Kentucky Business Organizations “Created” by a Filing with the Secretary of State

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Kentucky Business Organizations “Created” by a Filing with the Secretary of State 

Thomas E. Rutledge* 

Introduction

Under the federal Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”)[2] and the related Reporting Regulations,[3] most business organizations created in the United States[4] are subject, absent the availability of one or more of twenty-three exemptions,[5] to beneficial ownership reporting obligations.[6] Now “most” is not all, so it is important to distinguish between those organizations that at least initially are subject to these reporting obligations with all of the penalties that may attach upon a failure to discharge those obligations from those organizations that are ab initio outside the scope of the CTA and the Reporting Regulations. This differentiation will often be a matter of state law, and the objective of this article is to review Kentucky law against those particular provisions of the CTA and the Reporting Regulations. 

I.      The Gateway Question - Is My ??? a Reporting Company? 

The first step in the CTA analysis of a particular venture is to determine whether it is “reporting company.” A reporting company is obligated to file beneficial ownership reports into the Beneficial Ownership Secure System (“BOSS”) database being set up by FinCEN.[7] But if not a reporting company, then there is no filing obligation. The Reporting Regulations provide:

The term “domestic reporting company” means any entity that is: 

(A)   A corporation;

(B) A limited liability company; or

(C) Created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or any similar office under the law of a State or Indian tribe.[8]

At first blush this provision seems to identify three paths, any of which results in the venture under consideration being a reporting company:[9] (i) if venture is a corporation then it is a domestic reporting company; (ii) if venture is a limited liability company then it is a domestic reporting company; and (iii) if venture is a business entity that is not a corporation or a limited liability company but it is created by “created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state” then it is a domestic reporting company. However, FinCEN has issued a FAQ contradicting that reading, stating:

While FinCEN’s BOI reporting regulations define a domestic reporting company as including a corporation or limited liability company, the inclusion of those entities is based on an understanding that domestic corporations and LLCs are generally created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or similar office. In an unusual circumstance where a domestic corporation or limited liability company is created, but not by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or similar office, such an entity is not a reporting company.[10] 

The second element of the defined term is the use the word “entity.” Recognizing that “entity” is not itself defined (a recurrent problem in this provision and the CTA generally is the utilization of technical, often limiting terms, but without providing a definition), the question is whether the word is employed (i) as a generic equivalent to “any business organization form” or (ii) in its technical sense such that there may be “business organization forms” (to carry over the generic utilization) that are themselves not entities? If the former then “reporting company” is coincident with “created by a filing with the Secretary of State.”[11] Alternatively, if the latter is the correct reading, “reporting company” is the common area in the Venn diagram of (a) an “entity” and (b) “created by a filing with the Secretary of State.” If the first reading is correct, then “entity” may simply be little more than a term of itself denoting noting more than “a something.” If in the alternative “entity” is a second hurdle to classification as a reporting company there arises the significant problem that the term is undefined in the CTA and the Reporting Regulations. Indeed the word, in the context of the law of business organizations, lacks an agreed upon definition in that there is no consistent set of characteristics that follow from “a something” being identified (or not) as an entity.[12] That makes “entityness” a limiting factor unknowable as it does not define of knowable set; “what’s the difference between an orange?”

As that last question is irresolvable, we will here proceed on the basis of the first reading, that “reporting company” is equivalent to “created by a filing with the Secretary of State.” Well, not so fast. The term “created” is not defined in the CTA or the Reporting Regulations, and it is a term not employed in most business organization law. There are clearly defined terms for the “incorporation” of a corporation (business, non-profit, cooperative) and the organization of limited liability companies and other structures such as a cooperative association; they do not discuss how, when or by what mechanism any of those organizational structures are “created.”[13] This is an important issue in a statute with significant penalties, including the possibility of incarceration; ambiguities raise the costs of compliance and unjustifiably raise risk. For that reason, the CTA and the Reporting Regulations should be read as penal statutes in which all ambiguities are interpreted against the government.

But back to the task at hand; if we are to proceed on the basis that “reporting company” is equivalent to “created by a filing with the Secretary of State,” then when an attorney is presented with a particular business organization and needs to advise on whether it is a reporting company and therefore likely subject to the CTA’s reporting obligations[14] it is necessary to investigate the statute under which the organization was “created.”[15] To that end, this article reviews the iterations of the various statutes governing the formation of various business organizational forms to see whether they provide that a particular form is or at least arguably is not “created” by a filing with the Secretary of State.[16] Bear in mind that absent contrary language in the particular statute new legislation becomes effect the summer after then end of a particular General Assembly session. [17] When a law is herein described as being adopted in a particular year the statement speaks to the latter portion of the year. A business organization created earlier in the year, before the revision in the law takes effect is bound as to its organizational procedure by the prior law. For that reason as to business organizations formed in a year in which the law changed, particular attention to formation date and the effective date of new legislation for that year, is necessary.

After considering sole proprietorships, the order in which various forms are considered is based upon the order of the controlling statutes as set forth in KRS. 

II.    Sole Proprietorships

A sole proprietorship is simply a natural person doing business for her or his own account and benefit; there is no business structure separate and apart from the individual.[18] No filing with the Secretary of State is required for an individual to go into business for himself or herself. Even the filing of an assumed name certificate on behalf of a sole proprietorship is not filed with the Secretary of State - those filings are made with the county clerk.[19] Ergo a sole proprietorship is not a CTA reporting company.[20]

III.   Corporations 

Under Kentucky law “corporations” cast a wide net and encompasses traditional for profit and non-profit companies as well as atypical organizational forms such as the cooperative corporation. While some, at least in their current incarnations, “piggy-back” on the organizational model utilized for business corporations, that is not always the case. Hence a review of the particular statute under which an organization was incorporated is necessary.

A.    Corporations - Business

Kentucky’s 1891 Constitution provided that corporations shall not be chartered by local or special acts.[21] In furtherance thereof Kentucky has adopted a series of “business corporation” acts. Those acts are: (i) the current Kentucky Business Corporation Act, initially adopted in 1988 and codified at KRS ch. 271B (the “BCA-1988”);[22] (ii) the Business Corporation Act adopted in 1972[23] and codified at KRS ch. 271A (the “BCA-1972”);[24] (iii) the 1946 adoption of the Uniform Business Corporation Act codified at KRS ch. 271 (the “BCA-1946”);[25] and prior law (the “Pre-1946 BCA”).[26] In addition there were corporate laws in effect before the 1891 Constitution (the “Pre-1892 BCA”). They are each considered below in that order.

 i.         The BCA-1988

Under the Kentucky Business Corporation Act adopted in 1988,[27] it based upon the then recently updated Model Business Corporation Act, it is express that incorporation is accomplished by means of a filing with the Secretary of State[28] with incorporation effected by the Secretary of State filing the articles of incorporation.[29] Ergo, every corporation incorporated under the BCA-1988 is a CTA reporting company. 

ii.         The BCA-1972

Under this act, once articles of incorporation were prepared satisfying the statutory requirements,[30] they were then delivered to the Secretary of State. Assuming they met the statutory requirements and necessary fees were paid, the articles were then endorsed and filed in “his” office.[31] Thereafter, the effect of the certificate of incorporation was defined as:

upon the issuance of the certificate incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions required to be performed by the incorporators have been complied with, and that the corporation has been incorporated under this chapter , except as against this state in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the certification or involuntary dissolution of the corporation.[32]

Ergo, a corporation incorporated under the BCA-1972 is a CTA reporting company.

iii.         The BCA-1946 

Under the 1946 business corporation act, once articles of incorporation satisfying the statutory requirements were prepared and then “signed in triplicate originals by each of the incorporators,”[33] they were then delivered to the Secretary of State.[34] Assuming the requirements were deemed satisfied, the Secretary of State would file the articles and issue a certificate of incorporation.[35] While it remained necessary to file a duplicate copy of the articles of incorporation with the county clerk in which the registered office of the corporation was located,[36] it was upon the Secretary of State’s issuance of the certificate of incorporation that the corporate existence began.[37] Ergo, a corporation incorporated under the BCA-1946 is a CTA reporting company.

iv.         Pre-1946 BCA

The General Assembly, in 1893, no doubt in response to the recently approved state constitution and its numerous provisions directly regulating corporations,[38] adopted a comprehensive corporation statute.[39] Thereunder articles of incorporation, the requirements therefore being detailed,[40] were to be signed and then first “recorded in the county clerk’s office of the county in which its principal office or place of business is to be located” and then thereafter “a copy thereof shall be filed and recorded in the office of the Secretary of State.”[41] The statute is less than clear as to differentiating the effect of the county clerk and Secretary of State filings: 

When the articles are filed and recorded as provided, and the license tax imposed is paid to the State, the corporation shall be deemed to be organized for the purpose of transacting, promoting or carrying on the business or purpose for which it was created; and shall thereupon become a body-corporate, and be known by its corporate name, and as such may adopt and use a corporate seal; and shall have the power to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with; . . .[42] 

Now our inquiry is whether or not a particular organization is “created by the filing of a document with [the Kentucky] secretary of state.”[43] In this instance it would appear that both a state and county level filing were necessary for incorporation to take effect, leaving open the question of whether a mandatory two-office filing is outside the CTA’s definition of what is a reporting company, or in the alternative is the fact that there was a required Secretary of State filing, and “he” got the final word, sufficient to bring corporations formed thereunder within the scope of the CTA? It may be important that the delivery to the Secretary of State was of a “copy” of the document submitted to and filed by the county clerk. A reasonable case may be made that a corporation incorporated under 1893 law is not a CTA reporting company. 

B.     Corporations - Nonprofit

Kentucky initially adopted its current nonprofit corporation act in 1968.[44] Thereunder, incorporation of the corporation is accomplished by first delivering to the Secretary of State articles of incorporation satisfying the statutory requirements, and upon a determination that the articles “have been signed and acknowledged according to law,” then “he” (the Secretary of State) will “record one original in his office and issue a certificate of incorporation.”[45] Ergo, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the Kentucky Nonprofit Corporation Act (1968) is a CTA reporting company.

Previously, the law governing nonprofit corporations was not so straightforward. There was one body of law that governed religious, educational and other charitable organizations. These entities, but for the requirement that they maintain an agent for service of process, were not subject to the rules governing for-profit corporations.[46] The organization of such a corporation required that articles of incorporation be signed, and then “filed in the office of the secretary of state, and recorded in the county clerk’s office of the county where the principal place of business of the corporation is located.”[47] From there, it was provided that “when the articles are filed and recorded, and a certificate of that fact is issued by the Secretary of State, the corporation shall be considered organized….”[48] Ergo, these religious, educational, and other charitable nonprofit corporations are CTA reporting companies.

In addition, there existed separate provisions addressing a nonstock, nonprofit corporation.[49] As was the case above with respect to expressly religious organizations, a nonstock, nonprofit corporation is not subject to the laws governing business corporations.[50] After detailing the required contents of the articles of incorporation,[51] it was provided that “The articles of incorporation shall be filed and recorded, a certificate of incorporation shall be issued, in the same manner and upon payment of the same fees, with the same effect, as provided in KRS § 271.055 for business corporations.”[52] It is further provided that “upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin ….”[53] Ergo, these nonstock, nonprofit corporations are CTA reporting companies.

C.     Corporations - Cooperative

Kentucky law provides for a variety of purposes (marketing, agricultural and livestock) for which a cooperative corporation may be formed. To suggest that the statutes governing these organizations are confusing would be generous, and in any instance it is going to be necessary to undertake a deep investigation of the statute in place at the time a particular cooperative corporation was created. Restricting this review to the statutes in effect since the mid-1960s, with respect to an agricultural cooperative association it is clear that formation was accomplished by the filing of articles of incorporation with the Kentucky Secretary of State.[54] The curious provision requiring that the Secretary of State provide a certified copy of the articles of incorporation to the Dean of the College of Agriculture at the University of Kentucky and the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture[55] is not a condition precedent to the due incorporation of the cooperative corporation. Ergo, an agricultural cooperative corporation is a CTA reporting company.

Another form of the cooperative corporation is a livestock protective association. These organizations are a subset of corporations and are to the extent not modified by KRS 272.360 through 272.510 subject to the business corporation act. Organization of a cooperative livestock protective association is accomplished through the filing of articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State as provided for in the then applicable business corporation act.[56] There is, however, a provision that raises the question of whether the action of the Secretary of State is effective to create the corporation, or whether a further act is required; that provision reads: 

and, in addition, a quadruplicate of the articles, indorsed by the Secretary of State with the fact and time of recording of the articles in his office, shall be filed with the Department of Agriculture within ten (10) days after the articles have been recorded in the office of the Secretary of State. After the articles have been duly filed and recorded, and a certificate of incorporation has been issued, the corporation may proceed to do business.[57] 

Whether the filing of the Secretary of State’s file stamped articles with the Department of Agriculture is a condition precedent to the due incorporation of the livestock protective association, or alternatively whether that is a mere notice filing similar to the filings made for an agricultural cooperative association, is unclear. For that reason, it is not possible to make a definitive statement as to whether a particular cooperative livestock protective corporation was or was not incorporated upon the filing by the Secretary of State of the articles of incorporation; rather this is a question particular to each organization. In consideration of the question, attention should be paid to the applicable statute equivalent to KRS sections 271B.2-030[58] and 14A.2-070.[59] 

D.     Corporations - Professional Service

The “professional service corporation” arose out the efforts by members of the “learned professions” to benefit from the tax treatment, particularly as to tax-favored benefit and retirement plans, available to shareholders in a corporation.[60] After the IRS adopted the so-called “Kintner Regulations,” thereby effectively precluding professionals from structuring formats, examples being the partnership association and the limited partnership association, that would sufficiently mimic a corporation (as contemplated by the tax code), those “learned professionals” convinced state legislatures to amend their respective business corporation acts so as to permit the incorporation of professional firms.[61] The resultant professional service corporations (“P.S.C”s) are in almost every state organized as corporations under the applicable business corporation act[62] with particular language mandatory in the articles and other organizational documents meant to further the professional nature of the services rendered through the firm; in Kentucky those requirements are set forth in what is currently KRS section 274.015(1).[63]In that a PSC pre-supposes the incorporation of a business corporation under the business corporation act,[64] a professional services corporation is ab initio a reporting company.

E.     Corporations - Rural Electric and Rural Telephone 

Kentucky has had a statute specific to rural electric cooperative corporations since 1937,[65] the statute being declared an emergency and immediately effective.[66] The incorporation of a rural electric cooperative corporation is initiated through the preparation of articles of incorporation,[67] it at one point in time requiring that there be not less than five incorporators.[68] Thereafter: 

The articles of incorporation shall be executed in quadruplicate by the incorporators and each copy shall be acknowledged by each of the incorporators before a notary public or and other officer authorized by the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to take acknowledgements of deeds. When so acknowledged, the four copies of the articles of incorporation, together with the certificate of acknowledgement, shall be filed with the office of the Secretary of State, who, if he shall find the same legal and valid, shall forthwith indorse his approval on each of the said four copies, retain, record and file one of said copies in his office, delivering the other three copies thereof with his approval endorsed thereon to the incorporators, the incorporators upon the receipt of said approved copies of the articles of incorporation, shall thereupon file one of said approved copies of said articles of incorporation in the office of the county court clerk in the county where is to be located the principal office of said corporation and one of said approved copies of said articles of incorporation with the Dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky. As soon as the Secretary of State shall have approved the articles of incorporation and endorsed his approval thereon, the proposed corporation described in the articles of incorporation so filed, shall, under its designated name, be and constitute a body politic and corporate and shall thereupon be fully authorized to transact business in its corporate name.[69]

Essentially the same language as to when the existence of the rural electric cooperate corporation exists in the current law, namely: 

(2) As soon as the Secretary of State has filed the articles of incorporation, the proposed corporation shall be a body politic and corporate and may transact business in its corporate name.[70]

Ergo, whether formed under the statute as first adopted in 1936 or under the more modern statute, a rural electric cooperative corporation is a CTA reporting company.

Turning to rural telephone cooperatives, the statute providing for their creation was approved by the Kentucky General Assembly in 1950.[71] As then provided, articles of incorporation are to be prepared,[72] and once executed by at least the minimum of five incorporators,[73] the articles are delivered to the to the Secretary of State for filing.

The incorporators shall execute four copies of the articles of incorporation, and each incorporator shall acknowledge each copy before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds. They shall then file the four copies, together with the certificate of acknowledgment, in the office of the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State finds the articles to be legal and valid, he shall immediately endorse his approval on each of the copies, retain, record and file one copy in his office, and deliver the three other copies, with his approval endorsed thereon, to the incorporators. The incorporators shall then file one approve copy in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the principal office of the corporation is to be located.[74] 

Thankfully avoiding any ambiguity as to whether the county filing was a condition precedent to the incorporation, the statute went on to provide:

As soon as the Secretary of State has endorsed his approval of the articles of incorporation, the proposed corporation shall be a body politic and corporate and may transact business in its corporate name.[75] 

This same language as to when the corporate existence begins exists in the modern codification of this statute.[76] Ergo, a rural telephone cooperative corporation is a CTA reporting company. It should be noted, however, that each rural electric cooperative corporation and rural electric telephone cooperative almost certainly is exempt from the CTA’s definition of a “reporting company” by reason of the exemption for “public utilities”[77] 

F.     Benefit Corporations

“Benefit corporations” were added to the Kentucky Business Corporation Act in 2017.[78] Rather than a distinct organizational form, a benefit corporation is one that elects in its articles of incorporation to be a benefit corporation, thereby altering the (supposed) rule of shareholder primacy in the operation of the corporation and permitting the Board of Directors to consider the interests of “other constituencies” when making determinations as to the corporation’s path.[79] As a benefit corporation is simply a corporation that has elected a different paradigm for its internal allocation of responsibilities, and pre-supposes the incorporation of a business corporation under the business corporation act, a benefit corporation is ab initio a reporting company.[80]

G.     Legislative Corporations

It is a truism that for every categorical statement there is an exception, and there is one here. As noted above, a corporation, LLC or other business organization not created by a secretary of state filing pursuant to a so-called “enabling statute” such as the Kentucky Business Corporation Act or the Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act but rather by a state or federal legislative or other executive act is not a “reporting company.”[81] Certain corporations including those created by legislative act rather than a secretary of state filing are not subject to the CTA as they are not within the scope of the definition of a reporting company.[82] Those corporations are few and far between, but they do exist.[83]

IV.   Limited Liability Companies

Kentucky first adopted an LLC Act in 1994.[84] While the LLC Act has undergone repeated amendment in order to accommodate the rapidly evolving form,[85] the manner in which they have been organized has remained consistent, namely through articles of organization that become effective either when filed by the Secretary of State or upon an effective date that post-dates the Secretary of State’s filing, thereby causing the LLC to come into existence.[86]

Ergo, for our purposes, an LLC is created by a filing with the Secretary of State. This conclusion is equally applicable to an LLC that has a single member (a SMLLC) that is for tax purposes treated as either a sole-proprietorship (if the sole member is a natural person) or a division (if the sole member is another business organization). Irrespective[87] of tax classification, the venture is an LLC and therefore falls within the definition of what is a reporting company.

 Kentucky permits a general partnership to “convert” into a limited liability company by filing articles of organization that as well as the typical requirements[88] recite additional facts as to the pre-conversion partnership.[89] The conversion is effective upon the Secretary of State’s filing of the articles or organization.[90] So far it would appear we have a CTA reporting company. But then there is the question of the effect of a conversion; the statute provides in part:

A partnership or limited partnership that has been converted pursuant to this chapter shall for all purposes be the same entity that existed before the conversion.[91] 

Does the fact that the now LLC is the “same entity” that was converted impact the CTA analysis when it is remembered that a general partnership (even one that has elected LLP status) is not a CTA reporting company? To date FinCEN has issued no guidance on the question. While it may be argued that the LLC formed via the conversion of a general partnership is not a reporting company, that answer is a stretch, and likely the better answer is to treat the post-conversion LLC as a reporting company.

V.    General Partnerships Including Limited Liability Partnerships

No state requires a secretary of state or other filing in order for a general partnership to come into existence.[92] This rule is elemental in that partnership is a default category; when persons enter into a business relationship that satisfies the terms of what is a partnership then a partnership comes into being[93] unless they elect to structure their relations in another way such as a corporation or LLC.[94]

While some states permit a notice filing of a Statement of Partnership Authority to be made for the purpose of making clear who are (and by implication who are not) the partners therein and who has authority to on the partnership’s behalf convey its property,[95] the partnership making that filing exists by reason of the agreement of the partners to be, inter alia, partners, and that relationship is not altered by the fact of filing a Statement of Partnership Authority. There are certain other optional filings that a general partnership governed by a statute patterned upon RUPA may file such as a Statement of Denial,[96] filed by a person to deny they are a partner as listed in a Statement of Partnership Authority, a Statement of Dissociation,[97] filed by a person to state that they are no longer a partner in the named partnership, and a Statement of Dissolution.[98] None of these filings is necessary for the transaction in question to be effective; for example, a partnership may dissolve without filing a Statement of Dissolution.

In that no Secretary of State filing is required for a general partnership to come into being, a general partnership is not a CTA “reporting company” and is not subject to its reporting obligations.

A “limited liability partnership” (“LLP”), which under the Kentucky enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act is labeled a “registered limited liability partnership,”[99] is generally speaking a general partnership that via a state notice filing has elected to be governed by a special rule as to the vicarious liability of a partner for the partnership’s debts and obligations.[100] In a classic general partnership each partner is on a joint and several basis vicariously liable with the partnership and each other partner for the partnership’s debts and obligations.[101] While this rule had a number of benefits in small ventures including professional firms, the fallout of the Savings and Loan Crisis demonstrated that exposing partners across the country and across practices to personal liability for claims often arising in a distant office was no longer a viable structure.[102] There existed, however, a dearth of viable options as particularly professional firms were stymied by state law limitations on how they could be structured.[103] The LLP arose out of that tension. Continuation of the partnership format was desired as it continued existing management structures and tax treatment as well as the perceived value of identifying the firm’s principals as “partners” while not running afoul of then existing rules limiting professional practices to the forms of a general partnership and in certain instances a professional service corporation.[104] What was no longer desired was the rule of joint and several vicarious liability among the partners; the LLP format addressed that by means of a notice filing made by an existing partnership with a Secretary of State combined with a requirement as to the partnership’s name resulting in the elimination of the rule of joint and several liability. While there are a variety of distinctions under various state laws, if a partnership makes this notice filing and satisfies the name requirements, the partners qua partners are to one degree or another (the distinction is between so-called “partial” and “full” shield LLPs) not subject to joint and several liability for the partnership’s obligations, but rather enjoy limited liability akin to that enjoyed by shareholders in a corporation.[105] Some states require that the partnership periodically renew its LLP filing and that in the absence of that renewal it reverts to a traditional general partnership. Kentucky provides that the partnership that elects LLP status is the same entity that existed before that election was made.[106] Ergo, no business organization is “created” by an election by a partnership to be an LLP. Rather, there was a partnership that was not an LLP, and then there was a partnership that is an LLP, and it may come to pass that there is a partnership that once was but is no longer and LLP - throughout all of those conditions there was a single partnership.

In that a limited liability partnership, whether existing under the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act or the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006), is a general partnership whose organization was not contingent upon a Secretary of State filing, it is not a CTA reporting company. 

VI.   Limited Partnerships Including Limited Liability Limited Partnerships

Kentucky’s laws governing limited partnerships date back to 1849-50, and over the years there have been numerous iterations of these laws, including the adoption in sequence of three uniform acts. Under only the last two are limited partnerships “created” by a Secretary of State filing, so only they are subject to characterization as a “reporting company.”

The most recent statute is the Kentucky Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2006).[107] Under its provisions a limited partnership comes into being through a filing with the Secretary of State.[108]

Under the immediately preceding statute, an enactment of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 with the 1985 Amendments adopted in Kentucky in 1988,[109] a limited partnership came into being through a filing with the Secretary of State.[110]

Previously, under Kentucky’s 1970 adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916),[111] a limited partnership was formed via the preparation and execution of a certificate satisfying the statutory requirements that was then “file[d] for record the certificate in the office of the clerk of the county court in the county in which the principal place of business of the partnership is located.”, formation taking place upon “substantial compliance” with those requirements.[112] While the statute is not express as to whether the county clerk filing was a precondition to formation (i.e., is the only manner of substantial compliance with the filing requirement to effect the filing), the certificate was filed at the county, and not the Secretary of State, level. Ergo, a limited partnership formed under the 1970 limited partnership act is not a reporting company. Well, almost. In 1986 the KRS section 362.420 was amended to provide:

(1)    Two (2) or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall:

….

(b) File for record duplicate copies of the certificate first with the secretary of state, and thereafter file for record one (1) duplicate original of the certificate in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the principal place of business of the partnership is located.[113]

Now what is less than clear is whether that Secretary of State filing was a condition precedent to the formation of the limited partnership as only “substantial compliance” with the laws governing the filing of the certificate (as well as its contents) was required.[114] For our purposes a provision addressing which filing (if any) was necessary for the limited partnership to come into being would be most helpful but alas there is none. While reasonable minds could differ on the point, a solid case may be made that a limited partnership governed by this amendment to Kentucky’s then limited partnership act (i.e., one formed after the effective date of the 1986 amendment and before the effective date of the Act adopted in 1988), while being the first time a Secretary of State filing is provided for in connection with a limited partnership’s formation, is not a CTA reporting company.

Before 1970 Kentucky limited partnerships were covered by a statute codified at KRS 362.010 through 362.160, ultimately having been adopted in 1849-50 and codified at ch. 82. Thereunder, irrespective of the iteration, the certificate of limited partnership was filed with a county level office and not with the Secretary of State.[115] Ergo, a limited partnership formed under the pre-1970 limited partnership law is not a reporting company.

A limited liability limited partnership (“LLLP”) is a limited partnership that has as to the general partner component thereof elected LLP status. There are, however, for purposes of this inquiry, important distinctions between a limited partnership electing LLLP status and a general partnership electing LLP status. Unlike a general partnership/LLP in which a pre-existing partnership makes the LLP election, under Kentucky’s most modern limited partnership law, namely the Kentucky Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2006), the election by a limited partnership to be an LLLP is made in the certificate of limited partnership to the effect that there was never a time in which the LLLP was not a limited partnership created by a filing by the Secretary of State of a certificate of limited partnership.[116] While it is conceivable that a limited partnership created under a pre-2006 statute could elect LLP status under the LLP amendments to the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act,[117] which at the time of their adoption were not limited to general partnerships,[118] such organizations are at best few and far between. Still, it is possible that they exist, and if they do they are not CTA reporting companies. Other LLLPs existing under the 2006 Limited Partnership Act are CTA reporting companies. 

VII.  Business and Statutory Trusts 

Kentucky has two statutes governing the business organizations generically referenced as “business trusts,” one utilizing the common law concept and the second a statutory model. Both are fully in effect, business trusts organized under the common law model have not been subsumed into the statutory paradigm, and it is possible today to form under either option.

The statute addressing the common law model was adopted in 1966, and under it a business trust[119] comes into being by the declaration of a trust relationship.[120] In 2012 Kentucky adopted a modified form of the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act[121] under the name the Kentucky Uniform Statutory Trust Act (2012).[122] In contact to the common law mechanism used under the other statute, under the Statutory Trust Act formation is accomplished by means of a filing with the Secretary of State.[123]

Ergo, whether a “business trust” organized in Kentucky is a CTA reporting company depends upon under which statute it was organized; if under the common law formula it is not while if formed under the Statutory Trust Act then it is a reporting company. 

VIII.    Limited Cooperative Associations

Kentucky adopted a modified form of the Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act in 2012.[124] The formation of a limited cooperative association is accomplished via a filing with the Secretary of State.[125] The creation of a Kentucky limited cooperative association being premised upon a Secretary of State filing, a Kentucky limited cooperative association is a reporting company under the CTA.

IX. Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations

Kentucky adopted a version of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act in 2015,[126] thereby creating a statutory form for what are often informal nonprofit organizations that do not fall within the scope of one of the other organizational forms.[127] Initially, a UNPA comes into being by the agreement of the participants therein and does not require a Secretary of State or other filing.[128] An existing UNPA may file a certificate of association with the Secretary of State, whereupon the otherwise applicable rule of vicarious liability of the participants in the venture for its debts and obligation[129] is set aside, and those persons are no longer vicariously liable for the UNPA’s debts and obligations.[130] Therefore, irrespective of whether an UNPA has filed a certificate of association with the Secretary of State, a UNPA is not created by a Secretary of State filing and is therefore not a CTA reporting company.

Conclusion

The application of the Corporate Transparency Act is a watershed event in business law, it requiring answers to a variety of new questions including the one here reviewed, namely what is a “reporting company” as that term is applied to business organization formed in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Hopefully these thoughts will guide the assessment of particular organizations.

Post-Script

In late 2024 and through the first months of 2025 there was a flurry of judicial, legislative and executive action as to the validity and application of the Corporate Transparency Act.[131] While the authority to do so has been challenged,[132] on March 26, 2025, the Department of the Treasury published an Interim Final Rule[133] amending the Final Rules to the effect that a “reporting company” does not include a business venture created in the U.S. and that the beneficial owners of the remaining “reporting companies,” they being formed outside of the U.S. and then qualified to transact business under the laws of one of the states, will not include any persons who are U.S. citizens.[134] What is most important for this analysis is that the statutory definition of what is a reporting company has not been altered by this regulatory change.


* * * * * * * * * *

*I am a member of Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC resident in its Louisville, Kentucky office where my practice is focused on the law of business organizations. In addition, I am a frequent commentator on the law of business organizations and am an elected member of the American Law Institute. In 2018 I joined Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies as a co-author in place of the late Professor Ribstein. I would be remiss to not thank William A. Hilyerd, librarian at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, for his cheerful assistance in tracking down some of the law herein discussed.

[2] The Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”) was adopted as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, it being part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (the “NDAA”). The full name of the NDAA is the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. (2021). Congress’ override of the President’s veto was taken in Record Vote No. 292 (Jan. 1, 2021). The anti-money laundering provisions are found in §§ 6001-6511 of the NDAA. The CTA consists of §§ 6401-6403 of the NDAA. Section 6402 of the NDAA sets forth Congress’ findings and objectives in passing the CTA, and § 6403 contains its substantive provisions, primarily adding § 5336 to Title 31 of the United States Code.

[3] The Reporting Regulations appear at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380 (2023). The “final” beneficial ownership report regulations were released in Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498 (Sept. 30, 2022).Those “final” regulations were as to certain due dates amended by Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Deadline Extension for Reporting Companies Created or Registered in 2024, 88 Fed. Reg. 66730 (Sept. 28, 2023) and supplemented as to the use of FinCEN Identifiers by the release Use of FinCEN Identifiers for Reporting Beneficial Ownership Information of Entities, 88 Fed. Reg. 76995 (Nov. 8, 2023).

The most recent change to the Reporting Regulations took place on October 17, 2024, when FinCEN altered the definition of what is a “public utility” able to utilize a particular exemption from the CTA’s definition of what is a “reporting company.” See Update of the Public Utility Exemption Under the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 83782 (Oct. 18, 2024) (collectively the “Reporting Regulations”).In interpreting and applying the Reporting Regulations, reference should be made as well to the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting - Frequently Asked Questions (the “FinCEN FAQs”) and the FinCEN Small Entity Compliance Guide - Reporting Requirements (the “FinCEN Guide”). See also infra notes 131 through 134 and accompanying text.

[4] There is under the CTA and the Reporting Regulations a series of reporting requirements applicable to entities “formed” outside the U.S. and qualified to transact in one or more of the states. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(1)(ii) (2023) (outlining the reporting requirements for foreign reporting companies under the Reporting Regulations). As this article is focused on business organizations organized in Kentucky those non-U.S. organizations are excluded from this discussion.                                      

[5] An organization that is a “reporting company” may be excised from that classification by the application of one or more of twenty-three exceptions. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B) (“The term ‘reporting company’ . . . does not include”); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2) (2023) (“Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the term ‘reporting company’ does not include:”). The exemptions, as set forth in the Reporting Regulations, appear at 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.380(c)(2)(i) - (xxiii) (2023).

[6] For a review of the CTA and the Reporting Regulations generally, see Allison J. Donovan and Thomas E. Rutledge, The Corporate Transparency Act Is Happening To You and Your Clients: Dealing with the Tsunami, Kentucky Bar Ass’n (July 30, 2024) (hereinafter “Donovan & Rutledge, Tsunami”) https://www.skofirm.com/news/the-corporate-transparency-act-is-happening-to-you-and-your-clients-dealing-with-the-tsunami/ [https://perma.cc/FX9K-SQ27]. See also 1 Larry E. Ribstein, Robert R. Keatinge and Thomas E. Rutledge, Ribstein & Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies ch. 4A 293 – 460 (2024).

[7] See generally Donovan & Rutledge, Tsunami, supra note 6, at 9.

[8] 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.380(c)(i)(A)-(C) (2023).

[9] Technically a “domestic reporting company,” but as this article is discussing only reporting companies formed in Kentucky the “domestic” is hereinafter being dropped.

[10] See Frequently Asked Questions, C.9, FINCEN (Apr. 18, 2024), https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2] (emphasis added). This emphasis upon creation by a Secretary of State filing is consistent with certain commentary released in connection with the release of the final Reporting Rules. See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498, 59538 (Sept. 30, 2022) (“FinCEN . . . notes that the core consideration for the purposes of the CTA’s statutory text and the final rule is whether an ‘entity’ is ‘created’ by the filing of the document with the relevant authority.”); Id. (“We emphasize again that the only relevant issue for the purposes of the CTA and the final rule is whether the filing ‘creates’ the entity.”).

[11] Under the CTA and the Reporting Regulations there is not a defined term that encompasses all filing offices in the states including those such as Virginia where the filing is with the Corporations Commission and the equivalent offices of for example the various Indian Tribes, although there is a FAQ on point. See Frequently Asked Questions, C.17, FINCEN (Oct. 3, 2024), https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2]. Again, as we are here concerned only with Kentucky the label Secretary of State is accurate.

[12] See Thomas E. Rutledge, External Entities and Internal Aggregates: A Deconstructionist Conundrum, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 655 (2009) (exploring the characteristics of business organizations identified as being an “entity” and determining the label has no inherent meaning); see also J. William Callison, Indeterminacy, Irony and Partnership Law, 2 Stan. Agora 73–76 (2001), http:// agora.stanford.edu/agora/libArticles2/agora2v1.pdf [permalink unavailable]; David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 Stan. Agora 38, 58 (2001), http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/libArticles2/ agora2v1.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[13] See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.2-030 (West 2024) (“. . . the corporate existence shall begin . . .”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 272A.3-010(2) (West 2024) (“The limited cooperative association is formed when . . . ”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.2531 (West 2024) (“. . . [T]he corporate existence shall begin when . . .”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.020(2) (West 2024) ([T]he existence of the limited liability company shall begin when . . .”).

[14] Under the CTA and the Reporting regulations, a reporting company may be exempt from the reporting obligations if it meets one or more of twenty-three exemptions. Relatively few companies will fall within the scope of the exemptions; one of them, that for financial market utilities (see 31 C.F.R. 1010.380(c)(2)(xvii) (2023), applies to eight companies (listing available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm [https://perma.cc/XW85-R2T5]).                        

[15] A great many of the citations to Kentucky’s statutes governing various business organization forms have been “repealed,” but the references herein do not recite a history of, for example, “repealed effective July 15, 2024.”That is intentional because herein the consideration of what was the law governing the organization of a particular form at a particular date - it is the procedure dictated by the law of the time of formation that determines whether a particular company is a CTA reporting company. That a particular statute was subsequently repealed and replaced does not retroactively alter the manner in which a particular organization came into being.

[16] The “arguably” qualification acknowledges that notwithstanding the statutory language as carried forward in the Reporting Regulations, FinCEN could by fiat declare what is not a reporting company to indeed be a reporting company. The likelihood of a lawsuit challenging that determination must be recognized as being low, but still, it is not impossible. In Massachusetts a lawsuit was brought by a (common law) business trust seeking a determination that it and other business trusts are not reporting companies, but it was quickly dismissed for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs asserted that a Massachusetts Business Trust is not a reporting company in that it is not formed by a filing by a Secretary of State or similar officer, an assertion with which FinCEN agreed. There being no controversy as to the non-application of the CTA to the plaintiff its broader challenge to the CTA’s constitutionality was set aside for lack of standings. See Trustees of the Lewis Wharf Condominium Trust v. Yellen, No. 24-11679-LTS, (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2024) (order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice).

[17] See Ky. Const. § 55 (“No act, except general appropriation bills, shall become a law until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed”).

[18] As to the characteristics of a sole proprietorship, see Sparkman v. CONSOL Energy, Inc., 470 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Ky. 2015) (citations omitted):

A sole proprietorship is defined as a business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A sole proprietorship, therefore, differs greatly from other business organizations such as corporations or limited liability companies (LLCs), even in cases where a business organization has only one shareholder or member. For example, the sole member of an LLC or sole shareholder of a corporation is not entitled to assert in his or her individual capacity the rights of the business organization. An owner of a sole proprietorship, on the other hand, is liable in his or her personal capacity for the liabilities of the sole proprietorship and may assert the rights of the sole proprietorship in his individual capacity.

Keep in mind that the “sole proprietor” here being discussed is a state law concept; a single member LLC that is for tax classification purposes a “disregarded entity” is under the CTA, absent one of the twenty-three exemptions discussed below, a reporting company. See also Frequently Asked Questions, C.8, FINCEN (Apr. 18, 2024) (clarifying pass-through tax treatment of an S-corporation does not exempt it from characterization as a reporting company) https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2].

[19] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.015(3) (West 2024).

[20]See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498, 59537 (Sept. 30, 2022) (“In general, FinCEN believes that sole proprietorships, . . . would not be a reporting company under the final rule.”); Frequently Asked Questions, C.6, FINCEN (Dec. 12, 2023), https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2].  

[21] See Ky. Const. § 59 (“The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely: . . . Seventeenth, To grant a charter to any corporation, or to amend the charter of any existing corporation . . .”).

[22] See 1988 Ky. Acts, ch. 389; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.1-010 (West 2024) (“This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Kentucky Business Corporation Act’.”).

[23] See 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274 (H.B. 178), see also id., § 1 (codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.005 (“This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Kentucky Business Corporation Act.”) (repealed 1988).

[24] This act was based upon the 1972 edition of the Model Business Corporation Act. See James C. Seiffert, Kentucky Corporation Law with Forms, in Kentucky Practice Series § 3.1 (June 2022).

