State of Texas v. United States: Immigrant Status Hangs in the Balance for Millions

Tatiana Lipsey, KLJ Online Content Manager

DACA, DAPA, and Executive Action have been in the news a lot lately. While Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is nothing new1, on November 20, 2014, President Obama announced that the executive branch, in coordination with the Department for Homeland Security (DHS) would be taking many steps to “fix the broken immigration system.”2 Part of this effort included expanding existing DACA, beginning February 18, to include more immigrants and increase the period of deferred action and work authorization from two to three years.3 The effort also included the creation of a new program called Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) set to begin in May.4 The President’s announcement has received a lot of attention, and not surprisingly, legal challenges.State of Texas, et al v. United States 5 was filed in federal district court in Brownsville, Texas, last December by twenty-six states. The suit challenged the above two aspects of the immigration initiatives that President Obama announced on November 20.6 The states argue that the programs are not lawful and will cause economic injury to states that must finance the education, protection, and issuance of driver’s licenses to future recipients of DACA or DAPA.7On February 16, 2015, the district court issued a preliminary injunction temporarily blocking the expansion of DACA and the implementation of DAPA.8 The ruling did not address the constitutionality of the programs. Rather, the narrow holding for the injunction focused on the whether the federal government violated procedural requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act by not following the formal rulemaking procedures in creating these initiatives.9 The court decided that the government had failed to follow appropriate procedure.10 DHS has stated that it will challenge the decision and believes that there is legal authority for the action.11It could take months, or even years, for a final decision to be reached in the federal district court. In the meantime, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has requested that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals lift the injunction and allow expanded DACA and DAPA to go forward while the underlying lawsuit proceeds.12 Oral arguments on the emergency stay of the injunction were scheduled for April 17.13If the injunction is lifted, DHS could immediately begin implementing both programs while the lower court case continues. However, if either side appeals to the Supreme Court, which is likely, it could take until sometime next year for a decision on the future of expanded DACA and DAPA to become clearer. This is a case that many immigration scholars, lawyers, and undocumented immigrants will be following closely. The case will undoubtedly have a significant impact whether the executive actions are ultimately found lawful or not.


1 DACA was created June 15, 2012, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. See Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. The program provides relief from removal and work authorization for a period of two years, which can then be renewed as long as the program remains in existence. Current guidelines state that DHS has the discretion to terminate DACA at any time, with or without a Notice of Intent to Terminate. Ilissa Mira, What to Expect When Expanded DACA Opens Again, CLINIC, https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/what-expect-when-expanded-daca-opens-again.
2 Video: Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-action#.
3 Fixing Our Broken Immigration System Through Executive Action - Key Facts; Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action.
4 Id.
5 State of Texas, et al v. United States of America, et al., No. 1-14-CV-254 (D. Texas Feb. 16, 2015)(order granting preliminary injunction). Available at http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/notablecases/1-14-cv-254_145X20977588_0.pdf.
6 Mira, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Existing DACA, as it has existed since 2012, and renewals thereof, have not been affected by the injunction.
9 Mira, supra note 1.
10 State of Texas v. United States, No. 1-14-CV-254 at 123.
11 Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson Concerning the District Court's Ruling Concerning DAPA and DACA (Feb. 17, 2015), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/02/17/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-concerning-district-courts-ruling-concerning-dapa.
12 Mira, supra note 1.
13 Id.

Maintaining the Juvenile’s Right Against Self-Incrimination

Misty Stone, KLJ Staff Editor

Many people may be familiar with the Miranda[1] warnings, but how many of us truly understand them? Arguably, many adults do not understand the significance of their Miranda rights,[2] but what about juveniles whose brains are not yet fully functioning?  Research indicates only 21 percent of juveniles understand their Miranda rights.[3]Miranda is comprised of four main warnings that must be read to a person before custodial interrogation in order to protect their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.[4] Those rights are that (1) he, the witness, has right to remain silent; (2) any statement made may be used as evidence him; (3) he has the right to an attorney; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to him.[5]  Miranda adds, “The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”[6]While a person must unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent or right to counsel,[7] the Court does not maintain the unambiguous requirement when it comes to waiving those rights. In North Carolina v. Butler, the Court held that waiver may be implied, as opposed to unambiguous, through “the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.”[8] Thus, by merely answering a police officer’s question, the Court held the defendant “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”[9] waived his rights.[10] Thus, it is fairly easy to waive your Miranda rights. In fact, the Court held in Fare v. Michael C. that the validity of a juvenile’s waiver would be judged under the same test that applies to adults with the juvenile’s age as merely an ordinary factor in conducting the test. [11]However, juveniles are arguably more susceptible to self-incrimination because of “their eagerness to comply with adult authority figures, impulsivity, immature judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in decision-making and appear to be at greater risk of falsely confessing when subjected to psychological interrogation techniques.”[12] In response to such risks, Illinois passed legislation mandating juveniles under thirteen have access to an attorney before they are interrogated in murder and sex crimes cases.[13] While a juvenile is not afforded this protection in all scenarios, the juvenile is awarded this protection in cases that are certainly the most damaging to the juvenile’s future.While many courts find that the presence of a parent will render a juvenile’s confession voluntary,[14] and there are certainly pros to that approach, it is arguably better to mandate that a juvenile have access to an attorney. This is because only 42.3% of adults understand the significance of their Miranda rights.[15] If the parent does not understand the Miranda rights, how can the child? Moreover, given that courts may easily find an implied waiver,[16] a lawyer should be available to explain to the juvenile exactly what his rights are and what they mean. With this safeguard, a juvenile is treated fairly by obtaining the information in order to “knowingly and intelligently” waive his Miranda rights.In sum, states should enact legislation similar to Illinois that mandates juveniles have access to an attorney before they are interrogated. Given that juveniles are more susceptible to submitting to adult authority figures and general impulsiveness,[17] as well as many other factors that make them more susceptible to self-incrimination, an attorney should be provided to all juveniles before they undergo custodial interrogation, at least in cases involving murder and sex crimes that are of an especially serious nature.


[1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[2] Am. Psychological Ass’n, Right to Remain Silent Not Understood by Many Suspects (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/remain-silent.aspx (“Based on [Dr. Rogers’] analysis of nationwide statistics of 9.2 million arrests in 2009, he estimates that 976,000 arrests, or 10 percent of the cases, were compromised by problems with Miranda warnings. That estimate includes 360,000 arrests of adults with mental health disorders; 305,000 arrests of adults without mental health disorders; and 311,000 juvenile arrests.”).
[3] Thomas Grisso, Juvenile’s Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134, 1153 (1980).
[4] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441.
[5] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
[6] Id. (emphasis added).
[7] Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (defendant failed to invoke his right to counsel because he did not do so “unambiguously”); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389 (2010) (extending “unambiguously” standard to invoking the right to remain silent).
[8] North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
[9] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441.
[10] Butler, 441 U.S. at 372.
[11] Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011).
[12] Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L.Rev. 891, 1005 (2004).
[13] Id.
[14] See In re Andrew M., 88 P.3d 552, 555 (Ariz. 2004); In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1311-12 (Kan. 1998); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Mass. 1983); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1113 (N.J. 2000).
[15] Grisso, supra note 3, at 1153.
[16] See Butler, 441 U.S. at 372.
[17] Drizin, supra note 12.

Balancing Public Demand with Due Process: What the University of Oklahoma’s Actions Say about Our Society

Bardia Sanjabi, KLJ Staff Editor

What happens when interest in protecting a fundamental right clashes with general public opinion? Do the Constitution and our legal system kneel to what is and is not socially acceptable? The answer to these questions has become increasingly blurry in light of recent events.In March, a leaked video displayed members of the Oklahoma chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity singing a racist chant on a bus.[1] The University’s response to the video was swift and unforgiving, as it severed ties with the fraternity and expelled two of its members implicated in the video just two days after it was leaked.[2] This action drew attention from constitutional law experts, who raised the issue of whether the expulsion of the members was a violation of their First Amendment rights because it was an act by a government funded state institution.[3]The University, which as a public institution cannot discriminate on the basis of race, will likely justify its actions under its Student Rights and Responsibilities Code, where it lists “abusive conduct” under “prohibited conduct.”[4] Abusive conduct is defined as “unwelcome conduct that is sufficiently severe and pervasive that it alters the conditions of education or employment and creates an environment that a reasonable person would find intimidating, harassing or humiliating.”[5]Unfortunately for the University of Oklahoma, freedom of speech is a fundamental right under the Bill of Rights, and any policy by the state that may hinder this right will come under the purview of strict scrutiny within the courts.[6] There is a strong argument to be made that the chant on the bus, as bigoted as it may have been, remains protected speech by private individuals. Many scholars, including the UC Irvine law school dean Erwin Chemerinsky, seem to be of the opinion that should the expelled members file suit against the University, they will have an “excellent chance” of succeeding.[7]What is most concerning about this situation, however, is the immediateness and severity of the University’s response. It seems that our society places higher value on intolerance towards bigotry than the due process of our laws. This issue is also apparent in the recent developments of the Mike Brown shooting incident in Ferguson, MO. On March 4th, the Department of Justice released a report that specified they will not be prosecuting Officer Wilson for the shooting due to lack of corroborated eyewitness testimony.[8] No reliable source can confirm that Brown indeed raised his hands in a gesture of surrender, which was a key aspect of the nationwide movement covered by the media demanding justice for Brown’s death.[9]It is important to acknowledge that prejudice and hate crimes are still noteworthy issues in today’s society. Solving these issues, however, may best be dealt with in a calculated and forethoughtful manner. Emotional overreactions, while satisfying the public’s demand for swift justice, are not stable solutions. Just as the investigation of Brown’s shooting yielded no evidence to prosecute Officer Wilson, the expulsion of the two Oklahoma fraternity members may be reversed should they pursue to challenge the University’s decision on Constitutional grounds.


[1] Terrence McCoy, Why Expelled Oklahoma Frat Boys Would Have an ‘Excellent Chance’ in Court, Wash. Post (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/11/expelled-oklahoma-students-have-an-excellent-chance-of-succeeding-if-they-sue.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] University of Oklahoma Board of Regents, Student Rights and Responsibilities Code 3 (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.ou.edu/content/dam/studentlife/documents/AllCampusStudentCode.pdf.
[5] Id.
[6] Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
[7] McCoy, supra note 1.
[8] Trymaine Lee, Justice Department Clears Darren Wilson in Michael Brown Killing, Msnbc (Mar. 4, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/justice-department-clears-darren-wilson-michael-brown-killing.
[9] Matthew Balan, Surprise: CNN Reports 'Hands Up, Don't Shoot' is Based on Falsehood, Cnn (Mar. 6, 2015, 11:31 PM), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/matthew-balan/2015/03/06/surprise-cnn-reports-hands-dont-shoot-based-falsehood.

Do Ice Bucket Challenge Donations Lack the “Donative Intent” Necessary to be Tax-Deductible?

Mary Ellen Wimberly, KLJ Staff Editor[1]

In the summer of 2014, the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge took social media by storm. The premise was simple: those nominated to complete the challenge had to either pour a bucket of ice cold water on themselves or give $100 to the ALS Association.[2] Many chose to make donations in addition to participating in an icy shower. The challenge raised awareness for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), often called Lou Gehrig’s Disease, and also resulted in donations of $115 million to the ALS Association.[3]Many taxpayers will deduct these charitable contributions on their federal income tax returns without thinking about whether these contributions qualify for a deduction. While Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code generally allows deductions for charitable contributions[4], courts have interpreted the provision to also require “donative intent.” This requirement may limit the deductibility of those ALS Ice Bucket Challenge donations that were contributed because the participant wanted to avoid a cold shower.The test for donative intent in charitable contribution cases comes from the landmark case Commissioner v. Duberstein, which established the intent required by a transferor in making a “gift” for income tax purposes.[5] The U.S. Tax Court has consistently applied the Duberstein test in determining the donative intent requirement for charitable contribution cases,[6] and has noted that in determining whether a charitable contribution qualifies under § 170, “the term ‘charitable contribution’ is synonymous with the word ‘gift.’ ”[7] Therefore, to satisfy donative intent, the taxpayer’s charitable contribution must be made with detached and disinterested generosity and without the expectation of receiving something in return.[8] The Tax Court further delineated the test in DeJong v. Commissioner and stated that “[i]f a payment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit to the payor beyond the satisfaction which flows from the performance of a generous act, it is not a [charitable contribution].”[9]However, courts have generally interpreted the “donative intent” test liberally and in recent years have added a “quid pro quo” requirement, which provides that donative intent is lacking only when the donor anticipates receiving an actual financial benefit from the charitable contribution.[10] Consequently, because those who chose to forego the cold shower and opted to make a donation instead gained no financial benefit, those taxpayers should be able to correctly claim a deduction for a charitable contribution under Section 170.


