are created by the same author or have at least one common author, and if the claimant for each work in the group is the same.”[6] For films, a copyright is also automatically created when the film is generated, but copyright law protects “only the expression fixed in a motion picture (camera work, dialogue, sounds, and so on)” and “does not cover the idea or concept behind a work or any characters portrayed in it.”[7] Television shows are automatically protected by copyright law as well. For any type of media, though, registration is required “in order to file an infringement lawsuit.”[8]

Licenses allow a person or entity other than the copyright holder to legally use the copyrighted work. To obtain a license, one can contact the owner of the copyright for a particular work.[9] Importantly, “licenses allow a copyright owner to retain the rights while giving someone else a right to exercise some of them. . . .”[10] The rights a licensee has depend on whether the license granted is exclusive or nonexclusive, aside from the inability of a licensee to “authorize others to exercise the rights to that work without permission from the copyright owner.”[11] Additionally, no licensee can “sue and potentially recover damages for [copyright] infringement.”[12] If the license granted is nonexclusive, the original copyright owner of the work may still authorize other entities to use the work, and the original copyright owner may still “[use] the work in the manner and length of time described in the license.”[13] If the copyright owner grants an exclusive license, no one other than the exclusive licensee may use the work in the agreed upon manner for the duration of the license agreement, and no one else may be granted a license for that work during that time.[14]

A plaintiff in an action for copyright infringement may recover damages if the plaintiff can show “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copyright of constituent elements of the work that are original.”[15] In the event of copyright litigation, the fair use doctrine allows an entity to, in some circumstances, use a copyrighted work without first obtaining a license from the copyright holder.[16] When a particular use falls under the fair use doctrine, it is not an infringing use of the copyrighted work.[17] The fair use doctrine is an existing mechanism within copyright law that allows for greater access to creative works.[18] In addition to the fair use doctrine, certain statutes have been created to address the needs of particular creative industries, such as the MMA for the music industry.[19] The following sections will explain the technological changes that necessitated the creation of the MMA, and the provisions of it that could resolve problems within the film and television industries.

II.     Accessibility of Music

A.     The Music Modernization Act

Following changes to modes of music consumption, the Music Modernization Act was adopted by Congress in 2018, which allows copyright owners to obtain a compulsory license, through which copyright owners can receive royalties for their work without needing to grant “explicit permission” each time a license is sought from that copyright owner.[20] The MMA reflects a recent legislative update in the realm of copyright law, expanding it beyond the changes made to copyright law under the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.[21] The MMA is divided into three Titles: “Musical Works; Modernization Act, The Classics Protection and Access Act; and The Allocation for Music Producers Act.”[22]

The first of the three Titles “replaces the existing song-by-song compulsory licensing structure for making and distributing musical works with a blanket licensing system for digital music providers to make and distribute digital phonorecord deliveries (e.g., permanent downloads, limited downloads, or interactive streams).”[23] Blanket licenses give the licensee the ability to use and “access. . . a rightsholder’s entire catalog.”[24] Successfully obtaining a blanket license also protects the licensee from “an action for infringement. . . .”[25] To obtain a blanket license under the MMA, one must satisfy certain requirements.[26] To be eligible, the “primary purpose in making phonorecords of the musical work [must be] to distribute them to the public for private use, including by means of digital phonorecord delivery.”[27] One must also “[h]ave a direct contractual, subscription or other economic relationship with listeners or. . . must exercise direct control over providing the service to the listeners; [b]e able to report revenues (or other consideration) generated by the service; and [b]e able to provide certain reporting on usage of sound recordings of musical work.”[28]

As of January 1, 2021, the blanket licensing system, in its current form, is being operated by the Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC), established by the MMA.[29] Collective copyright management organizations can help artists to earn more for their work than they would under a performing rights organization (PRO), from which artists only earn performance royalties, or without either a PRO or a Collective Management Organization (CMO). [30] CMOs help artists to earn royalties for both the performance of their work and to earn “mechanical royalties.”[31] Mechanical royalties are earned when a licensee “reproduce[s] a piece of music onto CDs, DVDs, records or tapes.”[32]

B.     Technological and Legal Progression

Prior to the Music Modernization Act’s passage in 2018, several important technological shifts changed the way in which consumers engage with musical works.

Early streaming platforms violated copyright law by distributing music without first obtaining licenses or permission from the copyright holders of the music.[33] Without the protection of the fair use doctrine, which would have allowed these early platforms to continue operating legally, such distribution constituted copyright infringement. For instance, LimeWire was sued by various record labels alleging that LimeWire had directly infringed on their copyrighted works and had induced copyright infringement.[34] LimeWire ultimately settled and agreed to pay over $100 million in damages.[35]

C.     Streaming Titans and Digital Downloads

As technology continued to progress during the 2000s and 2010s, other legal streaming platforms rose in popularity. These platforms, to remain competitive, introduced new features to the market, such as digital downloading. Today, Apple Music, Spotify and SoundCloud are among the three most used music streaming platforms by consumers.[36] Spotify, which now has 640 million monthly users,[37] has a vast library of music[38] that spans countless genres, decades, and cultures.[39] Spotify is available in the form of a subscription, or as a free service with advertisements and restrictions on features such as the ability to “skip” songs.[40] Spotify had the largest payout to artists of any streaming platform in 2022, four years after the passage of the MMA.[41] To further illustrate the manner in which Spotify has grown to dominate the music streaming market, “[o]nline streaming services such [as] Spotify and Apple Music have become the music industry’s single biggest revenue source, overtaking physical sales and digital downloads for the first time.”[42] When a song or other audio on a streaming platform is played, artists can receive a payout.[43] These royalties consist of recording and publishing royalties. Importantly, publishing royalties “are [now] issued to publishers, collecting societies, and mechanical agencies.”[44]

Another notable feature of many current day streaming services is the ability to download the content found on the platform. Digital downloads, along with streaming, “predominate in the United States,”[45] rather than accessing music through physical copies such as vinyl, CDs, or other means. Digital downloads also allow streaming platform users to either obtain a permanent copy of a particular musical work, or to obtain a copy of a musical work “for offline listening.”[46] This gives consumers access to music without needing to obtain a physical copy of the music, meaning that consumers now have instantaneous access to nearly any song, provided it has been uploaded to the internet.[47] Both “the reproduction right” of “the sound recording and the underlying musical composition” are “implicat[ed]” by digital downloads.[48] The “reproduction right” is a right granted to artists through copyright law, giving them the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”[49] The rights to “the sound recording and the underlying musical composition” are codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114, and these rights give artists the exclusive rights to the sound of the song and the song in its written form.[50]

In a post-Napster era of the internet, streaming platforms are “enabling the market to reach new regions of the world, while helping wean[] a generation of music fans away from free or pirated music.”[51]  

III.   Accessibility of Television and Motion Pictures

A.     Licensing

Similar to the music industry, licenses can be obtained from the copyright owner or from an organization in order to show or distribute a film or television show.[52] Distributors of films and television shows include familiar companies such as Warner Bros., Sony, and Lionsgate.[53]

B.     Technology

Technology has also changed the television and film industries. Similarly, to the music industry, consumers now rely more on the internet than physical copies to access visual media.[54]

Netflix, which launched in 1997 and launched its streaming service in 2007, “now owns a 7.8% share of the US screen time,” second to YouTube.[55] Netflix obtains distribution and licensing rights through “Digital Exploitation Agreements.”[56] Through “Digital Exploitation Agreement[s],” Netflix obtains a license from “the producer of the film. . . [for] the right to communicate the film to the public.”[57] In May 2023, Netflix changed its policies to make it more difficult for subscribers to share a singular account across multiple home addresses.[58] This change resulted in increased rates of new subscriptions despite the “substantial risk” that the updated policy posed for Netflix.[59] Netflix’s prominence and popularity within the industry does not come without problems, though. Problems for the future of copyright law and the market for creative works have arisen as competitors for Netflix have appeared in recent years, as streaming platforms have to keep up with one another and with rapidly changing technology.