[25] See 1946 Ky Acts, ch. 141 (S.B. 6) (repealed 1972). This statute was one of the few adoptions of the Uniform Business Corporation Act (1928) written and promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), now known as the Uniform Law Commission (the “ULC”). Still, it was not adopted without sometimes questionable modification. See Willburt D. Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L. J. 125, 128 (1961). Not long after promulgating this Act NCCUSL abandoned corporate law to the American Bar Association and its Committee on Corporate Laws (the “ABA”). This is the source of the division of labor between the two groups with the ULC being charged with the unincorporated laws (e.g., the Uniform Partnership Act, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act) and the ABA taking as its charge the Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. The crafting of the Uniform Commercial Code is governed by different rules.

[26] See generally 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171.

[27] See 1988 Ky. Acts, ch. 23 (H.B. 323), codified at KRS ch 271B.

[28] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.2-010 (West 2024) (incorporation accomplished by delivering articles of incorporation to the Secretary of State for filing); id. § 271B.2-020 (required contents of articles of incorporation).

[29] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.2-030(1) (West 2024) (“Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence shall begin when the articles of incorporation are filed by the Secretary of State.”).

[30] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.270 (1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274, § 54).

[31] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.275 (1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274, § 55).

[32] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.280 (1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 274, § 57).

[33] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.035 (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 383).

[34] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.055(1) (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 385).

[35] Id.

[36] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.055(2) (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 385).

[37] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.065 (1946 Ky. Acts, p. 386).

[38] See, e.g., Ky. Const. § 207 (repealed 2002) (requiring that corporations utilize cumulative voting in the election of directors).

[39] See generally 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171.

[40] See 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 2 (detailing the requirements to properly effectuate articles of incorporation).

[41] See 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 3.

[42] 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 5.

[43] 31 U.S.C.A. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i).

[44] See 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 165 (S.B. 254); id. § 1 (“This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Kentucky Nonprofit Corporation Act.’”).

[45] See 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 165, § 29.

[46] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.010 (repealed 1968) (“Unless expressly included, corporations organized under KRS 273.020 shall not be subject to any statutes relating to corporations having a capital stock or organized for pecuniary profit, except KRS 271.385, requiring an agent for service of process, but shall at all times, be subject to visitation by the legislature.”).

[47] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.020 (repealed 1968).

[48] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.030 (repealed 1968).

[49] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.160 (repealed 1968).

[50] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.160(4) (repealed 1968) (“except as specifically provided in KRS 273.160 to 273.290, corporations organized under KRS 273.160 to 273.290 are not subject to any of the statues relating to corporations having capital stock or organized for pecuniary profit . . . .”).

[51] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.170 (repealed 1968).

[52] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.190 (repealed 1968).

[53] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273.200 (repealed 1968).

[54] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 272.131(3) (repealed and reenacted 2010) (The articles of incorporation “shall be filed and recorded in accordance with the statute relating to corporations generally; and when so filed, the articles of incorporation, or certified copies thereof, shall be received in all the courts of this state, and other places, as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, and of the due incorporation of the association . . . .”).

[55] See Id. (“A copy of the articles of incorporation, indorsed by the Secretary of State with the fact and time of recording in his office, shall be filed with the dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky and with the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture.”).

[56] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 272.410 (amended 1980) (“The articles of incorporation shall be signed, acknowledged, filed and recorded in accordance with the provisions of the general corporation law of this state, . . . .”).

[57] See Id.

[58] Currently, KRS § 271B.2-030 provides:

(1) Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence shall begin when the articles of incorporation are filed by the Secretary of State.

(2) The Secretary of State's filing of the articles of incorporation shall be conclusive proof that the incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to incorporation, except in a proceeding by the state to cancel or revoke the incorporation or involuntarily dissolve the corporation.

[59] Currently, KRS § 14A.2-070(1) provides:

(1)  Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section and KRS 14A.2-090(3), a document delivered to the Secretary of State for filing shall be effective:

(a)  On the date and at the time of filing, as evidenced by such means as the Secretary of State may use for the purpose of recording the date and time of filing; or                                          
(b) At the time specified in the document as its effective time on the date it is effective.

[60] See Thomas E. Rutledge and Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentuckys New Organizational Option, 83 Ky. L. J. 1 at 59 - 61 (1994-95).

[61] See T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553. This path greatly irritated the IRS, and it attempted to deprive these newly minted corporations of classification as “corporations” under the Internal Revenue Code. See Rutledge & Booth, supra note 60, at 74 (“Those efforts were unavailing and ultimately abandoned by the Service”). Professional service corporation provisions were first added to Kentucky law in 1962. See 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 236 (H.B. 97).                        

[62] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.015:

(1) One (1) or more individuals, … may incorporate and form a professional service corporation by filing articles of incorporation in the office of the Secretary of State.….

(2) A professional service corporation formed under the provisions of this chapter, except as this chapter may otherwise provide, shall have the same powers, authority, duties, and liabilities as a corporation formed under, and shall be otherwise governed by, KRS Chapter 271B. 

[63] See also 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 236 (H.B. 97) § 2(1) (referencing then in effect KRS ch. 271).

[64] See also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.015(2); 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 236, § 2(2).

[65] See 1936 Ky. Acts, 4th Ext. Sess. ch. 6, § 1 (“This act may be known, cited and referred to as the ‘Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation Act.’”).

[66] See 1936 Ky. Acts, 4th Ext. Sess. ch. 6, § 32 (“Whereas, many Rural Electric Cooperative Corporations are now ready to be organized and delay in their organization will endanger their receiving the federal funds appropriated for that purpose, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall become a law and be effective from and after it’s approval by the Governor.”).

[67] See Baldwins (1939 supp.) § 833j-4 (Setting forth the required contents of the articles of incorporation); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.030 (repealed and reenacted 2010).

[68] See Baldwins (1939 supp.) § 833j-3; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.020 (Under current law the required number of incorporators has been reduced to three).

[69] See Baldwins (1939 supp.) § 833j-5.

[70] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.040(2) (amended 2010).

[71] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147 (S.B. 69).

[72] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 3 (detailing required and optional provisions of articles of incorporation).

[73] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 2.

[74] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 5(1).

[75] See 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 147, § 5(2).

[76] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 279.350 (amended in 2010).

[77] See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xvi); see also Update of the Public Utility Exemption Under the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 83782 (Oct. 18, 2024).

[78] See 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 28, § 7(8) (H.B. 35); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.8-300(8) (amended in 2017).

[79] See also Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2017 Amendments to Kentuckys Business Entity Statutes, 56 Lou.                         L. Rev. 55 (Fall 2017). Amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act to provide for benefit corporations were approved in 2020. See Proposed Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act - New Chapter 17 on Benefit Corporations, 74 Bus. L. 819 (Summer 2019); Proposed (Revised) Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act - New Chapter 17 on Benefit Corporations, 74 Bus. L. 1177 (Fall 2019).

[80] The CTA and the Reporting Regulations provide an exception from classification as a reporting company for a “tax exempt entity.” See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xix). This exemption is not applicable to a benefit corporation in that a benefit corporation is a for-profit venture that ipso facto is not a non-profit organization able to qualify under Code § 501(c).

[81] See FinCEN FAQ C.9 (Apr. 18, 2024) (emphasis added) https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2]. This focus upon creation by a Secretary of State filing is consistent with certain commentary released in connection with the release of the final Reporting Rules. See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59538 (“FinCEN … notes that the core consideration for the purposes of the CTA’s statutory text and the final rule is whether an “entity” is “created” by the filing of the document with the relevant authority.”); id. (“We emphasize again that the only relevant issue for the purposes of the CTA and the final rule is whether the filing “creates” the “entity.”) (emphasis added).                        

[82] See FinCEN FAQ C.9 (Apr. 18, 2024) https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs [https://perma.cc/789C-PXM2].

[83] See, e.g., 2021 Ky. Acts. ch. 203, § 3 (HB 321) (creating a corporation under the name the “West End Opportunity Partnership”); 2024 Ky. Acts ch. 171, § 4 (SB 299) (repealing and reenacting KRS § 230.225(1) to establish a corporation under the name the “Kentucky Horse Racing and Gaming Corporation.”). See also Mark Harris, The Government Corporation in Kentucky, 29 Ky. L. J. 288 (1941). At the federal level, the Boy Scouts of America is a corporation created through federal law passed by Congress. See 36 U.S.C. § 30901(a). The same applies to the Girl Scouts of the United States of America. See 36 U.S.C. § 80301. Indian tribal corporations may be formed under federal law through the issuance of a charter of incorporation by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (25 U.S.C. § 477) while in Oklahoma the same action is accomplished under section 3 of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 503. See also U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Tribal Economic Development Principles at a Glance Series - Choosing a Tribal Business Structure, (last visited Aug. 13, 2024) https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/ieed/bia/pdf/idc1-032915.pdf [https://perma.cc/52QC-6TPW]. As such, these are not “reporting companies” as defined under the CTA. Alternatively, corporations may come into existence pursuant to Indian tribal law or through a state corporation act; in either of those instances the company so created is absent an applicable exemption subject to the CTA as a reporting company.

[84] See 1994 Ky. Acts, ch. 389; see also Rutledge & Booth, supra note 60 at 4.

[85] By way of example, under the LLC Act as originally adopted, it was required that the articles of organization recite that the LLC would have at least two members. This requirement was put in as a bulwark against the accidental creation of a single member LLC, an organizational structure that, in 1994, was significantly unknown as the tax code did not contemplate a single-member limited liability organization that was not a corporation. See also Rutledge & Booth, supra note 60 at 9–10. In December 1996, the IRS modified its classification rules, abandoning as to unincorporated entities the “Kintner Regulations” and adopting the current “Check the Box” rules and as well providing for the tax treatment of what was referred to therein as a “disregarded entity.” In response this provision of the LLC act was repealed, allowing there to be organized in Kentucky single-member limited liability company. See 1998 Ky Acts, ch. 341, § 23 (amending KRS § 275.025).

[86] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.025(7) (2011); id. §§ 14A.2-070(1), (2) (2011).

[87] And not “irregardless.”

[88] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.025 (2011).

[89] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 275.370(3)(a)-(e) (2010).

[90] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.370(4) (2010).

[91] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.375(1) (2010).

[92] I cannot address the laws of any of the Indian Tribes or of any of the U.S. Territories.

[93] See, e.g., Unif. P’ship. Act (1914) § 6(1); Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 202(a); 6 Del. Code § 15-202(a); Ala. Code § 10A-8A-1.01; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.175; id. § 362.1-202(1); Va. Code § 50-73.88(A); see also In re: Copeland, 291 B.R. 740, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003); Flying Phx. Corp. v. Sinclair, 2024 WYCH 3, 40–41, 2024 Wyo. Trial Order LEXIS 4 (Wyo. Chan. Ct. April 25,2024) (“A partnership is formed when ‘two or more persons’ associate ‘to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,’ ‘whether or not the persons intended to form a partnership.’ The determinative intent is not the parties’ subjective intent to be characterized (or not characterized) as partners, but their ‘intent to do things that constitute a partnership.’ This means that absent a partnership agreement, or even when the parties express their subjective intent not to form a partnership, the parties may inadvertently create a partnership through their conduct.”) (citations omitted); William Mead Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 20 (1917) (“A partnership is created by mere agreement between the partners. The approval of the state is not necessary.”); John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, vol. II, Partnership, 228 (1839) (“Partnerships are created by mere act of the parties; and in this they differ from corporations which require the sanction of state authority, either express or implied.”) (Law Book Exchange, 2003, at p. 294).

[94] See Unif. P’ship. Act. (1914) § 6(2); Rev. Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 202(b); 6 Del. Code § 15-202(b); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.175 (2011); id. § 362.1-202(2); Va. Code § 50-73.88(B).

[95] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 303; 6 Del. Code § 15-303(b); Ala. Code § 10A-8A-3.03; Calif. Corps. Code § 16105; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-303 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.93.

[96] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 304; Ala. Code § 10A-8A-3.04; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-304 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.94.

[97] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 704; 6 Del. Code § 15-704(a); Ala. Code § 10-8A-7.04; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-704 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.115.

[98] See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship. Act (1997) § 805; 6 Del. Code § 15-805; Ala. Code §10-8A-8.05; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-805 (2011); Va. Code § 50-73.121.

[99] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.555(1) (2011); id. § 362.155(7).

[100] In certain states including Delaware a limited partnership may as well make this filing, but for purposes of simplicity and to retain our focus upon Kentucky law this discussion is in the context of a general partnership. Under the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006), a limited partnership may not elect LLP statute. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-931 (2013) (LLP election made in a statement of qualification which may be filed by a “partnership,” a class that does not encompass a limited partnership); id. § 362.1-202(2) (an organization created other than under the partnership act is not a partnership).

[101] See Unif. P’ship. Act § 15; Revised Unif. P’ship. Act § 306(a); 6 Del. Code § 15-306(a); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.220 (2007); id. § 362.2-306(1).                        

[102] See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge and Robert R. Keatinge, LLPS Are Not Reporting Companies, Bus. L. Today (Oct. 10, 2024); Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at Birth (Nearly), 66 Colo. L. Rev. 1065, 1069 (1995); Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 Bus. L. 147, 147–49 (Nov. 1995). See also Harwell Wells, The Unexpected Origins of the US Limited Liability Partnership, in The Origins of Company Law (eds. Victoria Barnes and Jonathan Hardman 2024).

[103] See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, The Place (If Any) of the Professional Structure in Entity Rationalization, 58 Bus. L. 1413, 1419–21 (Aug. 2003) (discussing several states’ partnership laws, with a focus on the leniency of some states compared to others). Please note as well that from 1982 through 1997, S-corporation status was limited to firms with 75 or fewer shareholders, greatly reducing the utility of S-corporation classified PSCs for the organization of professional firms. Further, because of the requirement to accelerate recognition of accounts receivable upon conversion from Subchapter K to either Subchapter C or Subchapter S, there existed significant impediments to the conversion of an existing firm from a general partnership to a professional service corporation.

[104] Through 1992 the AICPA provided that CPAs could practice as sole proprietorships, as general partnerships and as professional service corporations. See also Rutledge and Keatinge, supra note 102.

[105] See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.220(2) (2007); id. § 362.555 (a partial shield statute); id. 362.1- 306 (full shield); Rev. Unif. P’ship. Act § 306(c) (full shield); 6 Del. Code § 15-306(c); Ala. Code § 10-8A-306(c); Va. Code §50-73.96(C).

[106] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 362.1-201(2)(2006); see also Revised Unif. P’ship. Act § 201(b) (“A limited liability partnership continues to be the same entity that existed before the filing of the statement of qualification under Section 1001.”); 6 Del. Code § 15-201(b); 805 ILCS 206/201(b); Va. Code § 50-73.132(E) (“A partnership that has been registered as a limited liability partnership under this chapter is, for all purposes, the same entity that existed before it registered.”); Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. Pickett, 11 F.Supp.2d 449, 452 at fn. 12 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (commenting in footnote that the New York LLP statute “clearly enunciates that a general partnership that is registered as a RLLP is for all purposes the same entity that existed before registration and continues to be general partnership under the laws of New York”) (citation omitted); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 657 fn.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d 173 F.3d 844 (2nd Cir. 1999) (upon a partnership becoming a limited liability partnership, “The partnership was not dissolved and continued without interruption with the same partners, principals, employees, assets, rights, obligations, liabilities and operations as maintained prior to the change. Thus, Peat Marwick LLP is in all respects the successor in interest to Peat Marwick.”); Sascki v. McKinnon, 707 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio App. 1997) (“Those two entities, E&Y and E&Y LLP are, but for the corporate change to a limited liability partnership designation, the same entities for all practical intents and purposes.”); Maupin v. Meadow Park Manor, 125 P.2d 611 (Mont. 2005) (LLP is “same entity that existed before registration”); Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 699 (Ala. 2005) (A LLP “is for all purposes, except as provided in Section 10-8A-306 [not relevant to our inquiry], the same entity that existed before the registration and continues to be a partnership under the laws of this state . . . .” (citing Ala. Code § 10-8A-1001(i)); Riccardi v. Young & Young, LLP, 74 Misc.3d 911, 915 (City Court of New York, Cohoes, Albany County 2022) (“An LLP is a general partnership which acquires limited liability characteristics upon registration with the Secretary of State.”) (citation omitted).

[107] Codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 362.2. See also Thomas E. Rutledge & Allan W. Vestal, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) Comes to Kentucky: An Owner’s Manual, 34 N. Ky. L. Rev. 41, 411–121 (2007); Thomas E. Rutledge and Allan W. Vestal, Rutledge & Vestal on Kentucky Partnerships and Limited Partnerships (2010).

[108] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.2-201(1) (2011) (“In order to form a limited partnership, a certificate of limited partnership shall be delivered to the Secretary of State for filing.”); see also id. § 14A.2-010 (2015); id. § 14A.2-070 (2012).

[109] See 1988 Ky Acts, ch. 284 (HB 582), codified at KRS §§ 362.401 through 550.

[110] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.415(1) (“In order to form a limited partnership, a certificate of limited partnership shall be executed and filed with the Secretary of State.”); id. § 362.415(2) (“A limited partnership shall be formed at the time of the filing of the certificate of limited partnership with the Secretary of State or at any later times specified in the certificate of limited partnership …”).                        

[111] See 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 97 (S.B. 172).

[112] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.420(b).

[113] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.420 as amended by 1986 Ky. Acts 342 (SB 224) (newly added text underlined and italics).

[114] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.420(2) (“A limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial compliance in good faith with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section.”).

[115] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.020 (“The persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall sign a written statement, showing the name and place of residence of each partner, the name or style of the firm, who are the general and who are the special partners, ….”); id. § 362.030 (“The statement and affidavit shall be acknowledged or approved before and recorded by the county clerk of each county in which a place of business of the firm is situated, in the same manner as deeds are acknowledged, approved and recorded. No limited partnership shall be deemed to have been formed until such record has been made and the statement has been published once a week for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper printed in each of the proposed places of business”); see also Baldwins 3769, GS ch. 82, § 4.

[116] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.2-201(2).

[117] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.555.

[118] See 1994 Ky. Acts, ch. 389, § 102(1) (not containing the “that is not a limited partnership” language subsequently added in 2006).

[119] What is a “business trust” under this statute is defined as:

A business trust is an express trust created by a written declaration of trust whereby property is conveyed to one (1) or more trustees, who hold and manage same for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be or become, the holders of transferable certificates evidencing the beneficial interest in the trust estate. For the purposes of KRS 386.370 to 386.440, business trusts shall include but are not limited to "Real Estate Investment Trusts" as defined by and which comply with the Federal Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended or such section or sections of any subsequent Internal Revenue Code as may be applicable to real estate investment trusts.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 386.370(1) (2010).

[120] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 386.380 (1966) (“A business trust may be established by a declaration of trusts, duly executed by one (1) or more trustees, for any full purpose . . . .”).

[121] For a review of this uniform act, see Thomas E. Rutledge & Ellisa O. Habbart, The Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act: A Review, 65 Bus. L. 1055 (Aug. 2010).

[122] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386A.1-010 (2012). For a review of this act as adopted in Kentucky, see Thomas E. Rutledge, The Kentucky Uniform Statutory Trust Act (2012): A Review, 40 N. Ky. L. Rev. 93 (2012–13) (explaining how at the time of the work’s publication, Kentucky was at the forefront of states by enacting the USTA).

[123] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386A.2-010(1) (2012) (“A statutory trust is formed when a certificate of trust that complies with subsection (2) of this section and filed by the Secretary of State is effective as determined under KRS 14A.2–070.”).

[124]See Thomas Earl Geu and James Dean, The Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act: An Introduction, 13 Drake J. of Agric. L. 63 (2008) (reviewing the Uniform Act); Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2012 Amendments to Kentucky’s Business Entity Statutes, 101 Ky. L.J. Online 1 (2012) (reviewing the act as adopted in Kentucky including the departures from the uniform act). The Kentucky Limited Cooperative Associations Act is codified at chapter 272A of KRS.

[125] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 272A.3-010(2) (2012) (“To form a limited cooperative association, an organizer of the association shall deliver articles of association to the Secretary of State for filing. The limited cooperative association is formed when articles of association that comply with subsection (3) of this section are filed by the Secretary of State, and are effective as determined under KRS 14A.2-070.”).

[126] See Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 273A.

[127] See generally Thomas. E. Rutledge, The 2015 Amendments to the Kentucky Business Entity Statutes, 42 N. Ky. L. Rev. 128 at 160 et seq. (2016) (explaining the formation process).

[128] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273A.005(11) (2015) (“‘Unincorporated nonprofit association’ means in unincorporated association consisting of two (2) or more members joined under an agreement that is oral, in a record, or implied from conduct, for one (1) or more common, nonprofit purposes.”).

[129] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273A.040 (2017).

[130] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273A.030(1) (2015).

[131]See Christina M. Houston, Robert R. Keatinge, Thomas E. Rutledge & James J. Wheaton, The Corporate Transparency Act: Are Rumors of its Death Exaggerated?, Bus. L. Today (March 17, 2025); Christina M. Houston, Robert R. Keatinge, Thomas E. Rutledge & James J. Wheaton, The Corporate Transparency Act Is Still on Pause, but Less So, Bus. L. Today (Feb. 7, 2025); and Christina M. Houston, Robert R. Keatinge, Thomas E. Rutledge & James J. Wheaton, The FinCEN That Stole Christmas: The Corporate Transparency Act Year 1, Bus. L. Today (Jan. 13, 2025).

[132] See Letter from Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Charles E. Grassley to Scott Bessent, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury (Mar. 10, 2025).

[133] See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirement Revision and Deadline Extension, 90 C.F.R. 13688 (Mar. 26, 2025); see also FinCEN, Interim Final Rule: Questions and Answers, available at Interim Final Rule: Questions and Answers. FinCEN.gov.

[134] See also Nikki McCann Ramirez, Exciting News’: Trump Brags About Gutting Anti-Money Laundering Law, Rolling Stone (March 3, 2025); Casey Wetherbee, The United States of Money Laundering, MSN.com (March 8, 2025).

State Executive Impeachment – We Need to Know More

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State Executive Impeachment – We Need to Know More

Gerald L. Neuman*

Impeachment in the legislature provides an important method of accountability for the abuse of executive office in the states, although the political character of the forum also creates risks. At the highest level of state government, impeachment enables state legislators to oust a transgressive governor. Over the years, eight state governors have been impeached and removed,[2] and others have resigned to avoid impeachment.[3] Resignations can be as important a result of an impeachment inquiry as a completed conviction.

Impeachment also reaches lower levels of the executive branch, most importantly the various executive officers who are independently elected and not freely subject to removal by the governor during their terms. State government structure contrasts with the federal government in the multiplicity of elected executive officials. No federal executive officer has ever been impeached and convicted, while quite a few state officers have been.[4] Kentucky recently witnessed its first impeachment conviction in over a century, of an elected prosecutor who extorted nude photos from a criminal defendant.[5] The last preceding conviction involved state treasurer James W. “Honest Dick” Tate, who embezzled vast sums and fled the country.[6] Other Kentucky officials have resigned after efforts began to impeach them.[7]

Consistent with the focus in the Journal’s recent Symposium on legislative/executive interactions, I emphasize here impeachment of executives, not judges. Impeachment does apply to judges, and in fact the only federal officers whom Congress has removed by impeachment have been life-tenured Article III judges.[8] However, impeachment of judges raises distinct issues of judicial independence, and the need for impeachment of state judges has decreased with the advent of modern systems of judicial discipline.[9]  Nonetheless, threats of impeachment and occasional removals do still occur.[10]

Impeachment talk is notoriously common. Reportedly, the past few decades saw a rise in demands for impeachment and the current extremely polarized political environment has resulted in a further increase.[11] Nonetheless even today the impetus for impeachment of an abusive official may come from the official’s own party.[12] We need more data to understand better the factors that make impeachment efforts at the state level succeed, and how the relevant factors may change over time.

Unfortunately, scholars have not given commensurate attention to the operation of state legislative impeachment, particularly on a nationwide comparative basis. The documentation of these lower profile events is dispersed, even for actual convictions, let alone for impeachment efforts that produce resignations. In 1895, the prolific treatise-writer Roger Foster included an avowedly incomplete survey of state impeachment trials in his Commentaries on U.S. constitutional law.[13] He also observed that the “fear of the disgrace [of impeachment] has caused the resignation of many corrupt judges, State and Federal, who shall here remain nameless.”[14] Just over forty years ago, Professors Peter Charles Hoffer and Natalie Hull published a volume analyzing the origins of U.S. impeachment practice and its application in the early Republic.[15] There are occasionally studies of particular states or of particularly significant state impeachments.[16]

Fuller knowledge of the facts could facilitate comparative studies of the dynamics of impeachment efforts and their effects. Impeachment now exists in all the states, after a 2024 ballot measure adopted it for Oregon.[17] Modern impeachment procedures in most states resemble the federal model, with accusation voted in the lower house, and trial in the state senate.[18] The percentage of legislators required at each stage can vary from the federal practice. Several states (now including Oregon) require 2/3 of the lower house to vote for impeachment instead of a majority.[19] Massachusetts requires only a majority of the upper house to convict instead of two-thirds, and has actually removed an official using this rule.[20]  One might expect that the varying percentages of votes required at each stage of impeachment proceedings affect the likelihood of initiation or of conviction, but there appears to be no study examining this question.                                                                                                                                              

In normative terms, it must be recognized that the impeachment process is subject to abuse for purposes foreign to its ostensible rationale. Allowing groups of politicians to judge claims of misconduct by a government official opens opportunities for partisanship and arbitrariness. Nonetheless, legislative authority provides an ultimate check on official wrongdoing that executive authority cannot or will not prevent. The need for running the risk may depend on the availability of other methods of removing the officials who are subject to impeachment.

Undoubtedly, impeachment has been abused in the past. A notorious set of examples arose after the Civil War, when the resurgent ex-Confederates used various types of law and violence to drive Blacks and their allies out of state governments. The impeachment of North Carolina Governor William Woods Holden, and the resignations of Mississippi Governor Adelbert Ames[21] and of the distinguished Black jurist Jonathan Jasper Wright,[22] are prominent illustrations. The early 20th century impeachment of New York Governor William Sulzer, as the Tammany Hall machine’s revenge after he turned to reform, offers another object lesson.[23]

In empirical terms, it seems reasonable to assume that impeachment competes with other removal options, and that one of the factors making impeachments or convictions less likely to occur would be the availability of easier alternatives. On the other hand, in most states (as in the federal government) impeachment can lead not only to removal but to disqualification from future office, which may be important to legislators in particular cases.[24] Without better data, the interaction among alternatives is difficult to explore.

One alternative mechanism for removal is a recall election. Nineteen states (not Kentucky) provide for recall of statewide officials.[25] Successful recalls of governors are rare – only two so far, one in North Dakota in 1921, and Gray Davis of California in 2003, who was replaced by Arnold Schwarzenegger.[26]

In a small minority of states certain executive officials may also be subject to removal by legislative “address,” a procedure originally created in England for removal of royal judges by Parliament, and adapted in state constitutions as a form of removal for state judges or executive officials or both. (Kentucky’s 1792 constitution authorized address for removal of state judges,[27] and the 1891 constitution extended it to railroad commissioners,[28] but these provisions have since been repealed.) As the Delaware Supreme Court explained in a 2022 opinion, removal by address can respond to less serious causes of unfitness for office than impeachment would legally require.[29] Different state constitutions frame the legislature’s address as a request to the governor to remove the individual, or as obliging the government to remove the individual.[30] Depending on the purpose of the analysis, the obligatory version of address might be viewed as a variant form of impeachment, while the nonbinding version of address might be viewed as a separate procedure that makes impeachment unnecessary if a larger set of actors agrees on removal.

Unlike U.S. presidents,[31] state governors who commit crimes, including some forms of corruption, may be subject to federal prosecution while in office. Independent state attorneys general or prosecutors may also be able to investigate or indict governors in ways that provoke resignation. State constitutions or statutes often provide that an executive official who is convicted of certain crimes shall be removed from office, or that the office automatically becomes vacant.[32] Nonetheless, the state legislature may be unwilling to leave an abusive official in power while awaiting the outcome of the criminal process, especially if the office remains occupied pending appeal.[33]

Thus, the greater independence that elected state officials have creates more occasions for state legislative intervention, and to varying degrees the need for intervention is counterbalanced by the availability of other methods for removal.

In short, the prevailing concentration of scholars on federal impeachment has distracted from a larger body of evidence regarding state-level impeachment. Our understanding of state practice would benefit from a variety of qualitative and quantitative studies, and to that end from the collection and publication of relevant data for all states. Both historical and contemporary projects would be useful here. As a starting point, I provide below a listing of the state-level impeachment convictions from 1776 to 2023 that I have found in the course of my own reading and research. We need to know more.

List of State Executive and Judicial Impeachment Convictions

(not necessarily complete) 

State and Year

Name

Office (or former office)

New Jersey 1778

Thomas Denny

Judge

New Jersey 1779

William Miller

Judge

New Jersey 1784

Peter Hopkins

Judge

Vermont* 1785

John Barret

Judge

Vermont* 1785

Matthew Lyon

Clerk of Court

Massachusetts 1788

William Greenleaf

Sheriff

Georgia 1791

Henry Osborne

Judge

South Carolina 1793

Alexander Moultrie

Attorney General

Massachusetts 1794

William Hunt

Judge

New Jersey 1799

Elijah Godfrey

Judge

Massachusetts 1800

John Vinal

Judge

Kentucky 1803

Thomas Jones

Surveyor

Ohio 1805

William Irvin

Judge

Pennsylvania 1805

Alexander Addison

Judge

Tennessee 1806

Isaac Philips

Judge

Ohio 1807

Robert Slaughter

Judge

South Carolina 1807

Daniel D’Oyley

Treasurer

South Carolina 1812

John Clark

Sheriff

Tennessee 1812

William Cocke

Judge

South Carolina 1814

Matthew O’Driscoll

Clerk of Court

Massachusetts 1821

James Prescott

Judge

Indiana 1821

Aaron Vandever

Judge

Tennessee 1822

Samuel Williams

Surveyor

Indiana 1825

Isaiah Cooper

Judge

Indiana 1826

Nathaniel Marks

Sheriff

Missouri 1826

Richard Thomas

Judge

New Jersey 1830

Henry Miller

Judge

Indiana 1832

Young Hughes

Judge

Louisiana 1844

Benjamin Elliot

Judge

California 1857

Henry Bates

Treasurer

California 1862

James Hardy

Judge

Kansas 1862

George Hillyer

Auditor

Kansas 1862

John Robinson

Secretary of State

Missouri 1867

Walter King

Judge

Tennessee 1867

Thomas Frazier

Judge

Louisiana 1870

George Wickliffe

Auditor

North Carolina 1871

William Woods Holden

Governor

Nebraska 1871

David Butler

Governor

New York 1872

George Barnard

Judge

Minnesota 1853

William Seeger

Treasurer

West Virginia 1875

John Burdett

Treasurer

Mississippi 1876

Alexander Kelso Davis

Lieutenant Governor

Georgia 1879

Washington Goldsmith

Comptroller General

Minnesota 1881

E. St. Julien Cox

Judge

New Jersey 1886

Patrick Laverty

Prison Warden

Kentucky 1888

James Tate

Treasurer

New Jersey 1895

Patrick Connelly

Judge

New York 1913

William Sulzer

Governor

Oklahoma 1915

A.P. Watson

Corporations Commissioner

Tennessee 1916

Jesse Edgington

Judge

Tennessee 1916

Z. Newton Estes

District Attorney

Texas 1917

James Ferguson

Governor

Montana 1918

Charles Liebert Crum

Judge

Oklahoma 1923

John Walton

Governor

Montana 1927

Charles Stewart

Secretary of State

Oklahoma 1929

Henry Johnston

Governor

Massachusetts 1941

Daniel Coakley

Governor’s Council

Michigan 1943

Michael Nolan

Judge

Tennessee 1958

Raulston Schoolfield

Judge

Oklahoma 1965

Napoleon Johnson

Judge

Texas 1976

O.P. Carrillo

Judge

Florida 1978

Samuel Smith

Judge

Arizona 1988

Evan Mecham

Governor

Pennsylvania 1994

Rolf Larsen

Judge

Missouri 1994

Judith Moriarty

Secretary of State

Nevada 2004

Kathy Augustine

Controller

Nebraska 2006

C. David Hergert

Regent

Illinois 2009

Rod Blagojevich

Governor

South Dakota 2022

Jason Ravnsborg

Attorney General

Kentucky 2023

Ronnie Goldy Jr.

Prosecutor

(*Vermont was not admitted as a state until 1791)


* J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School.

[2] The eight were William Woods Holden, North Carolina (1871); David Butler, Nebraska (1871); William Sulzer, New York (1913); James Ferguson, Texas (1917); John Walton, Oklahoma (1923); Henry Johnston, Oklahoma (1929); Evan Mecham, New Mexico (1988); and Rod Blagojevich, Illinois (2009). See Becky Little, 8 US Governors Who Were Impeached and Convicted, History (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/us-governors-impeached-convicted-left-office [https://perma.cc/9F9T-G659].

[3] Such as Andrew Cuomo in New York (2021), and John G. Rowland in Connecticut (2004). See Luis Ferré-Sadurní and Jeffery C. Mays, Cuomo Is Resigning, but Some Legislators Still Want to Impeach Him, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/12/nyregion/cuomo-impeachment-investigation.html [permalink unavailable]; Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709, 712 n.1 (Conn. 2004). At the federal level, Richard Nixon resigned to avoid impeachment. See Ron Elving, Half a century ago, Nixon became the only president to resign, NPR (Aug. 9, 2024), https://www.npr.org/2024/08/09/nx-s1-5068704/nixon-resign [https://perma.cc/93RP-PFLX].

[4] How federal impeachment works, USA.Gov (last accessed Feb. 24, 2025), https://www.usa.gov/impeachment [https://perma.cc/7ADF-AHKR].

[5] See Kentucky Senate convicts ex-prosecutor in impeachment trial, Associated Press (Mar. 20, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/impeachment-prosecutor-nude-photos-kentucky-senate-f5e6774d8622739e8842ede5777a431e [permalink unavailable]. The prosecutor, Ronnie Goldy, Jr., had resigned amidst the impeachment proceedings, but the legislators still went forward, and Goldy was convicted and disqualified from future office in Kentucky. See In re Articles of Impeachment against Ronnie Lee Goldy, Jr., 2023 Sess. (Ky. 2023) https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/23rs/RLGJ_ImpeachmentResult.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3M-QMBJ].

[6] See Robert Schrage & John Schaaf, Hidden History of Kentucky Political Scandals, ch. 3 (2020).

[7] In 1991, Commissioner of Agriculture Ward Burnette resigned after impeachment and before Senate trial. See Jailed Kentucky Official Quits, N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/07/us/7-arizona-lawmakers-charged-with-corruption.html [permalink unavailable]. Also in 2023, prosecutor Richard Boling resigned after the introduction of an impeachment resolution against him. See Andrew Wolfson, Western Kentucky prosecutor to resign rather than face impeachment, Louisville Courier J. (Jan. 9, 2023), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2023/01/09/rick-boling-resignation-kentucky-commonwealth-attorney/69792238007/ [https://perma.cc/C7SU-QHJP].

[8]  See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives Archive, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/ [https://perma.cc/8HNY-VV2F] (listing all impeachments passed by the House and their outcomes).

[9]  See, e.g., Hon. R. David Proctor, An Overview of Judicial Independence from Impeachment to Court-Packing, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1147, 1152-59 (2017); See also Gerald L. Neuman, Impeachment as Cause or Cure of Human Rights Violations, in Impeachment in a Global Context: Law, Politics, and Comparative Practice 3 (Chris Monaghan, Matthew Flinders & Aziz Z. Huq eds. 2024).

[10] See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1217, 1229-30 (2019) (discussing 2018 impeachment of the entire supreme court of West Virginia); In re Larsen, 812 A.2d 642, 644-46 (Pa. Spec. Trib. 2002) (discussing 1994 impeachment and removal of Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen).

[11] See, e.g., Peter Baker, Inside Impeachment’s Rise as a Weapon of Partisan Warfare, N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2024) https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/us/politics/impeachments-weapon-partisan-warfare.html. [permalink unavailable]; Bruce Schreiner, Impeachment fever hits Kentucky with efforts to oust leaders, Associated Press (Jan. 31, 2021) https://apnews.com/general-news-f9ebaa25985fee93634e1f28500536c1 [permalink unavailable].

[12] Recent examples include the impeachment and removal of South Dakota Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg, and the impeachment but acquittal of Texas Attorney General Robert Paxton. See Julie Bosman, South Dakota Removes Its Attorney General After Fatal Crash, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/us/jason-ravnsborg-impeachment-south-dakota.html [permalink unavailable] (discussing the impeachment and conviction of South Dakota’s Republican Attorney General, Jason Ravnsborg, by a Republican dominated state Senate); Zach Despart, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton acquitted on all 16 articles of impeachment, The Tex. Tribune (Sept. 16, 2023) https://www.texastribune.org/2023/09/16/ken-paxton-acquitted-impeachment-texas-attorney-general/ [https://perma.cc/JC9N-NSW9] (discussing the impeachment of Texas Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton by House Republicans and acquittal in state Senate). As prominent examples from earlier times, Governors Butler, Sulzer and Ferguson were removed by opponents from their own party. Supra note 2.

[13] See 1 Roger Foster, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Historical and Juridical, with Observations upon the Ordinary Provisions of State Constitutions and a Comparison with the Constitutions of Other Countries 633-713 (Boston, The Boston Book Co.1895) (describing acquittals and abandoned proceedings as well as convictions).

[14] Id. at 630.

[15] See Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull, Impeachment in America 1635-1805 (1984).

[16] See, e.g., Cortez A.M. Ewing, Early Tennessee Impeachments, 16 Tenn. Hist. Q. 291 (1957) (surveying Tennessee impeachments); Impeached: The Removal of Texas Governor James E. Ferguson 14 (Jessica Brannon-Wranosky & Bruce A. Glasrud eds. 2017) (chronicling the impeachment of Texas governor James E. Ferguson); Hannah Haksgaard, Tyler Moore, & Gabrielle Unruh, Making South Dakota History: An Introduction to the Special Impeachment Issue, S. D. L. Rev. 159 (2023) (issue focused on the impeachment of Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg).

[17] See Dianne Lugo, 3 of 5 statewide ballot measures fail in Oregon, Salem Statesman J. (Nov. 9, 2024), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/09/oregon-election-results-2024-ballot-measures-approve-fail/76091373007/ [https://perma.cc/687D-GKAY] (discussing the passing of Ballot Measure 115, granting Oregon lawmakers impeachment power); Or. Const. art. IV, §34. Previously the Oregon Constitution had dispensed with impeachment. See Foster, supra note 13, at 528; Or. Const. 1857, art. VII, §19.