[1] J.D. expected May 2016.
[2] Meg Tirrell, Ice Bucket Challenge: 6 Months Later, CNBC (Feb. 9, 2015, 8:26 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102405889.
[3] The ALS Ice Bucket Challenge, ALS Association, http://www.alsa.org/fight-als/ice-bucket-challenge.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
[4] 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012).
[5] Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
[6] See Rodney P. Mock, Burning Down the House and the Charitable Deduction, 11 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 353, 360 n.41 (2011).
[7] DeJong v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (T.C. 1961).
[8] Duberstein, 363 at 285.
[9] DeJong, 36 T.C. at 899.
[10] See generally Tony Nitti, Could the IRS Disallow Ice Bucket Challenge Charitable Contributions?, Forbes (Aug. 20, 2014, 9:24AM),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2014/08/20/could-the-irs-disallow-ice-bucket-challenge-charitable-contributions/.

Bison Populations Might Render the Grand Canyon Less Grand

Julie A. Barr, KLJ Staff Editor

Vacationers may soon be able to add beefalo hunting to their Grand Canyon National Park bucket list. These animals, a crossbreed of cattle and bison, have taken up residence in what has for years been a safe and protected home.  But recently, the large numbers of these animals have proven extremely detrimental to the land and other wildlife in the Park.[i] The deleterious impacts include overgrazing of the grass and overwhelming scarce and precious water sources.[ii] Some Native American groups have also reported that the animals have destroyed ancient ruins in the area.[iii] A lack of predators has allowed these animals to multiply in an area that is simply unable to accommodate them.[iv]One of the answers to combatting this growing population of animals might be to allow people to hunt the animals inside this federally-protected area.[v] As the formal owner of the bison population in the state, Arizona issues the permits required in order to hunt the animals outside the Park.[vi] Inside the boundaries of the Park, however, the National Park Service (NPS) maintains control.[vii] NPS’s primary directive is to protect the particular ecosystem of each national park.[viii] Because of the beefalo population’s negative impact on the ecosystem, hunting these animals could be one of the best options in order to preserve the grandeur of the Grand Canyon.[ix]There are plenty of people who oppose hunting these animals, however, including many Native American groups.[x] Hunting the beefalo is not the only available option, either.[xi] Less violent options include attempts to corral or enclose the population, or to somehow give the beefalo a form of contraception.[xii]If the hunting option should prevail, shooting one of these coveted, 2000 pound animals will come at a high price. Arizona residents might pay over $1000, and non-residents could pay over $5000, just to shoot one bison.[xiii] And, lest vacationers think otherwise, hunting bison is far from an easy task – these animals can clock in at forty miles per hour.[xiv] An ultimate decision as to the best solution is still looming. [xv] So for now, hunters might not want to book a flight to the Grand Canyon until they know for certain whether they will get a


[i] Anne-Marie Bullock, How do you solve a problem like the ‘Beefalo’?, BBC News (March 1, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-31661920
[ii] Laurel Morales, Grand Canyon Officials Want to Evict Bison From Park, NPR (May 27, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/27/316269168/grand-canyon-officials-want-to-evict-bison-from-park
[iii] Laura Clark, A Beefalo Invasion is Causing Trouble in the Grand Canyon, Smithsonian.com, (March 4, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/beefalo-invasion-causing-trouble-grand-canyon-180954458/
[iv] Edmund DeMarche, Hunters seek entry to Grand Canyon National Park, where roaming buffalo cause havoc, Fox News, (March 8, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/03/08/hunters-may-get-chance-at-bison-in-grand-canyon-national-park/
[v] Id.
[vi] Id.
[vii] Id.
[viii] Louis Russell, What Are the Parks For? Making Policy Explicit in the Park Service’s NEPA Decisions, 41 Ecology L.Q. 521, 525 (2014).
[ix] Supra note 2.
[x] Supra note 3.
[xi] Supra note 1.
[xii] Supra note 1.
[xiii] Supra note 4.
[xiv] Supra note 2.
[xv] Supra note 1.

On the Horizon: Domestic Drone Use and the Implications of FAA and State Regulation

Meredith Berge,[i] KLJ Staff Editor

Over the last few decades, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as “drones,” has exploded.[ii] The increase in private and commercial drone use presents significant legal implications. This post explores issues surrounding civilian drone use, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, and state legislation in lieu of agency action, all of which are (literally) on the horizon.For those who are less familiar with domestic drone use, here are some key facts. These unmanned, remotely operated devices can be as small as an insect[iii] and can often be controlled by a smart phone.[iv] They can also contain advanced technological systems including high-powered cameras, thermal imaging technology, and facial recognition software.[v] With such a wide range of technological options, the potential application of these devices is extremely broad.[vi] The possibilities here include mapping, agricultural practices and research, home delivery of packages, photography, journalism, real estate marketing, and hobby interests.[vii] However, the use of drones brings unique problems including collision with other objects, flying in dangerous proximity to other aircraft, and invasion into other people’s private spaces.[viii] These possibilities and complications bring legal concerns including individual privacy rights,[ix] property rights,[x] and FAA authority to govern all drone flight.[xi] With these issues in mind, lawmakers are poised to enact laws and regulations to better control these scenarios.As a reaction to the increase in drone use, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act in 2012, ordering the FAA to promulgate rules for the domestic operation of drones.[xii] After much anticipation, the FAA released its proposed rule on February 15, 2015.[xiii] The proposed rule governs the “non-recreational” use of small drones and requires operator certification, operation only in daylight, and prohibits operations that are out of the operator’s sight.[xiv] Notably, this prohibition on out-of-sight operations halts Amazon’s highly publicized plan for drone home delivery of packages.[xv] Additionally, concern exists that the FAA, charged with safety and efficiency in the national airspace, does not have the proper expertise to deal with Fourth Amendment protections like individual privacy.[xvi]Rather than waiting for the FAA’s rule proposal, some states have opted to pass legislation. At this point, at least nine states have passed and the vast majority of states have considered passing laws regulating the use of drones.[xvii] These laws vary widely among the states and tend to cover law enforcement use of drones, commercial uses, property rights, public safety, or some combination of these issues.[xviii] For example, Kentucky legislators have proposed a law that prohibits law enforcement drone surveillance without a warrant but allows drone use for search and rescue and for research and business purposes.[xix] While these state laws are proposed and enacted to protect citizens, there are concerns that adoption of the FAA’s proposed rule would cause preemption problems for the states that have drone laws on the books.[xx] FAA officials have “discouraged” states from continuing to pass laws on the subject so as to not upset the agency’s “unified regulatory structure.”[xxi] While the FAA stresses “virtually all drone activities affect the national airspace” and would be subject to FAA authority,[xxii] the statement begs the question: what activities are not covered and how should those flights be handled?The comment period for this proposed rule closes April 23 and the FAA expects comments in record numbers.[xxiii] Until a time when a final rule from the FAA is promulgated or more clarity on state authority is given, practitioners and lawmakers should be cautious when approaching these issues that may be truly right outside your window


[i] University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2016.
[ii] Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 157 (2015).
[iii] Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 13 (2014)
[iv] Rule, supra note 2.
[v] Taly Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 265, 266-67 (2014).
[vi] Id. at 267.
[vii] Id.; Rule, supra note 2.
[viii] See Rule, supra note 2.
[ix] Matiteyahu, supra note 5, at 267.
[x] Rule, supra note 2, at 163-64.
[xi] Id. at 164-65 (questioning FAA authority to govern potentially dangerous but low-altitude drone flight).
[xii] Farber, supra note 3, at 1-2.
[xiii] Scott Shane, F.A.A. Rules Would Limit Commercial Drone Use, The New York Times (February 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/us/faa-rules-would-limit-commercial-drone-use.html?_r=0.
[xiv] Id.
[xv] Id.; Jimmy Hoover, FAA Official Knocks State Drone Initiatives, Law360 (Feb. 24, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.law360.com.ezproxy.law.uky.edu/articles/624628/faa-official-knocks-state-drone-initiatives.
[xvi] Matiteyahu, supra note 5, at 268.
[xvii] Hoover, supra note 15.
[xviii] William O’Connor, May State and Local Gov’ts Control Low-Flying Drones?, Law360 (Dec. 04, 2015, 11:33 AM), http://www.law360.com.ezproxy.law.uky.edu/articles/601469/may-state-and-local-gov-ts-control-low-flying-drones-?article_related_content=1.
[xix] Scott Wartman, Ky. Lawmakers look to limit drone surveillance, USA Today (June 18, 2014, 8:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/18/ky-lawmakers-look-to-limit-drone-surveillance/10817479/.
[xx] O’Connor, supra note 17.
[xxi] Hoover, supra note 15.
[xxii] Id.

Haven’t you “Herd”? The “Herd Mentality” And How Much Control Parents Have In Vaccinating Their Children

Sarah Hines, KLJ Staff Editor[1]

As of February 23, 2015, 154 cases of measles were reported in the United States.[2] This number is significantly greater than the historic national yearly average in recent years.[3] Many of these cases can be tied to a recent outbreak at Disneyland.[4] This recent measles outbreak has sparked much debate among Americans about mandatory vaccination. Some argue that vaccinating as many people as possible will prevent future outbreaks of preventable diseases, such as measles. Others argue that it is every parent’s right to control health care decisions for their children, including whether or not to vaccinate their children.Not only is measles highly contagious, but it can also cause severe complications such as pneumonia and encephalitis, which can ultimately lead to death.[5] The good news is that a vaccine exists which protects against measles.[6] In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld a state mandate which required vaccination against smallpox.[7] Many states, including Kentucky, created state laws to mirror this holding and such laws mandate vaccination against certain preventable diseases, including measles.[8] Proof of vaccination is often required for enrolling children into public school systems.[9]Exceptions do exist in every state for those individuals who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons.[10] Many states also let parents opt out of vaccinating their children for religious reasons.[11]  Nineteen states allow parents to opt out of vaccinating their children for secular reasons of philosophy or philosophical beliefs.[12] It is this particular opt out policy for “personal beliefs” that is the source of debate.A small, but noticeable, group of parents opt out of vaccinating their children for personal reasons. These opponents of mandatory vaccination often pin their skepticism of vaccines on the purported safety of the vaccination.  For instance, many believe there is a link between vaccines and autism.[13] Others fear that vaccines can cause digestive health problems or brain damage.[14] Whatever the reason may be for avoiding certain vaccines, some argue that it is a parent’s right to decide whether to vaccinate their own child. As of 2014, thousands of kindergarten-aged children had not been vaccinated.[15]In opposition to these concerns is a concept called “herd mentality,” the driving force behind laws that require vaccination.[16] The idea is that if most of the people in any given population are vaccinated, then these vaccinated people will act as a barrier against those who cannot be immunized against a certain disease. Those who cannot be immunized will arguably not come into contact with the disease at all, thus slowing or even stopping the spread of certain diseases.Ultimately, the issue of mandatory vaccination comes down to an issue of public policy. The states are allowed to mandate vaccinations against certain preventable diseases.[17] Similarly, states can carve out any number of personal exceptions to allow parents to opt out of vaccinating their children. The more opt-outs that occur, the less effective the “herd mentality” argument becomes. It is important for states to weigh the risk of disease against the interests of parents who do not want to vaccinate their children. Many states, such as California, are considering legislation to end the “personal belief” exemption to vaccination.[18] Only time will tell how state laws will react to the current measles outbreak and its impact on the issue of parental control of health care decisions for their children.