In 2018, a smaller streaming platform’s attempt to provide consumers with an easier way to access television was not considered fair use and was held to be unlawful by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[60] The smaller streaming platform was distributing content from larger television networks, allowing its subscribers to not only watch ten-minute clips of television shows, but to also “email the clips for viewing by others, including those who are not TVEyes clients.”[61] The specific features of TVEyes platform that led to the lawsuit were the ten-minute clips available to its subscribers, as well as the shorter, fourteen-second clips available when a subscriber searched for a specific term.[62] Ultimately, fair use did not protect TVEyes largely because of the potential that TVEyes would harm the marketability of the news Fox was providing.[63]

In recent litigation involving major streaming platforms, including Netflix, the platforms sued an individual who was the “operator of two illegal streaming sites.”[64] That operator attempted, through two services, to provide consumers with content ordinarily available across several platforms that sometimes require separate subscriptions.[65] The operator’s two services, “AllAccessTV (AATV) and Quality Restreams,” gave consumers the opportunity to purchase subscriptions and to have access to a “live channel feed.”[66] The subscriptions allowed AATV and Quality Restreams subscribers to watch and download “copyrighted movies and TV shows.”[67] That recent case and TVEyes are two examples of the approach of modern copyright law as it relates to the distribution of visual media by entities other than major television networks or streaming platforms: attempts to distribute content for profit that belongs to another streaming platform will be swiftly stricken down, with no protection available from the fair use doctrine. This keeps visual media stuck in a patchwork of paywalls.

IV.   “Television and Film” Modernization Act: Recommended Solution

One possible solution to the problems faced by consumers and potential consumers of visual media would be the passage of the film and television equivalent of Title I of the MMA, establishing a new licensing system for the film and television industries. A new statute is also needed to protect artists regardless of the streaming platform their works end up on or how much the work gets distributed across the internet, and to give consumers more reliable (and legal) access to visual media.

A.     Artist Compensation

One problem shared by music streaming platforms is low pay for the creators of the media supplied by various platforms.[68] Writers, producers, and actors alike have received low royalties from Netflix, even when the television shows they have worked on have become popular.[69] A statute similar to Title I of the MMA could guarantee royalties for writers, producers, and actors, specifically. A “Film and Television” Modernization Act could do this by establishing a “mechanical licensing collective” that, like the MLC established by Title I of the MMA, “collect[s] and distribute[s] royalties, and identif[ies] musical works and their owners for payment.”[70] The MLC established by the MMA also maintains a database listing entities eligible to receive royalties.[71] An analogous statute for the film and television industries should provide for the creation and maintenance of a similar database. This could help ensure that creatives involved with the production of film and television projects earn royalties for their work, no matter where those projects (legally) end up across various streaming platforms.

Without a statute that ensures copyright holders receive compensation for the distribution of their work on streaming platforms, though, the film and television industries may face more strikes in the future, as technology continues to change. As seen in 2023, such strikes are incredibly costly and inherently reduce the content available to consumers because very little new content is being created.[72]

The MMA requires potential licensees to “have a direct contractual, subscription or other economic relationship with listeners or. . . must exercise direct control over providing the service to the listeners; [b]e able to report revenues (or other consideration) generated by the service; and [b]e able to provide certain reporting on usage of sound recordings of musical work.”[73] A similar statute for the film and television industries could mitigate some of the increased costs of fairly compensating writers and actors by requiring that licensees provide content through a paid subscription service, for which the revenues would have to be reported. This could, ideally, pave the way for greater transparency and accountability for the payment of royalties. Additionally, the licensees under such a statute should be required to report their usage of the copyrighted works to which they are given distribution rights, further ensuring that all royalties are accounted for.

B.     Consumer Access and Stability

It can become incredibly difficult for members of the public to access some films and television shows when, due to licensing agreements, they are removed from Netflix after a set amount of time.[74] Unstable consumer access is another reason why Congress should pass a statute similar to the MMA. Blanket licensing, especially one centralized and regulated through a licensing collective established through such a statute, could make it easier to distribute the content in a manner that the removal of it from one streaming platform would not render it nearly impossible to find and engage with. Through a blanket license, a platform such as Netflix would have the ability to distribute greater amounts of content without relying on piecemeal licensing agreements.

A statute similar to Title I of the MMA could inhibit competition between streaming platforms, ideally leading to fewer streaming platforms capable of legally distributing greater amounts of content. These streaming platforms could obtain blanket licenses through a “Film and Television Mechanical Licensing Collective,” which could allow for more streamlined distribution, with regard to both the content itself and the process of requesting a license for the use of such content. The existence of fewer streaming platforms with larger amounts of available content could mark the beginning of a more consumer-friendly streaming world.

C.     Modernization

The passage of the MMA also demonstrates that updating the laws to reflect the needs of creatives and consumers in a rapidly changing world is not an impossible task, even though it may be a difficult one. Although daunting and murky, the realm of copyright law that protects film and television needs to be updated to combat the modern problems facing creatives and consumers alike, such as piracy on social media.

Rampant piracy on TikTok, and other popular social media applications, further highlights the urgency which copyright law must adapt to technological changes. Online piracy can be difficult to regulate, and if existing copyright law cannot control it, it is doubtful that a new statute for film and television would be able to do so either. To leave the film and television industry without greater protection from piracy, though, would allow piracy to continue to spiral out of control. In contrast to the manner in which music streaming platforms have reduced the demand for pirated copies of music,[75] piracy of visual media still poses a great threat to the market for visual media streaming platforms.[76] The screen recording capabilities on various devices allow users of those apps to create copies of the posted movies, meaning that an individual could create copies that exist even after the post in the screen recording has been removed at the request of a copyright holder.[77]

Congress must respond to piracy by ensuring that legal infrastructure is in place to better facilitate licensing for film and television, thereby eliminating the need for consumers to illegally access visual media when content is removed from a given streaming service. Additionally, as with artist compensation, requiring the usage of copyrighted works by licensees to be reported could mitigate some problems caused by piracy by establishing a more centralized method for tracking where certain content has legally ended up across the internet.[78]

V.  Addressing the Complexities of Copyright Law: Potential Weaknesses

To propose a solution to problems within a particular creative field without acknowledging the flaws of that solution would do an incredible disservice to members of that field, the market, and consumers of the art produced by that field. Consequently, there are numerous potential issues that could arise if a kind of “Film and Television Modernization Act” is passed, each of which must be addressed. These potential issues include: monopolization, disparities between artists as a result of the MMA, and weaknesses—exposed by consumer engagement—with the copyrighted works made more easily available to them as a result of the MMA. Despite these concerns, though, there are ways that a “Film and Television” Modernization Act could ease them as the streaming world continues to change.

A.     Problems

It should be acknowledged that there are problems within music copyright law and that adapting music copyright law to other forms of media will not necessarily solve all problems in copyright law. There is a risk that those problems may be transferred to the television and film industry if copyright law is treated as “one size fits all.”

One problem with passing a statute analogous to Title I of the MMA for the film and television industries is that the market for collective licensing is already “a heavily regulated market” regarding music because of the potential for “monopoly pricing…of collective copyright control.”[79] If collective blanket licenses are utilized for visual media, then heavy regulation will also be needed to prevent monopolization, and the process of getting to a point of effective regulation could be fraught with litigation, lasting several years and potentially causing problems for consumers. It is also possible that increased regulation in the film and television industries could exacerbate current consumer access issues by making it even more difficult to access copyrighted works.

The use of virtual private networks (VPNs) may also eliminate the need for such a statute. VPNs allow users to access content available on streaming platforms in other countries, making creative works easily accessible to consumers.[80] VPNs could eliminate the need for an improved blanket licensing system for visual streaming platforms. Downloading a VPN is a much quicker process than waiting for new legislation to facilitate greater consumer access to media. VPNs also give consumers unlimited access, in a sense, to media. A consumer could digitally “follow” a piece of media around if it comes and goes from various platforms and on different versions of those platforms in various countries.[81]

With the merging of several streaming platforms,[82] it is possible that a statute similar to the MMA is not needed to resolve the problem presented by the existence of so many streaming platforms with no overlapping content. Perhaps all one needs to do is wait for this era of streaming to end, and to simply wait for studios to combine their platforms until there are fewer platforms to subscribe to in order to access all the content one wishes to access.

Recent developments in music copyright have put legal flaws on display for consumers, calling into question the ability of a “Film and Television Modernization Act” to successfully facilitate increased consumer access to copyrighted works. As of February 2024, music distributed through United Music Group (UMG) has been removed from the app TikTok, leaving countless videos on the platform without any sound.[83] This ongoing situation is one example of the legal relationship between major music distributors and a social media platform failing and leaving consumers to deal with the fallout. If the MMA could not prevent such an event, then its ability to ensure that artists receive royalties for their work is dubious, as well as its ability to foster the distribution and access of creative works. Such an event begs the question: why have a mechanical licensing collective in place if it cannot stop a mass-deletion of media from a popular platform, and why have such a collective in place for film and television if countless amounts of content could theoretically be wiped from Netflix the day after its establishment?