[18] Alaska Const. art. II, § 20 (The Alaska Constitution reverses the roles of the house and senate); Mo. Const. art. VII, § 2; Neb. Const. art. III, § 17 (Missouri and Nebraska provide for trial in the state supreme court, after accusation by the house in Missouri, and by the unicameral state legislature in Nebraska).

[19] E.g., Fla. Const. art. III, §17; Utah Const. art. VI, §17.

[20] See Mass. Const. of 1780, part II, ch. I, §2, art. VIII; 1941 Mass. Sen. J. 1535-52 (1941) (giving count-by-count votes on conviction and removal by majority of Daniel Coakley, an elected member of the Governor’s Council).

[21] See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 441, 562 (1988) (on Holden and Ames).

[22]  See Richard Gergel & Belinda Gergel, “To Vindicate the Cause of the Downtrodden”: Associate Justice Jonathan Jasper Wright and Reconstruction in South Carolina, in At Freedom’s Door: African American Founding Fathers and Lawyers in Reconstruction South Carolina 36 (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke Jr. eds. 2000).

[23] See e.g., Matthew L. Lifflander, The Only New York Governor Ever Impeached, 85(5) N.Y. State Bar Assn. J. 11 (2013).

[24] See Gerald L. Neuman, Impeachment, Disqualification, and Human Rights, 54 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 627, 652 (2023); In re Goldy, supra note 5; John R. Lundberg, The Great Texas “Bear Fight”: Progressivism and the Impeachment of James E. Ferguson, in Brannon-Wranosky & Glasrud , supra note 16, at 44-45.

[25] Recall of State Officials, National Conference of State Legislatures, (last updated Sep. 15, 2021) https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials [permalink unavailable].

[26] See Shaun Bowler, Recall and Representation: Arnold Schwarzenegger Meets Edmund Burke, 40 Representation 200 (2004); Id. at 207-08 (Bowler also reported a figure of 15 successful recalls of statewide officials (not including Davis), and many more at the municipal level).

[27]  Ky. Const. of 1792 art. V, para. 2; see also Ky. Const. §§ 112, 129 (repealed 1975).

[28]  Ky. Const. § 209 (repealed 2000).

[29]  Opinion of the Justices, 274 A.3d 269, 278-79 (Del. Supreme Court 2022) (Although the opinion was sought and given in general terms, the legislature’s request was prompted by improprieties attributed to the elected state auditor, Kathy McGuiness, who subsequently resigned after being convicted of misdemeanors); Melissa Steele, General Assembly Seeks Guidance on Removing Elected Officials, Cape Gazette, (Nov. 5, 2021) https://www.capegazette.com/article/general-assembly-seeks-guidance-removing-elected-officials/230000 [https://perma.cc/W23C-KQ49]; Ryan Mavity, Del. Auditor McGuiness Sentenced to Probation, Fined, Cape Gazette, (Oct. 19, 2022) https://www.capegazette.com/article/del-auditor-mcguiness-sentenced-probation-fined/247818?source=rs [https://perma.cc/WSB9-768Y]; See N.H. Const. art. 73 (In some states, the constitutional provision on address expressly targets the process at causes that would not be sufficient to justify impeachment).

[30]  See S.C. Const. art. XV, § 3 (obligatory: “shall” remove); Del. Const. art. III, § 13 (discretionary: may remove).

[31]  See Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).

[32] See , e.g., Cal. Const. art. XX, § 11; Del. Const. art. XV, § 6 (“The Governor shall remove…”); for Kentucky, see Troy B. Daniels, Dawn L. Danley-Nichols, Kate R. Morgan, & Bryce C. Rhoades, Kentucky’s Statutory Collateral Consequences Arising From Felony Convictions: A Practitioner’s Guide, 35 N. Ky. L. Rev. 413, 425-28 (2008) (for Kentucky); Ky Const. art. 150.

[33] See State ex rel. Olsen v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (N.D. 1934) (finding that office of governor was immediately vacated upon federal fraud conviction, despite pendency of appeal); City of Pineville v. Collett, 172 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1943) (finding that office of city clerk was not vacated upon conviction for voluntary manslaughter until appeal had been decided).

Navigating Intoxicated Parenting: A Call for Clear Guidelines in Kentucky Law

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Navigating Intoxicated Parenting: A Call for Clear Guidelines in Kentucky Law

Emily Prince*

Introduction

While no specific age is provided in Kentucky law for when a child may stay home alone, in certain circumstances, Child Protective Services (CPS) will substantiate neglect against parents who leave their child unattended.[2] This occurs if the child is, for whatever reason, incapable of meeting their immediate needs while unattended in such a way “that the physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected.”[3] Similarly, if the child is of sufficient age and mental capacity so that the child is not placed at risk of harm by being alone, CPS will not substantiate a finding of supervision neglect against the parents or legal guardians.[4] CPS social workers often piggyback off of supervision neglect to substantiate findings of neglect against parents who are physically present but too intoxicated to care for the basic needs of their children, thereby negatively affecting the physical health and safety of the child.

An interesting conundrum occurs when the child is sufficiently capable of providing for their own immediate needs, yet the parent is physically present and intoxicated. In instances such as these, I, a former Kentucky CPS social worker from 2021 to 2022, was advised by different supervisors in different cases to do different things. In the first case, I was advised to unsubstantiate the allegation of neglect because there was no proof that the parental substance use affected the child. In the second case, I was advised to substantiate the allegation of neglect because the parental substance use alone does negatively affect the child. The reasons given were that in the case of an emergency, a parent would be unable to transport the child to a hospital or give consent to treatment, parental substance abuse places the child at greater risk of other abuse and neglect, and it places the child at risk of accidental ingestion or other exposure to drugs and drug paraphernalia. In both cases, the children were sufficiently competent such that a finding of supervision neglect would have been unsubstantiated should the child have been alone for the same amount of time.

Currently, Kentucky leaves significant room open for CPS and trial courts to find supervision neglect against a parent solely due to a parent’s misuse of substances, even though the parent did not expose the child to increased risk in other ways. Such a finding of neglect can lead to the child being removed from the home and placed with relatives or in foster care. While parental substance abuse may increase the risk of environmental hazards[5] and is correlated with negative social-psychological effects,[6] when these risks are not present or are minimized, the child’s interest in stability and maintaining family bonds and the state’s interest in preserving resources should be predominant. Unfortunately, the ambiguities in Kentucky’s statutory and administrative guidelines have proven ripe for CPS social worker discretion and inconsistency in finding parental substance misuse as child neglect. In response, Kentucky rule–makers should amend statutory and administrative guidelines to make clear that parental substance abuse alone, without more, is not grounds for substantiating neglect, but may be grounds for other interventions aimed at strengthening families and reducing the associated risks. 

     I.         Current Kentucky Law Leaves Too Much Room for Inconsistent Application 

A.     Existing Kentucky Legislation Leaves Significant Discretion for the Cabinet 

Kentucky Revised Statutes defines “abused or neglected child” in relevant part as:

(1) [A] child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when:

(a) His or her parent, guardian, person in a position of authority or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child: . . .

2. Creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury as defined in this section to the child by other than accidental means;

3. Engages in a pattern of conduct that renders the parent incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child, including but not limited to parental incapacity due to a substance use disorder as defined in KRS 222.005;

4. Continuously or repeatedly fails or refuses to provide essential parental care and protection for the child, considering the age of the child; . . .

8. Does not provide the child with adequate care, supervision, food, clothing, shelter, and education or medical care necessary for the child's well-being when financially able to do so or offered financial or other means to do so . . .  [.][7]

Three points are noteworthy. First, parental substance abuse is mentioned only in subsection three. Second, to satisfy subsection three, the phrase, “[e]ngages in a pattern of conduct . . .” indicates that abuse or neglect in this instance requires a pattern of offenses, not just an isolated incident. Third, substance use disorder alone is insufficient to meet the criteria of abuse or neglect—the parent must also be incapable of meeting the child’s needs. In other words, the parent’s substance use must have an effect on the child.  

B.     Administrative Regulations Leave Significant Discretion for Worker 

922 KAR 1:330(2)(4) provides, in relevant part, that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) shall: 

(b) Investigate or conduct an assessment upon receipt of a report that alleges neglect of a child perpetrated by a caretaker that may result in harm to the health and safety of a child in the following areas: . . .

2. Supervision neglect if the individual reporting has reason to believe that the physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected by lack of necessary and appropriate supervision; . . .

8. Neglect due to a caretaker's use of drugs or alcohol that results in:

a. A child born exposed to drugs or alcohol, as documented by a health care provider pursuant to:

(i) 42 U.S.C. 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii); and

(ii) KRS 620.030(2);

b. A child's facilitated access to and use of drugs or alcohol that may result in a life-threatening situation for the child . . . [.][8] 

As substance abuse is only specifically mentioned regarding children’s access or exposure to drugs, social workers typically rely on supervision neglect when confronted with allegations of parental substance abuse.[9] The theory is that intoxication renders the parents unable to appropriately supervise their children. Although statutory and administrative guidance comes short in answering what constitutes “necessary and appropriate supervision,”[10] it nevertheless remains clear that the child must be detrimentally affected by the failure of the parents to supervise their child.[11] Inconsistency arises in practice concerning whether the “physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected” when the only potential for abuse arises from parental substance abuse in otherwise self–sufficient children. 

C.     Case Law Gives Rise to Unanswered Questions

M.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services[12] almost squarely addresses the problem presented in the introduction.  Although the father regularly consumed alcohol around his three children, who were thirteen and fifteen at the time, he maintained that his drinking did not “have an effect on his ability to parent and care for his children” and refused to attend intensive outpatient treatment.[13] When he drank, the children observed a change in the appearance of his eyes and his words would be slurred.[14] He only drank at night and always drank away from the children on the deck.[15] When he drove the children to school in the morning, he was sober.[16] One child was bothered by his drinking and it sometimes led to arguments between the child and her father.[17] The children had good school attendance and were excelling in school.[18] The social worker had “no concerns about them being properly fed, clothed, or otherwise provided for.”[19] The home was described as “extremely cluttered” but not dirty, and there was no indication that anything in the home posed “a threat to the children’s health or well-being.”[20]

The trial court “found that the children were neglected under KRS 600.020(1)(a)2, 3, 4, and 8.”[21] Finding that there were no means available to leave the children inside the home due to the father’s refusal to stop drinking or attend intensive outpatient treatment, the trial court removed the children from the home.[22] The Cabinet changed the permanency goal of the family to adoption and abandoned reunification efforts.[23] The father, M.C., “appealed the family court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed” the family court’s decision.[24]

M.C. appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, and the Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s finding of neglect.[25] The Supreme Court acknowledged that KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2) allows a neglect finding where “a risk of abuse exists and does not require actual abuse prior to the child’s removal from the home or limitation on the contact with an abusive parent,”[26] but nevertheless held that “‘the risk of harm must be more than a mere theoretical possibility,’ it must be ‘an actual and reasonable potential for harm.’”[27] The Court relied on the children’s age and abilities in overturning the neglect finding but declined to create a categorical age in which a child cannot be subjected to neglect from a parent’s substance use.[28] The Court distinguished this case from one in which the child was a newborn and required care “nearly twenty-four hours a day.”[29] The Court also emphasized that the record was devoid of evidence indicating that the father’s alcoholism impacted the needs of the children in any detrimental way.[30] The Court stated that, while “M.C. would be well-advised to continue to seek substance use treatment,” his substance use had not rendered him neglectful of his children.[31]

The case of M.C. was somewhat unique in two respects. First, M.C.’s success can be attributed to his ability to appeal the trial court’s ruling and overcome the discretion afforded to trial courts’ determinations of fact. In neglect and abuse cases, the Cabinet must prove neglect or abuse only by a preponderance of the evidence.[32] “A family court’s finding of fact in [an abuse or neglect] action ‘shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.’”[33] Trial courts have broad discretion in finding whether a child has been neglected or abused[34] and significant leeway in safekeeping their determinations from being overturned on appeal.[35] M.C. went through two appeals before the Supreme Court of Kentucky overturned the trial court’s finding of neglect.[36] Not all parents deemed neglectful due to a substance abuse disorder will be fortunate enough to have the resources to appeal once, let alone twice.[37]

Second, in M.C., the father was using alcohol, not illegal substances. Although M.C. did not address the distinction, it leaves open the question of whether the illegal nature of other substances places the children at higher risk of not having their needs met. Whether through causation or correlation, parental alcohol use appears to have better outcomes for those in the child protection systems than parental use of illegal drugs.[38] The Court also leaves open the question of what abuse or neglect due to substance abuse would look like for children who are self–sufficient and able to be on their own without supervision for extended periods.

In Cabinet for Health and Family Services on behalf of C.R. v. C.B.,[39] which the appellate court heavily relied on and the Supreme Court of Kentucky distinguished in M.C.,[40] the Court found that substance use alone can be the basis of a neglect finding without additional finding of harm to the particular child when the substance use has been the basis for a prior involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR).[41] In C.B., the father of a newborn who tested positive for suboxone at birth due to the mother’s prenatal substance use “admitted to using heroin, Percocet, and off-street suboxone.”[42] The father had previously had his parental rights to other children involuntarily terminated.[43] In upholding the trial court’s finding of neglect and reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that the father’s “prior history of drug abuse was found to have created a risk of harm in the prior TPR proceeding” and “the family court certainly does not have to wait for actual harm to occur before taking protective measures.”[44] The Court reiterated that “[KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2)], as written, permits the court’s finding where a risk of abuse exists and does not require actual abuse prior to the child’s removal from the home or limitation on the contact with an abusive parent.”[45] 

What exactly constitutes “a risk of abuse” is left undefined and subject to interpretation. The Court has insisted that “risk of harm must be more than a mere theoretical possibility” but “an actual and reasonable potential for harm.”[46] Surely, an alcoholic father of teenagers increases some risk of harm, yet M.C. found that it did not. While C.R. focused mostly on the prior TPR of the father,[47] the Court in M.C. made clear that the children’s ages were a predominant factor for the distinction.[48] M.C. also made clear that the fact that the children’s needs had not gone unmet was a motivating factor,[49] but no evidence was presented in C.R. that the newborn’s needs had gone unmet due to the father’s substance use.[50] What is left after these two cases is confusion, and confusion is a ripe breeding ground for inconsistent application of the law.

     II.         Supervision Neglect as a Basis for Finding Neglect Due to Parental Substance Abuse 

Given that no separate category of neglect exists for situations in which a parent is present but intoxicated, Cabinet workers must find that a case meets the criteria for supervision neglect before substantiating an allegation of neglect in such situations. The question becomes, then, whether, with all else being equal, the criteria for evaluating whether a child can be left unattended should be the same for when a child can be left alone with an intoxicated parent. Kentucky does not have a set age for when a child is permitted to stay alone.[51] Instead, Kentucky will accept a report for supervision neglect “if the individual reporting has reason to believe that the physical health and safety of the child is negatively affected by lack of necessary and appropriate supervision.”[52] Beyond this, workers are given a high level of discretion in how they determine whether a child may be left alone. One Cabinet worker, Misty, reported that she bases her discretion on “age, maturity, cognitive ability, etc.”[53] Misty assesses the child’s ability to respond appropriately in case of an emergency by providing the child with emergency scenarios and asking the child how they would respond, and also determining whether the child has access to emergency numbers.[54] Other workers will likely use similar criteria, but each worker will evaluate the information obtained differently.

Evaluating whether other factors should be considered beyond the age and abilities of the child when determining whether the child may be left with an intoxicated caregiver requires asking whether adding an intoxicated caregiver increases the risks that would otherwise exist if the child were left alone. The answer to this is in the affirmative—a present but intoxicated caregiver does pose potential risks to a child that would not be present if the child were alone.  A caretaker using substances exposes children to the risk of coming into contact with environmental hazards such as alcohol, drugs, or drug paraphernalia, which may lead to accidental overdose or physical injury to young children[55] and experimental drug use in older children.[56] These additional risks, however, fall under the Cabinet’s category of environmental neglect and could be charged as such if the parent exposes the child to a dangerous environment by leaving alcohol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia unsecured.[57]  These are distinct categories that must be separately satisfied. Fully or partially meeting the criteria for one does not substitute for fully meeting the criteria of another.

Another potentially added risk of an intoxicated parent versus an absent parent is that, in the case of an emergency, the parent would be unable to consent to treatment. Medical practitioners must gain the informed consent of a patient or their representative before providing treatment[58] and failure to do so can be considered malpractice.[59] Informed consent requires that the person giving the consent is able “to understand relevant medical information and the implications of treatment alternatives and to make an independent, voluntary decision.”[60] Depending on the level of intoxication, a parent may not have the requisite mental capacity to understand these risks and provide informed consent.[61] Fortunately, the Kentucky legislature has anticipated times when medical treatment should be given without pause.[62] In such cases, there is an exception to the requirement of informed consent for emergencies[63] and when “in the professional's judgment, the risk to the minor's life or health is of such a nature that treatment should be given without delay and the requirement of consent would result in delay or denial of treatment.”[64]

Of course, should these provisions fail to accommodate the situation and the child be forced to go without medical care based on the parent’s inability to consent, this potentially could be considered medical neglect. However, the criterion for medical neglect makes this scenario unlikely if not impossible. Medical neglect requires that the child not receive treatment for injury, illness, or disability that may be life threatening, “result in permanent impairment,” “interfere with normal functioning and worsen,” or “be a serious threat to the child’s health due to the outbreak of a vaccine preventable disease, unless the child is granted an exception to immunization pursuant to [statute].”[65] The statutory exceptions to informed consent discussed above ensure that consent is not a hurdle to seeking treatment for the sorts of ailments that would be considered medical neglect if gone untreated. Transportation to the hospital in the case of an emergency could still be a barrier to treatment when the driver is too intoxicated to drive, but limited transportation is not always considered neglect, such as when it is due to poverty.[66] Ambulatory services are capable of transporting children to the hospital in situations such as these.  Therefore, although intoxicated parents do increase risks, these risks are either considered neglect under a separate category or are sufficiently minimized to not constitute neglect.
 

III.         Considerations and Competing Interests

Determining how to address parental substance abuse in a child abuse or neglect context requires a weighing of multiple factors including parental rights, the best interests of the child, and the state’s interests in conserving its resources.

A.     Preserving Parental Rights 

Parents have a long–established fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children,[67] meaning that “a parent has a basic and fundamental right to be free from governmental interference when parenting a child.”[68] This is true even if the parents “have not been model parents.”[69] The Court has recognized a parent’s “‘desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an interest far more precious than any property right.”[70]  Before a parent can be deprived of this fundamental liberty interest by the state, the parent is entitled to procedural safeguards.[71]

In state–initiated abuse or neglect proceedings, the Cabinet must prove abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020[72] by a preponderance of the evidence.[73] In K.H. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky refused to uphold neglect findings where the risk of harm to the child was a “mere theoretical possibility” and where the conclusion was merely speculative and “based upon the compounding of inferences upon inferences.”[74] In so deciding, the court stressed the dangers of “wide-reaching intrusion by the state into the parent-child relationship” and warned that allowing the Cabinet to find neglect based on attenuated circumstances would give the state too much power in imposing its views about proper parenting.[75] A parent against whom neglect is found is placed on a registry and barred from working many jobs involving children and other vulnerable populations.[76] Given what a parent has at stake in abuse and neglect proceedings, it is crucial that a court ensure that the parent placed the child at risk of actual harm and not merely at risk of violating social norms.[77] 

B.     Preserving State Resources 

The state has “a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden” of neglect and abuse proceedings.[78] In 2016, Kentucky spent an estimated $560 million on child neglect and maltreatment.[79] It is nearly impossible to estimate how much money Kentucky spends on instances similar enough to the introductory scenario to be meaningful and thus determine how much Kentucky would save by constraining the criteria in which this sort of neglect is found. Nonetheless, a natural inference is that a narrower definition of abuse or neglect would result in fewer cases of neglect and less money expenditure by the state for investigating allegations and funding foster homes. Given that the state pays between $27 and $108.64 per day per child in foster care just to reimburse the foster parents, not factoring in other costs such as Medicaid coverage or food assistance[80], minimizing the number of children that go to foster care is a logical way to reduce financial expenditure by the state.

C.     Mitigating Harm to Children

Parental substance abuse poses dangers beyond inadequate supervision. CPS workers are highly aware that parental substance abuse is associated with an increased risk of child abuse and neglect.[81] Of course, correlation doesn’t necessarily mean causation. Many factors contribute to both substance abuse and child maltreatment, including parental mental illness, lower socioeconomic status, lower education, higher levels of stress in the home, and residential and caretaker instability.[82] Interestingly, child abuse rates are the same for parents with a current diagnosis of substance abuse as parents with a prior diagnosis of substance abuse, suggesting that sobriety does not mitigate the likelihood of committing abuse.[83] This implies that substance abuse itself is not the cause of child abuse but rather another symptom of a complex interplay between social, biological, and environmental factors.

Perhaps, then, the most efficient way to address child abuse through the lens of parental substance misuse is to broaden the scope of the inquiry to include other risk factors associated with parental substance misuse. In this vein, perhaps the state should consider making parental mental illness, lower socioeconomical status, lower education, higher levels of stress in the home, and residential and caretaker instability child abuse or neglect. Of course, this idea would shock the conscience of the average citizen, who would balk at the idea by saying that children are always exposed to risks, and such is part of life. There is some risk in giving a child a deadly weapon, yet school aged children all across the country are armed every year with bows and arrows in the name of archery. There is always a risk that a child will choke on solid foods, yet no pediatrician would advise the parents to maintain a liquid diet until the child is an adult. For that matter, parental cigarette smoking poses risks to children without benefiting them in any way, yet Kentucky does not make cigarette smoking by parents child abuse.[84]

This creates an interesting quandary about which risks society is willing to tolerate and which risks cross the line into abuse or neglect. The answer to this seems to focus not on the amount of risk but on the social acceptance of the act leading to the risk. For example, in my experience as a social worker and observing other workers, I noticed that the parent’s reasons for leaving a child unsupervised influenced whether the worker substantiated the neglect allegation. If the parents left the child home alone to go to work, the outcome would be more favorable to them than if they had left the child to visit a paramour. The risk to the child was the same but the outcomes of the cases were different. A similar bias seems to be at play regarding the “risk” of parental substance use and inadequate supervision. When discussing this topic with my former supervisor and coworkers, I was advised that if the parent is incapacitated due to drugs, this is neglect because the parent is unavailable should the child need medical treatment. At the same time, if the parent is sedated for surgery, this would not be neglect because it is for medical reasons. Again, the risk to the child is the same but the cases have different outcomes.

It is thus fair to conclude that, for better or for worse, in the abuse and neglect arena, the “risks” of parental substance abuse encompass more than just the risks to the child. The “risks” include at least some amount of social judgment of the proprieties of the parent’s actions. This is particularly relevant when contemplating whether to distinguish M.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services[85] (discussed above) from the introductory scenario. M.C. involved parental alcohol abuse.[86] Studies estimate between 12% and 70% of child abusers are alcoholics.[87] This overlaps significantly with the estimated 40% to 80% increase in child abuse brought on by parental substance misuse other than alcohol.[88] This indicates that there may not be a meaningful distinction drawn between the effects of parental substance abuse and parental alcohol abuse regarding child abuse sufficient to justify differential treatment of them in the dependency, neglect, and abuse courts. 

D.     Preventing Further Harm to Children by Removal

When the Cabinet believes there is sufficient evidence for the court to find neglect or abuse and the court agrees, the child may be removed from their family home and either placed with relatives, fictive kin, or put in foster care.[89] While removing a child from an at–risk home may intuitively seem to be in the best interests of the child, it is often the case that removing the child from their parents causes more psychological trauma than if the child had been left in the home.[90] In addition to the trauma associated with removal, children are frequently exposed to abuse and neglect in their foster homes.[91]

IV.         Balancing Risk and Intervention: The Argument for ‘Services Needed’ Approach 

Kentucky implemented its juvenile code to protect children and maintain family bonds by adopting effective policies and practices that are supported by empirical evidence and “offering all available resources to any family in need of them.”[92] Clearly, parental substance abuse is a real issue of concern for those concerned about child safety and welfare. While this Note argues that the current state of the law does not call for a finding of neglect for parental substance use beyond what is appropriate for such a finding under supervision neglect (or the narrow circumstances defined in 922 KAR 1:330(2)(4)(b)(8)),[93] it would be naïve to ignore the increased risk that accompanies such behavior. Parents that use substances expose their children to an increased risk of educational delays; insufficient dental and medical attention; mental, behavioral, and emotional issues; injury due to dangerous home environment; and substance abuse issues for the child themselves as they grow older.[94] Even if these risks are not sufficient to justify classifying the root behavior as neglect or abuse, perhaps other routes can be taken to improve outcomes.

Instead of substantiating or unsubstantiating an allegation of abuse or neglect, the Cabinet can instead make a “services needed” finding.[95] This finding is appropriate when the family has high risk factors but “the child was found to be safe during the child protection intervention” and the risk factors are at an insufficient level to open a protection case.[96] The goal of such a finding is to reduce these risk factors and provide services to the family.[97] If the Cabinet makes a “services needed” finding, the Cabinet would open an ongoing case and work with the family to provide empirical and strengths based preventative services, such as substance abuse treatment and mental health counseling.[98] These services are voluntary and the family is free to refuse them.[99] Should the family refuse and the Cabinet lacks the evidence to make a finding of abuse or neglect, the case is closed without providing further services.[100]

This avenue is the appropriate avenue for the introductory scenario. It recognizes that substance abuse raises the risk of maltreatment but isn’t in itself maltreatment. It allows the family the opportunity to receive services before the issues turn into abuse but abstains from encroaching on the parents’ fundamental rights. It also allows the state to conserve its resources and spend them wisely by investing them in those willing to make meaningful changes. 

Conclusion 

Understandably, the Kentucky legislature has given room to the Cabinet to decide what constitutes abuse or neglect. Also understandably, the Cabinet has attempted to give its workers wide enough latitude to deal with real life situations as they arise. These situations are varied, complex, and hard to predict. It would be impossible to exhaustively anticipate and provide guidance on all potential scenarios. One scenario, nonetheless, is reoccurring and demands more thorough guidance: the situation in which a child that would otherwise be competent to be unsupervised is left to the sole care of an intoxicated parent and no other associated risk is present. The law as it stands seems to indicate that this situation would not encompass neglect, but experience indicates a variety of approaches by differing workers and supervisors and results in different outcomes for materially equal cases. To prevent such inconsistency, Kentucky lawmakers should provide more guidance about how to address this situation. The most logical approach is to unsubstantiate claims of neglect in such a scenario and instead offer a “services needed” finding. This approach recognizes that risks are present when parents abuse substances but honors the parent’s constitutional rights, considers the best interests of the child, and takes into account the state’s interest in ensuring stability for the child and familial unity while also managing state resources efficiently. Kentucky lawmakers should update relevant laws to reflect these goals and remove discretion inconsistent with this recommendation.



* J.D Expected 2025, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law; BS Criminal Justice 2020, Eastern Kentucky University.

[2] Ana Rocío Álvarez Bríñez, At What Age Can You Leave Children Home Alone in Kentucky?, Louisville Courier J., https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2023/06/09/planning-on-leaving-your-kids-alone-this-summer-get-ready/70271092007/ [https://perma.cc/DT8M-ZV9X ] (June 10, 2023, 5:45 PM).

[3] See 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330 (2023).

[4] See id.

[5] Vincent C. Smith & Celeste R. Wilson, Families Affected by Parental Substance Use, 138 American Acad. of Pediatrics e2, e4 (Aug. 2016), http://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article-pdf/138/2/e20161575/1507458/peds_20161575.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[6] See Jessica M. Solis, Julia M. Shadur, Alison R. Burns & Andrea M. Hussong, Understanding the Diverse Needs of Children Whose Parents Abuse Substances, 5 Current Drug Abuse Rev. 135, 135 (2012).

[7] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022) (emphasis added).

[8] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330(2)(4)(b) (2023).

[9] Email interview with Misty Adkins, Social Service Worker, Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. (Jan. 31, 2024, 8:49 AM EST) (on file with author).

[10] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.020 (West 2019); 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330 (2023).

[11] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330(2)(4)(b) (2023).

[12] M.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 614 S.W.3d 915 (Ky. 2021).

[13] Id. at 919.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 919–20.

[20] Id. at 920.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 917.

[26] Id. at 923 (citing Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Ky. 2018)).

[27] Id. (citing K.H. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 358 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011)).

[28] Id. at 924–25.

[29] Id. at 924 (distinguishing Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Ky. 2018)).

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 929.

[32] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.100(3) (West 2021).

[33] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 921 (citing Ky. R. Civ. Proc. 52.01).

[34] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Ky. 2018) (citing Dep’t for

Human Res. v. Moore, 552 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)).

[35] See id. at 574.

[36] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 920.

[37] See Maia Szalavitz, Addictions Are Harder to Kick When You’re Poor. Here’s Why, Guardian (June 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/01/drug-addiction-income-inequality-impacts-recovery?CMP=share_btn_fb [https://perma.cc/HRN9-3NG8] (“addiction . . . is far less likely to hit people who have stable, structured lives and decent employment than it is those whose lives are marked by uncertainty and lack of work.”).  

[38] Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Parental Substance Use: A Primer for Child Welfare Professionals, 4 (2021), https://www.childwelfare.gov/resources/parental-substance-use-primer-child-welfare-professionals [permalink unavailable].

[39] C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568.

[40] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 923–25.

[41] C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 576.

[42] Id. at 570.

[43] Id.

[44] Id. at 576.

[45] Id.

[46] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 923.

[47] C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 575–76.

[48] M.C., 614 S.W.3d at 924–25.

[49] Id. at 924.

[50] See C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 576 (illustrating that the Court bases its holding on the father’s condition and drug use without evaluating whether the needs of the children were going unmet).

[51] Compare Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-801 (West 1986) (stating that a caretaker may not leave a child eight years of age in a building or vehicle unless someone thirteen years of age or older is with them), and Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.545 (West 1991) (stating that a custodian or caregiver may be charged with neglect if they leave a child under 10 years of age unattended), with Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022) (failing to include any age restriction on leaving children unattended under neglect parameters).

[52] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330 (2023).

[53] Email interview with Misty Adkins, supra note 9.

[54] Id.

[55] See Sofie Kuppens, Simon C. Moore, Vanessa Gross, Emily Lowthian & Andy P. Siddaway, The Enduring Effects of Parental Alcohol, Tobacco, and Drug Use on Child Well–Being: A Multilevel Meta–Analysis, 32 Dev. Psychopathology 765, 765 (2019). For a discussion regarding the causes of accidental overdose in children, see Brian C. Kelly, Mike Vuolo, & Laura C. Frizzell, Pediatric Drug Overdose Mortality: Contextual and Policy Effects for Children Under 12, Pediatric Rsch. 1258, 1259 (May 21, 2021).

[56] How Do Teens Find Drugs?, Recovery Village, https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/teen-addiction/drug/how-teens-get-drugs/  [https://perma.cc/K3HU-3QRL] (Aug. 30, 2024).

[57] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practice Manual: 2.3 Acceptance Criteria (effective Oct. 1, 2022), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter2/Pages/2-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/SBJ9-BNYL].

[58] Opinion 2.1.1: Informed Consent, AMA Code of Ethics, https://code-medical-ethics.ama-assn.org/ethics-opinions/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/7MR2-VWQP] (last visited Apr. 12, 2025).

[59] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.167(4) (West 2019); Informed consent in Kentucky, Gray L., PLLC (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.dgraylaw.com/blog/2019/09/informed-consent-in-kentucky/#:~:text=Physicians%20must%20get%20

informed%20consent,informed%20consent%20constitutes%20medical%20malpractice [permalink unavailable].

[60] Opinion 2.1.1: Informed Consent, supra note 58.

[61] See Catherine A. Marco, Does Patient Autonomy Outweigh Duty to Treat?, 5 Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics 37, 39 (2003).

[62] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.40–320 (West 1976).

[63] Id. § 304.40–320(3).

[64] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.185(5) (West 2021).

[65] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., supra note 57.

[66] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020(1)(a)(8) (West 2022).

[67] Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

[68] Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 33 (Ky, Ct. App. 2008).

[69] Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.

[70] Id. at 758–59 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).

[71] Id. at 753–54.

[72] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020 (West 2022).

[73] K.H. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 358 S.W.3d 29, 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

[74] Id. at 32 (overturning neglect finding against mother who refused to keep her children away from their father who had substantiated sexual abuse findings against a different child because the risk of harm to her children was too attenuated to constitute neglect).

[75] Id. at 31.

[76] See National Background Check Program (NBCP), Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., https://www.chfs.ky.gov/agen

cies/dcbs/dcc/Pages/nationalbackgroundcheck.aspx [permalink unavailable] (last visited Apr. 12, 2025).

[77] See K.H., 358 S.W.3d at 31. (“It is not enough for the Cabinet to show that K.H. would be well–advised to agree to the terms of the Aftercare Plan. The applicable statutory definition requires a finding that K.H. created or allowed to be created a risk that an act of sexual abuse will be committed upon the children”).

[78] Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).

[79] Prevent Child Abuse Kentucky, Primary Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, Prevent Child Abuse Am., https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/CommitteeDocuments/320/12791/7%2022%202020%20Primary%20Prevention%20KY.pdf [https://perma.cc/K83C-43WW ].

[80] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 12.24 Per Diem rates (Including Specialized Foster Care) (effective Feb. 15, 2024), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter12/Pages/12-24.aspx#Practice_Guidance [https://perma.cc/GW3T-P3KY].

[81] See Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 7.4 CPS Prevention Planning (effective June 29, 2020), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter7/Pages/7-4.aspx [permalink unavailable]; Kuppens, Moore, Gross, Lowthian & Siddaway, supra note 55.

[82] Solis, Shadur, Burns & Hussong, supra note 6.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] M.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 614 S.W.3d 915 (Ky. 2021).

[86] Id. at 918.

[87] Effects of Parental Substance Abuse on Children and Families, Am. Acad. of Experts in Traumatic Stress, https://www.aaets.org/traumatic-stress-library/effects-of-parental-substance-abuse-on-children-and-families [https://perma.cc/4NNY-4S7D ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2025).

[88] Solis, Shadur, Burns & Hussong, supra note 6.

[89] See Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 5.1 Relative and Fictive Kin Placement Consideration (effective Oct. 4, 2023), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter5/Pages/5-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/63XK-8RCH]; Ct. Improvement Program State Team, Dependency, Neglect and Abuse Cases: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities 5–8 (Oct. 2020), https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/CommitteeDocuments/17/13364/July%207%

202021%20Vanover%20Dependency%20Neglect%20and%20Abuse%20Booklet.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[90] Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 523, 527–41 (2019).

[91] Id. at 542–44.

[92] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.010(2)(a) (West 2014).

[93] 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:330(2)(4)(b)(8) (2023).

[94] Solis, Shadur, Burns & Hussong, supra note 6.

[95] Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Standards of Practi. Manual: 2.22 Making a Finding, Notifications, and Court Involvement (effective Oct. 19, 2022), https://manuals-sp-chfs.ky.gov/chapter2/Pages/2-22.aspx [permalink unavailable].

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

Blank Space: Film and Television’s Missing Statute

Download a PDF Version

Blank Space: Film and Television’s Missing Statute

Meghan Goins*

Introduction

Artists and consumers alike are currently grappling with rapidly changing technology. As digital media grows in popularity and prominence, some art forms, such as music, may be more harmonious with copyright law than others. Copyright law should be applied more evenly across various art forms and streaming platforms to better incentivize creativity and make art more easily accessible to consumers. Recognizing that music copyright needed to be updated, Congress has recently acted to further those interests for the music industry. The passage of the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA)[2] was a legislative response to the significant changes in the music industry.[3] To best achieve the goals of copyright law while balancing the interests of copyright holders and consumers, a statute analogous to the MMA should be passed for the film and television industries.

It will be important to first conduct a brief overview of the MMA and the history of the evolving vehicles for the consumption of copyright works. Rather than analyzing every major streaming platform, this Note will examine a few platforms which hold the most consumer attention regarding the specific art forms the platform provides access to. This Note will explore recent litigation and new developments within copyright law to determine how to achieve the goal of greater consumer accessibility to art. Ultimately, that discussion will lead to the recommendation that copyright standards for music should be adapted to visual media through a statute similar to Title I of the MMA.

I.      Background

Copyrights are automatically created when an artist (also called the “author” for purposes of copyright law) generates a creative work in a fixed medium.[4] Beyond the copyright automatically generated when a work is created, artists may also seek a copyright registration, which functions as a “public record of . . . ownership” and gives artists “access to federal courts in the case of infringement.”[5] To obtain copyright registration for a musical composition, artists may register “an individual sound recording or musical work,” “up to ten unpublished works all by the same author,” or “up to twenty musical works or twenty sound recordings if the works are created by the same author or have at least one common author, and if the claimant for each work in the group is the same.”[6] For films, a copyright is also automatically created when the film is generated, but copyright law protects “only the expression fixed in a motion picture (camera work, dialogue, sounds, and so on)” and “does not cover the idea or concept behind a work or any characters portrayed in it.”[7] Television shows are automatically protected by copyright law as well. For any type of media, though, registration is required “in order to file an infringement lawsuit.”[8]

Licenses allow a person or entity other than the copyright holder to legally use the copyrighted work. To obtain a license, one can contact the owner of the copyright for a particular work.[9] Importantly, “licenses allow a copyright owner to retain the rights while giving someone else a right to exercise some of them. . . .”[10] The rights a licensee has depend on whether the license granted is exclusive or nonexclusive, aside from the inability of a licensee to “authorize others to exercise the rights to that work without permission from the copyright owner.”[11] Additionally, no licensee can “sue and potentially recover damages for [copyright] infringement.”[12] If the license granted is nonexclusive, the original copyright owner of the work may still authorize other entities to use the work, and the original copyright owner may still “[use] the work in the manner and length of time described in the license.”[13] If the copyright owner grants an exclusive license, no one other than the exclusive licensee may use the work in the agreed upon manner for the duration of the license agreement, and no one else may be granted a license for that work during that time.[14]

A plaintiff in an action for copyright infringement may recover damages if the plaintiff can show “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copyright of constituent elements of the work that are original.”[15] In the event of copyright litigation, the fair use doctrine allows an entity to, in some circumstances, use a copyrighted work without first obtaining a license from the copyright holder.[16] When a particular use falls under the fair use doctrine, it is not an infringing use of the copyrighted work.[17] The fair use doctrine is an existing mechanism within copyright law that allows for greater access to creative works.[18] In addition to the fair use doctrine, certain statutes have been created to address the needs of particular creative industries, such as the MMA for the music industry.[19] The following sections will explain the technological changes that necessitated the creation of the MMA, and the provisions of it that could resolve problems within the film and television industries.