[1] University Of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. expected May 2016.
[2] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Measles Cases and Outbreaks (last updated Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html.
[3] Id.
[4] Jonathan Corum, Josh Keller, Haeyoun Park & Archie Tse, Facts About the Measles Outbreak (last updated Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/02/us/measles-facts.html?_r=0.
[5] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Complications of Measles (last updated Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/complications.html.
[6] Id.
[7] Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 858 (1905).
[8] E.g., KRS § 214.034.
[9] Id.
[10] Tom Frieden, Stop the Vaccination Debate, Newark Advocate (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.newarkadvocate.com/story/opinion/columnists/2015/02/23/stop-vaccination-debate/23876185/.
[11] Jacob Gershman, Should Vaccination Be a Choice? In Many States, It Already Is, The Wall Street Journal L. Blog (Feb. 3, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/02/03/should-vaccination-be-a-choice-in-many-states-it-already-is/.
[12] National Conference of State Legislatures, States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements (last updated Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.
[13] The Associated Press, Anti-vaccination parents explain their perspectives: 'We are not anti-science' (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.oregonlive.com/health/index.ssf/2015/02/anti-vaccination_parents_expla.html#.
[14] Id.
[15] Ranee Seither, Svetlana Masalovich, Cynthia L. Knighton, Jenelle Mellerson, James A. Singleton & Stacie M. Greby, Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten — United States, 2013–14 School Year (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6341a1.htm.
[16] Sarah Arnquist, Herd Immunity — Vaccinations Protect Us All, The Health Care Blog (July 29, 2008), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2008/07/29/herd-immunity-vaccinations-protect-us-all/.
[17] Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 858.
[18] See, e.g., Jenny Gold, Measles Outbreak Sparks Bid To Strengthen California Vaccine Law (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2015/02/05/383988632/vaccination-exemption-blamed-for-measles-spread-in-california.

Tragedy of the Commons in Public Health: Eliminating Religious and Personal Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccinations

Sarah Tipton, KLJ Staff Editor[i]

In January 2015, the United States had more cases of measles than the number typically diagnosed in an entire year.[ii] The outbreak, which began with forty diagnosed people at Disneyland in December, has now spread to at least six other states.[iii] However, this current outbreak is not the largest in United States history.[iv] Only months earlier, 383 people fell ill with measles in Ohio’s Amish Country.[v] For a disease that was declared eliminated in 2000, how and why has measles returned in such an unprecedented fashion?[vi]Through both traditional and social media, debate over the necessity and safety of vaccinations has recently intensified. News pundits, members of Congress, and stay-at-home moms alike have weighed in on the issue. New Jersey’s Governor, Chris Christie, and Kentucky’s own Senator Rand Paul, fueled the debate with their comments advocating for parents’ rights to choose whether to vaccinate their children.[vii] Though Christie and Paul claim to be pro-vaccination, Paul recited the common contention of the anti-vaccine movement, that vaccines may cause autism.[viii]In 1998, the British medical journal, The Lancet, published a study alleging a link between the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine and autism.[ix] This study has been widely discredited by the scientific community, and ten of the twelve researchers later retracted their conclusions.[x] Largely because of this misleading study, fear of vaccination still remains in America despite the critical role vaccines have played in preventing disease outbreak.[xi]Another important benefit of vaccination is herd immunity, which denotes a community's collective resistance to an infectious disease through the immunity of a majority of its members.[xii] Herd immunity protects susceptible persons, including those who have not received a vaccine due to a prohibiting medical condition.[xiii] For example, children undergoing chemotherapy cancer treatment cannot be vaccinated due to their weakened immune systems; therefore, herd immunity is essential to protect these individuals.Today, all fifty states have implemented mandatory vaccination laws for schoolchildren from kindergarten through twelfth grade in both public and private schools.[xiv] Nonetheless, large loopholes in mandatory vaccination still remain. All fifty states allow medical exemptions to vaccinations, forty-eight states allow religious exemptions, and seventeen states allow an exemption based on personal beliefs.[xv] Medical exemptions are necessary, as shown by the example of children who may have weakened immune systems. However, personal belief and religious exemptions to vaccines are neither medically nor constitutionally necessary.Mississippi and West Virginia, two leading states in immunization, have eliminated both religious and philosophical exemptions.[xvi] Supreme Court precedent permits this legislation.[xvii] In Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Zucht v. King, the Court upheld the authority of the states to enforce compulsory vaccination laws as part of the states’ police power to protect public health and safety.[xviii] Though the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of eliminating personal belief or religious exemptions, lower courts have generally rejected free exercise objections to immunization requirements.[xix]While philosophical and religious exemptions reflect an attempt to reconcile competing personal and public interests, these exemptions also allow parents to easily circumvent compulsory vaccinations.[xx] Parents may simply check an opt-out box, and in doing so they threaten the health and wellbeing of the nation.[xxi] Because vaccinations are imperative to preventing highly contagious, symptomatic illness, state legislatures should follow the lead of West Virginia and Mississippi and move to eliminate philosophical and religious exemptions.


[i] University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2016. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the opinions of any other person or entity.
[ii] Jonathon Corum, et al., Facts about the Measles, New York Times (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/02/us/measles-facts.html
[iii] Id.
[iv] Alicia Chang, Disneyland Measles Outbreak Isn’t Largest In United States History, ABC News (Feb. 4, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/disneyland-measles-outbreak-largest-recent-memory-28725434
[v] Id.
[vi] Huong McLean, Measels – United States, 2011, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6115a1.htm
[vii] Tara Haelle, Why the Not-So-Great Vaccine Debate of February 2015 Doesn’t Matter, Politico Magazine (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/vaccines-politics-115008.html#.VNuCW76pKSI
[viii] Id.
[ix] Linda E. LeFever, Religious Exemptions from School Immunization: A Sincere Belief or A Legal Loophole?, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 1047, 1055 (2006).
[x] Id.
[xi] Id. at 1048.
[xii] Matt Lasher, Improving Indiana's Mandatory Immunization Programs, 7 Ind. Health L. Rev. 117, 124 (2010).
[xiii] Id.
[xiv] Id. at 1052.
[xv] Vaccine Laws, National Vaccine Information Center (2014), http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws.aspx
[xvi] Alan Blinder, Mississippi, A Vaccination Leader, Stands by its Strict Rules, New York Times (Feb. 4 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/us/mississippi-a-leader-on-vaccination-rates-stands-by-strict-rules.html
[xvii] Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
[xix] See, e.g., Kajoshaj v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 543 Fed. Appx. 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2013); Caviezel v. Great Neck Public Schools, 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285, 264 (E.D. N.Y. 2010); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
[xx] Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 353, 353-54 (2004).
[xxi] Id.

“FAIR”ness and Forfeiture: New Bill and Justice Department Order Seek to Reign in Controversial Police Practice

Matt Dearmond, KLJ Staff Editor

To the pleasure of Fifth Amendment advocates, a thirty-year federal policy may be coming to an end. On Tuesday, January 27, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) reintroduced a bill known as the Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration (FAIR) Act. The bill would greatly limit law enforcement’s ability to seize the assets of individuals without a warrant or charging them with a crime, and would redirect proceeds from these “civil asset forfeitures” to the Treasury Department’s General Fund. This bill comes less than two weeks after departing Attorney General Eric Holder announced that local and state police would be barred from using federal law to seize cash, cars and other property without warrants or criminal charges, using a Justice Department program known as “equitable sharing.”[1]  Civil asset forfeiture is controversial for several reasons. For one, the very idea seems repugnant to many basic notions about property rights, as the owner of the property need not be arrested or convicted of a crime to have his or her property taken. Even those supportive of the general concept, however, harbor concerns about the policy’s application, pointing to the disparate impact borne by racial minorities and the poor. For instance, the ability of property owners to legally and effectively reclaim their property is often dependent upon their means and access to resources, such as a lawyer.[2] Representation by legal counsel is often necessary because in all but six states, the burden is on the owner, not the government, to prove that they are “innocent,” and that their property is not otherwise subject to forfeiture.[3]Under the equitable sharing program established in 1984, local and state law enforcement are able to circumvent state law that might have restricted their ability to seize certain assets by working with the Department to “federalize” or “adopt” the investigation, whereby they get to keep the forfeited property and split the proceeds with the Department.[4] In general, there are two forms of forfeitures under the equitable sharing program: “joint investigative” forfeitures, and “adoptive” forfeitures.[5] The first form concerns forfeitures that are the result of cooperative investigative activities between federal and state or local law enforcement agencies, where the percentage of funds shared with state/local agencies is determined by the amount of their involvement.[6] “Adoptive” forfeitures, the more controversial of the two, occur when, as a result of their investigation into a state crime, state/local agencies transfer seized property to federal law enforcement who can then “adopt” the seized property for purposes of federal forfeiture proceedings.[7] Police departments are able to keep up to 80 percent of the proceeds of such seizures, with the rest going to federal agencies.Holder’s announcement, impactful though it may be, is merely a change in Justice Department policy. As such, it lacks the force of law and is perfectly capable of being rolled back altogether by subsequent administrations. The FAIR Act, on the other hand, would codify this denunciation of prior federal forfeiture policy into law, for presidential administrations and executive agencies to come. What’s more, the FAIR Act goes farther than the new policy guidelines issued by the Attorney General in several ways. First, the new guidelines issued by Holder prohibit only “adoptive” forfeitures, while the Act would impose stronger limits on federal authorities’ ability to share forfeited assets with state/local law enforcement, regardless of whether they participated in the seizure.[8] The order explicitly provides that its prohibition does not apply to “seizures by state and local authorities working together with federal authorities in a joint task force,” or “seizures by state and local authorities that are the result of joint federal-state investigations or that are coordinated with federal authorities as part of ongoing federal investigations.”[9] Because of this, commentators have questioned the extent to which Holder’s order actually changes the status quo, citing the fact that between 2008 and 2013 approximately 86 percent of the money state/local agencies got from federal forfeitures were not of the kind covered by this new restriction.[10]Second, though Holder’s order will virtually eliminate all cash and vehicle seizures made by state/local law enforcement for purposes of the federal program, the order contained an exception for seizures of property “directly related to public safety concerns.”[11] This includes seizures involving illegal firearms, ammunition, explosives and property associated with child pornography.[12] The FAIR Act provides no such exception, but requires law enforcement to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense, and that the owner intentionally or knowingly consented to the use of the property in connection with the offense.[13] This “clear and convincing” standard marks an increase from current law, which merely requires that the government establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an asset is subject to forfeiture.[14]Additionally, the Act seeks to remove the profit incentive from the equation by requiring that money or proceeds from seizures go to the General Fund of the United States Treasury, rather than to a special fund known as the “Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund” for use only by the Justice Department.[15] This is an understandable concern, given how proceeds from civil asset forfeitures are undeniably a large source of funding for law enforcement agencies (sometimes up to 20% or more of a department’s entire annual budget).[16] It was apparently a concern as well for Holder (or at least an incidental benefit), according to an anonymous Justice Department official who said that Holder “believes that the new policy will eliminate any possibility that the adoption process might unintentionally incentivize unnecessary stops and seizures.”[17]Opponents of civil asset forfeiture policy were encouraged by Attorney General Holder’s order, and further encouraged by the introduction of the FAIR Act. However, because Sen. Paul’s bill and the Attorney General’s order apply only to federal law enforcement and the use of federal law, putting a stop to the practice is unlikely to happen without significant reform at the state level.[18] And though many states require seized proceeds to go into the general fund, according to at least one law professor who has studied the subject, at least 26 states allow police to keep 100 percent of the assets they seize.[19] As for Kentucky, 85% of the proceeds from seized property is paid directly to the law enforcement agency which seized the property, to be used directly for law enforcement purposes, while the remaining 15% is paid to the Office of the Attorney General.[20]While it may be tempting to view this populist proposal by Sen. Paul as simply political posturing on the eve of a presidential run, such a characterization probably does not do justice to the deeper issue of changing perceptions about the relationship between communities and law enforcement. Certainly the renewed interest in the issue and the apparent bipartisan support would lend support to that observation.[21] In fact, the goals of the bill that I’ve mentioned are in themselves manifestations of some of the more salient issues regarding law enforcement in America. The redirecting of proceeds to the General Fund rather than the pockets of police departments reflects the recent concern over the militarization and out-of-control spending on the part of law enforcement.[22] There is also an underlying racial component to be considered. As the sponsor of the bill himself has observed, the disparate treatment of minorities under asset seizure policy and by the criminal justice system as a whole is at least partially to blame for increasing racial tension in the U.S.[23]Regardless of one’s opinion on the underlying motivation behind the bill, for those that have long tried to raise these issues from the depths of social media punditry and into actual positive law, the FAIR Act would certainly signal a welcomed legislative victory.