Some artists were dissatisfied with the MMA not long after its passage. This dissatisfaction led to litigation between Eight Mile Style—the publishing company of the rapper Eminem—and Spotify, which began in August 2019, less than one year after the MMA was signed into law. In that case, the plaintiff went so far as to allege that the MMA is unconstitutional. In Eight Mile Style’s complaint, it argued that the MMA “retroactive[ly] eliminat[ed] . . . the right of a plaintiff to receive profits attributable to infringement, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees,” amounting to two violations of the Constitution: “denial of due process . . . and an unconstitutional taking of vested property rights.”[84]

B.     Final Discussion

The current state of the film and television industries is piecemeal and fragmented, a choppy legal sea upon which consumers must travel to access protected creative works. Streaming platforms are ever-changing, altering their policies to compete with one another. In the midst of those changes, a statute that regulates licensing of the content on those streaming platforms could offer some stability and consistency for consumers. A statute is also needed to protect the rights of creatives within the film and television industries. Although such a statute might not solve all the problems in the film and television industries, it could serve as a step in a new, more positive direction for the future of film and television. Such a statute could fill the existing gaps in copyright law created by rapidly advancing technology and could mitigate issues that have arisen in the years since streaming became such a central part of the film and television industries.

Conclusion

While there are problems with the manner in which copyright law has been applied to music streaming platforms as well as visual media streaming platforms, aspects of music streaming platforms should be adapted to visual media streaming platforms to better provide consumers access to the greatest amount of art and to ensure that there will continue to be a market for streaming platforms. Changes should be made to allow consumers to access visual media more easily, similar to the manner in which music is easily accessible on the internet. The many creatives of the film and television industries, and the consumers of their content, could be served well by a federal statute with similar provisions as the Music Modernization Act. No one can say with complete certainty what the current trajectory of the streaming world is, but the passage of a “Film and Television” Modernization Act could place copyright law on a path toward a brighter future, one in which the “blank space” currently left by Congress is gone.


* J.D. Expected 2025, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law; BA Political Science 2023, University of Kentucky.

[2] Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018) [hereinafter MMA].

[3] The Creation of the Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/creation.html?loclr=eamma" (last visited Mar. 4, 2025).

[4] What is Copyright?, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/what-is-copyright/#:~:text=What%20is%20copyright%20registration%3F,step%20is%20registering%20the%20work (last visited Mar. 4, 2025).

[5] What Musicians Should Know about Copyright, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/engage/musicians/#:~:text=Generally%2C%20to%20use%20the%20sound,set%20by%20the%20licensing%20contract (last visited Mar. 4, 2025).

[6] Id.

[7] U.S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 45, Mar. 2014, at 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ45.pdf.

[8] Copyright litigation 101, Thomas Reuters (Dec. 16, 2022), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/copyright-litigation-101/#:~:text=A%20copyright%20owner%20can%20sue,specific%20conditions%20(see%20below).

[9] U.S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 16A, Mar. 2021, at 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/m10.pdf.

[10] Copyright Licensing Under the Law, Justia, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/copyright/copyright-licensing/ (Oct. 2024).

[11] Michelle Kaminsky, What is a Copyright License?, LegalZoom, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/what-is-a-copyright-license (Jan. 24, 2025).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).

[16] U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/ (Nov. 2023).

[17] 17 U.S.C. § 107.

[18] U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, supra note 16.

[19] The Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://copyright.gov/music-modernization/.

[20] 17 U.S.C. § 115; Compulsory license, Black’s Law Dictionary (12 ed. 2024).

[21] Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2017); see also The Creation of the Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/creation.html?loclr=eamma (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).

[22] The Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).

[23] Musical Works Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/115/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).

[24] What Is a Blanket License?, Songtrust, https://help.songtrust.com/knowledge/what-is-a-blanket-license.

[25] Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) § 102(d)(1)(D).

[26] Digital License Coordinator, The Blanket License – Who Needs It and What You Need to Know, https://digitallicenseecoordinator.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Defining-and-Differentiating-between-a-%E2%80%9CBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-and-a-%E2%80%9CSignificant-NonBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-Resource-Document.pdf; MMA § 102(a)(1).

[27]MMA § 102(a)(1).

[28] Digital License Coordinator, The Blanket License – Who Needs It and What You Need to Know, https://digitallicenseecoordinator.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Defining-and-Differentiating-between-a-%E2%80%9CBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-and-a-%E2%80%9CSignificant-NonBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-Resource-Document.pdf.

[29] U.S. Copyright Office, Frequently Asked Questions, copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/faq.html#:~:text=The%20Music%20Modernization%20Act%20updates,addresses%20distribution%20of%20producer%20royalties.

[30] Id. at 5; Andrew Parks, Defining Pay Sources: CMO vs PRO, SONGTRUST, (last updated Dec. 11, 2023), https://blog.songtrust.com/pay-sources-difference-between-a-pro-and-cmo.

[31] Andrew Parks, Defining Pay Sources: CMO vs PRO, SONGTRUST, (last updated Dec. 11, 2023), https://blog.songtrust.com/pay-sources-difference-between-a-pro-and-cmo.

[32] BMI, What is the difference between performing right royalties, mechanical royalties and sync royalties?, BMI Member FAQs, https://www.bmi.com/faq/entry/what_is_the_difference_between_performing_right_royalties_mechanical_r.

[33] Quinn He, The vast accessibility of modern music streaming, Mass. Daily Collegian, (Dec. 10, 2019), https://dailycollegian.com/2019/12/the-vast-accessibility-of-modern-music-streaming/.

[34] Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 398, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

[35] Jonathan Stempel, LimeWire to pay record labels $105 million, ends suit, Reuters, (May 13, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE74B783/.

[36] He, supra note 33.

[37] Shubham Singh, Spotify Users Statistics 2025: Subscribers & Demographics Data, demandsage, (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.demandsage.com/spotify-stats/.

[38] See Tim Ingham, Over 60,000 Tracks Are Now Uploaded To Spotify Every Day. That’s Nearly One Per Second, Music Bus. Worldwide, (Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/A34C-4TVJ.

[39] He, supra note 33.

[40] Get more out of your music with Premium, Spotify, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium/.

[41] Singh, supra note 35.

[42] Music streaming overtakes physical sales for the first time -industry body, Reuters, (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/music-sales/music-streaming-overtakes-physical-sales-for-the-first-time-industry-body-idUSL8N1S143H.

[43] See Spotify, Royalties, Spotify for Artists, https://support.spotify.com/us/artists/article/royalties/.

[44] Id.

[45] Eric Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives in the Digital Streaming Age, 45 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 6 (2021).

[46] Id. at 7.

[47] See id.

[48] Id.

[49] 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).

[50] Moses Singer, Getting in Turn with Copyright Law: Musical Compositions vs. Sound Recordings in Richardson v. Kharbouch, Moses Singer Publ’ns (Mar. 5, 2024), www.mosessinger.com/publications/getting-in-tune-with-copyright-law-musical-compositions-vs-sound-recordings-in-richardson-v-kharbouch.

[51] Reuters, supra note 42.

[52] See, e.g., Media - Public Performance and Streaming Licenses: How to Obtain Rights, Univ. of Wis. Whitewater, https://libguides.uww.edu/c.php?g=548422&p=3762449#:~:text=Feature%20films%20and%20television%20shows,pictures%20from%20many%20major%20studios.https://libguides.uww.edu/c.php?g=548422&p=3762449#:~:text=Feature%20films%20and%20television%20shows,pictures%20from%20many%20major%20studios.

[53] See, e.g., Market Share for Each Distributor 1995-2024, The Numbers, https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributors.

[54] See Sarah Whitten, The Death of the DVD: Why Sales Dropped More than 86% in 13 Years, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/08/the-death-of-the-dvd-why-sales-dropped-more-than-86percent-in-13-years.html.

[55] Mindy Born, 60 Netflix Statistics & Facts for 2025: Subscribers, Revenue & More, Cloudwards (May 13, 2024), https://www.cloudwards.net/netflix-statistics/.