II.     Accessibility of Music

A.     The Music Modernization Act

Following changes to modes of music consumption, the Music Modernization Act was adopted by Congress in 2018, which allows copyright owners to obtain a compulsory license, through which copyright owners can receive royalties for their work without needing to grant “explicit permission” each time a license is sought from that copyright owner.[20] The MMA reflects a recent legislative update in the realm of copyright law, expanding it beyond the changes made to copyright law under the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.[21] The MMA is divided into three Titles: “Musical Works; Modernization Act, The Classics Protection and Access Act; and The Allocation for Music Producers Act.”[22]

The first of the three Titles “replaces the existing song-by-song compulsory licensing structure for making and distributing musical works with a blanket licensing system for digital music providers to make and distribute digital phonorecord deliveries (e.g., permanent downloads, limited downloads, or interactive streams).”[23] Blanket licenses give the licensee the ability to use and “access. . . a rightsholder’s entire catalog.”[24] Successfully obtaining a blanket license also protects the licensee from “an action for infringement. . . .”[25] To obtain a blanket license under the MMA, one must satisfy certain requirements.[26] To be eligible, the “primary purpose in making phonorecords of the musical work [must be] to distribute them to the public for private use, including by means of digital phonorecord delivery.”[27] One must also “[h]ave a direct contractual, subscription or other economic relationship with listeners or. . . must exercise direct control over providing the service to the listeners; [b]e able to report revenues (or other consideration) generated by the service; and [b]e able to provide certain reporting on usage of sound recordings of musical work.”[28]

As of January 1, 2021, the blanket licensing system, in its current form, is being operated by the Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC), established by the MMA.[29] Collective copyright management organizations can help artists to earn more for their work than they would under a performing rights organization (PRO), from which artists only earn performance royalties, or without either a PRO or a Collective Management Organization (CMO). [30] CMOs help artists to earn royalties for both the performance of their work and to earn “mechanical royalties.”[31] Mechanical royalties are earned when a licensee “reproduce[s] a piece of music onto CDs, DVDs, records or tapes.”[32]

B.     Technological and Legal Progression

Prior to the Music Modernization Act’s passage in 2018, several important technological shifts changed the way in which consumers engage with musical works.

Early streaming platforms violated copyright law by distributing music without first obtaining licenses or permission from the copyright holders of the music.[33] Without the protection of the fair use doctrine, which would have allowed these early platforms to continue operating legally, such distribution constituted copyright infringement. For instance, LimeWire was sued by various record labels alleging that LimeWire had directly infringed on their copyrighted works and had induced copyright infringement.[34] LimeWire ultimately settled and agreed to pay over $100 million in damages.[35]

C.     Streaming Titans and Digital Downloads

As technology continued to progress during the 2000s and 2010s, other legal streaming platforms rose in popularity. These platforms, to remain competitive, introduced new features to the market, such as digital downloading. Today, Apple Music, Spotify and SoundCloud are among the three most used music streaming platforms by consumers.[36] Spotify, which now has 640 million monthly users,[37] has a vast library of music[38] that spans countless genres, decades, and cultures.[39] Spotify is available in the form of a subscription, or as a free service with advertisements and restrictions on features such as the ability to “skip” songs.[40] Spotify had the largest payout to artists of any streaming platform in 2022, four years after the passage of the MMA.[41] To further illustrate the manner in which Spotify has grown to dominate the music streaming market, “[o]nline streaming services such [as] Spotify and Apple Music have become the music industry’s single biggest revenue source, overtaking physical sales and digital downloads for the first time.”[42] When a song or other audio on a streaming platform is played, artists can receive a payout.[43] These royalties consist of recording and publishing royalties. Importantly, publishing royalties “are [now] issued to publishers, collecting societies, and mechanical agencies.”[44]

Another notable feature of many current day streaming services is the ability to download the content found on the platform. Digital downloads, along with streaming, “predominate in the United States,”[45] rather than accessing music through physical copies such as vinyl, CDs, or other means. Digital downloads also allow streaming platform users to either obtain a permanent copy of a particular musical work, or to obtain a copy of a musical work “for offline listening.”[46] This gives consumers access to music without needing to obtain a physical copy of the music, meaning that consumers now have instantaneous access to nearly any song, provided it has been uploaded to the internet.[47] Both “the reproduction right” of “the sound recording and the underlying musical composition” are “implicat[ed]” by digital downloads.[48] The “reproduction right” is a right granted to artists through copyright law, giving them the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”[49] The rights to “the sound recording and the underlying musical composition” are codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114, and these rights give artists the exclusive rights to the sound of the song and the song in its written form.[50]

In a post-Napster era of the internet, streaming platforms are “enabling the market to reach new regions of the world, while helping wean[] a generation of music fans away from free or pirated music.”[51]  

III.   Accessibility of Television and Motion Pictures

A.     Licensing

Similar to the music industry, licenses can be obtained from the copyright owner or from an organization in order to show or distribute a film or television show.[52] Distributors of films and television shows include familiar companies such as Warner Bros., Sony, and Lionsgate.[53]

B.     Technology

Technology has also changed the television and film industries. Similarly, to the music industry, consumers now rely more on the internet than physical copies to access visual media.[54]

Netflix, which launched in 1997 and launched its streaming service in 2007, “now owns a 7.8% share of the US screen time,” second to YouTube.[55] Netflix obtains distribution and licensing rights through “Digital Exploitation Agreements.”[56] Through “Digital Exploitation Agreement[s],” Netflix obtains a license from “the producer of the film. . . [for] the right to communicate the film to the public.”[57] In May 2023, Netflix changed its policies to make it more difficult for subscribers to share a singular account across multiple home addresses.[58] This change resulted in increased rates of new subscriptions despite the “substantial risk” that the updated policy posed for Netflix.[59] Netflix’s prominence and popularity within the industry does not come without problems, though. Problems for the future of copyright law and the market for creative works have arisen as competitors for Netflix have appeared in recent years, as streaming platforms have to keep up with one another and with rapidly changing technology.

In 2018, a smaller streaming platform’s attempt to provide consumers with an easier way to access television was not considered fair use and was held to be unlawful by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[60] The smaller streaming platform was distributing content from larger television networks, allowing its subscribers to not only watch ten-minute clips of television shows, but to also “email the clips for viewing by others, including those who are not TVEyes clients.”[61] The specific features of TVEyes platform that led to the lawsuit were the ten-minute clips available to its subscribers, as well as the shorter, fourteen-second clips available when a subscriber searched for a specific term.[62] Ultimately, fair use did not protect TVEyes largely because of the potential that TVEyes would harm the marketability of the news Fox was providing.[63]

In recent litigation involving major streaming platforms, including Netflix, the platforms sued an individual who was the “operator of two illegal streaming sites.”[64] That operator attempted, through two services, to provide consumers with content ordinarily available across several platforms that sometimes require separate subscriptions.[65] The operator’s two services, “AllAccessTV (AATV) and Quality Restreams,” gave consumers the opportunity to purchase subscriptions and to have access to a “live channel feed.”[66] The subscriptions allowed AATV and Quality Restreams subscribers to watch and download “copyrighted movies and TV shows.”[67] That recent case and TVEyes are two examples of the approach of modern copyright law as it relates to the distribution of visual media by entities other than major television networks or streaming platforms: attempts to distribute content for profit that belongs to another streaming platform will be swiftly stricken down, with no protection available from the fair use doctrine. This keeps visual media stuck in a patchwork of paywalls.

IV.   “Television and Film” Modernization Act: Recommended Solution

One possible solution to the problems faced by consumers and potential consumers of visual media would be the passage of the film and television equivalent of Title I of the MMA, establishing a new licensing system for the film and television industries. A new statute is also needed to protect artists regardless of the streaming platform their works end up on or how much the work gets distributed across the internet, and to give consumers more reliable (and legal) access to visual media.

A.     Artist Compensation

One problem shared by music streaming platforms is low pay for the creators of the media supplied by various platforms.[68] Writers, producers, and actors alike have received low royalties from Netflix, even when the television shows they have worked on have become popular.[69] A statute similar to Title I of the MMA could guarantee royalties for writers, producers, and actors, specifically. A “Film and Television” Modernization Act could do this by establishing a “mechanical licensing collective” that, like the MLC established by Title I of the MMA, “collect[s] and distribute[s] royalties, and identif[ies] musical works and their owners for payment.”[70] The MLC established by the MMA also maintains a database listing entities eligible to receive royalties.[71] An analogous statute for the film and television industries should provide for the creation and maintenance of a similar database. This could help ensure that creatives involved with the production of film and television projects earn royalties for their work, no matter where those projects (legally) end up across various streaming platforms.

Without a statute that ensures copyright holders receive compensation for the distribution of their work on streaming platforms, though, the film and television industries may face more strikes in the future, as technology continues to change. As seen in 2023, such strikes are incredibly costly and inherently reduce the content available to consumers because very little new content is being created.[72]

The MMA requires potential licensees to “have a direct contractual, subscription or other economic relationship with listeners or. . . must exercise direct control over providing the service to the listeners; [b]e able to report revenues (or other consideration) generated by the service; and [b]e able to provide certain reporting on usage of sound recordings of musical work.”[73] A similar statute for the film and television industries could mitigate some of the increased costs of fairly compensating writers and actors by requiring that licensees provide content through a paid subscription service, for which the revenues would have to be reported. This could, ideally, pave the way for greater transparency and accountability for the payment of royalties. Additionally, the licensees under such a statute should be required to report their usage of the copyrighted works to which they are given distribution rights, further ensuring that all royalties are accounted for.

B.     Consumer Access and Stability

It can become incredibly difficult for members of the public to access some films and television shows when, due to licensing agreements, they are removed from Netflix after a set amount of time.[74] Unstable consumer access is another reason why Congress should pass a statute similar to the MMA. Blanket licensing, especially one centralized and regulated through a licensing collective established through such a statute, could make it easier to distribute the content in a manner that the removal of it from one streaming platform would not render it nearly impossible to find and engage with. Through a blanket license, a platform such as Netflix would have the ability to distribute greater amounts of content without relying on piecemeal licensing agreements.

A statute similar to Title I of the MMA could inhibit competition between streaming platforms, ideally leading to fewer streaming platforms capable of legally distributing greater amounts of content. These streaming platforms could obtain blanket licenses through a “Film and Television Mechanical Licensing Collective,” which could allow for more streamlined distribution, with regard to both the content itself and the process of requesting a license for the use of such content. The existence of fewer streaming platforms with larger amounts of available content could mark the beginning of a more consumer-friendly streaming world.

C.     Modernization

The passage of the MMA also demonstrates that updating the laws to reflect the needs of creatives and consumers in a rapidly changing world is not an impossible task, even though it may be a difficult one. Although daunting and murky, the realm of copyright law that protects film and television needs to be updated to combat the modern problems facing creatives and consumers alike, such as piracy on social media.

Rampant piracy on TikTok, and other popular social media applications, further highlights the urgency which copyright law must adapt to technological changes. Online piracy can be difficult to regulate, and if existing copyright law cannot control it, it is doubtful that a new statute for film and television would be able to do so either. To leave the film and television industry without greater protection from piracy, though, would allow piracy to continue to spiral out of control. In contrast to the manner in which music streaming platforms have reduced the demand for pirated copies of music,[75] piracy of visual media still poses a great threat to the market for visual media streaming platforms.[76] The screen recording capabilities on various devices allow users of those apps to create copies of the posted movies, meaning that an individual could create copies that exist even after the post in the screen recording has been removed at the request of a copyright holder.[77]

Congress must respond to piracy by ensuring that legal infrastructure is in place to better facilitate licensing for film and television, thereby eliminating the need for consumers to illegally access visual media when content is removed from a given streaming service. Additionally, as with artist compensation, requiring the usage of copyrighted works by licensees to be reported could mitigate some problems caused by piracy by establishing a more centralized method for tracking where certain content has legally ended up across the internet.[78]

V.  Addressing the Complexities of Copyright Law: Potential Weaknesses

To propose a solution to problems within a particular creative field without acknowledging the flaws of that solution would do an incredible disservice to members of that field, the market, and consumers of the art produced by that field. Consequently, there are numerous potential issues that could arise if a kind of “Film and Television Modernization Act” is passed, each of which must be addressed. These potential issues include: monopolization, disparities between artists as a result of the MMA, and weaknesses—exposed by consumer engagement—with the copyrighted works made more easily available to them as a result of the MMA. Despite these concerns, though, there are ways that a “Film and Television” Modernization Act could ease them as the streaming world continues to change.

A.     Problems

It should be acknowledged that there are problems within music copyright law and that adapting music copyright law to other forms of media will not necessarily solve all problems in copyright law. There is a risk that those problems may be transferred to the television and film industry if copyright law is treated as “one size fits all.”

One problem with passing a statute analogous to Title I of the MMA for the film and television industries is that the market for collective licensing is already “a heavily regulated market” regarding music because of the potential for “monopoly pricing…of collective copyright control.”[79] If collective blanket licenses are utilized for visual media, then heavy regulation will also be needed to prevent monopolization, and the process of getting to a point of effective regulation could be fraught with litigation, lasting several years and potentially causing problems for consumers. It is also possible that increased regulation in the film and television industries could exacerbate current consumer access issues by making it even more difficult to access copyrighted works.

The use of virtual private networks (VPNs) may also eliminate the need for such a statute. VPNs allow users to access content available on streaming platforms in other countries, making creative works easily accessible to consumers.[80] VPNs could eliminate the need for an improved blanket licensing system for visual streaming platforms. Downloading a VPN is a much quicker process than waiting for new legislation to facilitate greater consumer access to media. VPNs also give consumers unlimited access, in a sense, to media. A consumer could digitally “follow” a piece of media around if it comes and goes from various platforms and on different versions of those platforms in various countries.[81]

With the merging of several streaming platforms,[82] it is possible that a statute similar to the MMA is not needed to resolve the problem presented by the existence of so many streaming platforms with no overlapping content. Perhaps all one needs to do is wait for this era of streaming to end, and to simply wait for studios to combine their platforms until there are fewer platforms to subscribe to in order to access all the content one wishes to access.

Recent developments in music copyright have put legal flaws on display for consumers, calling into question the ability of a “Film and Television Modernization Act” to successfully facilitate increased consumer access to copyrighted works. As of February 2024, music distributed through United Music Group (UMG) has been removed from the app TikTok, leaving countless videos on the platform without any sound.[83] This ongoing situation is one example of the legal relationship between major music distributors and a social media platform failing and leaving consumers to deal with the fallout. If the MMA could not prevent such an event, then its ability to ensure that artists receive royalties for their work is dubious, as well as its ability to foster the distribution and access of creative works. Such an event begs the question: why have a mechanical licensing collective in place if it cannot stop a mass-deletion of media from a popular platform, and why have such a collective in place for film and television if countless amounts of content could theoretically be wiped from Netflix the day after its establishment?

Some artists were dissatisfied with the MMA not long after its passage. This dissatisfaction led to litigation between Eight Mile Style—the publishing company of the rapper Eminem—and Spotify, which began in August 2019, less than one year after the MMA was signed into law. In that case, the plaintiff went so far as to allege that the MMA is unconstitutional. In Eight Mile Style’s complaint, it argued that the MMA “retroactive[ly] eliminat[ed] . . . the right of a plaintiff to receive profits attributable to infringement, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees,” amounting to two violations of the Constitution: “denial of due process . . . and an unconstitutional taking of vested property rights.”[84]

B.     Final Discussion

The current state of the film and television industries is piecemeal and fragmented, a choppy legal sea upon which consumers must travel to access protected creative works. Streaming platforms are ever-changing, altering their policies to compete with one another. In the midst of those changes, a statute that regulates licensing of the content on those streaming platforms could offer some stability and consistency for consumers. A statute is also needed to protect the rights of creatives within the film and television industries. Although such a statute might not solve all the problems in the film and television industries, it could serve as a step in a new, more positive direction for the future of film and television. Such a statute could fill the existing gaps in copyright law created by rapidly advancing technology and could mitigate issues that have arisen in the years since streaming became such a central part of the film and television industries.

Conclusion

While there are problems with the manner in which copyright law has been applied to music streaming platforms as well as visual media streaming platforms, aspects of music streaming platforms should be adapted to visual media streaming platforms to better provide consumers access to the greatest amount of art and to ensure that there will continue to be a market for streaming platforms. Changes should be made to allow consumers to access visual media more easily, similar to the manner in which music is easily accessible on the internet. The many creatives of the film and television industries, and the consumers of their content, could be served well by a federal statute with similar provisions as the Music Modernization Act. No one can say with complete certainty what the current trajectory of the streaming world is, but the passage of a “Film and Television” Modernization Act could place copyright law on a path toward a brighter future, one in which the “blank space” currently left by Congress is gone.


* J.D. Expected 2025, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law; BA Political Science 2023, University of Kentucky.

[2] Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018) [hereinafter MMA].

[3] The Creation of the Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/creation.html?loclr=eamma" (last visited Mar. 4, 2025).

[4] What is Copyright?, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/what-is-copyright/#:~:text=What%20is%20copyright%20registration%3F,step%20is%20registering%20the%20work (last visited Mar. 4, 2025).

[5] What Musicians Should Know about Copyright, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/engage/musicians/#:~:text=Generally%2C%20to%20use%20the%20sound,set%20by%20the%20licensing%20contract (last visited Mar. 4, 2025).

[6] Id.

[7] U.S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 45, Mar. 2014, at 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ45.pdf.

[8] Copyright litigation 101, Thomas Reuters (Dec. 16, 2022), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/copyright-litigation-101/#:~:text=A%20copyright%20owner%20can%20sue,specific%20conditions%20(see%20below).

[9] U.S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 16A, Mar. 2021, at 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/m10.pdf.

[10] Copyright Licensing Under the Law, Justia, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/copyright/copyright-licensing/ (Oct. 2024).

[11] Michelle Kaminsky, What is a Copyright License?, LegalZoom, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/what-is-a-copyright-license (Jan. 24, 2025).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).

[16] U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/ (Nov. 2023).

[17] 17 U.S.C. § 107.

[18] U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, supra note 16.

[19] The Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://copyright.gov/music-modernization/.

[20] 17 U.S.C. § 115; Compulsory license, Black’s Law Dictionary (12 ed. 2024).

[21] Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2017); see also The Creation of the Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/creation.html?loclr=eamma (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).

[22] The Music Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).

[23] Musical Works Modernization Act, Copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/115/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).

[24] What Is a Blanket License?, Songtrust, https://help.songtrust.com/knowledge/what-is-a-blanket-license.

[25] Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) § 102(d)(1)(D).

[26] Digital License Coordinator, The Blanket License – Who Needs It and What You Need to Know, https://digitallicenseecoordinator.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Defining-and-Differentiating-between-a-%E2%80%9CBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-and-a-%E2%80%9CSignificant-NonBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-Resource-Document.pdf; MMA § 102(a)(1).

[27]MMA § 102(a)(1).

[28] Digital License Coordinator, The Blanket License – Who Needs It and What You Need to Know, https://digitallicenseecoordinator.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Defining-and-Differentiating-between-a-%E2%80%9CBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-and-a-%E2%80%9CSignificant-NonBlanket-Licensee%E2%80%9D-Resource-Document.pdf.

[29] U.S. Copyright Office, Frequently Asked Questions, copyright.gov, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/faq.html#:~:text=The%20Music%20Modernization%20Act%20updates,addresses%20distribution%20of%20producer%20royalties.

[30] Id. at 5; Andrew Parks, Defining Pay Sources: CMO vs PRO, SONGTRUST, (last updated Dec. 11, 2023), https://blog.songtrust.com/pay-sources-difference-between-a-pro-and-cmo.

[31] Andrew Parks, Defining Pay Sources: CMO vs PRO, SONGTRUST, (last updated Dec. 11, 2023), https://blog.songtrust.com/pay-sources-difference-between-a-pro-and-cmo.

[32] BMI, What is the difference between performing right royalties, mechanical royalties and sync royalties?, BMI Member FAQs, https://www.bmi.com/faq/entry/what_is_the_difference_between_performing_right_royalties_mechanical_r.

[33] Quinn He, The vast accessibility of modern music streaming, Mass. Daily Collegian, (Dec. 10, 2019), https://dailycollegian.com/2019/12/the-vast-accessibility-of-modern-music-streaming/.

[34] Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 398, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

[35] Jonathan Stempel, LimeWire to pay record labels $105 million, ends suit, Reuters, (May 13, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE74B783/.

[36] He, supra note 33.

[37] Shubham Singh, Spotify Users Statistics 2025: Subscribers & Demographics Data, demandsage, (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.demandsage.com/spotify-stats/.

[38] See Tim Ingham, Over 60,000 Tracks Are Now Uploaded To Spotify Every Day. That’s Nearly One Per Second, Music Bus. Worldwide, (Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/A34C-4TVJ.

[39] He, supra note 33.

[40] Get more out of your music with Premium, Spotify, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium/.

[41] Singh, supra note 35.

[42] Music streaming overtakes physical sales for the first time -industry body, Reuters, (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/music-sales/music-streaming-overtakes-physical-sales-for-the-first-time-industry-body-idUSL8N1S143H.

[43] See Spotify, Royalties, Spotify for Artists, https://support.spotify.com/us/artists/article/royalties/.

[44] Id.

[45] Eric Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives in the Digital Streaming Age, 45 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 6 (2021).

[46] Id. at 7.

[47] See id.

[48] Id.

[49] 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).

[50] Moses Singer, Getting in Turn with Copyright Law: Musical Compositions vs. Sound Recordings in Richardson v. Kharbouch, Moses Singer Publ’ns (Mar. 5, 2024), www.mosessinger.com/publications/getting-in-tune-with-copyright-law-musical-compositions-vs-sound-recordings-in-richardson-v-kharbouch.

[51] Reuters, supra note 42.

[52] See, e.g., Media - Public Performance and Streaming Licenses: How to Obtain Rights, Univ. of Wis. Whitewater, https://libguides.uww.edu/c.php?g=548422&p=3762449#:~:text=Feature%20films%20and%20television%20shows,pictures%20from%20many%20major%20studios.https://libguides.uww.edu/c.php?g=548422&p=3762449#:~:text=Feature%20films%20and%20television%20shows,pictures%20from%20many%20major%20studios.

[53] See, e.g., Market Share for Each Distributor 1995-2024, The Numbers, https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributors.

[54] See Sarah Whitten, The Death of the DVD: Why Sales Dropped More than 86% in 13 Years, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/08/the-death-of-the-dvd-why-sales-dropped-more-than-86percent-in-13-years.html.

[55] Mindy Born, 60 Netflix Statistics & Facts for 2025: Subscribers, Revenue & More, Cloudwards (May 13, 2024), https://www.cloudwards.net/netflix-statistics/.

[56] Riya Gupta, How Does Netflix Obtain the Rights for Streaming Movies, iPleaders (Apr. 26, 2021), https://blog.ipleaders.in/netflix-obtain-rights-streaming-movies/ .

[57] Id.

[58] Aaron Gregg & Eli Tan, Netflix Sign-Ups Double After Crackdown on Account Sharing, Wash. Post (June 9, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/06/09/netflix-password-sharing-rules/

[59] Id.

[60] Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2018).

[61] Id. at 175.

[62] Id.

[63] Id. at 179–80.

[64] Winston Cho, Disney, Major Studios Get $30M From Illegal Streaming Sites Amid Piracy Crackdown, Hollywood Rep. (Mar. 27, 2023), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/disney-major-studios-win-judgment-from-illegal-streaming-sites-1235361828/

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Nathan Kamal, Netflix Pays Zero Royalties for Its Most Popular Show Ever, Inside the Magic (June 28, 2023), https://insidethemagic.net/2023/06/netflix-squid-game-zero-royalties-nk1/.

[69] Id.

[70] U.S. Copyright Off., supra note 23.

[71] See 37 C.F.R. § 210.31 (2020).

[72] See, e.g., Robert Hum, The Hollywood Actors’ Strike is Over, but the Impact Will Linger for Some Big Companies, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2023), https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/09/sag-aftra-strike-impact.html#:~:text=CFO%20Gunnar%20Wiedenfels%20said%20on,strong%20films%20and%20games%20performance.%E2%80%9D (discussing the strike’s financial impact on studios and movie theaters).

[73] Digital License Coordinator, supra note 26.

[74] Why Do TV Shows and Movies Leave Netflix?, Netflix, https://help.netflix.com/en/node/60541.

[75] See Reuters, supra note 40.

[76] Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Piracy and Copyright Enforcement

Mechanisms, 14 Innovation Pol'y & Econ. 25, 27 (2014).

[77] See How to Screen Record Protected Videos [Completed Guide], iTop, https://recorder.itopvpn.com/blog/how-to-screen-record-protected-videos-1225 (Dec. 23, 2024).

[78] See, e.g., Digital License Coordinator, supra note 24.

[79] Priest, supra note 43, at 2.

[80] What is a VPN?, Microsoft Azure, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/resources/cloud-computing-dictionary/what-is-vpn#:~:text=A%20VPN%2C%20which%20stands%20for,and%20firewalls%20on%20the%20internet.

[81] Id.

[82] See, e.g., Ana Faguy, What a Warner Bros./Paramount Merger Could Mean for Users, Forbes (Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anafaguy/2023/12/21/what-a-warner-brosparamount-merger-could-mean-for-users/?sh=6b9de96c1dbe.

[83] Jem Aswad, TikTok Begins Removing Universal Music Publishing Songs, Expanding Royalty Battle, Variety (Feb. 27, 2024), https://variety.com/2024/music/musicians/tiktok-removing-universal-music-publishing-songs-1235923848/.

[84] Althea Legaspi, Eminem Publisher Sues Spotify for Copyright Infringement, Rolling Stone (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/eminem-publisher-spotify-copyright-infringement-lawsuit-874956/.

The Affordable Care Act’s Employer “Pay or Play” Mandate: A Tax or Regulation?

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The Affordable Care Act’s Employer “Pay or Play” Mandate: A Tax or Regulation?

Beckett Cromwell*

Introduction – About the Affordable Care Act

Imagine you are injured in a routine accident, and you have no means of paying for your hospital visit; however, you do not have prescribed medical insurance coverage or saved up cash to pay your medical bills out of pocket. Hopelessness begins to set in as you need medical attention but cannot bear the financial consequences of paying for the treatment yourself. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or simply the “Affordable Care Act” was implemented in two parts as a way to help Americans manage their healthcare insurance coverage in a cheaper and more efficient way.[2] The overall goals of the Affordable Care Act are to, “make affordable health insurance available to more people; expand the Medicaid program to cover all adults with income below 138% of the [federal poverty line]; and support innovative medical care delivery methods designed to lower the costs of health care generally.”[3] These are undoubtedly broad goals that require specific implementation in order to achieve them.

Key features of the Affordable Care Act include an increased access to medical insurance, increased protections for consumer medical coverage holders, emphasized early disease and illness detection and prevention, and lower care costs with improved system performances.[4] The Affordable Care Act widened the availability of consumer insurance coverage in two ways.[5] First, it allowed individual consumers to compare various plans and coverage options that were offered by individual states at the state level and gave a choice as to which coverage plan they wanted based on their health needs or other factors.[6] Second, as mentioned previously, the Act expanded Medicaid coverage to encompass more individuals and families below the poverty line, and as of 2018, in the eight years since the implementation of the Act in 2010, “the number of uninsured people in the country [had] fallen by about 20 million.”[7] The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) enhanced early disease and illness detection and prevention in early 2022 as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[8] This allowed for an estimated 150 million patients to have free-of-charge access to important preventative measures and diagnostic testing such as “vaccinations, contraception, and cancer screening” which is required by the Affordable Care Act.[9] These key features are important mechanisms enabling the Act to achieve its aforementioned broad goals of ensuring more Americans have cost-effective health insurance, precisely what Congress hoped to accomplish when it voted on and passed this healthcare reform legislation. Both premiums paid for health insurance and the number of uninsured Americans have gone down since the passing of the Affordable Care Act, thus making strides towards Congress’ goals of the Act.[10] This may be but a coincidence or a correlation and not caused by the Affordable Care Act but there are some metrics allowing the argument to be made.

Although the Act is arguably successful in achieving what it set out to accomplish, the Affordable Care Act has not been without controversy, and since its enactment, “the public was almost evenly divided between those who supported it and those who opposed it.”[11] Like many legislative bills, partisan issues arose and made the garnering of votes to have the bill pass through Congress a challenge itself, before each side of the aisle could even agree to the terms inside.[12] Upon the initial vote, partisan issues were prevalent as reports of up  to “80 percent of Democrats” supported the Affordable Care Act and around “81 percent of Republicans were strongly negative” toward the bill.[13] As a simple reminder, the Affordable Care Act was passed under a Democrat-controlled Congress under then-President Barack Obama.[14] Simple partisan divide is one reason for the opposition to the bill, but not the only reason.[15] Many people, including Republicans, were not in favor of the Affordable Care Act because of the “individual mandate” with some calling it “by far the most unpopular provision of the law”[16] and “one of U.S. history’s most contested laws.”[17] It required “all Americans to obtain health insurance or pay a tax penalty[.]”[18] Thus, Congress’ goals were bound to be met as Americans were obligated to have health insurance coverage, and by requiring people to have insurance, logically the number of uninsured Americans would go down, so the individual mandate was the driving force of the Act.[19]

I.      The Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act Stance Background

In 2012, a Supreme Court case, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) issued major guidance as to the individual mandate found in the Affordable Care Act.[20] In this case, the Supreme Court held that the individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’ taxing power, not under the Commerce Clause.[21] This was an unexpected decision because the lower courts that reviewed this case addressed the Commerce Clause argument and not Congress’ taxing power.[22] That still left the issue of whether the exaction was deemed a tax or a penalty.[23] The Court held that “because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, § 5000A can be interpreted as a tax.”[24] The Supreme Court used their precedential canon of construction and construed § 5000A as a tax in order to retain its constitutionality.[25] Should they have done this? Yes, it is easier to patch a hole in a leaky roof rather than replace the entire roof, but at some point a complete renovation will need to be undertaken to preserve the integrity of the structure. “As this note later discusses the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act, it is imperative to think about the above statement as it relates to the consequences of a “tax” determination.

In 2016, Donald Trump, a Republican, won the Presidential election and took control of the White House.[26] As stated earlier, Republicans strongly disfavored the individual mandate found in the Affordable Care Act.[27] Consequently, included in The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017[28] –spearheaded by Republicans in Congress – was a provision that in all practical effect, nullified the individual mandate.[29] In an explanation of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, the Joint Committee on Taxation stated the explanation of the provision is to “reduce[] the amount of the individual shared responsibility payment, enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act, to zero.”[30] Thus, in effect, there is no consequence for not abiding. The individual mandate “tax” is still zero dollars as of the completion of this note with no public plan to change any time soon.

Although Congress and the Supreme Court appear to have decided the individual mandate, the employer mandate that is still in effect[31] The employer mandate worked in conjunction with the individual mandate to fulfill Congress’ goals of lower costs of medical care and reducing the number of uninsured Americans.[32] The employer mandate provides that “certain employers (called applicable large employers or ALEs) must either offer health coverage that is “affordable” and that provides “minimum value” to their full-time employees (and offer coverage to the full-time employees’ dependents), or potentially make an employer shared responsibility payment to the IRS[.]”[33] In simple terms, places of employment that have more than fifty full-time employees or full-time equivalent employees are deemed ALEs and are subject to the employer mandate and must offer healthcare coverage to their employees as required by the Affordable Care Act or else they pay an exaction to the IRS.[34] This mandate went into effect in 2015 and requires that if you are an ALE then ninety-five percent of your full-time employees must have been offered healthcare coverage insurance.[35] Once again, this was another way of ensuring the Congressional goals of the Act were to be successful as more Americans would be accounted for when it came to healthcare insurance. Although the employer mandate seemingly infringed less on private citizens’ rights, the same partisan favor and disfavor was prevalent.[36] With regards to the employer mandate, thirty-four percent of Republicans favored it as compared to seventy-eight percent of Democrats.[37]

The penalty that is associated with non-conformance of the employer mandate is up for debate.[38] Even though the language of the statute in § 4980H does not provide the phrase “excise tax” anywhere, let alone “excise,”[39] the section falls under subtitle D which is “miscellaneous excise taxes.” Thus, some people view the employer shared responsibility payment for noncompliance with the mandate as an excise tax instead of a mere penalty.[40] So, like the individual mandate and the discussion in NFIB, there is division as to whether the payment is a “tax” or a “penalty.”[41]

The analysis may seem straightforward, as the U.S. Supreme Court has already decided that the individual shared responsibility payment that attached to the individual mandate was a tax, but it is hard to conclude that a fair comparison can be made between the two mandates because it is not necessarily a one-for-one comparison.[42] Further consideration shall be made upon different variables regarding the employer aspect that were not prevalent in the individual mandate, and there is always the possibility that the Supreme Court rushed to judgment when deciding that the individual mandate penalty was a “tax.” It appears the Supreme Court was trying to save the constitutionality of the Act as its main goal in NFIB, and may have not given enough thought as to whether the payment was a “tax” or if that was merely a means to save the Affordable Care Act from being nullified and rendered unconstitutional.[43]

Further, this note explores the differing rationales from the various circuits that are split in agreement concerning the employer shared responsibility payment as it pertains to the employer mandate as part of the Affordable Care Act. Part I, above, delved into the caselaw history of the individual mandate stemming from the Affordable Care Act in NFIB and the justifications for rendering the mandate to be a “tax,” but also considering possible Supreme Court shortcomings. Part II examines the split created by the Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. Part III compares and contrasts the varying circuits decisions while weighing the holdings made by each court and concludes that due to the purpose behind the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, the categorization of the exaction as a tax imposes a punitive damage rather than a proper deterring effect and thus the exaction should be labeled as a penalty and not a tax.

II.    Differing Circuits

Circuit courts are split as to the classification of the employer shared responsibility payment that attaches to the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act.[44] There are varying different views as it pertains to the characteristic of the employer shared responsibility payment and whether it is a “tax” or not.[45] The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have held the employer shared responsibility payment to be a tax and thus the Anti-Injunction Act[46] strips the court’s jurisdiction from any suit as the suit restrains the collection of a tax if it has not been previously paid.[47] The Fourth Circuit held employer shared responsibility payment to not be a tax because, as the individual mandate is concerned, Congress treats “penalties and liabilities” found in subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code as taxes for the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act and neither the individual mandate nor the employer mandate was found in subchapter 68B.[48] In sub-part A of this section, the Anti-Injunction Act and its procedural importance to tax liability litigation is considered. Sub-part B looks at the D.C. and Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act and their concluded agreement that the mandate is indeed a tax. Sup-part C of this section looks at the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the exaction under the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act is not a tax but is a penalty.

A.     Anti-Injunction Act

Before we begin the analysis between the various Circuits and how their characterization of the employer shared responsibility payment under the Affordable Care Act differs, it should be noted what the Anti-Injunction Act is and its importance to the discussion as it may either be invoked or useless depending on the court’s characterization of the employer shared responsibility payment. The Anti-Injunction Act is designed to allow for the collection of taxes in even the most mitigating of circumstances and provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.”[49] The rule stems from the rule elucidated in Flora v. United States, which provides that a person who disagrees with the assessment of a tax must first pay the full amount of tax owed and then file an administrative complaint to have the tax recovered as damages in a suit.[50] In short, Congress does not want the revenue they raise from tax collection to be limited by egregious lawsuits.[51] They want to be able to answer questions and decide issues later.