[1] Robert O’Harrow Jr., Holder limits seized-asset sharing process that split billions with local, state police, The Washington Post, Jan 16, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/holder-ends-seized-asset-sharing-process-that-split-billions-with-local-state-police/2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html?hpid=z1.
[2] Marian R. Williams et al, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, Institute for Justice, March, 2010, http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf.
[3] Id. at 23.
[4] David McCabe, Rand Paul: Stop feds from seizing property, The Hill, Jan. 27, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/230871-rand-paul-pushes-bill-to-block-the-feds-from-seizing-property.
[5] Williams et al, supra note 2, at 25.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] S. 255, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015) [hereinafter FAIR Act].
[9] Office of the Attorney General, Prohibition on Certain Federal Adoptions of Seizures by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/01/16/attorney_general_order_prohibiting_adoptions.pdf.
[10] Jacob Sullum, Cops Are Still Robbers: Eric Holder's new forfeiture policy affects only a small share of seizures, Jan. 26, 2015, http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/26/cops-are-still-robbers.
[11] Office of the Attorney General, supra note 9.
[12] Id.
[13] FAIR Act, supra note 8, at § 2(3).
[14] 18 U.S.C. 983(c)(1).
[15] Compare 21 U.S.C. 881(e)(2)(B)), and FAIR Act, supra note 8, at § 3(b)(1)(A).
[16] Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, The Washington Post, (2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/collection/stop-and-seize-2/.
[17] O’Harrow Jr., supra note 1.
[18] Leon Neyfakh, Helicopters Don’t Pay For Themselves: Why Eric Holder’s civil forfeiture decision won’t stop civil forfeiture abuse, Slate, Jan 16, 2015, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/01/will_eric_holder_s_civil_forfeiture_announcement_change_anything.html.
[19] Id.
[20] KRS § 218A.420(4) (2007).
[21] McCabe, supra note 4.
[22] See Sallah, supra note 16.
[23] Ashley Killough, Rand Paul: Civil Forfeiture part of racial problems in U.S., CNN, Jan. 27, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/27/politics/rand-paul-bill/.

Lawmakers Are Not Above the Law

Hillary Chambers, KLJ Staff Editor

Many of our fellow Kentucky citizens were disturbed when a member of the state legislature, charged with DUI, defended himself by claiming he was immune from prosecution.[1] On January 6, 2015, the first day of the legislative session, Senator Brandon Smith was charged with DUI.[2] To many people’s surprise, he filed a motion to dismiss citing Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution, which says that legislators are “privileged from arrest during their attendance of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.”[3] Although Smith subsequently asked his attorney to withdraw the motion, the episode sparked interest in the immunity clause he initially sought to use in order to have his case dismissed.[4] What was the clause intended to do? Do we still need the clause in our Constitution? Do we still want the clause in our Constitution?In Swope v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court made it clear that “[Section] 43 of the Constitution was never intended as a sanctuary for members who had committed a public offense.”[5] In that case, a member of the 1964 General Assembly of Kentucky was charged with breach of the peace after getting into a dispute with someone upon his return from Frankfort.[6] Similar to Smith’s withdrawn motion, William Swope claimed the court did not have jurisdiction to try the offense of breach of the peace against a member of the General Assembly under the provisions of Section 43.[7] The court considered parliamentary privilege in England to decide whether Swope should be immune from prosecution.[8] The crimes of treason, felony, and breach of the peace are expressly excluded from the immunity provided by Section 43; in England, those words were intended to exclude all crimes from the operation of parliamentary privilege, meaning only prosecutions of a civil nature were protected.[9]When the Constitution was adopted, there were state laws authorizing imprisonment for debt in aid of civil process, and the exemptions in state and federal Constitutions were meant to provide immunity in those cases.[10] Today, there is no such law in Kentucky.[11] Therefore, the reason for incorporating Section 43 in the Constitution has virtually disappeared.[12] In Swope, the state legislator was not immune from prosecution, and the judgment convicting him of breach of the peace was affirmed.[13] The lack of case law on this issue shows that not many legislators try to utilize or abuse the immunity clause, but what if Senator Smith would have gone forward with his initial plan and been successful? It would have left many outraged. Most would tend to agree with Kentucky Senate President Robert Stivers when he said, “[n]o member of the general assembly is above the law.”[14] After taking a look at why the clause was incorporated in the Constitution and seeing that the purposes have disappeared, it becomes apparent that Section 43 serves no real purpose. If there were more widespread abuse of the clause, it is likely there would be a stronger push to repeal Section 43 altogether. A law that was necessary in 1891 is no longer necessary in 2015.


[i] See Kentucky Lawmaker Wants DUI Charge Dismissed Based on Rule From 1891, Huffington Post, Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/26/brandon-smith-dui_n_6550090.html.
[ii] Id.
[iii] Id.
[iv] State Senator to Withdraw Motion in DUI Case, The Courier-Journal, Jan. 28, 2015,http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/28/brandon-smith-dui/22454591/.
[v] Swope v. Com., 385 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. 1964).
[vi] Id. at 57.
[vii] Id.
[viii] Id. at 58.
[ix] Id.
[x] Id.
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id.
[xiii] Id. at 59.
[xiv] Kentucky Lawmaker Wants DUI Charge Dismissed Based on Rule From 1891, Huffington Post, Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/26/brandon-smith-dui_n_6550090.html.

Restroom Choice Could be Mandated for Transgender Students in Kentucky

Mary Katherine Kington,[1] KLJ Staff Editor 

In January, state senator C.B. Embry, Jr. (R-Morgantown) introduced a bill in the Kentucky legislature that could dictate which restroom transgender students must use while at school. Senate Bill 76, also known as the Kentucky Student Privacy Act, would require “students born male to use only those facilities designated to be used by males and students born female to use only those facilities designated to be used by females.”[2] The school facilities listed include restrooms, locker rooms, and shower rooms that are accessible to multiple students.[3]The language of Embry’s bill requires transgender students to follow certain steps before they receive restroom “accommodations.” First, the student must assert to school officials that his or her gender is different from his or her biological sex, and then the student must provide written consent from a parent or guardian before the “best available” restroom accommodation is available.[4] According to the bill, this “best available accommodation” will never include allowing the transgender student to use restrooms used by students of the opposite biological sex.[5] Instead, transgender students must use single-stall, unisex, or faculty restrooms.[6]Interestingly, the bill goes a step further by creating a cause of action against the school for students who encounter a person of the opposite biological sex in their restroom.[7] If the student of the opposite sex was either given permission by school personnel, or school personnel failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the encounter, the offending school must pay the student $2,500 for each instance, plus attorney’s fees and possible damages for emotional, physical, and psychological harm.[8]The Kentucky bill was crafted in response to a policy change that occurred last summer at Louisville’s Atherton High School that added gender identity as a protected classification in the school’s anti-discrimination policy.[9] Atherton’s policy arose on the heels of new guidelines issued last spring by the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights that extended federal Title IX protection to transgender students.[10] While these guidelines do not carry the weight of the law, numerous opponents of Senate Bill 76 point to the bills as an example of impermissible discrimination under the DOE’s new guidelines, and thus out of sync with modern trend on the issue.Opponents argue that Embry’s bill inappropriately focuses on preventing uncomfortable situations for non-transgender students while fails to acknowledge the stigma and harassment transgender students could suffer from the bill’s private restroom mandate.[11] Some students, parents, and community members may be uncomfortable with a policy that allows transgender students to use the same restrooms as non-transgender students. However, if a transgender student were to receive an accommodation under the bill, the student would be isolated to specific restrooms in the building away from other students. They argue that this result will likely further the discrimination and bullying that transgender students face in schools across the state every day.Most state legislatures across the country have not addressed the issue, leaving transgender-friendly restroom policy decisions to local school districts or individual schools.[12] Kentucky’s bill does, however, directly contradict legislation adopted in California in 2013. California adopted a state law that allows transgender students to choose which restroom to use and which sports team to join based on gender identity, rather than biological gender.[13] Massachusetts[14] and Connecticut[15] have similar state-wide policies. It’s clear that the conversation about transgender rights – in schools and more broadly – is just beginning in our state and across the country. Kentucky’s bill was introduced to the senate in January and has been hotly debated in the media during the weeks following.[16] Lack of support from lawmakers makes it unlikely that the Kentucky Student Privacy Act will gain enough traction to pass through the senate, but lawmakers and school leaders should continue the dialogue and work to reach a solution for Kentucky’s students. Whether restroom policy decisions are made on a state-wide or school-by-school basis, transgender students should be afforded the same basic civil rights as their peers, especially in an environment as critical to development as our school system.


[1] University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2016
[2] S.B. 76, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2015).
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] S.B. 76, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2015).
[9] Michael McKay, Atherton One Step Closer To Protecting Transgender Students, The Courier-Journal, June 4, 2014, http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/education/2014/06/03/atherton-discuss-transgender-bathroom-policy/9913685/; Steven Nelson, Bill: Catch Trans Student in Wrong Bathroom, Win $2,500, Jan. 16, 2015, US News, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/16/kentucky-bill-catch-transgender-student-in-wrong-bathroom-win-2-500.
[10] Emma Margolin, Transgender Students Protected Under Title IX, DOE Says, MSNBC, Apr. 13, 2014, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/transgender-students-protected-under-title-ix.
[11] See generally Amanda Fallin & Keisa Bennett, Op-Ed, Ky. Bill to Monitoring Restrooms Puts Transgender Students at Risk, Kentucky.com, Jan. 29, 2015,  http://www.kentucky.com/welcome_page/?shf=/2015/01/29/3666567_ky-bill-to-monitoring-restrooms.html.
[12] Chris Kenning, Ky Bill Targets Transgender School-Bathroom Use, USA Today, Jan. 20, 2015, http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2015/01/19/ky-bill-targets-transgender-school-bathrooms/22005313/.
[13] Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5 (2013); Calif. Law Lets Schoolkids Choose Restroom, Sports Teams Based on Their Gender IDs, The Associated Press, July 3, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/new-calif-law-win-transgender-students-article-1.1389901. A bill similar to Embry’s failed to pass the Maine Legislature in 2011. See H.P. 781, An Act to Amend the Application of the Main Human Rights Act Regarding Public Accommodations, 121st Main Leg., Reg. Sess., (Ma. 2011).
[14] H.R. 3810, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011).
[15] H.B. 6599, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Pub. Act No. 11-55 (Conn. 2011).
[16] S.B. 76, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2015); E.g. Chris Kenning, Ky Bill Targets Transgender School-Bathroom Use, USAToday, Jan. 20, 2015, http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2015/01/19/ky-bill-targets-transgender-school-bathrooms/22005313/.

