Blog Post | 114 KY. L. J. ONLINE | November 14, 2025
Lost in the Legal Current: How Maritime Law Overlooks Inland River Workers
By: Emma James, Staff Editor, Vol. 114
The Jones Act was designed to ensure that maritime workers injured on the job could recover for their losses, recognizing the unique dangers of working on the water.[1] However, access to those protections hinges on one crucial threshold: whether the worker qualifies as a “seaman.”[2] Over time, courts have narrowed and refined this definition through caselaw, requiring employees to demonstrate a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation.[3] For inland river workers, who spend their days on towboats, barges, or fleeting operations along United States waterways, this test often creates an unexpected barrier.[4] Even though their work is inherently maritime, many are excluded from recovery because their duties do not fit neatly within the court-constructed definition of “seaman.”[5] This definitional gap undercuts the Jones Act’s core purpose and leaves a large segment of the maritime workforce without meaningful protection.
The Jones Act states that “[a] seaman injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil action at law . . . against the employer.”[6] Implicit in the language of the statute is the requirement that, in order to recover, the claimant must be a “seaman.”[7] However, Congress never provided an explicit definition for who a “seaman” actually is.[8] As a result, courts have spent decades refining the term through case law.[9] In 1991, the Supreme Court in McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander narrowed the definition of seaman by clarifying that a seaman does not have to contribute to the navigation of the vessel, but must contribute to the vessel’s mission or function.[10] Four years later, Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis seemingly nailed down a more stable two-part test: to qualify as a seaman, a worker must (1) be assigned to a vessel or fleet of vessels in navigation and (2) have an employment connection to that vessel substantial in both nature and duration.[11] Finally, the Supreme Court further limited coverage in Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, holding that an employee’s prior work for different employers could not be aggregated to satisfy the “substantial connection” requirement.[12]
While it may seem that these decisions have made things easier by narrowing the definition for seamen, in actuality, these cases have caused more confusion, leading courts to inconsistent holdings. Most of the issue seems to involve the “nature” aspect of the Chandris test, which considers whether a worker’s connection to a vessel is substantial in kind, not just in time spent.[13] Justice O’Connor’s language in Chandris linked the inquiry to “exposure to the perils of the sea,” which left lower courts struggling to apply an ocean-oriented concept to the varied realities of maritime employment.[14] Some courts interpret “nature” as requiring literal sea-going work, while others focus on functional exposure to the risks of maritime employment.[15] Factors such as allegiance to an employer, continuity of assignment, and the sea-based character of the work now dominate the analysis, yet none are applied uniformly.[16] For inland river workers, whose employment is inherently transitory and whose duties shift among fleeting areas, barges, and towboats, these criteria are almost impossible to satisfy consistently.[17] The result leaves river workers to face unpredictable outcomes that often turns on how a judge defines “the perils of the sea.”
Whether someone qualifies as a “seaman” is not only a technical question, it can completely change the outcome of an injury case.[18] A worker who meets the Jones Act definition has the ability to sue their employer for negligence and recover full tort damages, while land-based maritime workers are limited to using the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which functions like a state workers’ compensation act.[19] In practice, two employees injured in nearly identical ways can obtain vastly different remedies depending on whether the court considers the person a “seaman.” The bottom line is that the seaman classification opens the door for much more generous remedies under the Jones Act,[20] and this outcome carries “significant legal and economic ramifications for maritime employers, employees, and insurers.”[21]
The uncertainty surrounding seaman status leaves inland river workers navigating a legal system as unpredictable as the waterways they travel. For every case that grants recovery, another denies it on nearly identical facts, turning what should be a straightforward inquiry into a jurisdictional gamble. This lack of clarity not only frustrates courts, but it undermines the very purpose of the Jones Act.[22] Congress intended to protect those who face the hazards of maritime employment,[23] yet modern law rewards permanence and punishes transience, excluding many whose livelihoods depend on the river. Until courts or lawmakers reconcile the statute’s language with the realities of inland maritime work, the question of who counts as a “seaman” will remain unsettled. Ultimately, it seems that it will be up to Congress to construct a more comprehensive definition for who is eligible to claim recovery under the Jones Act, as they did for railway workers in the Federal Employers and Liability Act.[24] In my opinion, inland river workers and sea-based workers should each have their own explicit and specific definitions under the Jones Act. As river commerce continues to power the nation’s economy, it is time to acknowledge that the men and women who keep those waterways moving deserve clarity and coverage under the law that was designed to protect them.
[1] L. Taylor Coley, The “Perils of the Sea” -Man Status Question: The Fifth Circuit Falls Behind FELA’s Advancements in Remedies in Favor of the Continued Confusion Surrounding the Seaman Definition, 39 Tul. Mar. L.J. 371, 372 (2014).
[2] See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1995).
[3] Justin R. Martin, Tacking Toward a Reliable Test for Seaman Status Under the Jones Act, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 811, 812–19 (2000) (detailing the history of three of the most influential U.S. Supreme Court cases in defining seaman: McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander; Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis; and Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai).
[4] What Water Transportation Workers Do, U.S. Bureau Lab. Stat. (2025), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/transportation-and-material-moving/water-transportation-occupations.htm#tab-2.
[5] See Martin, supra note 3, at 817 (“Brownwater seamen and land-based workers whose connection to a vessel in navigation is merely sporadic or transitory are excluded from seaman status.”).
[6] 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (2022).
[7] Id.
[8] John B. Garry, The Rhyme and Reason of the Modern Mariner: Determining Who is a Jones Act Seaman, 48 R.I. B.J. 7, 7–8 (2000).
[9] Id. (“Since Congress did not define ‘seaman’ in the Jones Act, the courts have struggled for the better part of the twentieth century to determine who is eligible for this potentially lucrative remedy.”).
[10] McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (“[W]e believe the requirement that an employee's duties must ‘contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission’ captures well an important requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship's work.”).
[11] Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995).
[12] Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 559–60 (1997).
[13] See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting Sanchez: Turning Short Round, 24 Loy. Mar. L.J. 1, 3 (2025) (arguing that the “nature” inquiry is prevalent in the seaman analysis and contributes to much of the inconsistencies in determining whether an individual is a seaman).
[14] See id. at 7–8; see also Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (explaining that, in order to qualify for seaman status, the individual must be subject to “the perils of the sea”).
[15] See Galligan, supra note 13, at 10 (noting the difference between the Papai court’s reasoning, which focused on the employee performing “seagoing” work, and some other courts’ reasoning, which does not require an employee to literally go to sea “as long as they were exposed to the perils of the sea in their work”).
[16] Id. at 34–35 (detailing three factors the Sanchez court relied on when conducting the “nature” analysis and explaining that each of the factors derive from Wilander, Chandris, or Papai).
[17] Martin, supra note 3, at 817.
[18] Coley, supra note 1, at 374 (“The question of seaman status has always been a difficult one because of the valuable, multiple bases for recovery that it affords plaintiffs.”).
[19] Id. at 372.
[20] Coley, supra note 1, at 372.
[21] Garry, supra note 8, at 33.
[22] Coley, supra note 1, at 372 (noting that Congress’s intent in creating the Jones Act was to reward maritime employees for their labor, as they are exposed to dangerous and unrelenting conditions, i.e. “the perils of the sea.”).
[23] Id.
[24] Id. (explaining that the Federal Employers and Liability Act “provides an explicit definition of its intended beneficiaries”).