This is important as it pertains to the employer shared responsibility payment that attaches to failed completion of the employer mandate because a court cannot rule on a case before the tax is paid.[52] The key word in that sentence is “tax.” If the payment under the Act is deemed to not be a tax, then the Anti-Injunction Act will never apply as it only applies to suits that “restrain[] the assessment or collection of any tax[.]”[53] In an instance where the Anti-Injunction Act precludes a lawsuit from being brought, courts will not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.[54]

For example, if there is a suit brought in the D.C. Circuit by a company that owes an exaction to the Internal Revenue Service for a failure to abide by the employer mandate and another company in the Fourth Circuit that also owes an exaction to the IRS, one would be able to bring suit in the Fourth Circuit while the other would be barred from bringing suit in the Fifth and D.C. Circuits to challenge their exaction owed because of the Anti-Injunction Act.[55] This is why the characterization of tax or penalty is very important as it creates a procedural hurdle for courts and parties to overcome and disallow a court from hearing a suit.[56]

B.     Indeed a Tax – The Congressional Intent Theories

The D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit agree that the employer shared responsibility payment is a “tax” and thus the Anti-Injunction Act as described above applies. A lawsuit may not be brought until the tax has been paid to the Internal Revenue Service and an administrative claim for a refund has been filed.[57]

i.       The Fifth Circuit – Hotze v. Burwell

In the Fifth Circuit case, Hotze v. Burwell, Braidwood Management was the employer responsible for paying the employer shared responsibility payment as they met the requisite employment of more than 50 individuals.[58] Stephen Hotze and Braidwood Management sued over both the individual and employer mandate.[59] They argue that the individual and employer mandates violate both the Origination Clause and the Takings Clause of the Constitution.[60] Concerning the employer mandate, the defendants argued that the Anti-Injunction Act barred any action filed by Braidwood as they had yet to pay the assessed tax and file an administrative claim seeking refund first.[61] The defendants argued that the Affordable Care Act is not a revenue raising bill, but a bill to expand healthcare coverage and therefore the Origination Clause does not apply.[62] The district court followed this argument and found that there was proper jurisdiction and dismissed Hotze’s and Braidwood’s claim.[63] On appeal, the Fifth Circuit stated that the district court improperly concluded as to the merits of the Origination Clause argument and should have dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[64] Turning to the employer mandate analysis, the court recognized that “the employer mandate is the ACA provision that imposes a ‘tax’ on certain employers who fail to provide ‘affordable’ health-insurance coverage to their employees.”[65] As mentioned earlier, the Anti-Injunction Act bars any suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax[.]”[66] The Court recognizes the purpose behind the Anti-Injunction Act when it cites NFIB and states it “protects the Government's ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes.”[67]

The parties did not dispute that if the payment under the employer mandate were to be construed as a tax, then it would violate the Anti-Injunction Act and bar suit.[68] Instead, the court addressed whether the payment was a tax. The Anti-Injunction Act would apply if such payment was a tax, ending the need for further analysis.[69] The court recognized that both the Affordable Care Act and Anti-Injunction Act were created by Congress, so it was imperative to look at Congress’s intent when determining what is deemed a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act.[70] The court found that when looking at the language of the statute, Congress referred to the individual mandate as a “penalty” but referred to the employer mandate and many other exactions within the Affordable Care Act as a “tax.”[71] Going further, the court stated that “the employer-mandate exaction functions like a tax—it is collected by the IRS ‘in the same manner’ as a tax, . . . and the funds raised go to the general Treasury.”[72] There are numerous instances where the court highlighted the fact that the employer shared responsibility payment is referred to as a “tax” in the statute; the court showcases three portions of the Affordable Care Act where the payment is referred to as a tax.[73] The court here regurgitated what the Supreme Court said in NFIB stating “textual evidence is the ‘best evidence’ of whether an exaction constitutes a ‘tax’ for the purposes of the [Anti-Injunction Act].”[74] Finally, the court held that “the text of the ACA explicitly indicates that the employer-mandate exaction indeed is a ‘tax[;]’” therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act barred the employer-mandate as a consequence of Braidwood’s failure to pay the tax (the employer mandate) before filing suit.[75]

ii.     The D.C. Circuit – Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Service

As mentioned previously, the D.C. Circuit, in parallel with the Fifth Circuit, held the exaction assessed from the employer mandate was indeed a tax and not a penalty. In Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Service, appellant, Optimal Wireless operated as a company that provided wireless communications services in several states, including, Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Louisiana.[76] Prior to the D.C. Circuit taking the case, “[t]he district court dismissed Optimal’s suit for lack of jurisdiction[]” and “held that an exaction under § 4980H is a ‘tax’ for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, which strips courts of jurisdiction over suits having the ‘purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.’”[77] The court recognized the potential imposition of the Anti-Injunction Act when it stated, “Optimal plainly seeks to ‘restrain [] the assessment or collection’ of an exaction under § 4980H.”[78] Thus, prompting the court to derive a distinction between a tax or penalty as the case’s jurisdictional bar hinges upon this classification.[79]

The court began its discussion by going through background of the Affordable Care Act, its purpose, and a few nuances of the Act, such as what happens if an employer fails to offer a plan that provides “minimum essential coverage” or if an employee were to “claim[] a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction[.]”[80] As the Optimal Wireless court illustrated, there are two ways to violate the employer mandate of the Act and be subject to an exaction in the event that an employer does not provide minimum coverage or does not provide coverage at all.[81] First, liability is imposed on an employer in the form of an exaction “if it ‘fails to offer to its full-time employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan . . . for any month.’”[82] Second, liability is imposed on an employer in the form of an exaction “if it does ‘offer [] to its full-time employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage’ but an employee is still certified as having received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction.”[83] The court distinguished the two liability hooks by simplifying them and stating “Section 4980H(a) applies when an employer does not provide minimum essential coverage at all, whereas Section 4980H(b) applies when the employer offers coverage but that coverage fails to qualify as affordable or as providing minimum value.”[84] Through another distinguishing factor, the court explained that “Section 4980H(a)’s exaction amount is a function of the employer’s total number of full-time employees, whereas Section 4980H(b)’s exaction amount is a function of only the number of employees certified as having received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction.”[85] In Optimal Wireless, the court specifically highlighted different ways that a company may be held liable and how the exaction assessed against it may differ whereas the court in Hotze provides more of a generic overview of employer liability.[86]

In Optimal Wireless, the court determined that Optimal Wireless was liable for an exaction under the first hook, Section 4980H(a), as “one or more of Optimal’s employees had been enrolled in a qualified health plan for which a premium tax credit was allowed.”[87] Optimal’s exactions totaled “$395,640 for 2016 and $736,383 for 2017[,]” which is, in this author’s opinion, no small sum, especially when you consider the pay first, ask for a refund second model that the Anti-Injunction Act prescribes.[88] Optimal originally filed suit in federal district court against both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), arguing that the regulations that should apply require HHS, and not the IRS, “to issue the certification concerning an employee’s receipt of a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction, but HHS had not done so.”[89] The government argued dismissal of Optimal Wireless’s case on several grounds, the main one being the Anti-Injunction Act strips the court of jurisdiction to hear the case as the requisite exaction has not been paid yet.[90] The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the exaction imposed under Section 4980H is a “tax” and that the Anti-Injunction act is applicable.[91]

Optimal Wireless began its argument in the D.C. Circuit by arguing that to even conclude that the exaction that Section 4980H imposes is a “tax” that it “must contain a clear statement” saying so.[92] Their principal basis behind this argument was that there are harsh consequences that are associated with the statute, such as the imposition and requisite full payment of the exaction before a party is allowed to sue for a refund.[93] The court maintained that Optimal Wireless is confused with the statute, as it is really the Anti-Injunction Act that imposes the harsh consequences and not § 4980H of the Affordable Care Act.[94] The court reasoned that the “question of whether another statute is best read to implicate the Anti-Injunction Act’s jurisdictional bar – which here turns on whether Section 4980H imposes a “tax” – is governed by ordinary principle of statutory interpretation, not by any clear-statement rule.”[95] By looking at NFIB, the D.C. Circuit attempted to use the Supreme Court’s “congressional intent” theory where “Congress repeatedly described the exaction for noncompliance with the individual mandate as ‘a “penalty” rather than a tax,” the Anti-Injunction Act’s jurisdictional bar did not apply.”[96] When the D.C. Circuit here applied that same approach to the exaction under the employer mandate, the opposite conclusion was reached.[97] In the instance of the employer mandate, Congress expressly referred to the employer mandate exaction under Section 4980H as a “tax” on four separate occasions, whereas with the individual mandate it was described as a “penalty” and not a tax.[98]

Concerning the four references of “tax” associated with the employer mandate, “three are found in Section 4980H itself.”[99] The court went through the instances that the word is encountered to determine the context behind its use and whether Congress intended for the “tax” phrasing to be applied to the exaction as a whole or if the phrasing was mere surplusage.[100] The first instance pertained to employers offering unaffordable or “inadequate in value” coverage, stating that the “aggregate amount of tax determined under [subsection (b)(1)] ... shall not exceed the product of the applicable payment amount and the number of individuals employed by the employer as full-time employees during such month.”[101] The second instance pertained to deductions and states “[f]or denial of deduction for the tax imposed by this section, see section 275(a)(6).”[102] The last instance found explicitly in Section 4980H refers to the same section as before, but this time the title of the subsection itself its “Tax nondeductible.”[103] Lastly, in the sole reference not found within Section 4980H, another section implored the Secretary of the HHS to create “a separate appeals process for employers who are notified that that ‘may be liable for a tax imposed by section 4980H of Title 26.”[104] The court concluded that “[t]he multiple statutory references to Section 4980H’s exaction as a “tax” thus render it a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[105] Optimal attempted and failed to provide another justification aside from the Anti-Injunction Act for the usage of the word “tax,” but the court here relied on precedent that states “Congress said what it meant and meant what it said” as a means to upholding the usage of tax as Congress would not mistakenly and inappropriately use this terminology in contravention of their intentions.[106]

Even though Congress used other terms such as “assessable payment” or “penalty” when describing the exaction, those terms do not dissuade the court that “tax” was the true and main meaning of exaction under Section 4980H. A tax is a type of assessable payment and “[i]f Congress had only used the more general term ‘assessable payment’ to describe an exaction under Section 4980H, it might be unclear whether the exaction qualifies as a ‘tax’ for the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[107] Since “Congress also used the more specific term ‘tax’ to describe the same exaction (and did so repeatedly), it thereby established the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[108] The court here was equally convinced with the term “penalty” as they were with the term “assessable payment.”[109] The court drew a comparison between “tax” and “penalty” in that both can be used to describe an exaction and just because a tax seeks to influence conduct, like a penalty, that alone is not enough to strip an exaction of its “tax” status.[110] While recognizing that “Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other[,]” Congress does have the power to “describe something as a penalty but direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”[111] A common way that Congress does so is to “expressly label the exaction as a ‘tax,’ as [they] did for the exaction under Section 4980H.”[112]

In its holding, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause Congress repeatedly called the Section 4980H exaction a tax, Optimal’s suit is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.”[113] The Court here used the same Congressional intent theory elucidated in Hotze to uphold the employer shared responsibility payment as a “tax” with regard to the Anti-Injunction Act.[114] While the Congressional Intent theory rules the day in the Fifth and D.C. Circuits when determining that the exaction is a “tax,” a competing jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit, uses a different spin on the Congressional intent theory to conclude that the exaction is not a tax. An analysis of that theory will be covered in the next sub-part.

C.     Not a Tax

The Fourth Circuit, in Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, held that the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act did not constitute a “tax” under the Anti-Injunction Act.[115] Plaintiffs, including Liberty University and other individuals, brought suit challenging both the individual mandate and the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act.[116] Prior to the case’s current position, the original district court dismissed the lawsuit, and upheld the constitutionality of both the individual and employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act.[117] The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, determined that the Anti-Injunction Act disallowed jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims as they were seeking to contest the exaction without paying it in full first.[118] Consequently, because the Anti-Injunction Act stripped the court of jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case back down to the district court with an instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.[119] The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to further consider the implications of a the newly-decided NFIB case covering some of the same issues.[120]

The court began discussion of the employer mandate by defining various terms, determining when exactions must be paid, and how much the exaction is, among other things.[121] As mentioned in the above discussion of other circuit’s cases, and helpful to reiterate when drawing comparisons, this court determined that an employer mandate is required when an “applicable large employer” – which is an employer with “an average at least fifty full-time employees during the preceding year[]” – does not provide “affordable health care coverage to its full-time employees and their dependents[.]”[122] If at least one of the employers’ full-time employees is eligible for “an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction” in an effort to alleviate the costs of the medical coverage, the employer is then required to make the exaction or “assessable payment.”[123] An employee becomes “eligible for an ‘applicable premium tax credit’ or ‘cost-sharing reduction’ if the employer fails to offer the employee ‘affordable’ coverage providing ‘minimum value’ and the employee’s income falls between 100% and 400% of the poverty line.”[124] The court then discussed how the exaction is calculated under various scenarios, but that is not necessarily germane to our discussion.[125] It is important to note, however, that the court recognized that pertaining to the employer mandate, “the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to assess and collect the exaction in the same manner as a tax[,]” which was important to highlight since the individual mandate was deemed a “tax” in NFIB and the statute prescribes identical collection treatment to the employer mandate at issue.[126] The court here, highlighted the two liability hooks found in Section 4980H in (a) and (b) and states that “[i]n effect, then, § 4980H(a) imposes an assessable payment on an applicable employer who fails to offer coverage to its full-time employees and their dependents, while § 4980H(b) imposes an assessable payment on an applicable employer who provides coverage that does not satisfy the mandate’s affordability criteria.”[127]

Liberty University “employs approximately 3900 full-time faculty and staff[]” and is self-insured whole offering various insurance policies, savings accounts, and other reimbursement options to employees for their health care.[128] Liberty contended that depending on the definition of “minimum essential coverage” among other items, the University’s coverage may be deemed to be insufficient or unaffordable and thus cause them to be subject to payment of an exaction under the employer mandate of the ACA.[129] Even though one of the goals of the Act was to lower the costs of health care coverage for Americans, Liberty also asserts that “the employer mandate will ‘increase the cost of care . . . [and] will directly and negatively affect [the University] by increasing the cost of providing health insurance coverage[.]”[130] Finally, as a policy consideration, Liberty is a Christian institution that has certain moral beliefs, including the pro-life belief and that by helping fund abortions through paying an exaction, it is adverse to their religious grounding.[131] Bypassing the other issues, the Court here, on remand, “must decide whether the Anti-Injunction Act bars this pre-enforcement challenge to the employer mandate[.]”[132]

What Liberty contested regarding the employer mandate here “is a pre-enforcement suit to enjoin the collection of an exaction that is codified in the Internal Revenue Code, and which the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to collect in the same manner as a tax.”[133] The court here recognized from NFIB that application of the Anti-Injunction Act is in effect “only where Congress intends it to[,]” which is the same argument that the Fifth and D.C. Circuits made when looking at Congressional intent.[134] The Secretary of the Treasury uses two instances found in the Affordable Care Act referencing the exaction stemming from the employer mandate as a “tax” to bolster their position that the Anti-Injunction Act bars a challenge to the employer mandate without first paying the exaction in full then seeking a refund.[135] When refuting this observation by the Secretary, the court attempted to contradict him by highlighting that “the Secretary virtually ignores the fact that the Act does not consistently characterize the exaction as a tax[,]” but instead used the term “assessable payment” from time-to-time, including the first instance the exaction was mentioned.[136] Regarding the two instances found in the Affordable Care Act that reference the exaction from the employer mandate as a “tax,” one of them is in a “tax-specific context” and the court maintained that the use of another word besides “tax” would lead to interpretive confusion.[137] The first provision provides “[f]or denial of deduction for the tax imposed by this section . . .” and the second provision provides that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed for the following taxes[.]”[138] The court attempted to illustrate that through its cross-referencing sections of the code, Congress intended to be crystal clear that the exaction is a “tax” which is requisite for deductibility.[139] The court was less confident about an obvious justification for the second instance of the word “tax” being used in the Act.[140] The court did not place much weight on the inability to provide a concrete justification for this other instance of “tax” being used.[141] Instead, they realized that one instance of a lack of explanation is okay “[b]ecause Congress initially and primarily [referred] to the exaction as an ‘assessable payment’ and not a ‘tax,’ the statutory text suggests that Congress did not intend the exaction to be treated as a tax” under the analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act.[142]

While concluding the discussion, the court recognized that “Congress did not otherwise indicate that the employer mandate exaction qualifies as a tax for [Anti-Injunction Act] purposes, though of course it could have done so.”[143] The court here made it a point to highlight that the Supreme Court in NFIB noted that “26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) provides that the ‘penalties and liabilities’ found in subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code are ‘treated as taxes’ for purposes of the [Anti-Injunction Act].”[144] The court stated that “[t]he employer mandate, like the individual mandate, is not included in subchapter 68B, and no other provision indicates that we are to treat its ‘assessable payment’ as a tax.”[145]

Overall, the court in Liberty University thinks that “to adopt the Secretary’s position would lead to an anomalous result[]” because “the Supreme Court has expressly held that a person subject to the individual mandate can bring a pre-enforcement suit challenging that provision[,] [b]ut, under the Secretary’s theory, an employer subject to the employer mandate could bring only a post-enforcement suit challenging that provision.”[146] The court found it hard to believe that Congress, in just two isolated uses of the word “tax,” would have vastly different treatments of the mandates in terms of the Anti-Injunction Act’s applicability.[147] In layman’s terms, the court here believed that when Congress acts, it acts purposefully, and here they did not refer to the exaction as a tax initially, and they did not include it as a “tax” in subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code. If Congress intended to have the exaction under the employer mandate be a tax, then they would have made it clear. The court, in few words, decided the “tax” versus “penalty” issue by stating “the employer mandate exaction, like the individual mandate exaction, does not constitute a tax for the purposes of the [Anti-Injunction Act]. Therefore, the [Anti-Injunction Act] does not bar this suit.”[148]

Conclusion – Not a Tax

With the circuit courts being split in multiple directions, the question arises – which interpretation is correct? The answer to this question carries great importance as a Plaintiff’s rights can vary depending on their geographic location. The procedural and jurisdictional limitations that the Anti-Injunction Act places on the employer mandate are varied throughout circuits and need to be addressed.

As mentioned previously, precedent states “Congress said what it meant and meant what it said[,]” so it is imperative to examine their actions under a proverbial “microscope” when parsing a statute.[149] When examining the Fourth Circuit’s spin on the Congressional intent theory versus the Fifth and D.C. Circuit’s version of the Congressional intent theory, the notion that the exaction under the employer mandate is not a “tax” becomes clear.

Refer earlier to the introduction when the note discussed the overarching goal of the Affordable Care Act was to provide more affordable health care coverage to more Americans. A punishment would deter a company from doing something in the future whereas taxes are more routine in nature. To align with the goals of the Affordable Care Act, the exaction to be labeled as a “penalty” makes the most sense. This is a regulatory punishment to ensure more Americans are properly accounted for in terms of health care. There was never a revenue raising aspect of the employer mandate that typically accompanies a tax.

Further, of the interpretations, the one that makes the most sense with Congressional intent is the “penalty” classification. If Congress wanted to ensure that the employer mandate was a “tax,” then they could have and would have done so. It would have been easier for Congress to have expressly said that the exaction was a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act as only where they intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply is where it applies.[150] With all the time that goes into writing, lobbying, and amending a bill, Congress would have wanted to ensure that they were sending out a complete product that was not contradictory. Congress would not want to have two separate instances of the word “tax” being used that have vastly different consequences in terms of the Anti-Injunction Act.

For that reason, the proper interpretation when considering Congressional intent, the goals of the Affordable Care Act, and the language of the statute is that the employer mandate exaction is a “penalty” and not a “tax.” 


* J.D Expected 2025, University of Kentucky J. Rosenberg College of Law; BS Accounting & Finance 2021, University of Kentucky.

[2] What is the Affordable Care Act?, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/health-insurance-reform/what-is-the-affordable-care-act/index.html] (last updated Apr. 20, 2023) [permalink unavailable]; See also John Han, Why and How the Affordable Care Act Was Passed, Review (May 9, 2018), https://virginiapolitics.org/online/2018/5/9/why-and-how-the-affordable-care-act-was-passed [https://perma.cc/6CQG-UVSB].

[3] About the Affordable Care Act, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-aca/index.html (last updated Mar. 17, 2022) [permalink unavailable].

[4] Will Kenton, Affordable Care Act (ACA): What It Is, Key Features, and Updates, Investopedia (last updated Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/affordable-care-act.asp [https://perma.cc/9N7N-FZZQ].

[5] Adrianna McIntyre & Zirui Song, The US Affordable Care Act: Reflections and Directions at the Close of a Decade, PLOS Med. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002752&type=printable [https://perma.cc/3RPG-72ZF].

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] HRSA Updates the Affordable Care Act Preventive Health Care Guidelines to Improve Care for Women and Children, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/01/11/hrsa-updates-affordable-care-act-preventive-health-care-guidelines-improve-care-women-children.html [permalink unavailable].

[9] Id.

[10] Mike Patton, Obamacare 10 Years Later: Success or Failure?, Forbes (Nov. 11, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2020/11/11/obamacare-10-years-later-success-or-failure/?sh=3e7154c24844 [https://perma.cc/7NRD-6ZVD].

[11] Julie Rovner, Why Do So Many People Hate Obamacare So Much?, NPR (Dec. 13, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/12/13/570479181/why-do-so-many-people-hate-obamacare-so-much [https://perma.cc/M8UL-U53H].

[12] See, e.g., Susan Milligan, How Partisan Politics Threatened Even Must-Pass Legislation in Congress, U.S. News & World Rep. (Oct. 1, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2021-10-01/how-partisan-politics-threatened-even-must-pass-legislation-in-congress [permalink unavailable] (highlighting the Build Back Better bill from 2021 as an example showing how the contents of the bill provide for necessary infrastructure improvements that all Americans enjoy the benefits of and need, but Congress cannot come to an agreement due to political strife).

[13] Rovner, supra note 11.

[14] 111th United States Congress, Ballotpedia https://ballotpedia.org/111th_United_States_Congress [https://perma.cc/KZK7-BG7M] (showing the breakdown of Congress at the time that the Affordable Care Act or “Obamacare” was passed. The Democratic Party had control over the House, Senate, and Presidency at the same time, the first occurrence for them since the 103rd Congress in 1993. This was a major boost to gathering support for getting the bill passed and possibly a reasonable irritant for the objectives of dissenting Republicans).

[15] Rovner, supra note 11.

[16] Id.

[17] John E. McDonough, The Tortured Saga of America’s Least-Loved Policy Idea, Politico (May 22, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/22/health-care-individual-mandate-policy-conservative-idea-history-489956 [permalink unavailable].

[18] Matthew Fiedler, The ACA’s Individual Mandate In Retrospect: What Did It Do And Where Do We Go From Here?, 39 Health Affs. 429, 429 (2020).

[19] See id.

[20] Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 561–74 (2012).

[21] Id. at 575.

[22] Erika K. Lunder & Jennifer Staman, NFIB v. Sebelius: Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Sept. 3, 2012), https://www.crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42698/3 [permalink unavailable].

[23] NFIB, 567 U.S. at 562–63.

[24] Id. at 574 (emphasis added).

[25] Id. at 575.

[26] 2016 Presidential Election Results, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/A8C6-7JE7].

[27] Rovner, supra note 11.

[28] Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97.

[29] General Explanation of Pub. L. No. 115-97 at 91, https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-115JPRT33137/pdf/CPRT-115JPRT33137.pdf [permalink unavailable].

[30] Id. at 92.

[31] 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.

[32] About the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3.

[33] Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Affordable Care Act, Internal Revenue Serv., https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/questions-and-answers-on-employer-shared-responsibility-provisions-under-the-affordable-care-act (last accessed Oct. 26, 2024) [https://perma.cc/745Z-M4UX].

[34] Id.

[35] Nanci N. Rogers & Joe Keavy, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Employer Mandate Rules for the Affordable Care Act, Robbins Schwartz (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.rsnlt.com/news/law-alerts/2014/02/13/treasury-and-irs-issue-final-employer-mandate-rules-for-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/5DY6-X7JV].

[36] Rakesh Singh & Chris Lee, Majority Favors the Affordable Care Act’s Employer Mandate, But Opinion Can Shift When Presented With Pros and Cons, KFF (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/majority-favors-the-affordable-care-acts-employer-mandate-but-opinion-can-shift-when-presented-with-pros-and-cons/ [https://perma.cc/XF2B-8GSX].

[37] Id.

[38] Compare Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 996–99 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to be a tax) with Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 88–89 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to not be a tax).

[39] See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.

[40] Erik P. Doerring, Section 4980H Employer Shared Responsibility Payments (ESRP): The New “IRS Employment Tax Penalty”?, Burr & Forman LLP (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.burr.com/tax-law-insights/section-4980h-employer-shared-responsibility-payments-esrp-the-new-irs-employment-tax-penalty [https://perma.cc/N3JW-HGKN].

[41] Compare Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99 (holding that the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to be a tax) with Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 88–89 (holding the employer shared responsibility payment under § 4980H to not be a tax).

[42] Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012).

[43] Id. at 575.

[44] See Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 88–89; Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2013); Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Serv., 77 F.4th 1069, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

[45] Compare Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076 and Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99 with Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 88–89 and Korte, 735 F.3d at 669–70.

[46] 26 U.S.C. § 7421.

[47] Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076; Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996–99.

[48] Liberty, 733 F.3d at 88–89.

[49] 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[50] Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 159–60 (1960).

[51] See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[52] Id.

[53] Id. (emphasis added).

[54] Dye v. United States, 516 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D.D.C. 2007).

[55] Compare Liberty Univ., 733 F.3d at 87-89 with Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076–77 (The effect of the Anti-Injunction Act allowed the plaintiff in Liberty University to bring a claim in the Fourth Circuit that the plaintiff from Optimal Wireless was barred from bringing in the Fifth and D.C. Circuits).

[56] See Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1076–77.

[57] Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1073, 1077; Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 997, 999 (5th Cir. 2015); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 240 (1996).

[58] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 989.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id. at 990.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 991.

[65] Id. at 996.

[66] 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[67] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543 (2012)).

[68] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 996.

[69] Id.

[70] Id. at 997.

[71] Id.

[72] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 997 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(d)(1)).

[73] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 997.

[74] Hotze, 784 F.3d at 997 (citing NFIB, 567 U.S. at 544).

[75] Id. at 997, 999; 26 U.S.C. 7421(a); Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv. v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 240 (1996).

[76] Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Serv., 77 F.4th 1069, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

[77] Id. at 1070–71.

[78] Id. at 1073 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)).

[79] Id.

[80] Id. at 1071.

[81] Id.

[82] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)(1)).

[83] Id. at 1071–72 (citing § 4980H(b)).

[84] Id. at 1072.

[85] Id.

[86] Compare Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1071–72, with Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 2015).

[87] Optimal Wireless, 77 F.4th at 1072.

[88] Id.

[89] Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18081(e)(4)(B)(iii); 45 C.F.R. § 155.310(h)).

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id. at 1073.

[93] Id.

[94] Id. at 1073–74.

[95] Id.

[96] Id. at 1073–74.

[97] Id. at 1074.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] See id.

[101] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b)(2)).

[102] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (emphasis added)).

[103] Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (emphasis added)).

[104] Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18081(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added)).

[105] Id.

[106] Id.

[107] Id. at 1075.

[108] Id.

[109] Id.

[110] Id.

[111] Id. at 1076 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012)).

[112] Id. (citing CIC Servs., LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv., 593 U.S. 209, 212–13 (2021)).

[113] Id.

[114] Id. at 1074; Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 999 (5th Cir. 2015).

[115] Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 89 (4th Cir. 2013).

[116] Id. at 83.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Id. (citing Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011)).

[120] Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).

[121] Id. at 84–85.

[122] Id. at 84.

[123] Id.

[124] Id. at 84–85.

[125] Id. at 85.

[126] Id.

[127] Id.

[128] Id. at 86.

[129] Id.

[130] Id.

[131] Id.

[132] Id. at 87.

[133] Id.

[134] Id.

[135] Id. at 88.

[136] Id.

[137] Id.

[138] Id.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] Id.

[143] Id.

[144] Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543 (2012)).

[145] Id.

[146] Id.

[147] Id.

[148] Id. at 89. (emphasis added).

[149] Optimal Wireless v. Internal Revenue Serv., 77 F.4th 1069, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

[150] Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 87 (4th Cir. 2013).

Habitual Offender Statutes: A Need for Change

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Habitual Offender Statutes: A Need for Change

Jacob Bush[*]

Introduction

Many states have habitual offender statutes, which label those who violate the statutes as either habitual felony offenders or persistent felony offenders (hereinafter referred to as HFO).[2] While these statutes differ state-by-state, they all serve as a deterrent to those who may recommit felonies. In addition to longer sentences, many of those convicted under a HFO statute are also restricted in their eligibility for the different types of probation.[3]

While it may seem fair to punish those who are reoffenders harsher than first time-offenders, HFO statutes have a detrimental effect to our society. First, these kinds of statutes can be used by prosecutors in a way that interferes with traditional notions of fairness. Second, the punishment for those who have committed the lowest level of felonies, such as drug possession or petty theft can be sentenced similarly to felons convicted of violent crimes.[4] Finally, the public suffers financially from how they are currently used.[5] The solution to these issues requires two changes. First, to ensure fairness is preserved, the procedures that apply to HFO statutes should be similar to the procedures for capital punishment defendants. Second, HFO statutes should be revised to exclude low-level felonies.[6]

This Article can be broken down into five parts. Part I introduces the reader to the article and provides a broad view of the arguments to be made. Part II contains four subparts that discuss arbitrary use of persistent felony offender statutes. Part III involves amending HFO statutes. Part IV provides a short section of some of the changes being made or attempting to be made to remedy the problems with HFO statutes. Part V concludes the article by recognizing and refuting a potential counterargument and summarizing the content of this article.

 I.     Arbitrary Use of the Persistent Felony Offender Statute

To uphold the fairness our judicial system claims to promote, policies need to be applied to everyone equally. HFO statutes, however, are not applied equally to African Americans.[7] Four subparts will provide readers with sufficient evidence to support this. Subpart one introduces the reader to how prosecutorial discretion affects HFOs. Subpart two highlights how minorities are more often convicted of being a HFO than white people. The third and fourth subpart offers a solution to this issue.

A.    Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutorial discretion comes from the common law principle that the government has “broad discretion” on who to prosecute.[8] The purpose of this discretion is to provide for a more efficient way to prosecute crimes while staying in line with the public interest.[9] Broad discretion also extends to whether a defendant will face a HFO charge. An example of this can be seen in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.[10] This case involves the denial of a HFO’s habeas corpus claim.[11] The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor seeking a HFO charge, after the defendant denied a plea deal from the prosecution, was not a violation of due process because of the prosecutor’s broad discretion.[12] A palatable solution would be for states to adopt procedures that will ensure a fair sentencing process for defendants. Adopting these new procedures would take away the ability for prosecutors to use these statutes to impose a heftier sentence on a person solely because of a prosecutor’s personal biases.

Making changes to a specific kind of prosecution is not a foreign concept. In cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, counsel appearing on behalf of death penalty petitioners have urged that such cases are inherently “different.”.[13] With the steep sentences sometimes being imposed lower-level felons, HFO statutes should fall under this “different” category as well. The additional protections added for capital cases are very expensive and in some circumstances cost four times the amount of a non-death penalty case.[14]

Due to the large number of defendants facing a HFO charge, it would be unreasonable to expect all of the additional protections to apply to HFOs.[15] Applying all protections would create an overwhelming financial strain on the criminal justice system.[16] Instead, states should adopt select policies from the capital punishment procedures that would lower the amount of people being charged as a HFO. Specifically, instead of a prosecutor deciding if HFO status will apply to a defendant, that should be left up to an unbiased jury. Additionally, defense counsel should be required to do mitigation investigation and should be allowed to offer mitigating evidence to the jury.[17]

B.     Racial Disparity Among Habitual Offenders’ Sentencings

Many states leave it to the prosecutor to decide who will be charged as a HFO, which can create an environment where personal bias or prejudice can influence the sentence of the defendant.[18] One of the biggest areas for potential prejudice is race.[19] Several studies have looked at the disparities between race and when HFO statutes are applied. These studies have used data to show that in areas where there is increased “racial threat,” African Americans are more likely to be sentenced under the HFO statute compared to their similarly charged white counterparts.[20] The term racial threat refers to those in power feeling threatened by minorities.[21] Combining this fear with stereotypes about crime often leads to minorities receiving harsher sentences.[22] The disparity between race and HFOs are not exclusive to one state either.

In Mississippi, seventy-five percent of HFOs are African American.[23] While this statistic could be the consequence of a higher African American population in the general public of these states and in prison, the race disparity regarding HFOs is worse than the disparity of being incarcerated within the state of Mississippi.[24] African Americans make up fifty-eight percent of Mississippi’s prison population and comprise less than forty percent of the state’s population as a whole.[25] Maryland is another example of racial disparity among HFOs outside of the south.[26] In Maryland, seventy-five percent of people sentenced to life in prison under the HFO statute are also African American.[27] This is not an argument that prosecutors are inherently racist, but statistics show that there is a large disparity between which races are sentenced under the HFO statutes.[28] Because of this disparity, extra safeguards are needed to make sure that the justice system is fair and absent of personal bias.

C.     Taking the Decision Away from the Prosecutor

Allowing the jury to decide whether a person should be considered a HFO would provide an avenue less likely corrupted by prejudice. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court looked at a statute that would allow a defendant to be convicted of a second-degree offense by a jury but then have a sentence imposed on them as if it was a first-degree offense.[29] New Jersey allowed the sentence to be enhanced because it was considered a hate crime on top of the original offense committed.[30] The Supreme Court decided that other than a prior conviction, anything that could increase the penalty for a crime beyond the possible maximum penalty for the statute had to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.[31] While this rule eventually was applied to capital sentencing and provided substantial protections to defendants facing the death penalty, the court expressly excluded prior offenses from the holding.[32] Doing so sets the stage for HFO statutes to continue to be used to sentence defendants to extreme sentences compared to what it would be without HFO status.

In 2002, the Supreme Court reinforced the belief that a defendant has the right to a jury determination that he or she is not only guilty of the crime but that the aggravating circumstances exist as well.[33] In Ring v. Arizona, the Court looked back to Apprendi and relied on the same logic in coming to the conclusion in the current case.[34] Summing up this connection, Justice Ginsburg makes a comparison between the two cases stating, “[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.”[35] This quote from Justice Ginsburg highlights the core problem with those facing HFO sentencing. If someone who is facing an enhancer of two years is required to have that determined by the jury, why are those facing up to life enhancements not offered the same opportunity?

Recently, in 2016, the Court took a step further than Ring, in Hurst v. Florida.[36] In Hurst, the Court determined that a recommendation of death is not enough; it must be a determination made by the jury.[37] Many HFO statutes do technically leave this decision to the jury, but they have very little actual say in the sentence.[38] For the statute to activate, the jury just has to decide whether or not the defendant has prior applicable offenses. Once that is established, HFO status applies. For a more just outcome, the jury should be able to consider factors like those in death penalty cases that can provide context for a possible lighter sentence. Look at the case of Fair Wayne Bryant.[39] Bryant, a Louisiana man, was sentenced to life in prison for stealing a pair of hedge clippers.[40] Stealing hedge clippers on its own does not lead to a life sentence, but Louisiana’s HFO statute was used in this case due to Bryant’s four prior felonies.[41] Had Apprendi applied to prior convictions, Bryant may have received the same sentence, but it would have been up to the discretion and determinations of the jury and not a statute that automatically applied regardless of the crime.[42] This is not an isolated occurrence. Charles Collins is another person who was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in 2010 for drug charges. [43] Again, his life sentence came from the HFO statute in Illinois, tying the hands of the judge who had no choice but to impose that sentence.[44] Illinois Governor, JB Pritzker commuted Collins’s sentence to allow life with the possibility of parole.[45] Fortunately, Bryant was paroled in 2020[46] and Collins in 2023,[47] but many non-violent HFOs have not received the same fate. A 2005 study in California showed that out of those sentenced under the state’s HFO statute, a little over half of those inmates were convicted of nonviolent offenses.[48] In some circumstances, the judge or jury lacks the authority to decide whether someone is considered a HFO.[49] In some states, once the prosecutor convicts on the original-charged felony, they then only have to prove the defendant has prior felony convictions within the statutory time frame.[50] Look back to Collins’s case, where the judge made the comment that there was nothing she could do in regards to the sentence.[51] A blanket approach to stopping repeat offenders has created a risk of non-violent offenders slipping through the cracks and being lumped in with violent offenders.

D.    The Need for Mitigating Evidence

Capital punishment has been a controversial topic for decades, which has led to ample case law that has provided protections for defendants facing the death penalty.[52] One protection is requiring defense counsel to do investigation into mitigating evidence.[53] Even more important, however, is requiring the jury to consider that mitigating evidence before imposing the sentence.

Before a jury can be required to hear and consider mitigating factors of a potential HFO, the defendant’s attorney must produce it. In the realm of capital punishment, this is a requirement. In Wiggins v. Smtih, Wiggins sought relief after his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was denied by the United States Court of Appeals.[54] In his original case, Wiggins was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.[55] Partially to blame for the sentence, is his defense team not providing mitigating evidence on Wiggins’s behalf.[56] On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed Wiggin’s mitigating evidence, which included several instances of severe trauma.[57] It then concluded that a competent attorney would have introduced the mitigation evidence at trial, and that it would be relevant to the defendant’s mitigation argument..[58] They reason this is because society believes that defendants with a traumatic background are held to be less culpable those who do not.[59] Not only does this show that the Supreme Court recognizes how important it is to humanize people before a sentence is imposed on them, but that society believes that those with difficult life history are less culpable.[60] Establishing this procedural rule is necessary to implement the next point.

Mitigating evidence must be considered by the jury before imposing a sentence upon a defendant in a death penalty case. In Lockett v. Ohio, the defendant was convicted of murder and under the Ohio statute, the sentencer, did not consider certain mitigating evidence.[61] The Supreme Court analyzed this and recognized that, the lack of a requirement for mitigating evidence to be considered is attributable to a public policy decision, enacted through statute..[62] Even so, they recognized that treating defendants with “respect and uniqueness” is much more important in capital cases as there are not as many remedies for those defendants and because of the severity of the punishment.[63] The Court then held that a statute that prevents the sentencer in capital cases from considering the “defendant’s character and record” as well as circumstances of the offense, can create a situation where a lesser penalty would be imposed instead.[64] While this case does involve the most severe punishment in the United States, these cases normally involve the most heinous crimes. This logic should also be applied to HFO statutes. HFOs face punishments as severe as life in prison without the possibility of parole for drug or property crimes, which are much less severe than a capital offense.[65] It seems just as important to make sure these defendants should be just as protected from the harsh penalties under the HFO statutes as capital defendants are against capital punishments.[66]

An argument is likely to be made against these revisions from those who hold a staunch tough-on-crime mindset.[67] While the proponents of these kinds of laws are concerned about a real issue in the United States,[68] making the amendments proposed above would not be as light on crime as some may argue. If the changes suggested above were adopted, the prosecution would be allowed to offer up aggravating circumstances as well, to sway the jury toward applying HFO status just as if they were deciding for the death penalty in a capital punishment case.[69]

Jurek v. Texas, a capital punishment case, sets out this capital punishment procedure.[70] In this case, the Court observed that the jury weighed aggravating circumstances against the mitigating evidence, and the jury found that the prosecution’s aggravating circumstances weighed heavier.[71] The same procedures can be applied to HFO cases. For example, a defendant who is charged with felony drug possession could offer up facts such as a traumatic childhood, that their parents were addicted to drugs, or any information that could justify a lighter sentence. The prosecution could then point out factors that could sway the jury to not be as sympathetic.

While not as automatic as most states’ current HFO statutes, adopting some of the procedures from capital punishment cases would make sentencing fairer for defendants, while still maintaining a toughness toward crime. This would be done by taking the decision away from the prosecutor and allowing a jury, who is unbiased, to hear contextual information about the defendant and then make the decision to give them an enhanced sentence or not.

 II.     Excluding Lower-Level Felonies from Habitual Offender Statutes

Many states’ HFO statutes include lower-level felonies, which is detrimental for two reasons. First, many lower-level felonies are influenced by a person’s addiction to some sort of substance. Second, the financial impact that sentencing low-level felons to substantial prison time is a heavy burden on the public and the state prisons. Part III of this note will analyze this issue in two subparts. Subpart A will examine the kinds of lower-level felonies that are often included in HFO statutes. Subpart B will then examine the financial impact of lengthy sentences on lower-level felons.