[56] Riya Gupta, How Does Netflix Obtain the Rights for Streaming Movies, iPleaders (Apr. 26, 2021), https://blog.ipleaders.in/netflix-obtain-rights-streaming-movies/ .

[57] Id.

[58] Aaron Gregg & Eli Tan, Netflix Sign-Ups Double After Crackdown on Account Sharing, Wash. Post (June 9, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/06/09/netflix-password-sharing-rules/

[59] Id.

[60] Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2018).

[61] Id. at 175.

[62] Id.

[63] Id. at 179–80.

[64] Winston Cho, Disney, Major Studios Get $30M From Illegal Streaming Sites Amid Piracy Crackdown, Hollywood Rep. (Mar. 27, 2023), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/disney-major-studios-win-judgment-from-illegal-streaming-sites-1235361828/

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Nathan Kamal, Netflix Pays Zero Royalties for Its Most Popular Show Ever, Inside the Magic (June 28, 2023), https://insidethemagic.net/2023/06/netflix-squid-game-zero-royalties-nk1/.

[69] Id.

[70] U.S. Copyright Off., supra note 23.

[71] See 37 C.F.R. § 210.31 (2020).

[72] See, e.g., Robert Hum, The Hollywood Actors’ Strike is Over, but the Impact Will Linger for Some Big Companies, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2023), https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/09/sag-aftra-strike-impact.html#:~:text=CFO%20Gunnar%20Wiedenfels%20said%20on,strong%20films%20and%20games%20performance.%E2%80%9D (discussing the strike’s financial impact on studios and movie theaters).

[73] Digital License Coordinator, supra note 26.

[74] Why Do TV Shows and Movies Leave Netflix?, Netflix, https://help.netflix.com/en/node/60541.

[75] See Reuters, supra note 40.

[76] Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Piracy and Copyright Enforcement

Mechanisms, 14 Innovation Pol'y & Econ. 25, 27 (2014).

[77] See How to Screen Record Protected Videos [Completed Guide], iTop, https://recorder.itopvpn.com/blog/how-to-screen-record-protected-videos-1225 (Dec. 23, 2024).

[78] See, e.g., Digital License Coordinator, supra note 24.

[79] Priest, supra note 43, at 2.

[80] What is a VPN?, Microsoft Azure, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/resources/cloud-computing-dictionary/what-is-vpn#:~:text=A%20VPN%2C%20which%20stands%20for,and%20firewalls%20on%20the%20internet.

[81] Id.

[82] See, e.g., Ana Faguy, What a Warner Bros./Paramount Merger Could Mean for Users, Forbes (Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anafaguy/2023/12/21/what-a-warner-brosparamount-merger-could-mean-for-users/?sh=6b9de96c1dbe.

[83] Jem Aswad, TikTok Begins Removing Universal Music Publishing Songs, Expanding Royalty Battle, Variety (Feb. 27, 2024), https://variety.com/2024/music/musicians/tiktok-removing-universal-music-publishing-songs-1235923848/.

[84] Althea Legaspi, Eminem Publisher Sues Spotify for Copyright Infringement, Rolling Stone (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/eminem-publisher-spotify-copyright-infringement-lawsuit-874956/.

The Affordable Care Act’s Employer “Pay or Play” Mandate: A Tax or Regulation?

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The Affordable Care Act’s Employer “Pay or Play” Mandate: A Tax or Regulation?

Beckett Cromwell*

Introduction – About the Affordable Care Act

Imagine you are injured in a routine accident, and you have no means of paying for your hospital visit; however, you do not have prescribed medical insurance coverage or saved up cash to pay your medical bills out of pocket. Hopelessness begins to set in as you need medical attention but cannot bear the financial consequences of paying for the treatment yourself. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or simply the “Affordable Care Act” was implemented in two parts as a way to help Americans manage their healthcare insurance coverage in a cheaper and more efficient way.[2] The overall goals of the Affordable Care Act are to, “make affordable health insurance available to more people; expand the Medicaid program to cover all adults with income below 138% of the [federal poverty line]; and support innovative medical care delivery methods designed to lower the costs of health care generally.”[3] These are undoubtedly broad goals that require specific implementation in order to achieve them.

Key features of the Affordable Care Act include an increased access to medical insurance, increased protections for consumer medical coverage holders, emphasized early disease and illness detection and prevention, and lower care costs with improved system performances.[4] The Affordable Care Act widened the availability of consumer insurance coverage in two ways.[5] First, it allowed individual consumers to compare various plans and coverage options that were offered by individual states at the state level and gave a choice as to which coverage plan they wanted based on their health needs or other factors.[6] Second, as mentioned previously, the Act expanded Medicaid coverage to encompass more individuals and families below the poverty line, and as of 2018, in the eight years since the implementation of the Act in 2010, “the number of uninsured people in the country [had] fallen by about 20 million.”[7] The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) enhanced early disease and illness detection and prevention in early 2022 as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[8] This allowed for an estimated 150 million patients to have free-of-charge access to important preventative measures and diagnostic testing such as “vaccinations, contraception, and cancer screening” which is required by the Affordable Care Act.[9] These key features are important mechanisms enabling the Act to achieve its aforementioned broad goals of ensuring more Americans have cost-effective health insurance, precisely what Congress hoped to accomplish when it voted on and passed this healthcare reform legislation. Both premiums paid for health insurance and the number of uninsured Americans have gone down since the passing of the Affordable Care Act, thus making strides towards Congress’ goals of the Act.[10] This may be but a coincidence or a correlation and not caused by the Affordable Care Act but there are some metrics allowing the argument to be made.

Although the Act is arguably successful in achieving what it set out to accomplish, the Affordable Care Act has not been without controversy, and since its enactment, “the public was almost evenly divided between those who supported it and those who opposed it.”[11] Like many legislative bills, partisan issues arose and made the garnering of votes to have the bill pass through Congress a challenge itself, before each side of the aisle could even agree to the terms inside.[12] Upon the initial vote, partisan issues were prevalent as reports of up  to “80 percent of Democrats” supported the Affordable Care Act and around “81 percent of Republicans were strongly negative” toward the bill.[13] As a simple reminder, the Affordable Care Act was passed under a Democrat-controlled Congress under then-President Barack Obama.[14] Simple partisan divide is one reason for the opposition to the bill, but not the only reason.[15] Many people, including Republicans, were not in favor of the Affordable Care Act because of the “individual mandate” with some calling it “by far the most unpopular provision of the law”[16] and “one of U.S. history’s most contested laws.”[17] It required “all Americans to obtain health insurance or pay a tax penalty[.]”[18] Thus, Congress’ goals were bound to be met as Americans were obligated to have health insurance coverage, and by requiring people to have insurance, logically the number of uninsured Americans would go down, so the individual mandate was the driving force of the Act.[19]

I.      The Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act Stance Background

In 2012, a Supreme Court case, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) issued major guidance as to the individual mandate found in the Affordable Care Act.[20] In this case, the Supreme Court held that the individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’ taxing power, not under the Commerce Clause.[21] This was an unexpected decision because the lower courts that reviewed this case addressed the Commerce Clause argument and not Congress’ taxing power.[22] That still left the issue of whether the exaction was deemed a tax or a penalty.[23] The Court held that “because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, § 5000A can be interpreted as a tax.”[24] The Supreme Court used their precedential canon of construction and construed § 5000A as a tax in order to retain its constitutionality.[25] Should they have done this? Yes, it is easier to patch a hole in a leaky roof rather than replace the entire roof, but at some point a complete renovation will need to be undertaken to preserve the integrity of the structure. “As this note later discusses the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act, it is imperative to think about the above statement as it relates to the consequences of a “tax” determination.

In 2016, Donald Trump, a Republican, won the Presidential election and took control of the White House.[26] As stated earlier, Republicans strongly disfavored the individual mandate found in the Affordable Care Act.[27] Consequently, included in The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017[28] –spearheaded by Republicans in Congress – was a provision that in all practical effect, nullified the individual mandate.[29] In an explanation of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, the Joint Committee on Taxation stated the explanation of the provision is to “reduce[] the amount of the individual shared responsibility payment, enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act, to zero.”[30] Thus, in effect, there is no consequence for not abiding. The individual mandate “tax” is still zero dollars as of the completion of this note with no public plan to change any time soon.