Why You Gotta be So Rude? Don't You Know [a Chimp] Is Human, Too?: Tommy's Claim of Personhood

Andrea Reed, KLJ Staff Editor

A case for giving basic human rights to nonhuman primates is making its way through the New York court system.On December 18, 2014, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a motion for permission to appeal their case to New York’s Court of Appeals on the heels of the New York State Appellate Court, Third Judicial Department’s, ruling that Tommy the chimpanzee “is not a ‘person’ entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus.”[1]This case started last December, when four captive chimpanzees made history as the first nonhuman primates to sue their captors for the right to not be imprisoned illegally.[2] Previous advocates had worked rigorously to pass and enforce legislation protecting animal rights, such as the anti-cruelty statutes and the Endangered Species Act[3], but never before had a group brought a lawsuit seeking to apply legal human rights to nonhuman primates.The NhRP changed that with their representation of Tommy and three other primates in lawsuits against their New York captors, a research facility. As the first and only legal organization doing this type of work, the NhRP’s mission is to change the legal status of select nonhumans animals from “‘mere things,’ which lack the capacity to possess any legal right, to ‘persons,’ who possess such fundamental rights as bodily integrity and bodily liberty, and those other legal rights to which evolving standards of morality, scientific discovery, and human experience entitle them.”[4]So far their goal has been met with disappointment as all of New York’s lower courts have dismissed the case on the grounds that chimpanzees are not humans.[5]The NhRP argues that the New York Court of Appeals recognizes that ‘chimpanzees exhibit highly complex cognitive functions-such as autonomy, self-awareness, and self-determination, among others—similar to those possessed by human beings,’ and that it is thus time for the common law to recognize that these are sufficient to establish legal personhood.[6]While this case—and the very idea of animals as persons—is extremely controversial, “an ever-expanding body of observational, neurological, and genetic evidence about animal intelligence and behavior is forcing [the courts] to reconsider the age-old boundary between ourselves and other creatures.”[7]Tommy’s “owners” have until January 2nd to reply to NhRP’s motion for permission to appeal. And if the appellate court denies their appeal, NhRP will file a motion in the Court of Appeals directly, asking the court permission to appeal to it. Natalie Prosin, Executive Director of the NhRP, stated that "The issues in this ground-breaking case are novel ones that should be decided at the highest judicial level possible. We hope we are granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals so that we can give Tommy his day in court."[8]One wonders when one might file a similar lawsuit for horses.


[1]In “Tommy” Case, NhRP Seeks Appeal to New York’s Highest Court, Nonhuman Rights Project (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/12/18/in-tommy-case-nhrp-seeks-appeal-to-new-yorks-highest-court/.
[2] Charles Siebert, Animals Like Us, Popular Science, Jan. 2015, at 54.
[3] See generally, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANIMAL LAW, PART II (1985 - 2011) Joyce Tischler, A Brief History of Animal Law, Part II (1985 - 2011), 5 Stan. J. Animal L. & Pol'y 27 (2012).
[4] Press Release re. NhRP Lawsuit, Dec. 2nd 2013, Nonhuman Rights Project (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/11/30/press-release-re-nhrp-lawsuit-dec-2nd-2013/.
[5] In “Tommy” Case, NhRP Seeks Appeal to New York’s Highest Court, supra note 1.
[6] Appellate Court Decision in Tommy Case, Nonhuman Rights Project (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/12/04/appellate-court-decision-in-tommy-case/.
[7] Sibert, supra note 2.
[8] In “Tommy” Case, NhRP Seeks Appeal to New York’s Highest Court, supra note 1.

First and Ten: Should Northwestern Football Players be Considered Employees?

M. Caitlin Gallaher, KLJ Staff Editor

Whether it was your favorite football team growing up, your alma mater, or any game that happened to be on the TV, collegiate sports have been ingrained in the American way. But has the time come for us to stop considering the players’ student athletes, and instead refer to them as employees of their respective schools?At the start of the 2014-year, the Northwestern football team filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.), seeking for the team to be recognized as employees of the University, and thus enforce their right to unionize.[i] During the hearing, the College Athletes Players Association (CAPA) argued that under the N.L.R.B and the United States Supreme Court precedent the law dictates that: the common law definition of employee should be used; that the players fit under the definition of “employee” because they received compensation for services rendered; that those services created large amounts of revenue for the school; the players were under the control of the coaches; and that the players activities were separate from their roles as students.[ii] In response, Northwestern University urged the N.L.R.B. to determine the status of the players based on the test established in Brown University, which goes beyond the common law definition and considers their status as students; the role of their activity (playing football) in their education; the relationship between the student and the faculty; and the financial support they receive.[iii]In the decision issued on March 26, 2014, by the Regional Director, Peter Ohr, of region thirteen for the National Labor Relations Board, this right was granted.[iv] If allowed to be, and elected to be, organized by CAPA the players would be recognized by Northwestern and CAPA and would engage in negotiations to create an agreement between the players covering aspects that will be deemed important to the players and the University. The ruling of the Regional Director stated that the players were to be considered employees of the university by applying the N.L.R.B definition of “employee.”[v] This broad definition provided by the N.L.R.B. has been considered by the United States Supreme Court, which determined that in applying the definition it is necessary to also consider the common law definition of employee.[vi] Under the common law definition an employee is someone who “performs a service for another under a contract for hire, subject to the others control or right of control, in return for payment.”[vii] Thus, the Regional Director decided that scholarship-aid recipients that participate on Northwestern’s football team are employees based on the scholarships they receive, the service they provide in playing football, and the coaches’ control over the players’ time.[viii] Northwestern appealed to the N.LR.B. to have the determination that the players were employees reviewed, the appeal was granted and we are still awaiting decision on the ultimate issue.[ix]But should they really be considered employees? During the initial hearing, CAPA stated that the status of the football players is completely separate from that of their status as a student.[x] It seems as though CAPA considers the status of a football player, and that of a student at Northwestern, fully independent of each other. However, this assumption seems to remove from the analysis that but-for the football player’s status as a student there would be no availability for the players to be on the football team and thus at best the claim of independence between the two statuses should be questioned. Additionally, the separation of the players’ status takes no notice to the collective environment that a college campus provides. A college campus is not simply an academic institution, instead it is a community with students from all different backgrounds involved in a variety of activities, college football is but one sector of the community and is most certainly not the only division with students receiving scholarship-aid. The combination of these different activities and student participation is what creates the collegiate experience, without one of them the experience and environment could be drastically altered.It has also been stated that the scholarship-aid football players receive is in fact compensation for an activity performed by the football players.[xi] This argument is made despite the fact that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers scholarship-aid that is used for tuition and fees needed for attendance at an educational facility to not be considered part of a persons gross income, and therefore is non-taxable income.[xii] Moreover if the scholarship-aid is to be considered compensation it would consequently lose the standing of non-taxable income and the players could then be placed in a position where they would have to pay taxes on their scholarship.[xiii]The idea that the players constitute employees is also based on the level of control that the coaches have in regards to the players’ time. They issue itineraries, determine where the players stay before games, require notification regarding outside employment, require approval for living arrangements, and prohibit gambling and drug use.[xiv] However, there is no consideration of the fact that non-scholarship players can also be subject to this control, for the very reason that they are part of the football team and seen as the face of the university.Finally, if the N.L.R.B. affirms the Regional Directors determination that the football players are employees it could open the door for other football teams and sports to attempt to unionize. While on the surface this seems to be an incidental issue of little consequence, it is the opposite. The fact that different unions could enter different schools, or the same union into different schools, creates this situation where different teams would have different bargaining agreements and variance of benefits compared to other schools. The variety of bargaining agreements would essentially frustrate the very purpose of the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association), the body that governs the competition of collegiate sports: to create a level playing field for all collegiate sports.[xv]Therefore, allowing the Northwestern football team to be considered employees frustrates the purpose behind the NCAA; will potentially create a situation where players will owe money on their taxes; could possible disturb the collegiate environment promoted on college campuses; and also conclude that scholarship-aid is not a large enough factor to differentiate the players from non-scholarship athletes in order to institute a bargaining unit. Thus, in review, if the court follows the common law test for employees determination of employee will probably result. Additionally, if it is found that the Brown University test should be applied the student status of the players and their interrelated status as students would prohibit the determination that they are employees.


[i] Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, In re Northwestern University, 2014 (13-RC-121359).
[ii] Id. 6-7
[iii] Northwestern University v. College Athletes Players Association, Case 13-RC-121359 at 18 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).
[iv] Id. at 23.
[v] 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1978) (“employee shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise…”).
[vi] Northwestern University, Case 13-RC-121359 at 13 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014); NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995).
[vii] Northwestern University, Case 13-RC-121359 at 13 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).
[viii] Id. at 15-16.
[ix] Northwestern University, Case 13-RC-121359 at 1 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 24, 2014).
[x] Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, In re Northwestern University, 2014 (13-RC-121359).
[xi] Id.
[xii] See 26 U.S.C. § 117 (2001).
[xiii] See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1984); 26 U.S.C. § 63 (2009).
[xiv]  Northwestern University, Case 13-RC-121359 at 16 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).
[xv] National Collegiate Athletic Association, Frequently-Asked Questions About the NCAA (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa.

Body Cameras Bring a New Perspective to Police/Civilian Encounters

Mark Roth, KLJ Staff Editor

 This past week, the hotly debated issue of the use of police force has, again, captured the nation’s attention.  An Albuquerque, New Mexico district attorney has chosen to bypass the grand jury process and, instead, present murder charges to a judge at a preliminary hearing in an event involving two police officers who shot and killed a knife-wielding homeless man in New Mexico.[1]  This decision occurred while police tactics remain under intense review nationwide following the fatal shooting of an unarmed 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri, and the chokehold death of another unarmed man in New York City.[2]  In both cases, grand juries declined to charge the officers, sparking intense protests and debates across the nation about the use of excessive police force.[3]  While this easily could have been another case of a police related death without enough evidence to bring formal charges, a police body camera that captured the whole confrontation gave the prosecutor enough evidence to file formal charges.[4]  At this stage, the judge still must decide if, based on the evidence, the case may proceed. But, even if the judge does allow the case to proceed, the prosecutor faces an uphill battle as the standard of what constitutes force weighs heavily in favor of police officers.  So, whether this will usher in a new era of increased prosecutions of cops as a result of wearable cameras remains to be seen.Wearable cameras offer a number of potential benefits towards police-civilian encounters.  A study conducted by the University of Cambridge’s Institute of Criminology based on a 12 month trial in Rialto, California found that body cameras reduced the use of police force by roughly 50 percent, while complaints against police officers fell 90 percent compared to the previous year.[5]  While additional studies are necessary, the preliminary evidence indicates that body cameras increase the accountability of both officers and civilians, as both are aware that the encounters are being taped.  Some police officers are in favor of the change as well.  Officer Richard Royce says, “I’d rather have my version of that incident captured on high-definition video in its entirety from my point of view, then to look at somebody’s grainy cellphone camera footage captured from a 100 feet away that gets cropped, edited, changed or manipulated.”[6]Of course, the use of body cameras is not without the potential for negative consequences.  Widespread use of body cameras increases the potential for privacy infringement of individuals and presents a challenge for police departments trying to store and manage the huge amount of data that would result.[7]All the perceived benefits need to be balanced against the potential negative consequences, but increased accountability and a drop in complaints could help to improve relationships between police officers and their communities at a time when the tension between officers and civilians is high.Widespread use of body cameras does not appear to be on the immediate horizon just yet though.  Congress has not included President Obama’s proposed investment of $263 million into community policing in the budget, of which $75 million would go towards the cost of issuing 50,000 body cameras to police departments across the nation.[8]  This has not stopped other police departments from purchasing body cameras themselves though.[9]While all the potential benefits and consequences of police body cameras remain to be fleshed out, the early indication is that this is a step in the right direction.  Increased use of police body cameras will provide valuable evidence that will help police departments, lawyers, judges, and juries get closer to the truth of what happens in these encounters and, hopefully, bring about positive changes to police tactics in these situations.