A.     The Relationship between Substance Abuse and Lower-Level Felonies

When thinking of people who are serving the rest of their lives in prison, people’s minds are likely to go to murderers. Despite that, an ACLU study from 2012 shows that, throughout nine states, there were a total of 1,205 people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for non-violent crimes.[72] Some examples of crimes that have resulted in LWOP include: possession of stolen wrenches, shoplifting, breaking into a liquor store afterhours, and possession of a crack pipe.[73] Many of those convicted under these kinds of statutes, also have a substance abuse disorder.[74] As many statutes currently stand, many people with a substance use disorder are at a risk of receiving sentences similar to those who have been convicted of murder.[75]

This fact is made worse considering society has recently developed a better understanding of substance use disorders. In addition, other experts have determined that a person’s environment (e.g., traumatic experiences) can increase their chances of developing a substance use disorder.[76] Furthermore, if a person lives in a neighborhood that is high in poverty and/or violence, they are also more likely to develop a substance use disorder.[77] These facts have led some to believe that there are more effective ways to rehabilitate people with substance use disorders, rather than giving them a lengthy prison sentence.[78]

One alternative to a prison sentence is, placing offenders in cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). CBT is a psychological treatment that focuses on changing an addict’s thought process.[79] This form of therapy is based on three key tenants:.First is the principle that psychological problems can be the result of negative thoughts; .Second, patterns of unpleasant behavior can also cause psychological problems; Finally, people can learn to cope with these psychological problems, which will give them relief from their symptoms.[80] A 2010 study, which included over 2,000 people with a substance use disorder, determined that CBT was an effective method of treatment.[81] They concluded that to get the highest chance of success in CBT, the patient should combine this therapy with another form of treatment.[82] Accomplishing this would be difficult if the person is confined to a prison, where they have limited treatment options. A 2005 report highlights this issue. The author in this report uses a chart to show that 71 percent of prisoners do not receive substance abuse treatment because of budgetary issues.[83] The next two biggest reasons for not receiving treatment is space limitation (51 percent of prisoners) and limited counselors (39 percent of prisoners).[84] If people with substance use disorders were required to complete CBT rather than sentenced to years in prison, they could receive the treatment they need to solve their issues long term. Instead, when they are sentenced to prison, they have a high likelihood of using drugs again when they are released.[85]

CBT is not the only alternative either. While not a particular kind of treatment, in-patient rehabilitation centers can offer a “best of both worlds” approach. On the one hand, the patient, who has committed a crime, is sent to a facility where he or she will be punished for leaving prematurely. On the other hand, the patient is in a facility for a much shorter period than if he or she was sentenced under a HFO statute. Even more importantly, this facility would focus on rehabilitation, whereas a prison serves multiple purposes.[86]

One of the main benefits of an in-patient rehab, compared to any service offered in prisons, is the ability to personalize treatment. To determine which treatment would be the most beneficial to a specific client, a medical professional looks at the substance the person is addicted to.[87] For example, for those addicted to opioids, the preferred treatment is methadone, buprenorphine, extended-release naltrexone, and lofexidine.[88] To emphasize the importance of medicinal rehabilitation, look at its effectiveness.[89] For example, in a 2009 study, those being treated with methadone, “had 33 percent fewer opioid-positive drug tests and were 4.44 times more likely to stay in treatment."[90] This inclusion is important as most prisons do not use medicinal rehabilitation for prisoners who suffer from some substance use disorder.[91] If some of the most effective forms of rehabilitation are not permitted in prisons, then it is time to ask whether or not some prisoners — as well as the public — would benefit more from lower-level felons receiving proper drug treatment, rather than sitting in prisons for years.

B.     Financial Impact of Habitual Offender Statutes

At least two factors impact the cost of how much money HFO statutes cost taxpayers: the normal cost for annually housing an inmate, and healthcare cost for elderly inmates who are serving under HFO statutes.

First, state prisons are significantly funded by the citizens of the state.[92] From 1987 to 2008, state expenditures for corrections went from $10.62 billion to $47.73 billion, an increase of 349 percent.[93] As of 2021, this number had increased to around $80 billion.[94] To add some context to this data, one can look at states that are in different parts of the country and see the costs it takes to house inmates. First, in California, it is estimated to cost about $106,000 to incarcerate an inmate per year.[95] This number is 117 percent higher than a decade prior due to staff and medical costs.[96] In total, California spends around $8.5 billion annually for their incarcerated population.[97] HFOs specifically cost $5.5 billion from 2010 to 2020.[98] On the other side of the country, New York pays around $115,000 per year for each inmate incarcerated.[99] This figure as a whole is a part of a $3.5 billion annual budget for corrections in New York.[100] While California’s cost is the highest in the country, those states not mentioned also are burdened by extreme costs. For example, eleven other states spent at least $ 1 billion annually to incarcerate individuals.[101]

To see how expensive HFOs can be, one must look at the number of HFOs who have been sentenced for a substantial amount of time in a particular state. Take this number and multiply it with the average sentence for those offenders. Then take this number and multiply it with the amount of money a state spends on a prisoner per year. The result will give the average amount of money that the HFOs, with the longest time to serve, will cost the state over the course of their sentence. In 2019, a study was done in Mississippi that highlights these offenders.[102] Mississippi had over 2,600 people incarcerated under its HFO statute in 2019.[103] Of this number, 906 people have been sentenced to at least twenty years, with 439 more being sentenced to at least fifty years in prison.[104] Even by being conservative and using the lowest possible number for each set, the average sentence of these individuals is thirty-five years in prison.[105] Moreover, Mississippi pays around $20,000 per year per inmate, which is one of the lowest in the country.[106] To get the average cost of HFOs in Mississippi over the course of their sentence, multiply the total number of HFOs with substantial sentences (900 inmates) by the average sentence (35 years), which equals 31,500 total years.[107] Then take the total years (31,500 years) and multiply them by the annual cost per inmate ($20,000), which equals $630 million. This is the total amount of money spent over the course of the inmates’ sentences. For transparency, it is important to note that it is unclear how many of the HFOs with substantial sentences are charged with lesser level felonies. The statistics are nonetheless important, however. Removing those who are significantly sentenced for lower-level felonies from the pool would still save the state money, which it could use to combat other issues affecting its citizens.

Furthermore, aside from the normal costs of incarceration, when inmates are sentenced to prison for their entire life or until they are elderly, which are the sentences given to many HFOs, the state becomes responsible for their healthcare. In the United States, the average medical cost per prisoner, per year, is around $6,000, which makes up 18 percent of the average state prison’s expenditures.[108]

These statistics, however, are an average of all prisoners, when the more expensive medical care comes from the aging prison population.[109] This is because senior citizens, regardless of incarceration status, have a higher chance to develop dementia, have impaired mobility, and are more likely to suffer from hearing and vision loss.[110] When incarcerated, however, the Bureau of Justice Statistics concluded that older inmates are more likely to have chronic conditions as well as age quicker than those not incarcerated.[111] This can require the facility to have structural and security accommodations, treatments, and staff trained for special care.[112] Some studies have shown that the cost of incarcerating aging inmates is around $16 billion a year.[113] Maryland recognized this issue as well when it reduced prison sentences with the purpose of lowering the age of the age of its incarcerated population.[114] This move saved them around $185 million over the course of five years.[115] Using Maryland as an example, other states, should look to releasing some of its aging inmates who are only convicted of lower-level felonies. Not only would it benefit those incarcerated, but it would free up some state funds to solve other problems that the public may need assistance with.

Some may argue that compassionate release is already a remedy to this problem and those who are not granted release should still be in there. The problem with this line of thought is the infrequency in which compassionate release is used. 49 states, with the exclusion of Iowa, have some sort of compassionate release, but rarely use them.[116] To add some perspective, in Pennsylvania and Kansas from 2009 to 2016 only sixteen people were granted compassionate release.[117] Statistics for many states are hard to find as only thirteen states are required to track them.[118] Even without the tracking, the difficulty in being granted compassionate release can be seen in the statutes permitting it. California, one of the more severe statutes, requires the person to be, “permanently medically incapacitated, and unable to perform … breathing, eating or eliminating, and require round-the-clock care.”[119] Geogia has a similar statute, which requires the person to be totally incapacitated and expected to die within a year.[120] While it may seem like there is already a remedy for aging inmates, in the form of compassionate release, it is not accessible enough to fix the problem.

III.     A Step in the Right Direction

While the status of HFO statutes paints a bleak picture to many Americans, some states are taking, or attempting to take steps in the right direction. In 2017, Louisiana revised its HFO laws to prohibit life sentences for repeat offenders charged with drug crimes.[121] In addition to these changes, Louisiana judges can also suspend or reduce the sentences of HFOs.[122] Attempting to remedy this issue further, Louisiana extended parole eligibility to over three thousand inmates in 2021.[123] Kentucky is another example of a state where there has been an unsuccessful attempt to fix its HFO statute. Kentucky’s attempt comes in the form of SB 225 which, if passed, would allow the jury to reject the application of the HFO status, allow parole for those serving for non-violent crimes, and prohibit the use of the statute for simple drug possession crimes.[124] Not only was this bill not passed, but Kentucky has passed several laws that will worsen the state’s substantially high incarceration rate.[125]

What happened with Kentucky’s efforts to amend its HFO statutes is not the only example of injustice for HFOs. Even in states like Louisianna, problems remain for thousands of HFO inmates. The remedies provided in the 2017 law are helpful for many inmates, but the benefits do not apply retroactively.[126] When remedying this issue, it is important to not think of those who may be hindered in the future, but to also look back on those already sentenced under HFO statutes.

Conclusion

The public has an interest in punishing repeat felony offenders. The changes that this article suggests would work toward the same goal, while amending the harsh HFO statutes. First, by removing the decision to apply HFO status from the prosecutor and placing it in the hands of the jury, the risk of one person’s potential bias is removed, and the jury would decide if a prolonged sentence were necessary. Secondly, by removing lower-level felonies from HFO statutes, many people who are motivated by drug use can get the help they need, which could give them a better chance of being a productive member in the future. If alternative treatment is not convincing, the money saved, could be put back into the community and would benefit the public more than incarcerating a person with substance use disorder.

The solution to the biggest problems with HFO statutes is simple: Fix the arbitrariness of their application to ensure that every defendant has an equal chance and exclude lower-level felonies from the statutes to ensure the public does not have to bear the financial burden and the defendant gets proper treatment instead.


[*] J.D Expected 2025, University of Kentucky J. Rosenberg College of Law; BA History & Legal Studies 2021, Morehead State University.

[2] See Matt Mencarini, Chris Kenning & Jonathan Bullington What is a persistent felony offender? The law fueling Kentucky’s huge incarceration rate, Courier J. (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/investigations/2022/02/03/what-to-know-kentucky-persistent-felony-offender-pfo-law/8811901002/ [https://perma.cc/E3VE-WMFP]; see also Emily Frances Lynch, Johnson v. United States: The Impact on Texas’ Habitual Offender Statute, 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 187 (2017).

[3] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080 (West 2012).

[4] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.1415 –1417 (West 2011); Mencarini, Kenning & Bullington, supra note 2.

[5] See Infra Part II B.

[6] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.060 (West 2011).

[7] See Matthew S. Crow & Katherine A. Johnson, Race, Ethnicity, and Habitual-Offender Sentencing: A Multilevel Analysis of Individual and Contextual Threat, 19 Crim. Just. Pol’y. Rev. 63, 63 (2008); See also Charles Crawford, Gender, Race, and Habitual Offender Sentencing in Florida, 38 Criminol’y 263, 276–278 (1998) (noting that black females are more than twice as likely to be habitualized in areas where economic inequality along racial lines is comparatively low).

[8] Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n.11 (1982)).

[9] See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 Am. J. Compar. L. Supp. 643, 643–47 (2002).

[10] Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).

[11] Id at 360.

[12] Id. at 364–365.

[13] James D. Zirin, Death is Different, The Hill (Dec. 14, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/531564-death-is-different/; accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n.11 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).

[14] See., Facts about the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/URLs_Cited/OT2016/16-5247/16-5247-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE4A-NMH8].

[15] See Caitlyn Lee Hall, Good Intentions: A National Survey of Life Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses, 16 NYU J. Leg. & Pub. Pol’y. 1101, 1139–41 (2013).

[16] See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 12; see also Hall, supra note 13.

[17] Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S 586, 605 (1978).

[18] See e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080 (West 2012); see also LA R.S. 15.529.1 (West 2019).

[19] See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 12.

[20] See Crow & Johnson, supra note 5; see also Crawford supra note 5.

[21] See Crow & Johnson, supra note 5, at 64.

[22] See Id.

[23] Tana Ganeva, ‘Habitual Offender’ Laws Imprison Thousands for Small Crimes – Sometimes for Life, Scheerpost (Sep. 28, 2022), https://scheerpost.com/2022/09/28/habitual-offender-laws-imprison-thousands-for-small-crimes-sometimes-for-life/. [https://perma.cc/5NXP-ZX6L].

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Race and Sentencing, Nat’l. Ass’n. Crim. Def. Law., (Nov. 23, 2022), https://www.nacdl.org/Content/Race-and-Sentencing. [https://perma.cc/DZQ6-5NSE].

[27] Id.

[28] See Death Penalty Info. Ctr, supra note 12; See also Crow & Johnson, supra note 5; see also Crawford, supra note 7; see also Ganeva, supra note 21; see also Beth Shelburne, Alabama’s Habitual Offender Law: Driving Mass Incarceration Since 1977, ACLU Alabama (May 1, 2020), https://www.alabamasmartjustice.org/reports/hfoa (providing evidence of disparity between races when it comes to habitual offender statute application); [https://perma.cc/QHA8-2QFK]; see also, Race and Sentencing, supra note 24.

[29] See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490–91 (2000).

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id. at 490-97.

[33] Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).

[34] Id.

[35] Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.

[36]See Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).

[37] Id. at 97.

[38] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080(1) (West 2012); La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 (2019).

[39] See Matthew S. Schwartz, Black Man Serving Life Sentence for Stealing Hedge Clippers Granted Parole, NPR (Oct. 18, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/18/925198663/black-man-serving-life-sentence-for-stealing-hedge-clippers-granted-parole [https://perma.cc/5AWS-WSEC].

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

[43] Beth Hundsdorfer, Prisoner Review Board releases final Illinoisan serving life sentence for ‘three-stikes’ drug offense, NPR Ill. (Dec. 21, 2023, 1:15 PM), https://www.nprillinois.org/equity-justice/2023-12-21/prisoner-review-board-releases-final-illinoisan-serving-life-sentence-for-three-strikes-drug-offense [https://perma.cc/ZYN6-T9HT].

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Schwartz, supra note 39.

[47] Hundsdorfer, supra note 43.

[48] Brian Brown & Greg Jolivette, A Primer: Three Strikes – The Impact After More Than a Decade, Legis.Analyst’s Office (Oct. 2005), https://lao.ca.gov/2005/3_Strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm [https://perma.cc/A5G8-X9XM].

[49] See generally, Hundsdorfer, supra note 43 (Providing an example of where a judge explicitly stated their hands were tied when it came to habitual offender sentencing).

[50] See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080 (West 2012); see N.Y. § 70.10 (McKinney 2010); see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.087 (West 2023).

[51] Id.

[52] See ACLU, The Case Against the Death Penalty (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/documents/case-against-death-penalty. [https://perma.cc/66PR-E5GV].

[53] SeeWiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534–38 (2003) (deciding that mitigating evidence could have influenced the outcome of the case, so ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment was a valid claim).

[54] Id. at 514.

[55] Id. at 515–16.

[56] Id.

[57] Id. at 535.

[58] Id.

[59] Id (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)).

[60] Id.

[61] Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602–06.

[62] Id. at 604–05.

[63] Id. at 605.

[64] Id. at 605.

[65] See ACLU, A Living Death: Life without Parole for Nonviolent Offenders 35–36 (2013) [hereinafter “A Living Death”].

[66] See Id.

[67] See Charis E. Kubrin & Rebecca Rublitz, How to Think about Criminal Justice Reform: Conceptual and Practical Considerations, 47 Am . J. Crim. Just. 1050, 1053 (2022).

[68] Id. at 1057.

[69] See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976).

[70] Id. at 267, 270.

[71] Id. at 271 n.6.

[72] A Living Death, supra note 61, at 22.

[73] Id. at 5, 22.

[74] Cf. Abigail A. McNelis, Habitually Offending the Constitution: The Cruel and Unusual Consequences of Habitual Offender Laws and Mandatory Minimums, 28 Geo. Mason Univ. Civ. Rts. L.J. 97, 97–98 (2017) (Proving an example of a man sentenced to LWOP for cultivating marijuana for his own personal use).

[75] Id.

[76] Prevention, Nat’l. Inst. on Drug Abuse (Sept. 2023), https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/prevention#risk-and-protective-factors-impact [https://perma.cc/P75H-K7R4].

[77] Id.

[78] See Nora Volkow, Addiction Should Be Treated Not Penalized, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse (May 7, 2021), https://nida.nih.gov/about-nida/noras-blog/2021/05/addiction-should-be-treated-not-penalized [https://perma.cc/W6JV-F8VE].

[79] Stephan J. Bahr, Amber L. Masters, & Bryan M. Taylor, What Works in Substance Abuse Treatment Programs for Offenders. 92 Prison J. 155, 157 (2012).

[80] What is Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Am. Psych. Assoc. (2017), https://www.apa.org/ptsd-guideline/patients-and-families/cognitive-behavioral [https://perma.cc/QJK2-N44J].

[81] R. Kathryn McHugh, Bridget A. Hearon, & Michael W. Otto, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Substance Use Disorders, 33 Psychiatric Clinics N. Am. 511, 512 (2010).

[82] Id. at 520.

[83] Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, Substance Abuse Treatment for Adults in the Criminal Justice System 190–91 (2005).

[84] Id.

[85] See Ingrid A. Binswanger, Carolyn Nowels, Karen F. Corsi, Jason Glanz, Jeremy Long, Robert E. Booth, & John F. Steiner, Return to drug use and overdose after release from prison: a qualitive study of risk and protective factors, 7 Addiction Sci. & Clinical Prac., no. 1, 2012, at 1–5.

[86] Manuel Escamilla-Castillo, The Purposes of Legal Punishment, 23 Ratio Juris 460, 460 (2010).

[87] Drugs Brains and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, Nat’l. Inst. Drug Abuse (July 2011), https://nida.nih.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/treatment-recovery [https://perma.cc/V7MJ-Z7CM].

[88] Id.

[89] See How effective are medications to treat opioid use disorder?, Nat’l. Inst. Drug Abuse (May 2017), https://nida.nih.gov/publications/research-reports/medications-to-treat-opioid-addiction/efficacy-medications-opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/7PPV-7S37].

[90] Id.

[91] How is opioid use disorder treated in the criminal justice system?, Nat’l. Inst. Drug Abuse (May 2017), https://nida.nih.gov/publications/research-reports/medications-to-treat-opioid-addiction/how-opioid-use-disorder-treated-in-criminal-justice-system. [https://perma.cc/33UB-WDA6].

[92] See Dave Adkisson et al., Right-Sizing Prisons, Pew Ctr. on States (Jan. 2010), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/rightsizing20prisonspdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/63EL-PLHZ].

[93] Id.

[94] Ronnie K. Stephens, Annual Prison Costs A Huge Part Of State and Federal Budgets, Interrogating Just. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://interrogatingjustice.org/prisons/annual-prison-costs-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/6GNS-45X2].

[95] How much does it cost to incarcerate an inmate?, Legis. Analyst’s Off. (Jan. 2022), https://lao.ca.gov/policyareas/cj/6_cj_inmatecost [https://perma.cc/RQ7C-4AF6].

[96] Id.

[97] Stephens, supra note 93.

[98] See Anthony Nagorski, Arguments Against the Use of Recidivist Statutes That Contain Mandatory Minimum Sentences, U. St. Thomas J. L. & Pub. Pol’y, Fall 2010, at 214, 228 (2010).

[99] Jullian Harris-Calvin, Sebastian Solomon, Benjamin Heller, & Brian King, The Cost of Incarceration in New York State, Vera (Oct. 2022), https://www.vera.org/the-cost-of-incarceration-in-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/D5BV-96MC].

[100] Jullian Harris-Calvin, Sebastian Solomon, Benjamin Heller, & Brian King, An Analysis of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s Budget, Vera (Oct. 2022), https://www.vera.org/downloads/GJNY_DOCCS-Budget-Explainer_10.25.22.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X9H6-X53W].

[101] See Stephens, supra note 93.

[102] FWD, We All Pay: Mississippi’s Harmful Habitual Laws (Nov. 2019), https://www.fwd.us/criminal-justice/mississippi/we-all-pay/ [https://perma.cc/C2AY-MS5C].

[103] Id. at 2.

[104] Id.

[105] See Id.

[106] National Institute of Corrections, Mississippi 2019, https://dev-nicic.zaidev.net/resources/nic-library/state-statistics/2019/mississippi-2019 (last visited Sep. 6, 2024).

[107] See generally, FWD supra note 101.

[108] Shivpriya Sridhar, Robert Cornish, & Seena Fazel, The Costs of Healthcare in Prison and Custody: Systematic Review of Current Estimates and Proposed Guidelines for Future Reporting, Frontiers Psych., Dec. 2018, at 5.

[109] Matt McKillop & Alex Boucher, Aging Prison Populations Drive Up Costs: Older individuals have more chronic illnesses and other ailments that necessitate greater spending, Pew (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/02/20/aging-prison-populations-drive-up-costs. [https://perma.cc/6763-R7ZG].

[110] Id.

[111] Id.

[112] Id.

[113] Hope Reese, What Should We Do about Our Aging Prison Population?, JSTOR Daily (July 17, 2019), https://daily.jstor.org/what-should-we-do-about-our-aging-prison-population/ [https://perma.cc/4ASX-DELF].

[114] Id.

[115] Id.

[116] Mary Price, Everywhere and Nowhere: Compassionate Release in the States, Release Aging People in Prison 8, 12 (June 2018), https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Exec-Summary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN9Y-G3SZ].

[117] Id. at 12–13.

[118] Id. at 12.

[119] Id. at 13.

[120] Id.

[121] Dan Copp, Changes Coming to Habitual Offender Law, Houmatoday (Updated Jan. 22, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.houmatoday.com/story/news/crime/2017/09/25/changes-coming-to-habitual-offender-law/16029712007/ [https://perma.cc/NE6C-P9SR].

[122] Id.

[123] Mark Ballard, About 3,000 Inmates in Louisiana Could Get Parole Under New Law; Here’s Who Would be Eligible, The Advocate (July 31, 2021), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_6461957c-f234-11eb-9813-677f50cb4b9a.html [https://perma.cc/XZ9K-9ALL].

[124] Kaylee Raymer, Progress Made on Drug Policy in 2023 Though the Legislature Increased Other Criminal Penalties, KyPolicy (Apr. 13, 2023), https://kypolicy.org/kentucky-criminal-legal-recap-2023/ [https://perma.cc/T6KQ-9L7G].

[125] Id.

[126] Ballard, supra note 122.

DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973

Download a PDF Version

Disparate Impact Claims and the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Billy Devericks[I] 

Introduction            

In 2018, a class action complaint was filed against a group of defendants which included CVS Health Corporation, CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and other pharmaceutical companies.[2] These companies administered health plans where CVS Caremark withheld authority over pharmacy benefits and required enrollees to receive HIV/AIDS medications from specifically assigned pharmacies.[3] If the enrollees did not receive their medications from these pharmacies, they had to pay more (either with “no insurance benefits” at full price or more out-of-pocket expenses).[4] Since these medications were required by the enrollees in order to live, the plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by being forced to spend substantially more money to obtain their medications.[5]

The defendants in this action provided financial incentives to employer sponsors of CVS Caremark to utilize the program in their employment practices and provided no ability for enrollees to opt-out.[6] Prior to implementation of the program by employers, enrollees were able to obtain their medications from other non-CVS pharmacies with full insurance coverage.[7] The plaintiffs in this action had developed critical relationships with their pharmacists where they provided “essential counseling to help Plaintiffs and their families navigate the challenges of living with a chronic condition.”[8] All of the previously discussed procedures within the Program have resulted in negative impacts upon the ability of people with HIV/AIDS to obtain the necessary medications/treatments.[9] The enrollees were required by Caremark to receive their medications from a pharmacy whose practice is to mail the medications either to enrollees directly, or to make available for pick-up by the enrollees.[10] Due to delivery issues, there were multiple instances where enrollees had to wait days for delivery and missed appointments with their doctors, as well as work, as a result.[11] Even if enrollees chose to pick-up medications at a CVS pharmacy, these pharmacies were oftentimes many miles away, with pharmacies occasionally filling incorrect prescriptions, as well as staff shouting names of their medications in the presence of other customers.[12] The plaintiffs in this action were essentially given a choice between facing issues such as those previously described, or to pay large amounts of money for their medications at non-CVS pharmacies.[13]

The plaintiffs in Doe One v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. alleged that this program implemented by CVS discriminated against them in violation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and, in turn, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.[14] The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to determine whether disparate impact claims are recognized under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, therefore, the California Northern District Court relied upon the Court for the Western District Tennessee’s reasoning in Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee Inc. in holding that a disparate impact claim was not cognizable and the plaintiffs’ ACA claim was dismissed after applying a meaningful access standard.[15] This decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court to use a meaningful access standard, but stated that disparate impact claims were not precluded simply based upon a lack of meaningful access.[16] The Supreme Court of the United States granted the writ of certiorari, but the petition was dismissed following a stipulation by all parties that the writ of certiorari be dismissed.[17]

Given that the petition for writ of certiorari was dismissed in Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,[18] the Supreme Court has yet to make a decision regarding whether disparate impact claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are cognizable. Based on the Congressional history, policy implications and progression in recognition of disparate impact claims under the ADA and Rehabilitations Act across circuits, disparate impact claims should be cognizable under both Acts.

Part I of this note will define disparate impact and provide a general understanding of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Part II will provide a comparative analysis of the split between the Sixth, Ninth and Third Circuits regarding disparate impact claims under the Acts. Part III of this note will provide support for the argument that the Supreme Court of the United States should hold that disparate impact claims are cognizable under both the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  

Part I.  Understanding the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 

A.     Rehabilitation Act of 1973

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed by Congress in 1973 to require those who are governed by the statute to make accommodations for disabled Americans to obtain services.[19] Section 504 of this Act was designed with a pattern nearly identical to discrimination provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[20] The aim was to provide disabled individuals opportunities to pursue certain things such as employment or education free of any discrimination against them.[21] The Rehabilitation Act states that

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States…shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive [A]gency…[22] 

Congress had specifically stated that the purpose of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was to ensure that discrimination against those with disabilities would be prevented “regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation services, in relation to . . . any other [f]ederally-aided programs.”[23] An issue here is that the statute specifically only related to discrimination under programs or activities receiving “[f]ederal financial assistance”[24] and limited the application of the Act’s protections against discrimination based upon disability.[25] 

B.     Americans with Disabilities Act 

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was designed by Congress to address the issue of protection limitations presented by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act listed above.[26] The ADA met this goal by extending the rights under the Rehabilitation Act to the private sector as well, with a focus on employment.[27] The ADA states that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”[28] These protections against discrimination also apply to denial of “the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity”[29] and also apply to “any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”[30] The ADA provides a long list of private entities which constitute public accommodations assuming that said entity will affect commerce.[31] For example, pharmacies are explicitly stated to be a public accommodation.[32]

In order to understand how Courts have addressed disparate impact issues under the ADA, it is important to understand how and why Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is consistently brought up in most attempts at bringing disparate impact claims. Given that the ADA was created to extend the rights provided to disabled individuals under the Rehabilitation Act,[33] the two acts logically go hand-in-hand in many cases.[34] Since both of the Acts have “served as twin pillars of federal disability discrimination law,”[35] they have been “constant companions in our case law as it has developed to effect those rights.”[36] Before addressing the split amongst the Circuits, there must be a complete understanding of what disparate impact claims are.

C.    Disparate Impact Claims

There are two major concepts that arise when dealing with discrimination against protected classes: disparate treatment and disparate impact.[37] Where an action that is alleged to be discriminatory is alleged to be intentionally discriminatory, one must analyze the effects of the disparate treatment.[38] Discriminations of this type are the most common.[39] A good example of disparate treatment can be found in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.[40] In this case, the plaintiffs brought suit against a union and employer alleging discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[41] The employer was purposefully treating minority employees in a discriminatory manner by refusing to hire minorities as a practice, constituting disparate treatment.[42]

Disparate impact, in contrast, is a type of discrimination in which the discriminatory action/rule is, on its face, neutral or fair in its form, but results in a discriminatory consequence which impacts a protected class.[43] A case which illustrates this concept is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.[44] In this case, a company implemented a policy which required at least a high school education for initial department assignments or any transfers and required passing scores on two aptitude tests, which did not measure any abilities to perform jobs.[45] Due to a tendency for Caucasian employees to meet these requirements at a higher, disproportionate rate to minority group members, the Court held that the consequence was “directly traceable to race.”[46] Due to this disparate impact, the actions taken by the company were in violations of the Civil Rights Act.[47] Given how great the consequences of disregarding discriminatory consequences of facially neutral governmental actions may be, there is a great demand for disparate impact claims to be cognizable. This demand is rooted in justice and equality for all people, to prevent unchecked discrimination, especially under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

Part II.  Comparative Analysis 

A.  Background Case Law

There are two United States Supreme Court cases that are often cited when addressing disparate impact claims: Alexander v. Choate[48] and Alexander v. Sandoval.[49] In Choate, Tennessee suggested imposing a reduction in the number of days of inpatient care in hospitals that would be covered by Tennessee’s Medicaid program in an attempt to ease the burden on the state of Medicaid costs.[50] The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the change would result in discrimination of handicapped persons as statistics demonstrated that a disproportionate number of handicapped persons would be negatively impacted by the change in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.[51] The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the presentation of the statistics showing a disproportionate impact constituted a prima facie case.[52] The Supreme Court stated discrimination against the disabled was “most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference — of benign neglect.”[53] The Supreme Court further stated “the plight of the handicapped… [is] that discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus.”[54] The Court in Choate went on to discuss how Congress intended to alter conduct that would be extremely difficult or impossible to reach if the Rehabilitation Act was limited “only to conduct fueled by discriminatory intent.”[55]

Despite the focus on fulfilling the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act by preventing discrimination that is not facially or intentionally discriminatory, the Court held that a prima facie violation of the Rehabilitation Act was not established.[56] In what appears to be an attempt to delay the decision to recognize disparate impact claims as constituting prima facie violations, the Court stated that “we assume without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped.”[57] The reversal was grounded in the reasoning of balancing the financial burden on the state to the impact upon handicapped users.[58] The Court stated that the costs would be more than minimal and to require a decision to be the least disadvantageous to disabled individuals would create an unworkable requirement on the state.[59] The Court, seemingly without justification, equates the administrative burden of preventing disparate impacts to the administrative burden imposed upon entities by the National Environmental Policy Act, and even toys with the idea of a “Handicapped Impact Statement” as an assumption of the burden without provocation by the plaintiffs.[60]

Following the decision not to decide upon the issue of recognition of disparate impact claims, the Court applies a meaningful access standard, which states that a “benefit… cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefits may have to be made.”[61] This standard allowed for the Court to reason that because there is still access to Medicaid services for 14 days (compared to the previous 20 day limitation), handicapped users will still receive a benefit, regardless of the impact of the change in Medicaid service.[62] This arguably disregards the Court’s previous statement in the opinion that the purpose of the Act would be disregarded if the Act could not “rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design.”[63]

A little over sixteen years later, Choate was cited multiple times when addressing private rights to action in regard to disparate impact claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[64] In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Alabama Department of Public Safety received grants from the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Justice which in turn, subjected the Department of Public Safety to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race.[65] Alabama, through an amendment to its Constitution, declared English as the state’s official language.[66] Following this amendment, the Department of Public Safety only administered examinations for driver’s licenses in English.[67] The Court held that a private right of action exists to sue for violations of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act, but that § 601 only prohibits intentional discrimination.[68] The Court addresses the possibility, however, that disparate impact claims may be permissible under § 602 even though activities which are unintentionally discriminatory under § 601 are valid.[69] The issue was ultimately avoided since the petitioners in Sandoval did not challenge such regulations and the Court assumed that the regulations challenged will hold no disparate impact issues.[70] Again, while the issue in Sandoval revolved around the Civil Rights Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was modeled after the Civil Rights Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act was intended to expand the scope of the Rehabilitation Act.[71] 

i.  Sixth Circuit

In Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., John Doe (plaintiff) was an enrollee of a BlueCross BlueShield health care plan which required Doe to obtain his medicine for HIV via mail or a specialty pharmacy.[72] Medications under this plan which had the mail or specialty pharmacy requirements were usually very expensive medicines for serious diseases.[73] After implementation of the plan’s requirements, Doe would be required to pay “thousands of dollars per batch” if he did not go to a specialty pharmacy.[74] This situation bothered Doe because he had grown accustom to talking to his regular pharmacists who were aware of his specific needs and medical history.[75] Doe was also highly concerned about his privacy.[76] Doe then sued BlueCross BlueShield in violation of the ADA and the Affordable Care Act (ACA).[77]

The Americans with Disabilities Act claim did not survive because the Court held that BlueCross BlueShield is an insurance company, and not a pharmacy, and therefore they were not an entity to be considered a public accommodation under the ADA.[78] However, the disparate impact claim did not stop there. The Rehabilitation Act applies to claims under the Affordable Care Act because it is a federally financed health program.[79] The Sixth Circuit cited Sandoval and stated the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act allows for actions which may have a discriminatory disparate impact.[80] The Court relies upon the language of a single act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, to hold that disparate impact discrimination is valid under the Rehabilitation Act.[81] More specifically, because the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically prohibit activities/actions that “otherwise adversely affects” disabled individuals, there can be no disparate impact claim and cites, among other cases, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Sandoval to lend support.[82]

The Court’s reasoning for its decision lies in administrative and financial burdens that will be imposed as a result of deeming disparate impact claims cognizable under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.[83] It is reasoned that many policies which are facially neutral have negative impacts on those with disabilities, but because an “unwieldy administrative and adjudicative burden” would be imposed, the claims should not be recognized.[84] The Court goes on to reason that because the Supreme Court in Choate made an assumption, rather than a decision, the Sixth Circuit was free to decide however it wanted in the case at hand.[85] 

ii. Third Circuit 

While Helen L. v. DiDario does not explicitly discuss disparate impact, its analysis of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act served as grounds for the decision in a later case involving disparate impact claims under the ADA.[86] The plaintiff in DiDario suffered from meningitis which resulted in her being partially paralyzed years.[87] The Department of Public Welfare, through Medicaid, provides an attendant care program which provides for basic needs of disabled individuals in the home of the individual rather than in a nursing home.[88] The plaintiff, although eligible for attendant care, was placed in a nursing home because she was on a waitlist, which was much more expensive for the Commonwealth.[89] The plaintiff, due to her lack of contact with persons other than the staff and her two children who visit the home, alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of Title II of the ADA.[90]

The Court then went on to delve deep into the Congressional intent of both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.[91] The Court highlighted the purpose of responding to societal neglect of handicapped individuals in which Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act intended to serve by rectifying oversights of such neglect.[92] The ADA was created to address the shortcomings of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.[93] The Third Circuit stated that “Congress did not intend to condition the protection of the ADA upon a finding of ‘discrimination.’”[94] The Court further explained it is not possible that Congress intended to limit the protections of the ADA only to situations with intentional discrimination.[95]

This decision stood as the grounds for the Pennsylvania Eastern District Court to hold that disparate impact claims under Title II of the ADA are cognizable.[96] In Doe v. Perkiomen Valley School District, a group of children with disabilities, along with their parents, brought a class action against the Perkiomen Valley School District due to the Board’s decision to make wearing a mask during the COVID-19 pandemic in the schools optional.[97] Before the district made this decision, they developed a health plan for schools to return to in-person courses.[98] The argument by the plaintiffs was that the change in the rule discriminated against disabled children because it excluded them from a public institution, or denied them from participation in school district services.[99] This denial is rooted in the argument that optional masking increases COVID-19 transmission rates, and in turn, increase the likelihood that disabled children would become infected.[100] The children and parents alleged that this discrimination was in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.[101]

In bringing their claim, the plaintiffs focused on a disparate impact argument.[102] The Pennsylvania Eastern District Court recognized the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim.[103] The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Choate opened the door to recognizing disparate impact claims as prima facie evidence by referencing to the need to fulfill the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act by doing so.[104] Then, the Third Circuit led the way towards such a finding in DiDario, which allowed for the decision to be made in Perkiomen Valley School District.[105]  

iii.  Ninth Circuit 

The Ninth Circuit addressed a case involving the Los Angeles Community College District (“LACCD”), which operates community colleges in California, and two blind students, Roy Payan and Portia Mason, who were enrolled in class in the LACCD.[106] Mason and Payan were granted accommodations.[107] Although the students were given accommodations, they faced accessibility issues at LACCD, which they categorized as inaccessibility to in-class materials, educational technology, research databases, computer applications and websites, and textbooks.[108] The students filed suit alleging that these failures to accommodate for students with disabilities by LACCD was in violation of “Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the [Americans with Disabilities Act].”[109]

The Ninth Circuit first found that a “private right of action” existed, which would allow for the Plaintiffs to bring the suit and for the court to enforce the Title II Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504.[110] Then, the Payan court concluded that disparate impact claims are cognizable under Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.[111] The Ninth Circuit based its decision that disparate impact claims are cognizable upon two cases: Alexander v. Choate[112] and Crowder v. Kitagawa.[113],[114]  The court in Payan recited the popular line in Choate which stated that Section 504 can govern conduct which has a disparate impact on disabled individuals.[115] In Crowder, the Ninth Circuit held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Americans with Disabilities Act when a state’s practices discriminate against disabled persons.[116]

Part III.  Disparate Impact Claims Should be Cognizable 

A.  Legislative History

The legislative history of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act provide strong support for the Third and Ninth Circuit’s approach.