Although Congress and the Supreme Court appear to have decided the individual mandate, the employer mandate that is still in effect[31] The employer mandate worked in conjunction with the individual mandate to fulfill Congress’ goals of lower costs of medical care and reducing the number of uninsured Americans.[32] The employer mandate provides that “certain employers (called applicable large employers or ALEs) must either offer health coverage that is “affordable” and that provides “minimum value” to their full-time employees (and offer coverage to the full-time employees’ dependents), or potentially make an employer shared responsibility payment to the IRS[.]”[33] In simple terms, places of employment that have more than fifty full-time employees or full-time equivalent employees are deemed ALEs and are subject to the employer mandate and must offer healthcare coverage to their employees as required by the Affordable Care Act or else they pay an exaction to the IRS.[34] This mandate went into effect in 2015 and requires that if you are an ALE then ninety-five percent of your full-time employees must have been offered healthcare coverage insurance.[35] Once again, this was another way of ensuring the Congressional goals of the Act were to be successful as more Americans would be accounted for when it came to healthcare insurance. Although the employer mandate seemingly infringed less on private citizens’ rights, the same partisan favor and disfavor was prevalent.[36] With regards to the employer mandate, thirty-four percent of Republicans favored it as compared to seventy-eight percent of Democrats.[37]

The penalty that is associated with non-conformance of the employer mandate is up for debate.[38] Even though the language of the statute in § 4980H does not provide the phrase “excise tax” anywhere, let alone “excise,”[39] the section falls under subtitle D which is “miscellaneous excise taxes.” Thus, some people view the employer shared responsibility payment for noncompliance with the mandate as an excise tax instead of a mere penalty.[40] So, like the individual mandate and the discussion in NFIB, there is division as to whether the payment is a “tax” or a “penalty.”[41]

The analysis may seem straightforward, as the U.S. Supreme Court has already decided that the individual shared responsibility payment that attached to the individual mandate was a tax, but it is hard to conclude that a fair comparison can be made between the two mandates because it is not necessarily a one-for-one comparison.[42] Further consideration shall be made upon different variables regarding the employer aspect that were not prevalent in the individual mandate, and there is always the possibility that the Supreme Court rushed to judgment when deciding that the individual mandate penalty was a “tax.” It appears the Supreme Court was trying to save the constitutionality of the Act as its main goal in NFIB, and may have not given enough thought as to whether the payment was a “tax” or if that was merely a means to save the Affordable Care Act from being nullified and rendered unconstitutional.[43]

Further, this note explores the differing rationales from the various circuits that are split in agreement concerning the employer shared responsibility payment as it pertains to the employer mandate as part of the Affordable Care Act. Part I, above, delved into the caselaw history of the individual mandate stemming from the Affordable Care Act in NFIB and the justifications for rendering the mandate to be a “tax,” but also considering possible Supreme Court shortcomings. Part II examines the split created by the Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. Part III compares and contrasts the varying circuits decisions while weighing the holdings made by each court and concludes that due to the purpose behind the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, the categorization of the exaction as a tax imposes a punitive damage rather than a proper deterring effect and thus the exaction should be labeled as a penalty and not a tax.

II.    Differing Circuits

Circuit courts are split as to the classification of the employer shared responsibility payment that attaches to the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act.[44] There are varying different views as it pertains to the characteristic of the employer shared responsibility payment and whether it is a “tax” or not.[45] The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have held the employer shared responsibility payment to be a tax and thus the Anti-Injunction Act[46] strips the court’s jurisdiction from any suit as the suit restrains the collection of a tax if it has not been previously paid.[47] The Fourth Circuit held employer shared responsibility payment to not be a tax because, as the individual mandate is concerned, Congress treats “penalties and liabilities” found in subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code as taxes for the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act and neither the individual mandate nor the employer mandate was found in subchapter 68B.[48] In sub-part A of this section, the Anti-Injunction Act and its procedural importance to tax liability litigation is considered. Sub-part B looks at the D.C. and Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act and their concluded agreement that the mandate is indeed a tax. Sup-part C of this section looks at the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the exaction under the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act is not a tax but is a penalty.

A.     Anti-Injunction Act

Before we begin the analysis between the various Circuits and how their characterization of the employer shared responsibility payment under the Affordable Care Act differs, it should be noted what the Anti-Injunction Act is and its importance to the discussion as it may either be invoked or useless depending on the court’s characterization of the employer shared responsibility payment. The Anti-Injunction Act is designed to allow for the collection of taxes in even the most mitigating of circumstances and provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.”[49] The rule stems from the rule elucidated in Flora v. United States, which provides that a person who disagrees with the assessment of a tax must first pay the full amount of tax owed and then file an administrative complaint to have the tax recovered as damages in a suit.[50] In short, Congress does not want the revenue they raise from tax collection to be limited by egregious lawsuits.[51] They want to be able to answer questions and decide issues later.

This is important as it pertains to the employer shared responsibility payment that attaches to failed completion of the employer mandate because a court cannot rule on a case before the tax is paid.[52] The key word in that sentence is “tax.” If the payment under the Act is deemed to not be a tax, then the Anti-Injunction Act will never apply as it only applies to suits that “restrain[] the assessment or collection of any tax[.]”[53] In an instance where the Anti-Injunction Act precludes a lawsuit from being brought, courts will not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.[54]

For example, if there is a suit brought in the D.C. Circuit by a company that owes an exaction to the Internal Revenue Service for a failure to abide by the employer mandate and another company in the Fourth Circuit that also owes an exaction to the IRS, one would be able to bring suit in the Fourth Circuit while the other would be barred from bringing suit in the Fifth and D.C. Circuits to challenge their exaction owed because of the Anti-Injunction Act.[55] This is why the characterization of tax or penalty is very important as it creates a procedural hurdle for courts and parties to overcome and disallow a court from hearing a suit.[56]

B.     Indeed a Tax – The Congressional Intent Theories

The D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit agree that the employer shared responsibility payment is a “tax” and thus the Anti-Injunction Act as described above applies. A lawsuit may not be brought until the tax has been paid to the Internal Revenue Service and an administrative claim for a refund has been filed.[57]

i.       The Fifth Circuit – Hotze v. Burwell

In the Fifth Circuit case, Hotze v. Burwell, Braidwood Management was the employer responsible for paying the employer shared responsibility payment as they met the requisite employment of more than 50 individuals.[58] Stephen Hotze and Braidwood Management sued over both the individual and employer mandate.[59] They argue that the individual and employer mandates violate both the Origination Clause and the Takings Clause of the Constitution.[60] Concerning the employer mandate, the defendants argued that the Anti-Injunction Act barred any action filed by Braidwood as they had yet to pay the assessed tax and file an administrative claim seeking refund first.[61] The defendants argued that the Affordable Care Act is not a revenue raising bill, but a bill to expand healthcare coverage and therefore the Origination Clause does not apply.[62] The district court followed this argument and found that there was proper jurisdiction and dismissed Hotze’s and Braidwood’s claim.[63] On appeal, the Fifth Circuit stated that the district court improperly concluded as to the merits of the Origination Clause argument and should have dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[64] Turning to the employer mandate analysis, the court recognized that “the employer mandate is the ACA provision that imposes a ‘tax’ on certain employers who fail to provide ‘affordable’ health-insurance coverage to their employees.”[65] As mentioned earlier, the Anti-Injunction Act bars any suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax[.]”[66] The Court recognizes the purpose behind the Anti-Injunction Act when it cites NFIB and states it “protects the Government's ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes.”[67]

The parties did not dispute that if the payment under the employer mandate were to be construed as a tax, then it would violate the Anti-Injunction Act and bar suit.[68] Instead, the court addressed whether the payment was a tax. The Anti-Injunction Act would apply if such payment was a tax, ending the need for further analysis.[69] The court recognized that both the Affordable Care Act and Anti-Injunction Act were created by Congress, so it was imperative to look at Congress’s intent when determining what is deemed a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act.[70] The court found that when looking at the language of the statute, Congress referred to the individual mandate as a “penalty” but referred to the employer mandate and many other exactions within the Affordable Care Act as a “tax.”[71] Going further, the court stated that “the employer-mandate exaction functions like a tax—it is collected by the IRS ‘in the same manner’ as a tax, . . . and the funds raised go to the general Treasury.”[72] There are numerous instances where the court highlighted the fact that the employer shared responsibility payment is referred to as a “tax” in the statute; the court showcases three portions of the Affordable Care Act where the payment is referred to as a tax.[73] The court here regurgitated what the Supreme Court said in NFIB stating “textual evidence is the ‘best evidence’ of whether an exaction constitutes a ‘tax’ for the purposes of the [Anti-Injunction Act].”[74] Finally, the court held that “the text of the ACA explicitly indicates that the employer-mandate exaction indeed is a ‘tax[;]’” therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act barred the employer-mandate as a consequence of Braidwood’s failure to pay the tax (the employer mandate) before filing suit.[75]

ii.     The D.C. Circuit – Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Service