[1] Tribune Wire Reports, Two New Mexico Cops Charged with Murder in Shooting of Homeless Camper, Chicago Tribune (Jan. 12, 2015, 8:56 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-new-mexico-cops-charged-with-murder-20150112-story.html
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Josh Sanburn, How Body Cams on Cops Brought a Murder Charge in New Mexico, Time (Jan. 14, 2015), http://time.com/3667089/albuquerque-police-murder-charge-body-cameras/
[5] Stan Ziv, Study Finds Body Cameras Decrease Police’s Use of Force, Newsweek (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/amidst-debate-study-finds-body-cameras-decrease-polices-use-force-295315
[6] Officers’ Body Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns, Foxnews (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/03/15/officers-body-cameras-raise-privacy-concerns/
[7] Stan Ziv, Study Finds Body Cameras Decrease Police’s Use of Force, Newsweek (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/amidst-debate-study-finds-body-cameras-decrease-polices-use-force-295315
[8] Lauren Victoria Burke, Oh, and President Obama’s Request for Police Body Cameras? It Wasn’t in the Budget Congress Just Passed, The Root (Dec. 18, 2014 10:49 AM), http://www.theroot.com/articles/politics/2014/12/congress_skips_body_cam_funding_request.html
[9] Id. (Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti announced the Los Angeles Police Department will purchase 7,000 body cameras for its officers . . .”).

NBA Commissioner Adam Silver: A New Outlook on Sports Betting

Joey Kramer, KLJ Staff Editor

The week before Thanksgiving, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver made headlines when he became the first commissioner in the history of the major sports leagues – the NBA, NFL, MLB, NHL, and NCAA – to openly support sports gambling in the United States.  In an essay published in the New York Times, Silver wrote, “I believe that sports betting should be brought out of the underground and into the sunlight where it can be appropriately monitored and regulated.”The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) enacted in 1992 prohibits all but four states – Nevada, Delaware, Montana, and Oregon – from regulating sports betting.[i] Silver is essentially lobbying for Congress to eliminate this prohibition by creating a federal system that gives states the ability to regulate and monitor sports betting.[ii]  According to the Commissioner, illegal sports gambling is a $400 billion enterprise that has continued to grow despite the federal ban that resulted from PAPSA.[iii] By bringing sports betting “into the sunlight,” it’s possible that appropriate regulations could be created to continue to improve the integrity of the game.[iv] Silver noted several of the regulations that he hoped to see in the future, including: mandatory monitoring and reporting of unusual betting-line movements, a licensing protocol to ensure betting operators are legitimate, minimum-age verification requirements, and mechanisms to identify and exclude people with gambling problems.[v]Silver’s comments have been met with some confusion by critics, especially in light of current sports betting litigation in the state of New Jersey. In 2011, New Jersey passed a referendum to allow sports gambling in casinos and racetracks.[vi] The law was blocked by a United States district judge the following week.[vii]  The NBA, NFL, NHL, MLB, and the NCAA have been persistent in their efforts to prevent New Jersey from legalizing sports betting, with the NFL spearheading a lawsuit against the state.[viii]While Silver’s essay might not initially seem in line with the league’s position in the New Jersey lawsuit, a closer examination proves otherwise. The Commissioner only supports federally regulated sports betting; he does not support unregulated sports betting, which is essentially what the proposed New Jersey law allows. It’s feasible that he may one day support sports gambling in New Jersey’s casinos and racetracks, but not before numerous federally mandated regulations are put in place.Silver’s recent comments have also caused several critics to point out many potential risks of a legalized sports betting system such as the one Silver supports. One of the greatest areas of concern seems to be that legalized sports betting could tempt players to fix games to cash in on large bets. While I could see this as a potential (though unlikely) problem at the NCAA level, I find it highly improbable at the professional level. The simple fact is that lucrative salaries of professional athletes provide a strong incentive to avoid such temptations. Attempting to fix games carries with it several costs which athletes in today’s world would not be willing to risk.While I do believe there is much to be done before sports betting is legalized in the United States, I also think that Commissioner Silver’s comments represent a changing of the guard in the sports world. I agree with the Commissioner that federally mandated regulations could prove extremely beneficial and could actually improve the integrity of the games we all love. It will be interesting to see how the Third Circuit Court of Appeals handles the New Jersey litigation and how others in the sports industry address Commissioner Silver’s comments moving forward.


[i] David Purdum, Explaining Silver’s Betting Stance, Espn (Nov. 18, 2014), http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/11896833/gambling-explaining-nba-commissioner-adam-silver-stance-sports-betting.
[ii] Id.
[iii] Id.
[iv] Adi Joseph, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver Wants Legal Sports Gambling, USA Today (Nov. 13, 2014, 8:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2014/11/13/adam-silver-sports-gambling-commissioner-new-jersey-editorial/18998755.
[v] Matt Moore, Adam Silver Writes in Support of Legalization of Sports Gambling, CBS Sports (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:39 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/eye-on-basketball/24805520/adam-silver-writes-in-support-of-regulation-legalization-of-sports-gambling.
[vi] Brian Cohn, Sports Gambling: Charge or Block?, Brown Political Review (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:15 AM), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/11/sports-gambling-charge-or-block.
[vii] Id.
[viii] Id.

An Update on the State of the Union - Same-Sex Marriage

Kirby Stephens, KLJ Staff Editor 

A few weeks ago, the United States Supreme Court declined all seven petitions for certiorari of the same-sex marriage cases before the court.[1] This outcome had been foreshadowed by an earlier statement from Justice Ginsburg, who said that unless a circuit split arose on the issue there was “no need for us to rush.”[2] Justice Ginsburg was specifically referencing the forthcoming decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which heard arguments surrounding bans in Tennessee, Ohio, Kentucky and Michigan in August.[3]According to FreedomtoMarry.org, after the Supreme Court’s Monday denial of the petitions, “Same-sex couples are able to marry in 29 states, and will soon be free to marry in an additional 6.”[4] The website tracks marriage equality by state and offers listings of both recent cases and laws surrounding marriage and marriage bans. [5]The constitutional law surrounding same-sex marriage is based largely around jurisprudence authored by Justice Kennedy. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado Constitutional Amendment that prohibited antidiscrimination laws aimed at protecting homosexuals as a violation of the equal protection clause.[6] The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, explained that the classification drawn by the amendment “lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”[7]Similarly, in Lawrence v Texas, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute that made it illegal for two persons of the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual intercourse.”[8] The majority opinion, again written by Justice Kennedy, overruled the previous decision of Bowers v. Hardwick and emphasized, “The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”[9]More recently, in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down the definition of marriage in the federal Defense of Marriage Act. The Court, again led by Justice Kennedy, emphasized that “the principal purpose is to impose inequality” and that DOMA interfered with both the due process and equal protection rights protected by the Fifth Amendment.[10]  The Court continued to emphasize a lack of legitimate justification for such an action.[11]This same argument about lack of sufficient justification that was highlighted in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor was echoed in Judge Posner’s recent opinion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which struck down marriage bans in Wisconsin and Indiana.[12] Posner emphasized that whether Indiana or Wisconsin could provide “a clearly offsetting governmental interest” in rejecting same sex-marriage was “really the only issue” in the case.[13] Posner reached the same conclusion as Justice Kennedy – in a word: no.[14]While it is unclear exactly on what constitutional grounds, whether fundamental rights or equal protection, the right is based, the current trend seems to be toward recognizing a right same sex marriage. It is also clear the Supreme Court will not consider the issue at this time. The Supreme Court further emphasized this decision Friday when they declined a request by Idaho officials to postpone a lower court ruling that nullified Idaho’s ban on same-sex marriage.[15] It is unclear what the Supreme Court will do if a circuit split arises. Decisions are currently pending in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.[16] If one of those circuits upholds a marriage ban, it could force the Supreme Court into deciding an issue it has avoided for now.


[1] Amy Howe, Today’s orders: Same-sex marriage petitions denied, SCOTUS BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014, 10:41 am), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/todays-orders-same-sex-marriage-petiti....
[2] Associated Press, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Talks Gay Marriage, Politico (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/supreme-court-gay-marriage-ruth-ba....
[3] Id.; Steve Delchin, Still Waiting On Sixth Circuit’s Same-Sex Marriage Rulings As U.S. Supreme Court Denies Cert Petitions In Same-Sex Marriage Appeals From Three Other Circuits, Sixth Circuit App. Blog (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/still-waiting... Steve Delchin, Sixth Circuit Gearing Up To Hear Same-Sex Marriage Appeals On August 6, 2014, Sixth Circuit App. Blog (July 21, 2014), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/sixth-circuit....
[4] Where State Laws Stand, Freedomtomarry.org, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
[5] Marriage Rulings in the Courts, Freedomtomarry.org, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) [https://perma.cc/7EH2-LK4W]; States, Freedomtomarry.org, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
[6] Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
[7] Id. at 632.
[8] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
[9] Id. at 578; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
[10] Id. at 2694-95; Though not immediately apparent from the language of the Fifth Amendment, it has been held to also include an analogue to the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause, which then applies to the federal government. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
[11] Id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
[12] Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 to 14-2388, No. 14-2526, at 3 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (“We’ll see that the governments of Indiana and Wisconsin have given us no reason to think they have a “reasonable basis” for forbidding same-sex marriage.”).
[13] Id. at 13-14
[14] Id. at 38.(“ To return to where we started in this opinion, more than unsupported conjecture that same-sex marriage will harm heterosexual marriage or children or any other valid and important interest of a state is necessary to justify discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. As we have been at pains to explain, the grounds advanced by Indiana and Wisconsin for their discriminatory policies are not only conjectural; they are totally implausible.”).
[15] Lyle Denniston, No delay on Idaho same-sex marriages (FURTHER UPDATE for Alaska ruling), SCOTUS BLOG (Oct. 11, 2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/no-delay-on-idaho-same-sex-marriages.
[16] Id.

Inherent Interest in Directors' Decisions Related to Executive Compensation

Nolan M. Jackson, KLJ Staff Editor [i]

Delaware – the hotbed for business incorporation – got it wrong.[ii] In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed a corporate decision on the compensation owed to the Walt Disney Company chief executive by presuming the disinterestedness of the corporate decision-makers. The Court’s opinion wrongly applied the forgiving business judgment rule where it should have scrutinized the Disney directors’ decision on executive compensation under a less deferential standard that recognizes directors’ interest in decisions affecting executive compensation.The business judgment rule presumes that corporate directors decide upon reasonable informedness, in good faith, and disinterestedly (independently). Where a plaintiff shareholder cannot rebut any of the business judgment predicates, Delaware courts measure the rationality between the directors’ decision and the entity’s interests.[iii] The presumption accords considerable deference to directors’ decisions.[iv] It ignores, however, considerable evidence and practical understanding that directors decide the compensation of their executives interestedly.Scholarship suggests and corporate authorities recognize that directors are inherently interested in the compensation of the executives whom they oversee. For example, corporate executives play a significant role in nominating directors of the board, and directors clearly have an interest in retaining directorships that have become increasingly exorbitant.[v] “[D]irectors who displease a CEO will often find it difficult to retain their board seats. Accordingly, a director who has a material financial incentive to retain his directorship will not really be independent of the CEO.”[vi] Critical of the misapplication of the business judgment rule in Disney, D.A. Jeremy Telman addresses Disney Chairman Michael Eisner’s influence over his board members and financial interest in the board’s approval of a lucrative executive compensation package:Eisner stacked his . . . board of directors with friends and other acquaintances who, though not necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly   more willing to accede to his wishes   and support him unconditionally than truly independent directors . . . Because Eisner's compensation package would have to be at least as generous as that of his subordinate, Eisner and the board he controlled had every reason to make [the executive’s] compensation package as generous as possible (internal citations and quotations omitted).[vii]Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange’s listing standards – presumably to protect against the chief executive’s influence over the corporate board and its decisions on his or her compensation – require a compensation committee of independent directors charged with approving chief executive compensation.[viii] While the listing standards permit the committee to hire a compensation consultant responsible for independent assessment of the executive’s compensation package, some have recognized the executive’s influence over the hiring of such consultants.[ix]Despite evidence of directors’ interest in decisions affecting the corporate executive’s compensation, still Delaware reviews the reasonableness of directors’ decisions on executive compensation under a standard that presumes directors’ disinterestedness. Simply, Delaware wrongly applies the business judgment rule where it should apply a standard of review that recognizes directors’ interest in decisions affecting executive compensation. Such an alternative, the intrinsic fairness standard, for example, rather than presuming directors’ disinterestedness, requires directors to prove the fairness of corporate decisions.[x] While not necessarily advocating for the application of the intrinsic fairness standard to directors’ decisions on executive compensation, I mention intrinsic fairness to demonstrate that alternatives to the business judgment rule exist – alternatives that do not presume disinterestedness in the face of practical understanding that directors decide the compensation of their executives interestedly.Delaware’s jurisprudence misapplies the business judgment rule in review of corporate directors’ decisions on executive compensation. Misapplication harms shareholders and grows inequity. Demonstrated in Disney, the business judgment rule accords deference to directors’ decisions on executive compensation that leave shareholders on the hook for parachute payouts upon termination.[xi] Also, deferential review of directors’ decisions on compensation grows inequality. Judicial deference encourages corporate executives to manipulate directors’ decision-making (i.e. nominate friendly directors to the board; call for exorbitant benefits, bonuses, and options; and hire consultants receptive to the executive’s suggested compensation package); since 1992, the ratio between the average chief executive and the average large-company employee has ballooned to 500:1.[xii]Admittedly the topic of judicial review of directors’ decisions on executive compensation implicates legal and economic considerations that a blog entry cannot accommodate; a fairer discussion would acknowledge the proportionality standard of review as expanded to directors’ decisions on compensation[xiii], more thoroughly describe the intrinsic fairness standard[xiv], and address the “market”[xv] for chief executive compensation. This brief entry, however, must limit its acknowledgments to the standard of review that the state for incorporation applies to directors’ decisions on executive compensation. Practical understanding suggests that Delaware wrongly applies the business judgment rule.