For decades, the Rehabilitation Act and its progeny, the Americans with Disabilities Act, have served as twin pillars of federal disability discrimination law. Both statutes secure the rights of individuals with disabilities to independence and full inclusion in American society and, unsurprisingly, have been constant companions in our case law as it has developed to effect those rights.[117]

After all, Section 504 is known as “the cornerstone of the civil rights movement of the mobility-impaired.”[118]

The Congressional intent to prohibit discrimination in the Rehabilitation Act would “ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as design.”[119] It is clear that this intent calls for protections of disabled individuals where the discriminatory impact is both intentional, or unintentional, as in disparate impact claims. The crucial thrust of the Rehabilitation Act is to “eliminate the creaming and shift the focus to harder cases in order to serve individuals” with disabilities.[120] Further, the Rehabilitation Act was intended to provide additional services for disabled individuals, and to provide them with more attention “to focus . . . on making employment and participation in society more accessible.”[121]

When the Rehabilitation Act was drafted, there were certain expectations in mind whenever it came to how disabled individuals should benefit from it. One of which was to serve individuals with disabilities through the provision of a reasonable expectation that said disabled individuals could benefit from the fruit of the act and that they would be “fit to engage” in societal and employment activities.[122] Senator Cranston, being an original sponsor of the legislation, was a staunch advocate for change to support Americans suffering from disabilities.[123] Cranston argued that “[f]or those millions of handicapped individuals who pay taxes and have the right to expect that their tax will go toward making their environment more accessible” and that these individuals had a right for their lives to be easier.[124] Cranston emphasized it is the right of disabled individuals to have “employment which complements their abilities represent overdue avenues of restitution for previous societal neglect.”[125] Senator Humphrey, known for his previous attempts to pass legislation to protect disabled individuals, famously said, “the time has come to firmly establish the right of disabled Americans to dignity and self-respect as equal and contributing members of society and to end the virtual isolation[.]”[126]

The legislative intent that brought the Americans with Disabilities Act to light supports the proposition that there is no Congressional intent to strictly limit claims against parties in violation of either Act to situations where discriminatory intent exists. One of the fundamental conclusions reached by Congress was that current laws prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act were inadequate to confront and address discrimination against disabled people.[127] Given that the Rehabilitation Act was already enacted by this time, it is evident that Congress intended for the protections provided by the ADA would be intended to govern all issues involved discrimination regardless of intent. Additionally, the report from the Committee reached the fundamental conclusion that “discrimination denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and costs the United States…and the private sector billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses” as a result.[128]

Most importantly, the report states that discrimination that discriminates “by effect as well as by intent or design” is the discrimination in which the ADA intends to address.[129] “Discrimination also includes harms resulting from . . . the adoption or application of standards and criteria and practices and procedures based on thoughtlessness or indifference––of benign neglect.”[130] These statements make it clear that there is no doubt that the ADA was passed with the intentions of preventing discrimination implemented by any manner. The report goes as far to recognize the issues of enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act in that the disparate impact claims were difficult to bring based upon the language of the statute.[131] “The Committee recognizes that . . . this legislation differs from section 504 by virtue of the fact that the phrase ‘solely by reason of his or her handicap’ has been deleted.”[132] Congress learned from its previous mistakes and stated the reliance on the language of Section 504 led to absurd results in attempts to enforce the protections of the Rehabilitation Act.[133] By adopting differing language, Congress intended to reject such absurd results.[134] This Congressional intent has been recognized as a key component in repairing any damages done by the lack of enforcement of provisions protecting disabled classes in previous years.[135]

The combined intent of Congress in passing both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA presents strong opposition to the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc.[136] The Supreme Court in Sandoval reasoned that it was beyond dispute that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act “prohibits only intentional discrimination.”[137] The Supreme Court, however, did not rely on the statutory text of the Civil Rights Act but instead relied upon two Supreme Court cases to form their decision.[138] The Ninth Circuit pointed out this flaw. The Payan court stated that “[b]ecause this limitation is not based on the statutory text of the Civil Rights Act, the similar statutory language in Section 504 and the ADA does not create an analogous limitation on disparate impact disability discrimination claims.”[139] The Ninth Circuit went on: “Sandoval, therefore, does not upset the historical understanding that Section 504 and the ADA were specifically intended to address both intentional discrimination and discrimination caused by ‘thoughtless indifference’ or ‘benign neglect.’”[140] 

Conclusion 

Congressional intent has played a significant role in determining whether disparate impact claims in civil rights cases are cognizable. The United States Supreme Court in Griggs relied heavily Congressional intent in making its landmark decision to ensure that the civil rights of citizens were protected.[141] The Supreme Court, when presented with the issue again of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA, should follow the reasoning of the Third and Ninth Circuits. In particular, the Supreme Court should give significant weight to the legislative history of both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA and hold, in accordance with the intent of Congress, that disparate impact claims are cognizable under both Acts. 


[I] J.D. 2024, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; BA Political Science & History 2021, University of Kentucky.

[2] First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Doe One v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-01031-EMC) 2018 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 20162 at *1.

[3] Id.

[4] Id. at 1–2.

[5] Id. at 2–3.

[6] Id. at 2.

[7] Doe One v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 967, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 977.

[11] Id. at 978.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 977, 980.

[15] CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d at 981–86.

[16]  Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 982 F.3d 1204, 1210–12 (9th Cir. 2020).

[17] CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Doe, 142 S. Ct. 480 (2021).

[18] 982 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2020).

[19]  See Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 546 (2d Cir. 2000).

[20]  S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 39 (1974).

[21] Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

[22] 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

[23] S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 38 (1974).

[24] 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

[25] Lauren R.S. Mendonsa, Dualing Causation and the Rights of Employees With HIV Under § 504 of The Rehabilitation Act, 13 Scholar: St. Mary’s L. Rev. on Race and Soc. Just. 273, 285 (2010).

[26] See Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 219, 219 (2002).

[27] Id.

[28] 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

[29] Id. § 12132.

[30] Id. § 12182(a).

[31] See id. § 12181(7).

[32] Id. § 12181(7)(F).

[33] Colker, supra note 26, at 219.

[34] See, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 241–44 (6th Cir. 2019); Doe 1 v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 3d 668, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2022); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329–32 (3d Cir. 1995).

[35] Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 109 (3rd Cir. 2018).

[36] Id. at 110.

[37] See Legal Update on ADA Claims of Disparate Impact vs. Disparate Treatment, Great Lakes ADA Ctr. (Mar. 16, 2022) https://www.accessibilityonline.org/ada-legal/archives/110998. [https://perma.cc/8M6F-9ZXA]

[38] Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 Duke L. J. 861, 868 (2006).

[39] See Great Lakes ADA Ctr, supra note 37.

[40] 431 U.S. 324 (1977).

[41] Id. at 328.

[42] Id. at 334–37.

[43] See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).

[44] Id.

[45] Id. at 425–28.

[46] Id. at 430.

[47] See id.

[48] 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

[49] 532 U.S. 275 (2001).

[50] Choate, 469 U.S. 287 at 289 (1985) (The change was “a reduction from 20 to 14 in the number of inpatient hospital days per fiscal year” that Medicaid would cover).

[51]Id. at 289–90 (“Statistical evidence…indicated that…27.4% of all handicapped users of hospital services who received Medicaid required more than 14 days of care, while only 7.8% of nonhandicapped users required more than 14 days of care.”). See also 42 U.S.C. §12112.

[52] Choate, 469 U.S. at 291–92 (“Because both the 14-day rule and any annual limitation on inpatient coverage disparately affected the handicapped, the panel found that a prima facie case had been made out…”).

[53] Id. at 295.

[54] Id.at 296.

[55] Id.at 296–97.

[56] Id. at 309.

[57] Id. at 299.

[58] Id. at 308. 

[59] Id.

[60] See id. at 298­–99 (“Had Congress intended § 504 to be a National Environmental Policy Act for the handicapped, requiring the preparation of ‘Handicapped Impact Statements’ before any action was taken… we would expect some indication of that purpose in the statute or its legislative history.”). see also U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, National Environmental Policy Act Review Process (Oct. 5, 2022)  https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process. [https://perma.cc/A8HD-3VSW]

[61] Choate, 469 U.S. at 301.

[62] Id. at 302.

[63] Id. at 297.

[64] See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.at 279.

[68] Id. at 280–81.

[69] Id. at 281 (“[R]egulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under § 601.”).

[70] Id. at 282.

[71] See supra text accompanying note 19–20. See also Colker, supra note 26.

[72] 926 F.3d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 2019).

[73] Id.

[74] Id. at 238.

[75] See id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Id. at 243–44.

[79] Id. at 239.

[80] Id at 240.

[81] Id.

[82] Id. at 240–41. (“The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, it is true, prohibits disparate-impact discrimination… [b]ut unlike that statute, the 1975 Age Act does not bar practices that ‘otherwise adversely affect’ people because of their age..”).

[83] See id. at 242.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. (“The key word is ‘assume.’ Because Choate did not decide the issue either way, and in fact expressed reservations about the effects of disparate-impact liability in this area, we remain free to hold that § 504 does not cover disparate-impact claims.”).

[86] 46 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 1995).

[87] Id. at 328.

[88] Id. at 329.

[89] Id.

[90] Id.

[91] See id. at 331–35.

[92] See DiDario, 46 F.3d at 330.

[93] See id. at 331. See also S. Rep. No. 101–116, at 18 (1989) (“State laws are inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing.”).

[94] DiDario, 46 F.3d at 334.

[95] See id. at 335.

[96] Doe v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 3d 668, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2022).

[97] Id. at 673.

[98] Id at 674-75.

[99] Id. at 679.

[100] Id. at 680.

[101] Id. at 679.

[102] Id. at 687.

[103] Id.

[104] See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 52–55.

[105] See Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 926 F.3d at 687–88.

[106] Payan v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2021).

[107] Id. at 732.

[108] Id.

[109] Id. at 733.

[110] Id at 734.

[111] Id. at 737.

[112] 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

[113] 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996).

[114] Payan, 11 F.4th at 734–35.

[115] See id.; see supra text accompanying note 55.

[116] Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1485.

[117] Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. Of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 109–10 (3d Cir. 2018).

[118] Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1205 (3d Cir. 1989)).

[119] Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 (1985).

[120] 119 Cong. Rec. 5861 (1973).

[121] Id. at 5863.

[122] Id.

[123] See Kitty Cone, Short History of the 504 Sit-in, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, https://dredf.org/504-sit-in-20th-anniversary/short-history-of-the-504-sit-in/.

[124] See 119 Cong. Rec. 5882–83 (1973).

[125] Id. at 5883.

[126] Kitty Cone, Short History of the 504 Sit-in, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, https://dredf.org/504-sit-in-20th-anniversary/short-history-of-the-504-sit-in/.

[127] S. Rep. No. 101­–116, at 6 (1989).

[128] Id.

[129] Id.

[130] Id.

[131] Id. at 44.

[132] Id.

[133] Id.

[134] Id. at 45.

[135] See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d. Cir. 1995).

[136] 926 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 2019).

[137] Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).

[138] Id. at 280–282. See also Payan v. L.A. Cmty. College Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 736–737 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that Sandoval supported its proposition with the use of two Supreme Court cases).

[139] Payan, 11 F.4th at 736.

[140] Id.at 736-37.

[141] See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–36 (1971).

In an Era of Social Media and Cloud Computing, It’s Time for the Server Test to Retire

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In an Era of Social Media and Cloud Computing, It’s Time for the Server Test to Retire

Kara West I

Introduction

In 2021, two photographers—Alexis Hunley and Matthew Brauer—sued the social media giant Instagram for copyright infringement.[2] Hunley and Brauer, like many other artists throughout the world, displayed their work on their Instagram accounts.[3] Online publishers then used Instagram’s embedding tool to display the photos from Hunley’s and Brauer’s profiles on their webpages without the artists’ permission.[4] To the casual internet user, a photo or video that has been embedded on a webpage could look as if it were simply copied from the source material and pasted on the page. Unlike a simple copy-paste job, however, some federal court jurisdictions don’t consider embedding to be copyright infringement.[5] Companies and users are free to use photos without permission, and artists who rely on social media to market themselves are left vulnerable to having their work essentially stolen from them.

Hunley was brought in the Ninth Circuit which had previously decided, in a case called Perfect 10 v. Amazon, that embedding does not constitute copyright infringement.[6] Using what is now termed the “server test,” the Ninth Circuit held that a party who embeds an image belonging to another as a thumbnail in its search page is not liable for copyright infringement.[7]  The district court judge in Hunley dismissed the case under the precedent of Perfect 10.[8]

This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s server test is outdated and should be discarded in favor of an interpretation of the display right that focuses on the audience’s perspective rather than whether a potential infringer possesses a copy of the work. Part I briefly explains the necessary history of copyright and gives statutory definitions of the relevant sections of the Copyright Act; Part II introduces the server test and alternative interpretations of the display right used by the Second Circuit that can better address the right in the modern age; Part III shows the inapplicability of the server test in the digital era and discusses an alternative in contract.

I.  A Brief History and Background 

Centuries before the birth of the Internet, English law recognized the importance of establishing a property right in intellectual works.[9] The invention of the printing press in the mid-1400’s made it easier and cheaper than ever to create copies of books.[10] In 1710, The British Parliament enacted the first formal copyright statute, the Statute of Anne.[11] Although the Statute was broadly worded and, in many cases, practically ineffective, it is the common origin of the two fundamental principles of American copyright law: the right of an author to his or her writing and the encouragement of societal learning.[12] 

The Framers purposefully incorporated the principles into the Constitution via the Intellectual Property Clause, which allotted to Congress the power “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”[13] The first copyright act passed by Congress in 1790 “was essentially a copy of the Statute of Anne.”[14] Under the 1790 Copyright Act, the only items that could be copyrighted were maps, charts, and books.[15] The list of copyrightable subject matter grew over time in response to advancements in technology.[16] In 1865, Congress amended the Copyright Act to include photographic prints and negatives.[17] Congress compared the image taken by the photographer to writings by an author.[18] The latest iteration of the Act lists eight broad categories of copyrightable subject matter.[19] The list is not exhaustive because the legislative drafters of the 1976 Act intentionally allowed room for new technology to be included in the eight stated categories.[20]

A.  Some Copyright Terminology 

The 1976 Copyright Act uses the term “copies” somewhat counterintuitively.[21] Imagine an artist draws an adorable furry raccoon on a sheet of paper. She places the drawing in a copier. The copier scans the drawing and then spits out an exact replica of the raccoon on another sheet of paper. Section 101 of the Act states that “copies” are “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”[22] Both the original drawing and the copy are material objects; both are embodied on sheets of paper; both can be framed and hung on a wall, captured by photograph, and run through the copier over and over again. Both raccoons are “copies” under the Act.

A work can only be “protected by copyright” if it is “recorded in some physical[,]” tangible form—like the drawing on paper in the example above.[23]  This is known as the fixation requirement.[24] Throughout the twentieth century, works have fulfilled the fixation requirement by being recorded in the forms of “books, maps, and charts [as well as] dramatic works like plays, musical compositions, visual art, [and] photographs.”[25] In the digital world, works typically fulfill the requirement by being stored on some physical device such as a hard drive or SD card.[26]

Although a work must be “fixed” in a tangible form—like a copy—to be protected by copyright, a work is nonetheless its own distinct entity.[27] Multiple copies of the same work can exist at once, and often those copies are in different forms.[28] For example, you can buy J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit in either the form of an eBook or a classic hardcover on Amazon.

B.  The Display Right 

The term “copyright” applies to a bundle of several rights which often overlap with one another.[29] Copyright includes the right to reproduce, to prepare derivatives, to distribute, to perform, and to display.[30] The copyright holder’s “display” right is at the center of the server test.[31] The plaintiffs in Hunley alleged that the third-party publishers infringed their copyright by displaying their photos when they used Instagram’s embedding tool.[32]  When the Copyright Act of 1976 was constructed, Congress gave a few examples of what constitutes a “display”: projecting an image, transmitting the image “by electronic or other means,” and even “showing [it] on … [a] viewing apparatus connected with any sort of information storage and retrieval system.”[33] Computer displays or iPhone screens could easily fit into these examples, especially when one considers Congress’ admission that it couldn’t include every conceivable piece of future technology in 1976.[34]

II.  Introducing the Server Test

The server test was reviewed in the Ninth Circuit case Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com.[35]  Perfect 10 operated a subscription website.[36] Perfect 10’s subscribers used a password to log into a “members’ area” where they could access images of nude models that Perfect 10 had copyrighted.[37] On occasion, website publishers would “republish Perfect 10’s images on the Internet without [prior] authorization.”[38] Google’s search engine then automatically indexed the webpages that containined the images and it provided thumbnail versions of the images “in response to user inquiries.”[39] When a user clicked a thumbnail, he or she would be taken to a webpage showing the full-size version.[40] Perfect 10 claimed that Google directly infringed its copyrights by displaying Perfect 10’s photos in its image search.[41] After applying the server test, the Ninth Circuit court ruled that Google did not committed copyright infringement because Google never stored the images in its servers.[42]

The Ninth Circuit’s server test states that an alleged infringer displays an image in violation of a copyright holder's rights only if a copy of the image is stored in the infringer’s computer server, hard disk, or “other storage device.”[43]  Under the Copyright Act of 1976, “[t]o  ‘display’ a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process . . . .”[44] To be “shown,” under the Copyright Act, a copy must first be “fixed.”[45] Fixation occurs when a copy is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”[46]

This reasoning suggests that in order to “display” a copy, one must be in possession of the copy in the first place. Google never displayed a copy because it never had possession of a copy; it never had possession of a copy because it never stored (i.e., “fixed”) a copy in its servers.[47]  Instead, when a user clicks on a thumbnail in Google’s image search, HTML instructions direct the user to the image on a third party’s website.[48] The third party is in possession of the copy, not the search browser.[49]

A.  Framing v. Embedding 

Perfect 10 addresses both framing and embedding, but both types of activity violate the display right, and courts typically treat them the same.[50] However, for the sake of clarity, it is important to highlight the difference between the two. “Framing” in the digital world is similar to literally placing a frame around an original artwork.  One party displays another party’s webpage within the “frame” of its website.[51] The content from the source’s webpage appears exactly the same on the framer’s website as it does on the source’s site, “including any explanatory text, advertisements, or attribution information.”[52] The only difference between the two is the web address.

Embedding (also known as in-line linking) occurs when “code on one page . . . links to content (often images or videos) hosted elsewhere.”[53] Think of embedded links like directions on a map: they show a user’s computer “how and where to access content” elsewhere on the Internet.[54] However, embedding is different from framing in that instead of showing a source webpage as it appears on the source’s website, it places specific content from the source into the new context of another website.[55] “[A]ny text or advertisements which may have accompanied the content on the source[’s]” webpage are replaced by the text and advertisements on the new website.[56]  

B.  The Server Test and Embedding 

Although the server test closely aligns with the language in the Copyright Act, it leads to impractical real-world results. Perfect 10 was decided in 2007, three years before the creation of Instagram and almost 15 years before Hunley.[57] The Seventh Circuit used a similar construction of the server test in 2012 in Flava Works v. Gunter, where it demonstrated the flawed operation of the test’s logic.[58]

Flava Works concerned a “social bookmarking” website called myVidster, which operated somewhat like YouTube.[59] MyVidster users could “bookmark” videos they found on the Internet on its site so other users could watch them later.[60] “Upon receiving the bookmark[,] myVidster automatically requested the video’s ‘embed code’ from the server that [stored] the video.”[61] “[E]mbed codes contain[ed] the video’s web address [along with] instructions [on] how to display the video.”[62] Once myVidster received the code from the server, it created its own webpage with the video, making it appear to the user as though the video from the third-party website was located “on myVidster’s website.”[63]

The Seventh Circuit held that since the users who bookmarked videos on myVidster’s website never actually copied the videos, they had not infringed Flava Works’ copyrights;[64] and MyVidster could not have contributorily infringed because it only used embedded links and never stored any copy on any of its servers.[65] A social bookmarking service like myVidster should not be made “a policeman of copyright law[,]” the court stated, because it could never “know whether a video that a visitor bookmarks on . . . [its] website is protected by copyright”.[66]

The financial motivation for the use of copyrighted work on social media websites is far stronger now than in 2012. For example, Facebook acquired Instagram in 2012, the same year Flava Works was decided.[67] In 2012, the social media company brought in no revenue at all.[68] However, in 2021, less than ten years later, Instagram made an estimated $47.6 billion in revenue.[69] Also in 2021, advertising across all the major social media platforms grew to an estimated $57.7 billion.[70] Users generate income from the advertisements social media platforms place on their posts, creating a fierce drive to produce (and infringe on) engaging content.[71]

C.  American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. 

In 2014, the Supreme Court decided American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.[72] Aereo concerned the performance right, which makes up part of the bundle of rights that is copyright.[73] The Court’s opinion in Aereo is the closest the Court has come to discussing the issues surrounding the server test.[74]

Aereo offered a subscription service that allowed its subscribers to view broadcast television live over the Internet.[75]  Once a subscriber chose a show to watch on Aereo’s website, Aereo used its own antennas to capture the broadcast and its own transcoders “translate the signals received into data.”[76] It saved the data “in a subscriber-specific folder on [its] hard drive.”[77] Once a few seconds of the show had “been saved, Aereo’s server [then] stream[ed]” it “to the subscriber over the Internet.”[78]

In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., a predecessor case to Aereo, the Court held that a service which only enhances its customers’ ability to access copyrighted material does not perform the copyrighted material in violation of the Act.[79] Instead, the service works like a stage play, the broadcaster taking on the role of an actor and the viewer taking on the role of a member of the audience.[80] However, as the Court implicitly acknowledged, this performer/viewer dichotomy fails when technology is added to the mix.[81] A broadcaster does less than an actor who creates an image of a character in front of an audience; it simply provides electronic signals.[82] And a viewer of a broadcast takes a more active role than a viewer of a stage play; he or she provides the equipment necessary to convert the broadcaster’s electronic signals into images.[83]“Broadcasters perform[ed].” Since the service simply “enhance[d] the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals,” it fit the role of viewer more so than performer.[84]

Fortnightly was decided in 1968.[85] Eight years later, Congress amended the Copyright Act once again, this time with an intention to overturn the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of the performance right in Fortnightly.[86] Congress added language to clarify and broaden the scope of the right.[87] The newest version of the Act states technology that occupies the role of either broadcaster or viewer has the capacity to “perform[]’ a work”, meaning it can “show its images in any sequence or . . . make the sounds accompanying it audible.”[88]

The Aereo Court applied the amended Copyright Act’s definition of “perform” to Aereo and therefore determined that Aereo infringed on the plaintiffs’ public performance right.[89] Aereo’s activities were “substantially similar to those of the . . . companies . . . Congress” targeted when it amended the Act in 1976.[90] Under the amended Copyright Act, the companies in Fortnightly “performed” a broadcast whenever their equipment transmitted the electronic signals that made up the broadcast to their customers.[91] Similarly, Aereo “performed” whenever one of its servers streamed a program to a subscriber.[92] 

D.  The Influence of Aereo in the Southern District of New York

The Southern District of New York has explicitly rejected the server test twice in the past several years, in both instances using the Court’s holding in Aereo to support its interpretation of the display right in the Copyright Act.[93] The focus of the performance right analysis is on the effect a new piece of technology has on a viewer, not its physical structure.[94]Since the performance right and the display right are both part of the bundle of rights which comprise copyright, they should be analyzed similarly.[95]

Goldman v. Breitbart concerned a plaintiff who, similar to the plaintiffs in Hunley, owned the copyright to a photo he had taken and posted to social media. The plaintiff’s photo of football star Tom Brady had gone viral online.[96] The plaintiff alleged that, by Breitbart and other news outlets embedding Tweets that contained his photo in their articles, they infringed on his display right.[97]

The Southern District of New York pointed out that a key component of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Aereo was that “technical distinctions [that are] invisible to the user should not be the lynchpin on which copyright liability lies….”[98]  So the fact that the defendants never stored a copy in their servers is irrelevant.[99] Their websites “displayed” the plaintiff’s Tom Brady photo simply by “putting a process in place[, embedding, ]that resulted in a transmission of the photo[] so [it] could be visibly shown.”[100]

In 2021—three years after Breitbart—the Southern District of New York decided Nicklen v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.[101] The plaintiff in Sinclair was a nature photographer who had posted a video of a polar bear to his Instagram and Facebook.[102] The video’s caption expressly directed those who wished to use the video to contact the plaintiff’s organization.[103] Sinclair Broadcast Group, a Maryland-based media conglomerate, used an embedding tool to add the video to one of its articles.[104] A casual reader, even one without a Facebook or Instagram, could view the video in the article without ever having to navigate to the plaintiff’s social media accounts.[105]

The Southern District of New York described the display right as being “technology neutral.”[106] It is “concerned not with how a work is shown, but that a work is shown.”[107] So despite all the technical jargon surrounding embedding, the embed code is nonetheless “simply an information ‘retrieval system’” that allows an image or video to be seen.[108] Sinclair therefore “displayed” the plaintiff’s video within the meaning of the Copyright Act when it embedded the video in its article.[109]

E.  Other Courts’ Approaches to the Display Right 

In Leader’s Institute v. Jackson, the Northern District of Texas considered the display right in relation to framing.[110] The plaintiffs in Jackson had “framed” the defendants’ webpage by including code in their website that instructed a visitor’s browser to retrieve data from both the plaintiff’s and defendants’ servers simultaneously and display it all under the plaintiff’s web address.[111]  The plaintiffs argued along the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Perfect 10 that framing could not be copyright infringement because it does not require possession of a copy.[112] The Leader’s Institute court expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perfect 10—the Copyright Act only requires that a copy be shown to be displayed.[113]

This reading closely aligns with the definition of “display” Congress used when constructing the newest version of the Act in 1976.[114] The Report for the House Committee on the Judiciary for the 1976 revision to the Copyright Act asserts that an infringement occurs if a copy is “transmitted by any method (by closed or open circuit television, for example, or by a computer system) from one place to members of the public located elsewhere” without the permission of the copyright holder.[115] The ambiguity in the use of the word “place” may imply that the framers of the 1976 amendment did not intend to require an infringer to possess a copy to display it. This implication is reinforced when noting that the report expressly addresses the issue of possession in relation to the display right only to note that possession of a copy in the form of a rental or loan does not carry with it a right to display.[116]

The Northern District of California hinted in its opinion in Free Speech Systems, LLC, v. Menzel that, even within the Ninth Circuit, the copyright holder’s display right may be broader than it was portrayed in Perfect 10; however, the court refused to deviate from the boundaries established by the Perfect 10 server test.[117] In Menzel, a news website incorporated nine photographs from a photographer’s website into one of its posts without the photographer’s consent.[118] In response to the news website’s argument that its conduct was protected by Perfect 10, the Menzel court noted that no case outside or within the Ninth Circuit had ever (at that point) applied the server test outside the specific context of search engines.[119]

The court declined to take judicial notice of whether the photographs were copied or embedded in the news website’s post, so it did not discuss the server test any further in its opinion.[120] However, the little discussion it did devote to the subject is enlightening. The court’s emphasis on the inapplicability of the test outside the specific context of search engines indicates that it may have reservations as to the usefulness of the test itself. Menzel was decided in 2019, twelve years after Perfect 10.[121] The Menzel court dealt with a highly developed digital environment, which likely had an impact on its reluctance to embrace Perfect 10’s server test.[122]

III.  The Cloud Problem and Potential Solutions

A “cloud” is a web of connected servers and software that allows users to remotely access their data and storage.[123] The cloud got its name because, like a cloud in the sky, it has no single fixed shape and it covers various geographic areas.[124] A cloud’s servers can exist anywhere in the world, but they’re usually located in clusters and are far removed from major population centers.[125]

The individuals and businesses who use cloud servers usually do not own them.[126] Instead, they pay companies like Microsoft or Google to use their clouds and thereby prevent the headaches that come with hosting and managing hardware and software.[127] A cloud, such as OneDrive, contains millions of digital files which can be easily reproduced and almost always exist in more than one place (e.g., a laptop hard drive).[128]  This greatly limits the amount of control a copyright owner can extend over any one copy.

Currently, the framework for mediating the conflict between the competing rights of consumers and creators is centered around ownership of physical copies.[129] Further, digital copies are typically treated like physical copies.[130] An owner of a copy of software, for example, has the right to make copies, run them, back them up, or modify them.[131] Copies that are stored on a public cloud server are treated as “fixed” for copyright purposes—the same way they would be if they were stored on a private home server.[132]

However, imagine the following: a cloud server owned by a single service provider stores the data of hundreds of thousands of individuals and businesses.[133] User A uploads a photo of her realistic raccoon drawing to her blog, which uses the cloud. The photo is stored in one of the cloud’s servers. User B sees the photo on the blog and, instead of embedding it, he copies and pastes it into an article he’s writing for a small news website. User A’s blog and User B’s news website happen to both use the same service provider. Obviously, User B is infringing User A’s copyright by displaying her work in his article without her permission. Using the Ninth Circuit’s server test, though, he wouldn’t be committing copyright infringement because his copy is “stored” in the same physical place as the original copy.[134] However, User B is nonetheless “displaying” the copy by “showing” it via device or process (copy-paste).[135] And he is “showing” the copy by “causing or permitting” it to be seen in his article.[136]

The server test provides just enough ambiguity in the law to allow businesses to use social media to profit at the expense of creators. Instead of seeking a license from Getty Images or a similar company, businesses can easily find a suitable image on Instagram and embed it into their webpages for free.[137] The problem is widespread—roughly 70 percent of blogs embed links.[138] The terms and conditions on social media websites often state that users cannot post third-party content without consent, but those same sites nonetheless promote the sharing of third-party content in order to increase their advertising revenue.[139]

On Instagram, copyright owners can attempt to dissuade potential copyright infringers by making their accounts private or by clicking a switch in their settings to disable automatic embedding.[140] However, embedding is still the default, and one must comb through the settings in the Instagram app or website to find the switch.[141] A court may be unlikely consider a copyright owner leaving embedding on a license for others to embed the owner’s content, but this measure alone is only flimsy stop-gap for the problem.[142] Particularly persuasive parties may try to find a way around the setting by requesting a sublicense from Instagram itself.[143]

In Sinclair v. Ziff Davis, Instagram granted a sublicense to Mashable to use a photographer’s photo that she had uploaded to her account on Instagram.[144] Mashable used the sublicense to embed the photo in its article after the photographer did not accept its offer to license the rights directly from her.[145] When the photographer sued Mashable for copyright infringement, the court held that Mashable did not infringe her copyright because she had granted Instagram a permission for to sublicense the photo by agreeing to Instagram’s terms of service when she created her account.[146] The court could not release her from the agreement she had made because it was a valid contract.[147]

As of 2023, Instagram’s terms of service still include the provision that anyone who agrees to it (and you must agree the terms of service to use Instagram) grants Instagram “a non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, sub-licensable, worldwide license to host, use, distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display, translate, and create derivative works of [their] content.”[148] A copyright owner can only control the content on their profile via their privacy and application settings.[149] So while they can flip the switch to prevent parties from embedding their work, if they keep their profile public to access their market, Instagram maintains the right to use and grant use to others anyway.[150] So in many ways, copyright owners only have the illusion of control over their content.

Instagram’s terms of service are not unique—on Facebook, a user with a public profile is forced by the terms of service to allow anyone who comes across the profile to display the work he or she posts.[151] Unlike traditional contracts, “which are founded on the mutual consent of the parties to agreed terms,” terms of service are contracts of adhesion.[152] Contracts of adhesion are meant to accommodate many agreements between an entity and those who wish to access its products and services at once.[153] As was the case in Ziff Davis, courts typically have no problem enforcing these types of contracts even when there is an obvious imbalance of negotiating power between the contracting parties.[154]

Hypothetically, Instagram could alter its terms of service to no longer allow the granting of a sublicenses to third parties to use content uploaded by Instagram’s users. Its terms could look like those of Pinterest, for example, which restrict Pinterest’s right to license to include only those acts which are carried out on the Pinterest platform.[155]

A.  Potential Solution: Instant Licenses

Some have suggested that platforms implement an instant license.[156] An instant license would ideally operate in the form of a “clickwrap agreement,” which requires a user to agree to a set of terms before being allowed to access any content.[157] The agreement would operate as follows: A user clicks on an embedding tool and is confronted with a pop-up that presents a choice to either accept that he or she is a obtaining a license from a copyright owner to use the owner’s image outside the bounds of the social media site or click away and thereby be prevented from using the tool.[158]

It is the opinion of this note that an instant license can be easily customized to meet the needs of both copyright owners and social media companies. It could require a small fee to proceed with embedding, for example, or clearly state that the signor recognizes that the copyright owner may choose to enforce his or her copyright against any unauthorized use. If a social media company would prefer the instant license to be as unobtrusive as possible while also keeping it accessible, the company could place a one or two-sentence statement about copyright on the pop-up along with a link to a webpage that contains the entire text of the license.

Online news outlets, by using an “instant license,” could easily license the photos and videos they find on social media and thereby shield themselves from threats of copyright infringement.[159] The lack of clarity surrounding the application of the fair use doctrine in social media, which journalists have traditionally relied on in the past, would also become less of an issue as journalists could depend on the text of the license to represent that they are operating within the bounds of copyright.[160]

The instant license would also only apply to sharing photos and videos outside the social media website via embedding, so it wouldn’t affect most of the sharing activity that occurs between users within the site. Instagram could keep its license to use users’ social media posts for that purpose. The fundamental nature of social media wouldn’t disappear completely. 

Conclusion

Copyright law evolves alongside technological innovation. The United States has had three Copyright Acts since its founding, and each Act was changed several times before being replaced.[161]

The server test relies on outdated logic—it assumes that one must possess a copy to display it.[162] In the past, that made perfect sense: if one wanted to play a film for an audience, he would have to possess a copy of it in the form of a film reel or tape first. But when film is transformed into bits of data and streamed to an audience through an Internet connection, possession becomes a lot less important.[163]

To counter the diminishing value of possession in the copyright analysis, U.S. courts potentially could follow the Southern District of New York’s example and shift their focus from the operation of the technology to the audience’s experience. The physical location of a single server matters little when it is part of a cloud managed by a large company like Apple or Amazon.[164] It’s much simpler to view an Instagram photo embedded on a webpage the same way as a physical copy of the photo hung in a window. In both cases, the photo is being displayed in violation of the owner’s copyright simply because people are viewing it without the copyright owner’s permission.

Any legislation or case law or contract that replaces the server test should prioritize protecting the interests of artists in their works. Alexis Hunley and Matthew Brauer are examples of photographers who depend on copyright to make a profit.[165] When artists like the Hunleys can enjoy the fruit of their creativity, society benefits from the presence of more beautiful photographs.


I J.D Expected 2024, University of Kentucky J. Rosenberg College of Law; BA English 2018, BA Writing, Rhetoric & Digital Studies 2018, University of Kentucky

[2] Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, No. 21-CV-03778-CRB, 2022 WL 298570, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022).

[3] First Amended Complaint for Damages Based on Copyright Infringement at 5, Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, No. 21-CV-03778-CRB, 2022 WL 298570 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022); see How has social media changed the world of art?, adobo mag. (Oct. 12, 2022), https://www.adobomagazine.com/press-release/how-has-social-media-changed-the-world-of-art/ [https://perma.cc/HW5W-S7HW].

[4] Hunley, 2022 WL 298570, at *1.

[5] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007)

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 1159–62.

[8] Hunley, 2022 WL 298570, at *2.

[9] See The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison); Zvi S. Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1055, 1060 (2018).

[10] See Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From the Printing Press to the Cloud 25–26 (Stanford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2019); see also M. Sophia Newman, So, Gutenberg Didn’t Actually Invent Printing As We Know It, LitHub (June 19, 2019) https://lithub.com/so-gutenberg-didnt-actually-invent-the-printing-press/#:~:text=Do%20this%20many%20times%2C%20and,printing%20of%20the%20aforementioned%20Bible [https://perma.cc/8EJ9-M82B] (explaining that the printing press was created around 1440 and that it allowed for “mass-produced books”).

[11] Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations without a Theme, 47 Hous. L. Rev. 965, 966 (2010).

[12] Id. at 971–75.

[13] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

[14] Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 967.

[15] Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).

[16] Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 17, 25 (2016).

[17] Goldstein, supra note 10, at 38.

[18] See id.

[19] 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

[20] See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 47, 51–52 (1976).

[21] See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[22] Id.

[23] Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy 18 (2016).

[24] Id.

[25] See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 23, at 36.

[26] Id. at 40.

[27] Id. at 36.

[28] Id. at 36, 40.

[29] H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976).

[30] 17 U.S.C. § 106.

[31] Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).

[32] Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, No. 21-CV-03778-CRB, 2022 WL 298570, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022).

[33] H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976).

[34] See generally H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) (“[T]here are unquestionably other areas of existing subject matter that this bill does not propose to protect but that future Congresses may want to.”).

[35] Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).

[36] Id. at 1157.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Id. at 1160–61.

[43] Id. at 1159–60.

[44] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[45] See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61.

[46] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[47] Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61.

[48] Id. at 1155–56.

[49] Jason W. Whitney, Two Cases Raise New Copyright Infringement Concerns for Internet Linking, 37 Comput. & Internet Law., 7, 7 (July 2020).

[50] Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); see Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiargo, Embedding Content or Interring Copyright: Does the Internet Need the “Server Rule”?, 32 Colum. J. L. & Arts 417, 436 (2019).

[51] Ginsburg & Budiargo, supra note 50, at 435.

[52] Id.

[53] Whitney, supra note 49, at 7.

[54] Id.

[55] See generally Jonathan Bailey, Rethinking Embedding and Framing, PlagiarismToday (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2021/03/23/rethinking-embedding-and-framing/ [https://perma.cc/HM2W-YCHH ](explaining the differences between framing and embedding).

[56] Ginsburg & Budiargo, supra note 50, at 435–36.

[57] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Raisa Bruner, A Brief History of Instagram’s Fateful First Day, Time (July 16, 2016), https://time.com/4408374/instagram-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/89CH-DSZ4]; Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, No. 21-CV-03778-CRB, 2022 WL 298570 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022).

[58] Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2012).

[59] Id. at 756, 759.

[60] Id. at 756.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 757–58.

[65] Id. at 758.

[66] Id.

[67] Steve Henn, Instagram Sells for $1 Billion Despite No Revenue, NPR (Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/04/10/150372288/instagram-sells-for-1-billion-despite-no-revenue [https://perma.cc/X3G5-C5QN]; see Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012).

[68] Id.

[69] Mansoor Iqbal, Instagram Revenue and Usage Data (2024), Bus. of Apps Data (Jan. 8, 2024), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/instagram-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/F243-5TPM].

[70] Digital Advertising Soared 35% to $189 Billion in 2021 According to the IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report, Interactive Advert. Bureau (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.iab.com/news/digital-advertising-soared-35-to-189-billion-in-2021-according-to-the-iab-internet-advertising-revenue-report/ [https://perma.cc/H9SR-LPVT].

[71] How to Make Money on Social Media, Accion Opportunity Fund (last visited Apr. 8, 2023) https://aofund.org/resource/make-money-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/HQ6W-TQS4].

[72] 573 U.S. 431 (2014).

[73] Id. at 438.

[74] Id. at 436–37.

[75] Id. at 436.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Id. at 437.

[79] Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–99 (1968).

[80] Id. at 398.

[81] See id.

[82] See id.

[83] See id. at 398–99.

[84] Id. at 399.

[85] Id. at 390.

[86] Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 441 (2014).

[87] Id. at 441–42; see 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 23, at 36 (discussing the expansion of copyright law during the twentieth century).

[88] Aereo, 573 U.S. at 441 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).

[89] Id. at 450.

[90] Id. at 442.

[91] Id. at 441–42.

[92] Id. at 443–44.

[93] Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 594–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Nicklen v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 3d 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

[94] Breitbart, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 594–95.

[95] Id. at 589.

[96] Id. at 586.

[97] Id.

[98] Id. at 595.

[99] See id. at 593.

[100] Id. at 594.

[101] Nicklen v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 3d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

[102] Id. at 191.

[103] Id. at 192.

[104] Id.

[105] Id.

[106] Id. at 194.

[107] Id.

[108] Id.

[109] Id.