As mentioned previously, the D.C. Circuit, in parallel with the Fifth Circuit, held the exaction assessed from the employer mandate was indeed a tax and not a penalty. In Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Service, appellant, Optimal Wireless operated as a company that provided wireless communications services in several states, including, Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Louisiana.[76] Prior to the D.C. Circuit taking the case, “[t]he district court dismissed Optimal’s suit for lack of jurisdiction[]” and “held that an exaction under § 4980H is a ‘tax’ for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, which strips courts of jurisdiction over suits having the ‘purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.’”[77] The court recognized the potential imposition of the Anti-Injunction Act when it stated, “Optimal plainly seeks to ‘restrain [] the assessment or collection’ of an exaction under § 4980H.”[78] Thus, prompting the court to derive a distinction between a tax or penalty as the case’s jurisdictional bar hinges upon this classification.[79]

The court began its discussion by going through background of the Affordable Care Act, its purpose, and a few nuances of the Act, such as what happens if an employer fails to offer a plan that provides “minimum essential coverage” or if an employee were to “claim[] a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction[.]”[80] As the Optimal Wireless court illustrated, there are two ways to violate the employer mandate of the Act and be subject to an exaction in the event that an employer does not provide minimum coverage or does not provide coverage at all.[81] First, liability is imposed on an employer in the form of an exaction “if it ‘fails to offer to its full-time employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan . . . for any month.’”[82] Second, liability is imposed on an employer in the form of an exaction “if it does ‘offer [] to its full-time employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage’ but an employee is still certified as having received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction.”[83] The court distinguished the two liability hooks by simplifying them and stating “Section 4980H(a) applies when an employer does not provide minimum essential coverage at all, whereas Section 4980H(b) applies when the employer offers coverage but that coverage fails to qualify as affordable or as providing minimum value.”[84] Through another distinguishing factor, the court explained that “Section 4980H(a)’s exaction amount is a function of the employer’s total number of full-time employees, whereas Section 4980H(b)’s exaction amount is a function of only the number of employees certified as having received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction.”[85] In Optimal Wireless, the court specifically highlighted different ways that a company may be held liable and how the exaction assessed against it may differ whereas the court in Hotze provides more of a generic overview of employer liability.[86]

In Optimal Wireless, the court determined that Optimal Wireless was liable for an exaction under the first hook, Section 4980H(a), as “one or more of Optimal’s employees had been enrolled in a qualified health plan for which a premium tax credit was allowed.”[87] Optimal’s exactions totaled “$395,640 for 2016 and $736,383 for 2017[,]” which is, in this author’s opinion, no small sum, especially when you consider the pay first, ask for a refund second model that the Anti-Injunction Act prescribes.[88] Optimal originally filed suit in federal district court against both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), arguing that the regulations that should apply require HHS, and not the IRS, “to issue the certification concerning an employee’s receipt of a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction, but HHS had not done so.”[89] The government argued dismissal of Optimal Wireless’s case on several grounds, the main one being the Anti-Injunction Act strips the court of jurisdiction to hear the case as the requisite exaction has not been paid yet.[90] The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the exaction imposed under Section 4980H is a “tax” and that the Anti-Injunction act is applicable.[91]

Optimal Wireless began its argument in the D.C. Circuit by arguing that to even conclude that the exaction that Section 4980H imposes is a “tax” that it “must contain a clear statement” saying so.[92] Their principal basis behind this argument was that there are harsh consequences that are associated with the statute, such as the imposition and requisite full payment of the exaction before a party is allowed to sue for a refund.[93] The court maintained that Optimal Wireless is confused with the statute, as it is really the Anti-Injunction Act that imposes the harsh consequences and not § 4980H of the Affordable Care Act.[94] The court reasoned that the “question of whether another statute is best read to implicate the Anti-Injunction Act’s jurisdictional bar – which here turns on whether Section 4980H imposes a “tax” – is governed by ordinary principle of statutory interpretation, not by any clear-statement rule.”[95] By looking at NFIB, the D.C. Circuit attempted to use the Supreme Court’s “congressional intent” theory where “Congress repeatedly described the exaction for noncompliance with the individual mandate as ‘a “penalty” rather than a tax,” the Anti-Injunction Act’s jurisdictional bar did not apply.”[96] When the D.C. Circuit here applied that same approach to the exaction under the employer mandate, the opposite conclusion was reached.[97] In the instance of the employer mandate, Congress expressly referred to the employer mandate exaction under Section 4980H as a “tax” on four separate occasions, whereas with the individual mandate it was described as a “penalty” and not a tax.[98]

Concerning the four references of “tax” associated with the employer mandate, “three are found in Section 4980H itself.”[99] The court went through the instances that the word is encountered to determine the context behind its use and whether Congress intended for the “tax” phrasing to be applied to the exaction as a whole or if the phrasing was mere surplusage.[100] The first instance pertained to employers offering unaffordable or “inadequate in value” coverage, stating that the “aggregate amount of tax determined under [subsection (b)(1)] ... shall not exceed the product of the applicable payment amount and the number of individuals employed by the employer as full-time employees during such month.”[101] The second instance pertained to deductions and states “[f]or denial of deduction for the tax imposed by this section, see section 275(a)(6).”[102] The last instance found explicitly in Section 4980H refers to the same section as before, but this time the title of the subsection itself its “Tax nondeductible.”[103] Lastly, in the sole reference not found within Section 4980H, another section implored the Secretary of the HHS to create “a separate appeals process for employers who are notified that that ‘may be liable for a tax imposed by section 4980H of Title 26.”[104] The court concluded that “[t]he multiple statutory references to Section 4980H’s exaction as a “tax” thus render it a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[105] Optimal attempted and failed to provide another justification aside from the Anti-Injunction Act for the usage of the word “tax,” but the court here relied on precedent that states “Congress said what it meant and meant what it said” as a means to upholding the usage of tax as Congress would not mistakenly and inappropriately use this terminology in contravention of their intentions.[106]

Even though Congress used other terms such as “assessable payment” or “penalty” when describing the exaction, those terms do not dissuade the court that “tax” was the true and main meaning of exaction under Section 4980H. A tax is a type of assessable payment and “[i]f Congress had only used the more general term ‘assessable payment’ to describe an exaction under Section 4980H, it might be unclear whether the exaction qualifies as a ‘tax’ for the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[107] Since “Congress also used the more specific term ‘tax’ to describe the same exaction (and did so repeatedly), it thereby established the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[108] The court here was equally convinced with the term “penalty” as they were with the term “assessable payment.”[109] The court drew a comparison between “tax” and “penalty” in that both can be used to describe an exaction and just because a tax seeks to influence conduct, like a penalty, that alone is not enough to strip an exaction of its “tax” status.[110] While recognizing that “Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other[,]” Congress does have the power to “describe something as a penalty but direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[111] A common way that Congress does so is to “expressly label the exaction as a ‘tax,’ as [they] did for the exaction under Section 4980H.”[112]

In its holding, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause Congress repeatedly called the Section 4980H exaction a tax, Optimal’s suit is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.”[113] The Court here used the same Congressional intent theory elucidated in Hotze to uphold the employer shared responsibility payment as a “tax” with regard to the Anti-Injunction Act.[114] While the Congressional Intent theory rules the day in the Fifth and D.C. Circuits when determining that the exaction is a “tax,” a competing jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit, uses a different spin on the Congressional intent theory to conclude that the exaction is not a tax. An analysis of that theory will be covered in the next sub-part.