[i] Second-year law student at University of Kentucky College of Law; Juris Doctor candidate, May 2016; B.A. 2013, University of Kentucky.
[ii] See Melvin Aron Eisenberg & James D. Cox, Corporations and Other Business Organizations (10th ed. 2011), 208-09.
[iii] Id. at 645.
[iv] See id. (“An example of a decision that fails to satisfy the rationality standard is a decision that cannot be coherently explained.”)
[v] See Eisenberg & Cox, supra note 2, at 779; Rutherford B. Campbell, Business Associations 851-001 Fall-2014, (2014) (In 2006, former Georgia Senator Sam Nunn received $536,233 for his service on General Electric’s board of directors. That year, Nunn concurrently served on the boards of Coke, Dell, and Chevron.) (on file with author).
[vi] Eisenberg & Cox, supra note 2, at 778.
[vii] D.A. Jeremy Telman, Note, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 829, 883-85 (2007).
[viii] NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05(a)(i)(A) (2002).
[ix] Id. at (c)(i); see Telman, supra note 7, at 870. (“[C]onsultants are hired by management. They’re going to be rehired by management . . . [T]he basic goal of compensation consultants is to justify whatever it is the CEO wants to make.”)
[x] See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
[xi] See Eisenberg & Cox, supra note 2, at 693. (Sixteen months into a five-year contract, Disney chief executive Michael Ovitz received $140 million in severance.)
[xii] Eisenberg & Cox, supra note 2, at 775.
[xiii] See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (affirming the application of a fairness standard where a predicate of the business judgment presumption is absent).
[xiv] See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (recognizing an interest contradictory to shareholders’ interest in wealth maximization when corporate directors implement defensive measures and affirming the application of a standard of review that measures the reasonableness of anti-takeover measures and proportionality to the threat posed by takeover when implemented by a corporate board).
[xv] See 17 Douglas A. Michael, The Corporate Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. Corp. L. 785, 802 (“An observer might be tempted to conclude that a functioning market exists for the CEOs of large United States corporations.”)

The Quarantine Debate: Containment of Disease or Restraint of Liberty?

Joseph J. Sherman and Kirby Stephens, KLJ Staff Editors

Introduction

Last Tuesday marked nurse Kaci Hickox’s twenty-first asymptomatic day since her last exposure to an Ebola patient. The day also officially ended her monitoring period as set up in a settlement with the State of Maine and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services.[1] The terms of her monitoring had included among other conditions: (1) direct active monitoring; (2) coordinating her travel plans with public health officials; (3) avoiding the use of public transportation; (4) avoiding congregate public places and workplaces; and (5) “maintain[ing] a 3-foot distance from others when engaging in non-congregate public activities.”[2] While Nurse Hickox, her family and loved ones, as well as the general public, are certainly breathing a sigh of relief, her story has sparked a national debate over the advisability and constitutionality of quarantining health care workers who came into contact with Ebola patients.This blog presents the arguments both in opposition to and in defense of quarantine. These arguments are constructed as if a person challenging quarantine were basing their challenge on their liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. While this is not the only way to approach this question, it is one of the most central arguments surrounding the constitutionality of quarantines.Arguably, quarantine is a type of medical treatment. An order of quarantine may come in tandem with an order for medical treatment.[3] But more than that, it seems reasonable to believe that quarantine would facilitate appropriate medical care for patients with delicate, highly contagious, or deadly conditions. To what extent, then, can individual patients refuse to be treated? To what extent can they refuse quarantine?The right to refuse medical treatment has been described by the Supreme Court as a “liberty interest.”[4] Whereas a fundamental right would afford Hickox and others greater constitutional protection against a quarantine, a liberty interest is generally something less that can be overcome by state interests. In Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, the Supreme Court assumed that there is a right for a competent patient to refuse medical treatment, even if it is life-sustaining.[5] While the Court has not explicitly articulated a standard of review for cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment,[6] the Court’s language suggests that it may favor rational basis review for such constitutional challenges.[7] Nevertheless, lower federal courts have used strict scrutiny when addressing this liberty interest.[8] Under strict scrutiny, a state must articulate a “compelling government interest” that justifies an intrusion into a citizen’s rights, and the intrusion must be “narrowly tailored” to achieving that interest.[9]

In Opposition to Quarantine

Joseph J. Sherman, KLJ Staff Editor

The first question is whether the government has a compelling interest in keeping aid workers under quarantine until it is clear that they do not have Ebola. The government frequently cites public health as a compelling interest for its actions.[10] In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the state of Massachusetts used its state interest in public health to justify compulsory vaccination against smallpox.[11] When there is a threat of epidemic, as the court found that there was in Jacobson, the government has an increased interest in administering medical care.[12]The narrower question, then, is whether the threat of an Ebola epidemic is serious enough to make the government’s interest in public health a compelling one. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention say that “the risk of an outbreak in the U.S. is very low.”[13] According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there have been four cases of Ebola diagnosed in the United States, and there has been only one death.[14] Other than direct contact with fruit bats and monkeys, Ebola only spreads by direct contact with “blood or body fluids . . . of a person who is sick with Ebola” or “objects . . . that have been contaminated with the virus.”[15] In Jacobson, the Court recognized that the Smallpox epidemic was out of control.[16]  For the foregoing reasons, it is not clear that-any state has a compelling interest in public health related to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. We can probably assume that the government has a legitimate interest in public health related to the Ebola virus, but it is unclear that that interest rises to the level of being compelling in any constitutional analysis.Even if we can assume the government had a compelling interest, the second question is whether  quarantine is narrowly tailored to that interest. In other words, is quarantine necessary? Generally, government action is not narrowly tailored to its compelling interest if it is unnecessary or there are other ways of achieving that interest.[17] In Hickox’s case, it would be difficult to argue that her quarantine was narrowly tailored. Ebola has a long incubation period of up to twenty-one days, during which the carrier is not contagious.[18] Only after symptoms develop does an individual become dangerous to others around them.[19]One important purpose of a quarantine, if construed as medical treatment, is to monitor the quarantined individual for changes in their condition. However, Hickox and other medical professionals have the ability to monitor their own medical condition, and thus they are not similarly situated with the rest of the population. In other words, a quarantine is not necessary in carrying out the government’s interest. When medical professionals travel to West Africa, they do so for the sole purpose of abating the pandemic that has gripped the region. Upon return, it is unreasonable to believe that those same professionals would immediately throw caution to the wind and risk the safety of Americans by venturing out when their condition was unsafe. Put simply, they know the symptoms of Ebola, and they know what to do if such symptoms manifest.In Hickox’s case, Maine law authorizes a court to “make such orders as it deems necessary to protect other individuals from the dangers of infection” pending a hearing on a petition for a public health order.[20] Interestingly, this language mirrors the language of the Supreme Court, which requires narrow tailoring of any laws that curtail the right to refuse medical treatment.[21] The State of Maine failed to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that limiting [Hickox’s] movements to the degree requested [was] ‘necessary to protect other individuals from the dangers of infection.’”[22] Given the findings of both the district court in Maine, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization, it is far from clear that quarantine of aid workers is constitutional.However, there are those who disagree.[23]

In Defense of Quarantine

Kirby Stephens, KLJ Staff Editor

Assuming that quarantined workers would have a liberty interest recognized by the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court to refuse medical treatment, the state interests outweigh any individual interests. Both Federal and local governments have compelling state interests in protecting public health and preventing the spread of Ebola. This compelling interest is demonstrated by the high mortality rate among Ebola patients as well as the demonstrable lack of vaccine, despite several trials currently ongoing.[24] Public health and safety concerns have been previously recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Jacobsoen v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court affirmed a forcible vaccination law implemented by the Cambridge Massachusetts Board of Health to stop the spread of smallpox.[25] The Court explained: “According to settled principles the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and public safety.”[26] The same concerns are at issue here. It is unclear that this state interest can be disputed.The more pressing issue is whether a state’s proposed quarantine laws are narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in protecting public health. Symptoms of Ebola can appear anywhere from two to twenty-one days after exposure with symptoms appearing on average within eight to ten days after exposure.[27] Further, the early symptoms of Ebola, like fever, are “nonspecific” to Ebola and the virus is detectable in the blood only after a person is symptomatic.[28] The CDC reports that “it may take up to three days after symptoms start for the virus to reach detectable levels.”[29] Given these concerns, it is narrowly tailored to require a person who has been exposed to Ebola to be fully -quarantined during the course of the full twenty-one day period to control the spread of Ebola. This quarantine is also beneficial for the potentially infected individual as during quarantine, the individual would be subject to constant monitoring and medical treatment. Simply because Nurse Hickox, or another quarantined medical worker like her, would be able to monitor their own symptoms does not change the analysis. A person who can monitor their own health still poses the same health risks as any other potentially infected person. Given the risks posed by Ebola, the best solution is quarantine, even though it may have required an imposition on the liberty interests of the effected individual.In a recent article in The Guardian, Nurse Hickox accused “ambitious” politicians of playing on public fears to garner support for their quarantine policies and in her words, “escalat[e] anxieties and giv[e] the public permission to discriminate, stigmatize and even hate aid workers like me.”[30] Nurse Hickox is correct that public policy should not be motivated by fear, but fear is not the same thing as caution. Given the known facts about Ebola, fear is not the major motivation behind quarantine policy, caution is. While it is true that healthcare and other aid workers should be applauded for their heroism in times of crisis, it is undeniable that their heroism poses risks that must be remedied upon their return to their homes. Based on the above grounds, Federal and state governments would have the power to constitutionally impose quarantine restrictions on returning aid workers.

Conclusion

Ebola is emerging as a serious international crisis. According to a recent World Health Organization publication, there have been 5459 reported deaths from Ebola out of a total 15,351 reported cases in eight effected countries since the beginning of the outbreak.[31]  These numbers do not include the recent death of Dr. Martin Salia at a hospital in Nebraska.[32] These numbers indicate that the risk of a potential outbreak is far from over and that the United States could soon be faced with another situation like Nurse Hickox’s quarantine. In her case, the Maine courts imposed something in between the absolute positions argued above. However, this is a debate that is far from over.


