Blog Post | 114 KY. L. J. ONLINE | November 30, 2025
All the King’s Horses and All the King’s Men, Couldn’t Put Hump[hrey’s] Together Again: Exploring Potential Issues of a Post-Humphrey’s Executor World
By: Ellie Driver, Staff Editor, Vol. 114
In the summer of 1933, a mildly agitated President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote a letter to then Federal Trade Commissioner, William E. Humphrey, stating, “[I] do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country that I should have full confidence.”[1] Through that letter, President Roosevelt sparked one of the most significant presidential removal decisions of the modern era, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, where the Court held that Congress could restrict the president’s removal power of officers working in “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” agencies for cause.[2] The Court justified its decision by highlighting the importance of keeping independent agencies separate from executive control.[3]
Flash-forward to 2025, and many are suspicious that Humphrey’s 90-year precedent is on its way to joining the growing list of overturned cases on the Roberts Court.[4] This suspicion stems primarily from an upcoming case, Trump v. Wilcox, where the Court issued a preliminary decision allowing President Trump to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) at will.[5] This preliminary decision blatantly contrasts with the holding in Humphrey’s because the NLRB and MSPB are independent agencies that exercise “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers and are afforded for-cause removal protections through their organic statutes.[6] However, despite this being an easy case under the traditional Humphrey’s analysis, [7] the Court hinted at its likely desire to overturn Humphrey’s in the decision by stating, “[t]he stay reflects our judgment that the Government is likely to show that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive power.”[8]
The Court’s emphasis on “considerable executive power” reveals the likelihood that the Court will seek to overturn Humphrey’s. This is because, under the current presidential removal doctrine, it does not matter if an agency exercises “considerable executive power.”[9] Currently, the only way a president can remove an officer at will is if they work for an agency that performs “purely executive”[10] functions or interferes with the core “functioning of the Executive Branch.”[11] If the Court moves to a “considerable executive powers” test, then virtually all independent agencies could be at risk of losing their for-cause removal protections and become subject to the political whims of any sitting president.[12]
Notably, even though the Court hinted in the Wilcox decision that it is looking to overturn Humphrey’s, the Court made sure to highlight an exception for the Federal Reserve.[13] The Federal Reserve (Fed), like the NLRB and MSPB, is an independent agency that exercises various powers and is provided with for-cause removal protections through its organic statute.[14] Despite this, the Court noted, “[t]he Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”[15] In making this distinction, the Court likely thought that it was closing the door to any uncertainty about the Fed’s future, but when President Trump fired Federal Reserve Governor, Lisa Cook, for cause in August 2025, new questions started to emerge about the future of the Fed in a post-Humphrey’s world.[16]
One of the biggest questions that will follow the Court if it overturns Humphrey’s is what for-cause removal protections will look like for the Fed, if the conception of “for-cause removal” devised around Humphrey’s is no longer good law. For example, in the D.C. District Court’s order regarding Lisa Cook, the court explained that during the Humphrey’s period, for-cause removal meant “concerns about the Board member’s ability to effectively and faithfully execute their statutory duties, in light of circumstances that have occurred while they are in office.”[17] If Humphrey’s is overturned, the Court would likely find interpretations of for-cause removal around the time of Humphrey’s to be less persuasive, and could decide that presidents have the power to remove Fed Governors for conduct that occurred before their tenure or outside of their statutory duties. Such an increase in executive power could affect the Fed’s ability to set interest rates without political interference, and could expose the Fed to executive overreach, potentially resulting in higher inflation and a less stable economy overall.[18] However, based on the Court’s explicit carve-out for the Fed in the Wilcox decision, many believe that the Court will attempt to preserve the Fed’s independence, even if Humphrey’s is overturned.[19]
That said, regardless of whether the Fed will be shielded from the principal effects of a post-Humphrey’s world, the Court’s likely decision to overturn Humphreys will still have a significant impact on all other independent agencies in the federal system.[20] Without Humphrey’s, the president will have the ability to remove officers who carry out anti-trust laws, labor laws, and other important responsibilities that have traditionally been thought to deserve independence from political interference for any reason at all, including removal for mere political disagreements.[21] A decision of that magnitude would redefine the structure of the administrative state, effectively eradicate independent agencies, and greatly increase the power of the presidency. Of course, only time can tell what will happen next, but one thing is for certain: In a post-Humphrey’s world, presidents will be guaranteed to have the “full confidence”[22] in administrative officers that Roosevelt addressed in his letter to Humphrey, even if that “confidence” comes in the form of coercion.
[1] Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935) (emphasis added).
[2] Id. at 629. For-cause removal implies that presidents cannot remove officers in independent agencies for any reason. Selia L.v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 197 (2020). Typically, a president needs to show some “inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office” before they could fire an officer. Id.
[3] Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 628.
[4] Amy Howe, Overturning Precedent on the Roberts Court, SCOUTUSBlog (Oct. 29, 2025), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/overturning-precedent-on-the-roberts-court/ (highlighting the Roberts Court’s recent decisions to overturn other seminal cases such as Roe and Chevron).
[5] Trump v. Wilcox, No. 24A966, slip op. at 1 (May 22, 2025).
[6] Id.; What We Do, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 15, 2025); About MSPB, U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., https://www.mspb.gov/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2025).
[7] Wilcox, slip op. at 3 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
[8] Wilcox, slip op. at 1.
[9] See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935); Selia L. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 217 (2020).
[10] Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 632.
[11] Selia, 591 U.S. at 217.
[12] Lauren McFerran & Celine McNicholas, Trump’s Assault on Independent Agencies Endangers Us All, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Oct. 22, 2025), https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-assault-on-independent-agencies-endangers-us-all/ (explaining that for-cause removal protections are highly important because they allow for independent agencies to “truly exercise their regulatory and enforcement powers independent of White House influence.”).
[13] Wilcox, slip op. at 2.
[14] The Fed Explained, The Fed. Rsrv. Bd., https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/the-fed-explained.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2025); 12 U.S.C. § 242.
[15] Wilcox, slip op. at 2.
[16] Aaron Pellish, Kyle Cheney, & Sam Sutton, Trump Says He’s Firing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, Politico (Aug. 25, 2025, at 23:21 EDT), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/25/trump-says-hes-firing-federal-reserve-governor-lisa-cook-00523841 (explaining that President Trump fired Lisa Cook “for cause” via social media based on alleged false statements on Cook’s mortgage applications).
[17] Cook v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2903, slip op. at 16 (D. D. C. Sep. 9, 2025) (emphasis added).
[18] David Wessel, Why is the Federal Reserve Independent, and What Does that Mean in Practice, Brookings (May 23, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-is-the-federal-reserve-independent-and-what-does-that-mean-in-practice/.
[19] Adam White, Why the Justices Defend the Federal Reserve, SCOTUSBlog (Aug. 7, 2025), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/08/why-the-justices-defended-the-federal-reserve/.
[20] John Fritze, Is There Anyone in Government Trump Can’t Fire? Why Humphrey’s Executor May be in Peril at the Supreme Court, CNN (Feb. 12, 2025, at 22:05 EST), https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/12/politics/trump-fire-anyone-humphreys-executor-supreme-court.
[21] Id.
[22] Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).