C.     Not a Tax

The Fourth Circuit, in Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, held that the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act did not constitute a “tax” under the Anti-Injunction Act.[115] Plaintiffs, including Liberty University and other individuals, brought suit challenging both the individual mandate and the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act.[116] Prior to the case’s current position, the original district court dismissed the lawsuit, and upheld the constitutionality of both the individual and employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act.[117] The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, determined that the Anti-Injunction Act disallowed jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims as they were seeking to contest the exaction without paying it in full first.[118] Consequently, because the Anti-Injunction Act stripped the court of jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case back down to the district court with an instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.[119] The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to further consider the implications of a the newly-decided NFIB case covering some of the same issues.[120]

The court began discussion of the employer mandate by defining various terms, determining when exactions must be paid, and how much the exaction is, among other things.[121] As mentioned in the above discussion of other circuit’s cases, and helpful to reiterate when drawing comparisons, this court determined that an employer mandate is required when an “applicable large employer” – which is an employer with “an average at least fifty full-time employees during the preceding year[]” – does not provide “affordable health care coverage to its full-time employees and their dependents[.]”[122] If at least one of the employers’ full-time employees is eligible for “an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction” in an effort to alleviate the costs of the medical coverage, the employer is then required to make the exaction or “assessable payment.”[123] An employee becomes “eligible for an ‘applicable premium tax credit’ or ‘cost-sharing reduction’ if the employer fails to offer the employee ‘affordable’ coverage providing ‘minimum value’ and the employee’s income falls between 100% and 400% of the poverty line.”[124] The court then discussed how the exaction is calculated under various scenarios, but that is not necessarily germane to our discussion.[125] It is important to note, however, that the court recognized that pertaining to the employer mandate, “the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to assess and collect the exaction in the same manner as a tax[,]” which was important to highlight since the individual mandate was deemed a “tax” in NFIB and the statute prescribes identical collection treatment to the employer mandate at issue.[126] The court here, highlighted the two liability hooks found in Section 4980H in (a) and (b) and states that “[i]n effect, then, § 4980H(a) imposes an assessable payment on an applicable employer who fails to offer coverage to its full-time employees and their dependents, while § 4980H(b) imposes an assessable payment on an applicable employer who provides coverage that does not satisfy the mandate’s affordability criteria.”[127]

Liberty University “employs approximately 3900 full-time faculty and staff[]” and is self-insured whole offering various insurance policies, savings accounts, and other reimbursement options to employees for their health care.[128] Liberty contended that depending on the definition of “minimum essential coverage” among other items, the University’s coverage may be deemed to be insufficient or unaffordable and thus cause them to be subject to payment of an exaction under the employer mandate of the ACA.[129] Even though one of the goals of the Act was to lower the costs of health care coverage for Americans, Liberty also asserts that “the employer mandate will ‘increase the cost of care . . . [and] will directly and negatively affect [the University] by increasing the cost of providing health insurance coverage[.]”[130] Finally, as a policy consideration, Liberty is a Christian institution that has certain moral beliefs, including the pro-life belief and that by helping fund abortions through paying an exaction, it is adverse to their religious grounding.[131] Bypassing the other issues, the Court here, on remand, “must decide whether the Anti-Injunction Act bars this pre-enforcement challenge to the employer mandate[.]”[132]

What Liberty contested regarding the employer mandate here “is a pre-enforcement suit to enjoin the collection of an exaction that is codified in the Internal Revenue Code, and which the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to collect in the same manner as a tax.”[133] The court here recognized from NFIB that application of the Anti-Injunction Act is in effect “only where Congress intends it to[,]” which is the same argument that the Fifth and D.C. Circuits made when looking at Congressional intent.[134] The Secretary of the Treasury uses two instances found in the Affordable Care Act referencing the exaction stemming from the employer mandate as a “tax” to bolster their position that the Anti-Injunction Act bars a challenge to the employer mandate without first paying the exaction in full then seeking a refund.[135] When refuting this observation by the Secretary, the court attempted to contradict him by highlighting that “the Secretary virtually ignores the fact that the Act does not consistently characterize the exaction as a tax[,]” but instead used the term “assessable payment” from time-to-time, including the first instance the exaction was mentioned.[136] Regarding the two instances found in the Affordable Care Act that reference the exaction from the employer mandate as a “tax,” one of them is in a “tax-specific context” and the court maintained that the use of another word besides “tax” would lead to interpretive confusion.[137] The first provision provides “[f]or denial of deduction for the tax imposed by this section . . .” and the second provision provides that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed for the following taxes[.]”[138] The court attempted to illustrate that through its cross-referencing sections of the code, Congress intended to be crystal clear that the exaction is a “tax” which is requisite for deductibility.[139] The court was less confident about an obvious justification for the second instance of the word “tax” being used in the Act.[140] The court did not place much weight on the inability to provide a concrete justification for this other instance of “tax” being used.[141] Instead, they realized that one instance of a lack of explanation is okay “[b]ecause Congress initially and primarily [referred] to the exaction as an ‘assessable payment’ and not a ‘tax,’ the statutory text suggests that Congress did not intend the exaction to be treated as a tax” under the analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act.[142]

While concluding the discussion, the court recognized that “Congress did not otherwise indicate that the employer mandate exaction qualifies as a tax for [Anti-Injunction Act] purposes, though of course it could have done so.”[143] The court here made it a point to highlight that the Supreme Court in NFIB noted that “26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) provides that the ‘penalties and liabilities’ found in subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code are ‘treated as taxes’ for purposes of the [Anti-Injunction Act].”[144] The court stated that “[t]he employer mandate, like the individual mandate, is not included in subchapter 68B, and no other provision indicates that we are to treat its ‘assessable payment’ as a tax.”[145]

Overall, the court in Liberty University thinks that “to adopt the Secretary’s position would lead to an anomalous result[]” because “the Supreme Court has expressly held that a person subject to the individual mandate can bring a pre-enforcement suit challenging that provision[,] [b]ut, under the Secretary’s theory, an employer subject to the employer mandate could bring only a post-enforcement suit challenging that provision.”[146] The court found it hard to believe that Congress, in just two isolated uses of the word “tax,” would have vastly different treatments of the mandates in terms of the Anti-Injunction Act’s applicability.[147] In layman’s terms, the court here believed that when Congress acts, it acts purposefully, and here they did not refer to the exaction as a tax initially, and they did not include it as a “tax” in subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code. If Congress intended to have the exaction under the employer mandate be a tax, then they would have made it clear. The court, in few words, decided the “tax” versus “penalty” issue by stating “the employer mandate exaction, like the individual mandate exaction, does not constitute a tax for the purposes of the [Anti-Injunction Act]. Therefore, the [Anti-Injunction Act] does not bar this suit.”[148]

Conclusion – Not a Tax

With the circuit courts being split in multiple directions, the question arises – which interpretation is correct? The answer to this question carries great importance as a Plaintiff’s rights can vary depending on their geographic location. The procedural and jurisdictional limitations that the Anti-Injunction Act places on the employer mandate are varied throughout circuits and need to be addressed.

As mentioned previously, precedent states “Congress said what it meant and meant what it said[,]” so it is imperative to examine their actions under a proverbial “microscope” when parsing a statute.[149] When examining the Fourth Circuit’s spin on the Congressional intent theory versus the Fifth and D.C. Circuit’s version of the Congressional intent theory, the notion that the exaction under the employer mandate is not a “tax” becomes clear.

Refer earlier to the introduction when the note discussed the overarching goal of the Affordable Care Act was to provide more affordable health care coverage to more Americans. A punishment would deter a company from doing something in the future whereas taxes are more routine in nature. To align with the goals of the Affordable Care Act, the exaction to be labeled as a “penalty” makes the most sense. This is a regulatory punishment to ensure more Americans are properly accounted for in terms of health care. There was never a revenue raising aspect of the employer mandate that typically accompanies a tax.

Further, of the interpretations, the one that makes the most sense with Congressional intent is the “penalty” classification. If Congress wanted to ensure that the employer mandate was a “tax,” then they could have and would have done so. It would have been easier for Congress to have expressly said that the exaction was a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act as only where they intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply is where it applies.[150] With all the time that goes into writing, lobbying, and amending a bill, Congress would have wanted to ensure that they were sending out a complete product that was not contradictory. Congress would not want to have two separate instances of the word “tax” being used that have vastly different consequences in terms of the Anti-Injunction Act.

For that reason, the proper interpretation when considering Congressional intent, the goals of the Affordable Care Act, and the language of the statute is that the employer mandate exaction is a “penalty” and not a “tax.” 


* J.D Expected 2025, University of Kentucky J. Rosenberg College of Law; BS Accounting & Finance 2021, University of Kentucky.