[1] Temporary Order, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 2014); Jacob Gershman, Nurse Who Defied Ebola Quarantine Reaches Settlement with Maine, WSJ L. Blog (Nov. 3, 2014, 1:06 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB-49694.
[2] Temporary Order, Hickox, No. CV-2014-36.
[3] See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 995 A.2d 812, 823 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
[4] Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905).
[5] Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
[6] See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S.
[7] Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262, 281, 298 (referring repeatedly to the state’s “legitimate interest[s]” (emphasis added)).
[8] See, e.g., Blouin ex rel. Estate of Pouliot v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 359 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing the “right to reject life-sustaining medical treatment as a function of the fundamental right to bodily integrity under the Due Process Clause” (emphasis added)).
[9] See, e.g., Blouin, 356 F.3d at 359.
[10] See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11.
[11] See generally id.
[12] Id. at 27 (stating that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members”).
[13] Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Questions and Answers on Ebola, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/qa.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2014).
[14] Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Cases, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html (last updated Nov. 24, 2014).
[15] Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Transmission, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/index.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2014).
[16] Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
[17] See, e.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007).
[18] Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Signs and Symptoms, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2014); Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Diagnosis, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/diagnosis/index.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2014).
[19] Diagnosissupra note 18.
[20] Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 811(3) (West 2014); Order Pending Hearing, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36, 1 (Me. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 2014), available at http://courts.maine.gov/news_reference/high_profile/hickox/order_pending_hearing.pdf.
[21] See, e.g.Ragland, 481 U.S. at 231; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733.
[22] Order Pending Hearing, Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 at 3.
[23] See infra In Defense of Quarantine.
[24] Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ebola Virus Disease Information for Clinicians in U.S. Healthcare Settings, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/clinician-information-us-healthcare-settings.html (last updated Nov. 24, 2014).
[25] Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, at 12-13 (1905).
[26] Id. at 25.
[27] Signs and Symptomssupra note 18.
[28] Diagnosissupra note 18.
[29] Id.
[30] Stop Calling Me ‘the Ebola Nurse, TheGuardian.com Opinion (Nov. 17, 2014, 7:30 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/17/stop-calling-me-ebola-nurse-kaci-hickox.
[31] World Health Organization, Ebola Response Roadmap: Situation Report Update, 1 (Nov. 21, 2014), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/144117/1/roadmapsitrep_21Nov2014_eng.pdf?ua=1 .
[32] Ashley Fantz, Doctor’s Death Marks Second U.S. Ebola Fatality, CNN Health (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:34 PM EST), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/health/ebola-u-s-/.

The Sixth Circuit Speaks: Upholds Same-Sex Marriage Bans

Kirby Stephens, KLJ Staff Editor

Last week, the Sixth Circuit finally ruled on the same-sex marriage cases before it and upheld the bans from Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee by a two to one vote. Though it began its opinion by noting that the recognition of gay marriage seems almost inevitable, the two-judge majority expressed concern that the issue should be more properly addressed through the democratic process.[1]The majority engaged in an analysis of history and tradition as part of its conclusion, explaining:Not long ago American society took for granted the rough correlation between marriage and creation of new life, a vision under which limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples seemed natural. Not long from now, if current trends continue, American society may define marriage in terms of affirming mutual love, a vision under which the failure to add loving gay couples seems unfair. Today’s society has begun to move past the first picture of marriage, but it has not yet developed a consensus on the second.[2]Along with this analysis, the majority pointed to the fact the other circuits that have chosen to overturn state bans on same-sex marriage have not agreed on a consistent reason for doing so.[3]Calling the majority’s opinion “an introductory lecture in Political Philosophy,” dissenting Senior Circuit Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey castigated the majority’s decision to “wait and see” and “let the people decide.”[4] She concluded, “If we in the judiciary do not have the authority, and indeed the responsibility, to right fundamental wrongs left excused by a majority of the electorate, our whole intricate, constitutional system of checks and balances, as well as the oaths to which we swore, prove to be nothing but shams."[5]This decision has left some commentators cheering, as it has created exactly what Justice Ginsburg heralded it might take for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a same-sex marriage case: a circuit split.[6] Currently, the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits stand in disagreement with the Sixth Circuit.  Despite speculation about whether litigants would petition for hearing en banc at the Sixth Circuit first, there has been some indication of an immediate appeal to the Supreme Court.[7] Amidst the ongoing national debate, the Supreme Court may now be forced to take up the question it neatly sidestepped a little over a month ago.In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit has provided some light reading for the wait. The opinion, including a description of the facts of each case, can be found here.


[1] DeBoer v. Snyder, Nos. 14-1341, 14-3057, 14-3464, 14-5291, 14-5297, 14-5818, slip op. at 7 (6th Cir. 2014); Id. at 42 (“When the courts do not let the people resolve new social issues like this one, they perpetuate the idea that the heroes in these change events are judges and lawyers. Better in this instance, we think, to allow change through the customary political processes, in which the people, gay and straight alike, become the heroes of their own stories by meeting each other not as adversaries in a court system but as fellow citizens seeking to resolve a new social issue in a fair-minded way.”).
[2] Id. at 36-37.
[3] Id. at 16.
[4] Id. at 60 (Daughtrey, J. dissenting).
[5] Id. at 63-64 (Daughtrey, J. dissenting).
[6] Jonathan Capeheart, Hurray for the 6th Circuit rejection of gay marriage, Washington Post (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/11/07/hurray-for-the-6th-circuit-rejection-of-gay-marriage/.
[7] Lyle Denniston, Sixth Circuit: Now, a split on same-sex marriage, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:50 pm), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/sixth-circuit-the-split-on-same-sex-marriage/.

On Solid Ground: In Defense of Death with Dignity

Joseph J. Sherman, KLJ Staff Editor

In early October 2014, Brittany Maynard captured the attention of Americans when she announced her intention to end her own life in response to her cancer diagnosis.[1] Maynard was a California woman who was diagnosed with terminal glioblastoma.[2] However, since California prohibits physician-assisted death, she and her family made the difficult decision to move to Oregon, where she could legally seek such medical care.[3] On November 1, 2014, Maynard carried out her plan to end her own life by taking a lethal dose of barbiturates prescribed by her doctor.[4] Her choice to end her own life, rather than to let her tumor take its natural course, has generated a great deal of controversy about physician-assisted death,[5] which is also referred to as “Death with Dignity” (hereinafter “DWD”).[6] Is it beneficent to promote an early death for the terminally ill to prevent pain and suffering? Do we overextend our role in medicine when death becomes a prescription? What implications do DWD laws have on the future of end-of-life care?One contributing factor to this controversy may be a simple lack of information about the legal framework surrounding DWD. “Physician-assisted [death] occurs when a physician facilitates a patient’s [death] by providing the necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act.”[7] This definition is distinct from the refusal of life-saving medical care, which the United States Supreme Court has recognized as a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.[8] The Court declined to recognize a similar liberty interest for suicide, holding state bans on physician-assisted death to be constitutional as long as they neither infringe on citizens’ fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[9]There are only three states that statutorily allow physician-assisted death. In 1994, Oregon voters passed an initiative making them the first state in the United States to legalize the practice.[10] In 2008, Washington became the second state to endorse DWD by voter initiative.[11] In 2013, the Vermont legislature passed a bill to protect patient choices at the end of life.[12]Court rulings in two other states also allow for DWD. In 2009, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that doctors in Montana could not be prosecuted for assisting their patients to end their own lives.[13] In a recent New Mexico state court ruling, a district court judge issued an injunction preventing the prosecution of doctors who facilitate the end of life in competent, terminally ill patients.[14] However, the New Mexico ruling was not made by the state’s court of last resort, and the New Mexico Attorney General is considering an appeal of the decision.[15]The American Medical Association expressly disapproves of physician-assisted death, arguing that it is “fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.”[16] But is that always true when a patient is in great pain, suffering from a terminal illness for which treatment is futile? Some medical professionals argue that the DWD movement is a “slippery slope,” pointing to other developed nations where they say the movement has gone awry.[17] In Holland and Belgium, for example, certain organizations apparently provide euthanasia to patients with clinical depression and no terminal physical illness.[18]However, without addressing the value of those claims, it is at least questionable to suggest that outright euthanasia programs could exist in the legal framework of the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court has time and again recognized the interest of states in preserving human life.[19] When weighing a citizen’s liberty interests, courts are also likely to recognize a state’s “legitimate interest[] in . . . protecting vulnerable individuals.”[20] These government interests can only be overcome when there is a terminal illness and medical care is futile. There is no legal foundation to the contention that the natural endpoint of the DWD movement is state-sanctioned suicide for non-life-threatening conditions. The United States has only been willing to allow physician-assisted death in cases where death is already imminent, and that is unlikely to change soon.Since Brittany Maynard carried out her intentions to end her own life, end of life organizations have reinvigorated their advocacy efforts. Compassion & Choices, a nonprofit organization “committed to helping everyone have the best death possible,”[21] has set up the Brittany Maynard Fund to aid in the effort “to expand the death-with-dignity option to all.”[22] That expansion has touched only five states so far, but more states should take notice. When terminally ill patients have the means and the will to travel, the prohibition against physician-assisted death serves only to force already-suffering families to relocate in order to avail themselves of DWD laws elsewhere. In the absence of such means or will, many patients face a painful natural death.In the wake of Maynard’s decision, states would be wise to reconsider the benefits of DWD. Currently, most states inadvertently send a grim message to their terminally ill residents: “Leave or suffer the consequences.” That is the last message any state should want to send.


[1] E.g., Brandon Griggs, Dying Young: Why Brittany Maynard’s Story Resonates, CNN Living (Oct. 14, 2014, 4:28 PM EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/08/living/death-dignity-brittany-maynard/.
[2] Nicole Weisensee Egan, Terminally Ill Woman Brittany Maynard Has Ended Her Own Life, People Exclusive (Nov. 2, 2014, 7:35 PM ET), http://www.people.com/article/brittany-maynard-died-terminal-brain-cancer.
[3] The Brittany Maynard Fund, Compassion & Choiceshttp://www.thebrittanyfund.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
[4] Eyder Peralta, As Planned, Right-To-Die Advocate Brittany Maynard Ends Her Life, NPR: Blog (Nov. 3, 2014, 8:27 AM ET), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/11/03/361094919/as-planned-righ...; Egan, supra note 2.
[5] See, e.g., Peralta, supra note 4; Egan, supra note 2.
[6] See, e.g., Compassion & Choicessupra note 3.
[7] Am. Med. Ass’n, Opinion 2.211 – Physician-Assisted Suicide (1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-....
[8] See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
[9] Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-28 (1997).
[10] Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800-897 (West 2014). The United States Attorney General attempted to block Oregon’s law by determining that physician-assisted death was not a legitimate medical practice under the Controlled Substances Act. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904. However, the Supreme Court ruled that such a determination fell within the states’ traditional police powers and not with the power of the U.S. Attorney General. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 923.
[11] Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010-904 (West 2014).
[12] Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5281-92 (West 2014). The bill was signed into law on My 20, 2013, but many substantive portions of the law will not take effect until July 1, 2016. Id.
[13] Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
[14] Morris v. Brandenberg, 2014 NM Dist. Ct. 2909U, ¶ PP, available at http://agoodgoodbye.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/199446010-Physician-a...See also Phil Milford, Right to Die with Doctor’s Help Affirmed in New Mexico, Bloomberg News (Jan. 14, 2014, 1:33 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-14/right-to-die-with-doctor-s-help....
[15] Milford, supra note 14.
[16] Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 7.
[17] Ira Byock, Doctor-Assisted Suicide is Unethical and Dangerous, NY Times Opinion (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/06/expanding-the-right-to-d....
[18] Id.
[19] E.g.Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (reaffirming the state’s interest in the preservation of fetal life articulated in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973)).
[20] E.g.Vacco, 521 U.S. at 798. Individuals in this class might include the elderly or the mentally or physically disabled.
[21] About, Compassion & Choices, https://www.compassionandchoices.org/who-we-are/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
[22] Compassion & Choices, supra note 3.