[2] What is the Affordable Care Act?, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/health-insurance-reform/what-is-the-affordable-care-act/index.html] (last updated Apr. 20, 2023) [permalink unavailable]; See also John Han, Why and How the Affordable Care Act Was Passed, Review (May 9, 2018), https://virginiapolitics.org/online/2018/5/9/why-and-how-the-affordable-care-act-was-passed [https://perma.cc/6CQG-UVSB].

[3] About the Affordable Care Act, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-aca/index.html (last updated Mar. 17, 2022) [permalink unavailable].

[4] Will Kenton, Affordable Care Act (ACA): What It Is, Key Features, and Updates, Investopedia (last updated Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/affordable-care-act.asp [https://perma.cc/9N7N-FZZQ].

[5] Adrianna McIntyre & Zirui Song, The US Affordable Care Act: Reflections and Directions at the Close of a Decade, PLOS Med. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002752&type=printable [https://perma.cc/3RPG-72ZF].

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] HRSA Updates the Affordable Care Act Preventive Health Care Guidelines to Improve Care for Women and Children, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/01/11/hrsa-updates-affordable-care-act-preventive-health-care-guidelines-improve-care-women-children.html [permalink unavailable].

[9] Id.

[10] Mike Patton, Obamacare 10 Years Later: Success or Failure?, Forbes (Nov. 11, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2020/11/11/obamacare-10-years-later-success-or-failure/?sh=3e7154c24844 [https://perma.cc/7NRD-6ZVD].

[11] Julie Rovner, Why Do So Many People Hate Obamacare So Much?, NPR (Dec. 13, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/12/13/570479181/why-do-so-many-people-hate-obamacare-so-much [https://perma.cc/M8UL-U53H].

[12] See, e.g., Susan Milligan, How Partisan Politics Threatened Even Must-Pass Legislation in Congress, U.S. News & World Rep. (Oct. 1, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2021-10-01/how-partisan-politics-threatened-even-must-pass-legislation-in-congress [permalink unavailable] (highlighting the Build Back Better bill from 2021 as an example showing how the contents of the bill provide for necessary infrastructure improvements that all Americans enjoy the benefits of and need, but Congress cannot come to an agreement due to political strife).

[13] Rovner, supra note 11.

[14] 111th United States Congress, Ballotpedia https://ballotpedia.org/111th_United_States_Congress [https://perma.cc/KZK7-BG7M] (showing the breakdown of Congress at the time that the Affordable Care Act or “Obamacare” was passed. The Democratic Party had control over the House, Senate, and Presidency at the same time, the first occurrence for them since the 103rd Congress in 1993. This was a major boost to gathering support for getting the bill passed and possibly a reasonable irritant for the objectives of dissenting Republicans).

[15] Rovner, supra note 11.

[16] Id.

[17] John E. McDonough, The Tortured Saga of America’s Least-Loved Policy Idea, Politico (May 22, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/22/health-care-individual-mandate-policy-conservative-idea-history-489956 [permalink unavailable].

[18] Matthew Fiedler, The ACA’s Individual Mandate In Retrospect: What Did It Do And Where Do We Go From Here?, 39 Health Affs. 429, 429 (2020).

[19] See id.

[20] Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 561–74 (2012).

[21] Id. at 575.

[22] Erika K. Lunder & Jennifer Staman, NFIB v. Sebelius: Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Sept. 3, 2012), https://www.crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42698/3 [permalink unavailable].

[23] NFIB, 567 U.S. at 562–63.

[24] Id. at 574 (emphasis added).

[25] Id. at 575.

[26] 2016 Presidential Election Results, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/A8C6-7JE7].

[27] Rovner, supra note 11.

[28] Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97.

[29] General Explanation of Pub. L. No. 115-97 at 91, https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-115JPRT33137/pdf/CPRT-115JPRT33137.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[30] Id. at 92.

[31] 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.

[32] About the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3.

[33] Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Affordable Care Act, Internal Revenue Serv., https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/questions-and-answers-on-employer-shared-responsibility-provisions-under-the-affordable-care-act (last accessed Oct. 26, 2024) [https://perma.cc/745Z-M4UX].

[34] Id.

[35] Nanci N. Rogers & Joe Keavy, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Employer Mandate Rules for the Affordable Care Act, Robbins Schwartz (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.rsnlt.com/news/law-alerts/2014/02/13/treasury-and-irs-issue-final-employer-mandate-rules-for-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/5DY6-X7JV].

[36] Rakesh Singh & Chris Lee, Majority Favors the Affordable Care Act’s Employer Mandate, But Opinion Can Shift When Presented With Pros and Cons, KFF (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/majority-favors-the-affordable-care-acts-employer-mandate-but-opinion-can-shift-when-presented-with-pros-and-cons/ [https://perma.cc/XF2B-8GSX].

[37] Id.

[38] Compare Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 996–99 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to be a tax) with Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 88–89 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to not be a tax).

[39] See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.

[40] Erik P. Doerring, Section 4980H Employer Shared Responsibility Payments (ESRP): The New “IRS Employment Tax Penalty”?, Burr & Forman LLP (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.burr.com/tax-law-insights/section-4980h-employer-shared-responsibility-payments-esrp-the-new-irs-employment-tax-penalty [https://perma.cc/N3JW-HGKN].

[41] Compare Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99 (holding that the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to be a tax) with Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 88–89 (holding the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to not be a tax).

[42] Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012).

[43] Id. at 575.

[44] See Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 88–89; Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2013); Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Serv., 77 F.4th 1069, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

[45] Compare Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076 and Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99 with Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 88–89 and Korte, 735 F.3d at 669–70.

[46] 26 U.S.C. § 7421.

[47] Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076; Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99.

[48] Liberty, 733 F.3d at 88–89.

[49] 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[50] Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 159–60 (1960).

[51] See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[52] Id.

[53] Id. (emphasis added).

[54] Dye v. United States, 516 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D.D.C. 2007).

[55] Compare Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 87-89 with Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076–77 (The effect of the Anti-Injunction Act allowed the plaintiff in Liberty University to bring a claim in the Fourth Circuit that the plaintiff from Optimal Wireless was barred from bringing in the Fifth and D.C. Circuits).

[56] See Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076–77.

[57] Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1073, 1077; Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 997, 999 (5th Cir. 2015); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 240 (1996).

[58] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 989.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id. at 990.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 991.

[65] Id. at 996.

[66] 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[67] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543 (2012)).

[68] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996.

[69] Id.

[70] Id. at 997.

[71] Id.

[72] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 997 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(d)(1)).

[73] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 997.

[74] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 997 (citing NFIB, 567 U.S. at 544).

[75] Id. at 997, 999; 26 U.S.C. 7421(a); Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv. v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 240 (1996).

[76] Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Serv., 77 F.4th 1069, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

[77] Id. at 1070–71.

[78] Id. at 1073 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)).

[79] Id.

[80] Id. at 1071.

[81] Id.

[82] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)(1)).

[83] Id. at 1071–72 (citing § 4980H(b)).

[84] Id. at 1072.

[85] Id.

[86] Compare Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1071–72, with Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 2015).

[87] Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1072.

[88] Id.

[89] Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18081(e)(4)(B)(iii); 45 C.F.R. § 155.310(h)).

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id. at 1073.

[93] Id.

[94] Id. at 1073–74.

[95] Id.

[96] Id. at 1073–74.

[97] Id. at 1074.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] See id.

[101] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b)(2)).

[102] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (emphasis added)).

[103] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (emphasis added)).

[104] Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18081(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added)).

[105] Id.

[106] Id.

[107] Id. at 1075.

[108] Id.

[109] Id.

[110] Id.

[111] Id. at 1076 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012)).

[112] Id. (citing CIC Servs., LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv., 593 U.S. 209, 212–13 (2021)).

[113] Id.

[114] Id. at 1074; Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 999 (5th Cir. 2015).

[115] Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 89 (4th Cir. 2013).

[116] Id. at 83.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Id. (citing Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011)).

[120] Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).

[121] Id. at 84–85.

[122] Id. at 84.

[123] Id.

[124] Id. at 84–85.

[125] Id. at 85.

[126] Id.

[127] Id.

[128] Id. at 86.

[129] Id.

[130] Id.

[131] Id.

[132] Id. at 87.

[133] Id.

[134] Id.

[135] Id. at 88.

[136] Id.

[137] Id.

[138] Id.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] Id.

[143] Id.

[144] Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543 (2012)).

[145] Id.

[146] Id.

[147] Id.

[148] Id. at 89. (emphasis added).

[149] Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Serv., 77 F.4th 1069, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

[150] Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 87 (4th Cir. 2013).