[110] Leader's Inst., LLC v. Jackson, No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 WL 5629514, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017); see also Ginsburg & Budiargo, supra note 50, at 435 (for further explanation on the concept of “framing”).

[111] Leader's Inst., 2017 WL 5629514, at **10–11.

[112] Id. at *11; see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).

[113] Leader's Inst., 2017 WL 5629514, at **11–12 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).

[114] See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[115] H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 80 (1976).

[116] Id.

[117] Free Speech Sys., LLC v. Menzel, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1171–72 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

[118] Id. at 1166–67.

[119] Id. at 1172.

[120] See id.

[121] Id. at 1162; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).

[122] See generally Menzel, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 1166–68, 1171–72 (detailing the background of the case and relevant facts then contrasting the case with Perfect 10).

[123] Perzanowski & Shultz, supra note 23, at 42; Lee Davis & Rob Watts, What is Cloud Computing? The Ultimate Guide, Forbes Advisor (Oct. 19, 2022, 9:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/business/what-is-cloud-computing/ [https://perma.cc/P632-8MFB].

[124] Tung-Hui Han, A Prehistory of the Cloud 4 (2015).

[125] See id. at 79.

[126] See James Edmondson, Pros and Cons of Cloud Storage, Bus. Tech Wkly. (Mar. 13, 2022), https://www.businesstechweekly.com/operational-efficiency/clud-computing/pros-and-cons-of-cloud-storage/ [https://perma.cc/JGE5-EXWE].

[127] Tatum Hunter, What Is Cloud Native and Why Is It Important?, builtin (Sept. 25, 2020) https://builtin.com/cloud-computing/what-is-cloud-native [https://perma.cc/X485-XRDV].

[128] See Aaron Perzanowski, You Buy It, You Break It: A Comment on Dispersing the Cloud, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 527, 527 (2017).

[129] Id. at 527–28; Perzanowski & Shultz, supra note 23, at 40.

[130] Id.

[131] Id. at 41–42.

[132] Id. at 40.

[133] Cf. id. at 44 (providing further examples of how to analogize a server to tangible items).

[134] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).

[135] See Nicklen v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 3d 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

[136] See id.

[137] Ginsburg & Budiargo, supra note 50, at 430–31 (quoting Otto v. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 412, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).

[138] Id. at 432.

[139] H. Bosher & S. Yeşiloğlu, An Analysis of the Fundamental Tensions between Copyright and Social Media: The Legal Implications of Sharing Images on Instagram, 33 Int’l Rev. L., Computs. & Tech., 164, 177 (2019).

[140] Kyle Jahner, Embed Copyright Cases Could Multiply as Server Test Faces Siege, Bloomberg L. (Aug. 17, 2021, 5:02 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/embed-copyright-cases-could-multiply-as-server-test-faces-siege [https://perma.cc/N4EP-KSCA]; Alicia Wagner Calzada, How Instagram Changed Its Embedding Feature—and What That Means for Photographers and Publishers, Copyright All. (Jan. 20, 2022), https://copyrightalliance.org/how-instagram-changed-embedding-feature/ [https://perma.cc/KY2G-T4LD].

[141] Calzada, supra note 140.

[142] See id.

[143] Id.

[144] Sinclair v. Ziff Davis, LLC, 454 F. Supp. 3d 342, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[145] Id. at 343.

[146] Id. at 345.

[147] See id. at 345–46.

[148] Terms of Use, Instagram (July 26, 2022), https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870.

[149] See Calzada, supra note 140.

[150] Terms of Use, Instagram (July 26, 2022), https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870.

[151] Corinne Tan, Regulating Content on Social Media: Copyright, Terms of Service and Technological Features 100 (2018).

[152] Niva Elkin-Koren, Giovanni De Gregorio & Maayan Perel, Social Media as Contractual Networks: A Bottom up Check on Content Moderation, 107 Iowa L. Rev. 987, 1022 (2022).

[153] Id.

[154] Id. at 1023.

[155] Tan, supra note 151, at 100.

[156] Jahner, supra note 140.

[157] Click Wrap Agreements, Greenberg & Lieberman, LLC, https://aplegal.com/education-tools/click-wrap-agreements/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2023) [https://perma.cc/37UW-J88V].

[158] See Chauncey Crail & Jane Haskins, Terms of Use Agreement: What it is & Do You Need it?, Forbes Advisor (Aug. 25, 2022, 1:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/business/why-your-website-needs-terms-of-use-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/2E2Q-EVR5].

[159] See generally id. (explaining how clickwrap agreements, which would be the basis of an “instant license,” work and how they shield against copyright infringement).

[160] Patricia Aufderheide, Journalists, Social Media and Copyright: Demystifing Fair Use in the Emergent Digital Environment, 9 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 74, 86–87 (2014); see also supra note 159 and accompanying text (explaining how “instant licenses” could shield online news outlets from threats of copyright infringement).

[161] A Brief History of Copyright in the United States, U.S. Copyright Off. (last visited Apr. 15, 2023), https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/5F84-QHJ2].

[162] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2007).

[163] See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2014).

[164] Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 23, at 44.

[165] See Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, No. 21-CV-03778-CRB, 2022 WL 298570, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022).

Requiem for a Survivor: The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome in Acquitting Survivors of Abuse

Requiem for a Survivor: The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome in Acquitting Survivors of Abuse 

Bailey Pierce I 

Introduction 

In January 2019, Marjory Dingwall was charged with three counts of robbery and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.[2] Dingwall admitted to the robberies but maintained that she was acting under “fear of brutal violence” by her then-boyfriend Aaron Stanley.[3] A Wisconsin District Court denied Dingwall’s motion in limine to admit detailed records of emails and text messages between Dingwall and Stanley that showed a history of abuse and an evaluation by a physician with the Midwest Domestic Violence Resource Center, who diagnosed Dingwall with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Battered Woman Syndrome.[4] Marjory Dingwall was sentenced to thirty months and one day in prison along with three years of supervised release.[5]

Stories like that of Marjory Dingwall are found across the country.[6] According to a 2016/2017 report on intimate partner violence, in a twelve-month period in the United States alone, approximately eleven women experienced physical violence by an intimate partner every minute.[7] Additionally, 32.5% of women in the same twelve-month period reported severe physical violence, such as being hit by a fist, choked, burned, or harmed with a knife or gun.[8] Of 120 women in a 2012 study who are survivors of intimate partner violence, 94.2% reported being subject to economic abuse, which includes controlling how and when the woman spends her own money, forcing the woman to give the abuser money, and threatening physical violence if their financial demands are not met.[9]

Repeated and persistent physical, sexual, and/or economic abuse by an intimate partner can lead to “measurable psychological changes” that can prevent women from “recognizing opportunities for escape or other alternatives to their abusive environment.”[10] These psychological changes are collectively referred to as Battered Woman Syndrome (hereinafter “BWS”).[11] Women who experience recurring, escalating abuse often develop “avoidance responses,” such as minimizing or denying the present danger or forgetting a particular incident, that “protect [them] from experiencing the full-blown trauma response.”[12]

In the United States criminal justice system self-defense and duress defenses, as well as “a history of abuse,” can be considered to establish culpability and to determine  sentences, even in cases of murder.[13] However, cases like Marjory Dingwall’s illustrate why evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome and recurring abuse should be admissible in all cases where such a defense would be relevant.

This Note argues that evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome and related abuse should be admissible to support an affirmative duress defense, even when not related to a homicide or assault charge, in line with the guidance offered by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Dingwall.[14] Part I explored the origins of BWS and the psychology of abuse. Part II discusses the affirmative defense of duress and its application. It also compares the use of BWS in self-defense cases to affirmative duress defenses. Part III looks at how the Circuits have addressed the use of evidence related to BWS as a defense of duress and rationale for allowing or disallowing. Use by state courts is also examined in this section. Part IV will go over why it is imperative that BWS evidence be admitted.

A.  Limitations 

Before proceeding, it is important to note a few things. The language surrounding BWS generally focuses on heterosexual relationships, where violence and abuse are perpetrated by a cisgender man against a cisgender woman.[15] Dr. Walker, in The Battered Woman Syndrome, notes that it is important to acknowledge that those who fall outside of that relationship dynamic may have different, more nuanced experiences.[16] Focusing on experiences of cisgender heterosexual intimate partner abuse is in no way intended to invalidate, ignore, or subjugate the experience of same-sex and trans survivors. Space is left open for those with more applicable identities and experiences to tell those stories.

Battered Woman Syndrome and the Psychology of Abuse 

A.  Origins in Psychology and Diagnosis

Battered Woman Syndrome was first discussed in the first edition of Dr. Lenore E. A. Walker’s book of the same name.[17] Now considered a subcategory of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (hereinafter “PTSD”), BWS refers to the pattern of behaviors that are often exhibited by women who have suffered persistent sexual, physical, and/or emotional abuse by an intimate partner.[18] The partner ­exerts control and power over the female that dictates her every action with no regard for her health, safety, or wellbeing.[19] BWS looks specifically at intimate partner violence,[20] which refers to partners in a “romantic or dating relationship.”[21]

Women who experience abuse go through the three phases of abuse—which Walker refers to as the “cycle of violence”—and remain in the relationship with their abuser.[22] Phase I is marked by escalating tension between the woman and the abuser.[23] The abuser may engage in intentionally hurtful behaviors, such as verbal abuse and physical violence, or express dissatisfaction and hostility.[24] These behaviors, however, do not take on the “extreme or maximally explosive form.”[25] The woman may attempt to temporarily appease the abuser to avoid further violence.[26] She is often successful at placating her abuser for a time, which begins the “unpredictable noncontingency response/outcome pattern” between the woman and the abuser.[27]

In response to Phase I, the woman is likely to withdraw from her abuser to avoid the heightening tension as she becomes more fearful of violence.[28] As she becomes more withdrawn, the abuser will intensify his oppressive actions, causing tensions to escalate even more until they reach Phase II, the “acute battering incident.”[29] The abuser releases “a barrage of verbal and physical aggression.”[30] Hence, Phase II is the phase most likely to involve injury to the woman.[31] The “acute battering incident” ends when the battering ends and is usually followed by a period of peace between the woman and the abuser, further reinforcing the phases themselves, as “[v]iolence often succeeds because it works.”[32]

Phase III, according to Walker, can take on several forms, but could be indicated by a lack of violence or tension.[33] The abuser may show remorse or kindness toward the woman, and may “shower her with gifts and/or promises.”[34] The woman likely trusts these promises and, as a result, she receives “positive reinforcement,” which could lead to “learned helplessness.”[35] While the cycle seems predictive, within each phase, the woman is unable to predict the exact reaction of her abuser, creating further noncontingency between the woman’s response to abuse and the reaction of the abuser.[36] The inability to control or predict when and why the physical, emotional, and verbal abuse of Phase I will escalate to the more severe violence in Phase II leads to “perceptual distortions,” and may “diminish the woman’s motivation to respond” or escape her relationship.[37]

Professionals have rationalized that leaving an abusive relationship requires women to make numerous difficult decisions: realizing their relationship is unhealthy, understanding it will never change, “giving up” on the hope of an idealized relationship, and facing the realization that the relationship may never truly end (e.g. shared custody of a child).[38] Further, many women in abusive relationships face barriers regarding access to shelter, economic support, and protection from the world at large.[39]

In analyzing the use of BWS in an affirmative duress defense, the need for a diagnosis is less important than the concepts and research behind the theory. Nonetheless, looking toward the introduction of PTSD diagnoses and the similarities between PTSD and BWS can provide guidance in analyzing a claim of duress.[40]  Walker’s research has produced six criteria that identify BWS: 1) intrusive reexperiencing of the trauma event(s); 2) hyperarousal and high levels of anxiety; 3) high levels of avoidant behavior and emotional numbing; 4) difficulty in cognitive function; 5) disrupted interpersonal relationships; 6) body image distortion and issues with physical health; 7) “[s]exual and intimacy issues.” [41]

Notably, the first four criteria are also present in the diagnosis of PTSD, while the remaining three criteria are unique to BWS.[42] There have been numerous uses of PTSD in criminal cases to refute both actus reus and mens rea.[43]

Affirmative Duress Defense and BWS 

A.  BWS and Self-Defense in Homicide

Historically, BWS evidence has been admissible in cases, frequently in the absence of present, immediate, and impending harm.[44] In 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a woman who killed her former boyfriend because trial counsel failed to submit evidence of BWS as a defense of duress.[45] Carol Stonehouse provided substantiated evidence of years of abuse suffered at the hands of her former boyfriend and co-worker.[46] This cycle of abuse, similar to the cycle outlined in Walker’s work, led Stonehouse to shoot and kill her abuser.[47] Though the issue of expert evidence was not raised on appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that failing to bring evidence of battered woman syndrome was prejudicial to Stonehouse and “allowed the jury to base the verdict on unfounded myths surrounding the battered woman.”[48]

This decision made expert testimony on BWS admissible to demonstrate the need for self-defense.[49] Other state courts at the time echoed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.[50] State courts have also allowed expert testimony on BWS to establish the “reasonableness” requirement of self-defense.[51] The very nature of self-defense requires that an individual take account of the circumstances before defending oneself to determine the reasonableness of their actions and the force to be used.[52] In the heat of the moment, the defender does not have the Court’s gift of hindsight. This analysis begs the question of whether legal analysis of self-defense is based on what is right or what is truly justified.[53] “If the defender acts on the information available to him, has he acted justifiably?”[54]

The information available to a battered woman is not isolated to a single event, but is instead a combination of multiple, predictable interactions with a known abuser. Walker’s cycle of violence expertly paints this picture: a barrage of verbal and physical abuse escalates to a pinnacle before collapsing back into a routine of abatement and apology before beginning again.[55] This is more information than is normally available to those who fend off a strange attacker or defend their home from an intruder. Yet women who have experienced a history of battering are held to a higher standard of decorum than those in analogous positions.

B.  BWS and the Elements of Affirmative Defenses

i.  Imminent Threat

To establish a defense of duress in general, the defendant must show that there was “reasonable fear of imminent death or serious injury.”[56] Additionally, the defendant must show that there was no “reasonable, legal alternatives” available to the defendant, which prompted the commission of the crime to avoid serious bodily harm and/or death.[57]

The Federal Rules of Evidence generally allow for testimony of an “alleged victim’s pertinent trait,” such as a tendency to be violent, to demonstrate the imminence of a threat.[58] Evidence of BWS would fall under this rule to contextualize the interaction between the woman and the abuser to illustrate imminence—courts have echoed this sentiment.[59]

ii.  Reasonableness

The language surrounding a defense of duress implies that it is a defense of “self-protection.”[60] A reasonable person acting in the defendant’s position would “not be able to resist such conduct.”[61] The actor has been “placed in a moral dilemma,” where they maintain rational decision-making abilities but cannot reasonably act lawfully without endangering themselves.[62] While it is often understood to be a gender-neutral term, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a “reasonable woman standard” when addressing issues of workplace harassment.[63] The Third Circuit is the only circuit to date that has followed the Ninth in adopting a “reasonable person of the same sex in that position” standard, while “[t]he Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have clearly rejected a gender-specific standard.”[64] In recent years, there has been a concerted effort to transition the court system to use more gender-neutral language in proceedings, forms, and orders.[65] Gender should be considered, however, when the disparate treatment of gender plays a central role in the dynamics between parties and their interaction with society.[66] The illusion of gender neutrality still tends to favor a “male-biased” experience and “systematically ignore[s] the experience of women.”[67] Instead, the background knowledge of preexisting social imbalance should be considered when determining true reasonableness.[68]

Given this, objective reasonableness must consider the experience of a person in that individual’s position, especially considering gender identity, gender roles, and prior experiences. This does not convert reasonableness to a subjective standard, but rather brings objectivity in line with objective reality.  

Current Circuit Split Regarding Evidence of BWS and Defense of Duress 

There has been pushback when presenting evidence of BWS to support affirmative defenses of duress, despite the similarities in the self-defense and affirmative duress defense.[69]

A.  Rejecting BWS Defenses 

The Fifth Circuit has held that evidence of BWS is “inherently subjective” and does not offer guidance on how the objective, reasonable person would have reacted in that circumstance.[70] In 1992, Kathy Willis and David Perez were arrested in connection to a narcotics transaction organized by an undercover agent.[71] Willis was charged with “carrying a firearm during, and in relation to, the commission of a drug trafficking crime….”[72] Willis alleged that Perez took a gun out of his pants and slipped it into her purse, fearing that Willis would get caught as a convicted felon in possession of a hand gun.[73]

At trial, Willis raised an affirmative defense of duress, arguing that she feared that if she refused to hold Perez’s weapon, he would have beat her in that moment, as he had done many times before.[74] The Court sustained objections against the defendant’s evidence of abuse and BWS, stating that evidence of BWS cannot be considered in conjunction with the “objective terms” of a defense of duress.[75] United States v. Dixon built upon United States v. Willis in the Fifth Circuit, finding that discussion of the defendant’s “subjective perception of danger” was irrelevant to a defense of duress.[76]

Other circuits have echoed this rationale, finding issue with the use of evidence similar to BWS to support a defense that relies on objective, reasonable fear and rational action.[77] BWS is not offered, however, to shift to a subjective view of the circumstances, but rather to add context to the “reasonableness” requirement of a defense of duress.[78]

B.  Allowing BWS Defenses

As stated, an affirmative defense of duress requires that the threat or danger be present, imminent, and impending, and place the defendant in a position where the danger is inevitable should the criminal action not occur.[79] Evidence of BWS demonstrates to a jury why the defendant had an objectively reasonable fear that harm or danger was imminent.[80] The traditional view of a defense of duress involves “"[t]he proverbial mode of. . .a gun pointed at the head as the ultimate persuader to do (or not do) something ... and right now!"'[81] Taken another way, however, it seems equally as reasonable to believe that a predictable cycle of unpredictable violence, as in Walker’s theory of BWS, would result in an objective fear of imminent harm.[82]

Recently, the Seventh Circuit ruled for Marjory Dingwall, allowing her to present evidence of persistent abuse against robbery charges.[83] Dingwall’s experience serves as a perfect picture of the cycle of violence and abuse suffered by many women. Dingwall met her abuser, Aaron Stanley, “while she was in treatment for alcohol abuse.”[84] After several bouts of homelessness and difficulty finding space at local homeless shelters, Dingwall and her daughter moved in with Stanley.[85] Dingwall and her daughter left after a week after Dingwall became concerned with Stanley’s treatment of her, but after reaching the maximum stay at the homeless shelter once again, they were forced to move back in with him.[86] After Stanley began to use crack cocaine, the abuse suffered by Dingwall escalated from emotional to physical.[87] A clear pattern emerged: “Stanley would beat Dingwall, then apologize profusely, and things would then return to ‘normal’” behavior before unpredictably beginning the cycle of abuse again. [88] At one point, Stanley bought a gun and shot “into the mattress on the side where Dingwall slept.”[89]

In January 2019, when Stanley was out of money from his own previous robberies, he drove Dingwall to a Stop-N-Go gas station, put a gun in her hand, and said it was her “turn.”[90] That night, Stanley did not hit Dingwall, “sending the message that committing the crime as ordered was a way to avoid his abuse.”[91] Dingwall would commit two more robberies at Stanley’s request before being arrested.[92]

Marjory Dingwall can be considered a “textbook” case of Walker’s cycle of violence and learned helplessness.[93] There is moderate emotional and physical abuse before escalating to physical violence.[94] Dingwall also experienced common tactics of economic abuse.[95] When Dingwall would give Stanley money, he would be “nice to [her].”[96] When Dingwall complied with Stanley’s robbery plans, she was rewarded with an evening of peace, indicating that to avoid violence, she must comply with Stanley’s wishes, regardless of the legality.[97] Dingwall expressed a desire to leave Stanley but “felt that she had no other options.”[98]

The District Court ruled that evidence of BWS and abuse would do little to satisfy the elements of a duress defense.[99] On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on rulings from other circuits to guide new precedent.[100]

In Dando v. Yukins out of the Sixth Circuit, the petitioner committed several armed robberies with her boyfriend after he threatened to kill her.[101] The Sixth Circuit ruled that “evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome can explain why a reasonable person might resort to such actions given a history of violent abuse and the imminent violent threats.”[102] The court noted that BWS theory “is not at odds with the reasonableness requirement” of a defense of duress, but instead, could potentially assist the jury in understanding what is or is not reasonable.[103]

Similarly, then-Judge Kavanaugh writing for the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Nwoye (Nwoye II), said, “the duress defense requires a defendant to have acted reasonably under the circumstances, and expert testimony [discussing BWS] can help a jury assess whether a battered woman’s actions were reasonable.”[104] Whether the actions taken were reasonable remains a question for the jury, but expert testimony assists in illustrating the role persistent abuse plays in “a battered woman’s particular circumstances.”[105]

The Ninth Circuit cited Nwoye II in its own landmark case regarding BWS evidence in United States v. Lopez.[106] Lopez’s abuser threatened her and her family before forcing her to buy a gun for him using her twin sister’s identification.[107] When Lopez was arrested for lying in order to obtain a firearm, she presented evidence of her abuser’s threats to support her defense of duress.[108] The Ninth Circuit reversed the exclusion of BWS evidence in the district court and affirmed that BWS lends context to the objective reasonableness element of duress, going on to say that BWS “serves an important role in helping dispel many of the misconceptions regarding women in abusive relationships.”[109] Most significantly, the Court proffered that “expert testimony may be characterized as explaining how a reasonable person can nonetheless be trapped and controlled by another at all times even if there is no overt threat of violence at any given moment.”[110]

i.  Summary

The parallels between self-defense and affirmative duress defenses are striking, calling into question the struggle the courts seem to have with allowing BWS in one instance and prohibiting it in another. Both self-defense and affirmative duress defenses require reasonableness and imminent danger.[111] Both defenses require an objective consideration of the circumstances of a reasonable person.[112] Both should allow for the admission of BWS expert testimony. While the circuits are split, there is a clear majority of circuits that find BWS admissible in affirmative duress defenses.[113] The decisions of the courts that do not allow such evidence are based on an incorrect perception of the use of such evidence. 

ii.  Moving Forward 

According to the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, one in four women experience sexual violence or other physical violence in their lifetime.[114] “On a typical day,” more than 19,000 calls are placed to domestic violence hotlines.[115] Intimate partner violence accounted for 20% of all violent crime in the United States in 2018, which costs $5.8 billion or more a year and an accumulated eight million days of lost work for survivors.[116]

Leaving an abusive relationship requires much more than simply deciding to leave. Women must first make a series of difficult decisions including realizing that they are in fact in an abusive relationship and that their experience is unlikely to change. [117] For most, it takes experiencing a traumatic event to prompt them to leave, giving up on the hope of an idealized relationship and facing the realization that the relationship may never truly end.[118] When their abuser asks them to commit a crime—buy or sell drugs, rob a convenient store, steal from a loved one—it is often easier to comply than to risk the retaliation that they have come to expect.[119]

The circuits are currently split on whether to allow expert testimony on the impact of BWS in cases that do not involve homicide.[120] In these cases, the courts have misconstrued the purpose of BWS testimony.[121] Instead of challenging the objectivity of duress defenses, BWS testimony strives to expand juror general knowledge—knowledge that is expected to be treated as commonplace.[122] It is not only impractical, but irresponsible to ask jurors to make determinations based on a base of knowledge they do not possess. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. circuits have successfully navigated this distinction.[123] Women who fall within the parameters of BWS are not unreasonable, nor do they assert this when raising a duress defense.[124] Instead, reasonable should be viewed as what a reasonable person in a similar situation would have done.[125] A similarly situated reasonable individual would likely share the perspective that is being submitted through BWS expert testimony.[126]

The statistics nationally on the prevalence of domestic violence and intimate partner violence paint a grim picture: the experiences of women who are survivors of abuse are not novel. Luckily, federal sentencing guidelines permit a court to consider an individual’s experiences in determining an appropriate sentence.[127] Judges are permitted to stray from sentencing requirements if there is evidence that the defendant "committed the offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense.” [128] While this is an exceptional safeguard for survivors of abuse, steps should be taken to ensure they never reach this stage.

Allowing BWS evidence to be admitted at the guilt-innocence phase of a trial will not force the criminal justice system to treat battered women any differently than other offenders.[129] This discomfort, however, should be examined further. Institutions that are typically relied on for protection, such as police or family services, have historically been inadequate at meeting the needs of battered women.[130] Battered women typically do not have an extensive criminal record and a nonexistent history of violent behavior, making their often-sudden departure into crime all more shocking.[131] It is for these reasons that attempts must be made to ensure equal treatment for the most vulnerable among us.


I J.D Expected 2024, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; BA Sociology 2021, BA Political Science 2021, University of Kentucky

[2] United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2021).

[3] Id. at 745–46.

[4] Id. at 749–50.

[5] Id. at 750.

[6] See generally Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining the case of Debra Dando, who was charged with a string of armed robberies and assaults that were committed after her boyfriend, Brian Doyle, beat her and threatened to kill her); United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining the case of Lashay Marie Lopez, who was charged with three federal offenses that were committed after Hector Karaca threatened to harm her and her family); United States v. Nwoye (Nwoye II), 824 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining the case of Queen Nwoye, who was charged with conspiring with her boyfriend, Adriane Osuagwu, to extort money from a doctor which was done after “Osuagwu repeatedly beat her and forced her to participate in the extortion scheme”).

[7] See Ruth W. Leemis, Norah Friar, Srijana Khatiwada, May S. Chen, Marcie-jo Kresnow, Sharon G. Smith, Sharon Caslin & Kathleen C. Basile, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 Report on Intimate Partner Violence, 5 (October 2022) (The study provides that “4.5% of women (5.6 million) reported experiencing any physical violence by an intimate partner.” In dividing 5.6 million by the number of minutes in 12 months, the statistic shows that approximately eleven women experienced physical violence by an intimate partner every minute).

[8] Id.

[9] Judy L. Postmus, Sara-Beth Plummer, Sarah McMahon, N. Shaanta Murshid & Mi Sung Kim, Understanding Economic Abuse in the Lives of Survivors, 27 J. Interpersonal Violence 411, 419–20 (2012).

[10] Michaela Dunn, Note, Subjective Vulnerabilities or Individualized Realities: The Merits of Including Evidence of Past Abuse to Support a Duress Defense, 54 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 347, 348 (2021).

[11] Lenore E. A. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 3 (4th ed. 2017).

[12] Id. at 52.

[13] See Penal Reform International, Women Who Kill in Response to Domestic Violence: How Do Criminal Justice Systems Respond?, 5–6 (2016).

[14] 6 F.4th 744, 761 (7th Cir. 2021) (“. . .we conclude that Dingwall should not have been denied the opportunity to offer evidence of battering and its effects, including expert opinions, to support her duress defense. Such evidence can help inform the factfinder how an objectively reasonable person in her circumstances may behave.”).

[15] Walker, supra note 10, at 49–50 (explaining that the original concept of BWS focused on a woman’s signs and symptoms of abuse as a pattern while also explaining that “usually, but not always, a man” is the source of abuse).

[16] See generally id. at 405 (explaining that it is important to consider “race, culture, sexual orientation, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) and gender-nonconforming issues”).

[17] See Walker, supra note 10, at 5.

[18] Id. at 49–50; See also Omri Berger, Dale E. McNiel, & Rene´e L. Binder, PTSD as a Criminal Defense: A Review of Case Law, 40 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 509, 509 (2012) (“[O]ther trauma-related syndromes not included in the DSM, such as [BWS] … have been offered as bases for criminal defenses. However, these related syndromes have generally been presented as special types [or subcategories] of PTSD.”).

[19] Walker, supra note 10, at 49–50.

[20] See id. at 8.

[21] The Language We Use, Women Against Abuse, https://www.womenagainstabuse.org/education-resources/the-language-we-use (last visited Feb. 15, 2024) (explaining the difference in domestic violence and intimate partner violence) [https://perma.cc/XNC7-Y6T8]. In this Note, I will not be using the phrases interchangeably. Any use of “domestic violence” should be understood under the definition used by Women Against Abuse.

[22] Walker, supra note 10, at 94.

[23] Id. at 94, 97.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at 97.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 98.

[34] Id.

[35] See id. at 77, 98

[36] Id. at 75 (noting the “original intended meaning” of learned helplessness is “having lost the ability to predict that what you do will make a particular outcome occur” or “the loss of contingency between response and outcome”).

[37] See id. at 76–77, 94, 97–98 (discussing perceptual distortions because of unpredictability and explaining the phases in Walker’s cycle theory of violence).

[38] Ola W. Barnett, Why Battered Women Do Not Leave, Part I, 1 Trauma, Violence, Abuse  345–46 (2000).

[39] See id. at 347–49.

[40] See Jennifer Gentile Long & Dawn Doran Wilsey, Understanding Battered Woman Syndrome and its Application to the Duress Defense, 40 Prosecutor 36, 37–38 (2006).

[41] See Walker, supra note 10,  at 3.

[42] Id.

[43] See generally Berger, McNiel & Binder, supra note 17, at 510–17 (discussing cases such as the Daubert trio and listing in Tables 1 and 2 cases involving the use of PTSD evidence).

[44] See Elizabeth Williams, Proof of Criminal Acts Committed Under Duress, 204 Am. Juris. Proof Facts 3d 95 § 10 (2023).

[45] Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 784–85 (Pa. 1989).

[46] Id. at 774–81.

[47] Compare id. (detailing the history of abuse Stonehouse suffered before fatally shooting her former boyfriend), with Walker, supra note 10, at 94–99 (explaining the cycle theory of violence).

[48] Gayle P. Lafferty, Criminal Law—Battered Women and Self-Defense—Pennsylvania Allows Expert Evidence on Battered Woman Syndrome as a Basis for Proving Justification in the Use of Deadly Force When Evidence Indicates Defendant Is Victim of Abuse: Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 94 Dick. L. Rev. 553, 553–54 (1990).

[49] Id. at 554.

[50] See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375–76 (N.J. 1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).

[51] See State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 314 (Wash. 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Weaver, 198 Wash.2d 459 (2021); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981).

[52] Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, 24 L. & Phil. 711, 715 (2005).

[53] See id. at 716.

[54] Id. at 715.

[55] See Walker, supra note 10, at 94–99 (explaining the cycle theory of violence).

[56] Williams, supra note 43, at § 4.

[57] Id.

[58] Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B).

[59] See Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1574, 1582 (1993); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1984); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984); State v. Wilkins, 407 S.E.2d 670, 673 (S.C. 1991); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315–16 (Wash. 1984).

[60] See Dunn, supra note 9, at 356.

[61] Id.

[62] Id. at 357.

[63] Alyssa Agostino, The Reasonable Woman Standard's Creation of the Reasonable Man Standard: The Ethical and Practical Implications of the Two Standards and Why They Should Be Abandoned, 41 J. Legal Prof. 339, 339 (2017).

[64] Nicole Newman, The Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Difference?, 27 Bos. Coll. Third World L.J. 529, 532 (2007).

[65] Andy Wirkus, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. , Gender Inclusivity in the Courts: How to Treat Everyone With Fairness, Dignity, and Impartiality 21–22 (2023).

[66] See Domestic abuse is a gendered crime, Women’s Aid, https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/domestic-abuse-is-a-gendered-crime/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2024) (discussing the distinct experiences of both women and men who experience abuse and the importance of providing tailored services to survivors based on the intersection of their gender identity and abuse suffered) [https://perma.cc/D8ZJ-B2M5].

[67] Newman, supra note 63, at 536.

[68] See id. at 530.

[69] See United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888, 891 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the Court found testimony of the defendant’s susceptibility to coercion due to a history of abuse “irrelevant and inadmissible”); United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1994) (summarizing the Court’s finding that “evidence of the particular susceptibility of battered women could not be taken into account in determining criminal liability”); United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1170, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that the defendant’s “subjective beliefs” about the imminence of danger are not controlling).

[70] Willis, 38 F.3d at 175.

[71] Id. at 173.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id. at 174.

[75] Id. at 174–175 (“Such evidence is not addressed to whether a person of reasonable firmness would have succumbed to the level of coercion present in a given set of circumstances.”).

[76] United States v. Dixon, 413 F.3d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 2005).

[77] See United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888, 893 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1170, 1181 (10th Cir. 2018).

[78] Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 211, 231 (2002) (“The cycle theory of violence [a substantial component of the theory of Battered Woman Syndrome] is said to help jurors not only to weigh the credibility of a domestic violence victim’s account of subjective fear, but also to determine whether the defendant had an objectively reasonable belief that harm was imminent. If the jury is permitted to consider expert testimony summarizing the cycle theory of violence and its impact on the battered woman, the argument goes, then the jury may conclude that a reasonable person in the battered woman’s position would have perceived an imminent threat of harm, despite the apparent peacefulness of the current situation.”).

[79] See Williams, supra note 43, at § 4.

[80] See Burke, supra note 77, at 231.

[81] George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts Of Legal Thought 105 (1996).

[82] See Burke, supra note 77, at 254.

[83] United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2021); see supra Introduction at 1–2 (discussing Marjory Dingwall’s case).

[84] Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 747.

[85] Id. at 748.

[86] Id.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] Id.

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id. at 748–49.

[93] Compare United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 747–49 (7th Cir. 2021) (detailing the history of abuse Dingwall suffered before Dingwall committed a robbery to appease Stanley), with Walker, supra note 10, at 94–99 (explaining the cycle theory of violence).

[94] See Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 748–49.

[95] See id. at 748.

[96] Id.

[97] See id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id. at 750, 762.

[100] Id. at 746, 751–53.

[101] Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791, 794 (6th Cir. 2006).

[102] Id. at 801.

[103] Id.

[104] United States v. Nwoye (Nwoye II), 824 F.3d 1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

[105] Id. at 1137.

[106] 913 F.3d 807, 821 (9th Cir. 2019).

[107] Id. at 811.

[108] Id.

[109] Id. at 825.

[110] Id. at 820 (citing United States v. Marenghi, 893 F.Supp. 85, 95 (D.Me. 1995)).

[111] See United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2021) (“To present a duress defense, the defendant must produce evidence that ‘(1) she reasonably feared immediate death or serious bodily harm unless she committed the offense; and (2) there was no reasonable opportunity to refuse to commit the offense and avoid the threatened injury.’”); Lucas D. Martin, Defense of self-defense in prosecution for assault or battery, generally; elements of defense; relation of defense to retaliation or accident, Am. Juris. 2d Assault and Battery § 47 (2023).

[112] Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 752 (stating that “the duress defense used an objective standard of reasonableness”); Martin, supra note 110, at § 47. Though Martin does not use the word “objective” in laying out the elements of self-defense, the reasonable person standard is understood to be an objective standard. See Legal Information Institute, reasonable person, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/reasonable_person [https://perma.cc/EZ26-HZX3] (last updated Aug. 2021).

[113] See supra Part III a–b (discussing the current circuit split where four of the seven circuits that have faced this issue have held to allow admission of BWS evidence).

[114] National Statistics, Nat’l Coal. Against Domestic Violence (2020) https://ncadv.org/STATISTICS [https://perma.cc/8PZ5-EYQ4].

[115] Id.

[116] Id.

[117] Barnett, supra note 36, at 345–46.

[118] Id.

[119] See Burke, supra note 77, at 223–24; see also United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 748 (7th Cir. 2021) (Dingwall discussing that the established cycle of violence reinforced her imminent fear of abuse and danger if she denied her abuser’s wishes).

[120] See supra Part III a–b (discussing the current circuit split).

[121] Id.

[122] United States v. Marenghi, 893 F.Supp. 85, 96 (D.Me. 1995).

[123] See Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 811 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Nwoye (Nwoye II), 824 F.3d 1129, 1136–37 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

[124] Cf. Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 751 (“Dingwall argues, however that a reasonable person in her situation, including the repeated violent abuse and psychological pressure from Stanley, could fear imminent death or serious injury if she did not commit the robberies and could not see other reasonable alternatives to the crimes.” Dingwall is asserting her reasonableness viewed in the light of someone in her situation, which is consistent with a reasonable person standard.).

[125] Cf. Dando, 461 F.3d at 802 (“The Sixth Circuit concluded that, where the defendant participated in a crime spree while accompanied by her heavily armed boyfriend who had threatened her life, ‘a reasonable person in her situation would likely have feared death or serious bodily harm.’”).

[126] Cf. id. (“The court reasoned that ‘evidence of Battered Woman’s Syndrome can explain why a reasonable person might resort to such actions given a history of violent abuse and the imminent violent threats.’”).

[127] See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 5K2.12 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021).

[128] Id.

[129] Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 58, at 1591.

[130] See Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 227, 233 (1986).

[131] See Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 58, at 1591.

Judicial Interpretations of the "Contributing Factor" Element of Sarbanes-Oxley Retaliation Claims

Judicial Interpretations of the "Contributing Factor" Element of Sarbanes-Oxley Retaliation Claims

Ryan Crum I

Introduction

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) is, essentially, “a securities regulation smorgasbord,” enacted in response to a number of very public instances of corporate fraud in the early 2000s.[2]

Congress intended for SOX to help reestablish trust in U.S. financial markets, after seeing it eroded by the bad behavior of some of the nation’s largest companies.[3] One key provision of SOX, section 806 (codified as section 1514A), “protect[s] employees … [from] retaliatory action for providing information concerning conduct the employee reasonably believes violates . . . any … provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.”[4] The legislative history provides that Congress intended section 1514A to “play a crucial role in restoring trust in the financial markets by ensuring that … corporate fraud and greed [could] be better detected.”[5] 

The text of section 1514A, however, has caused problems for courts.[6] That said, courts traditionally have uniformly identified the elements of a section 1514A claim.[7] Recently, however, the Second Circuit, in Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, split with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits regarding its interpretation of one of the elements—the “contributing factor” element.[8] The Second Circuit held that the element “requires a whistleblower-employee to prove retaliatory intent,” a determination flatly rejected by its sister circuits.[9]

This Note explores the conflicting interpretations of the “contributing factor” element of section 1514A and argues that the correct interpretation does not require an employee to prove retaliatory intent. The remainder of this introduction provides (I) necessary background information on SOX and (II) a more detailed analysis of the SOX antiretaliation provision. In addition, the analysis that follows encompasses two parts. Part I examines judicial interpretations of the “contributing factor” element. Part II outlines why the correct reading of the statute does not require a showing of retaliatory intent. 

Necessary Background Information on SOX 

Context is vital in understanding both the scope and the purpose of SOX. It is only possible to talk about SOX by first discussing Enron. Enron, an energy trading firm, was one of the largest companies in the United States before its collapse in late 2001 and early 2002.[10] Prior to Enron's collapse, the company began experiencing economic difficulties.[11] The company's executives, however, sought to hide the reality of these hardships to avoid a decrease in the value of the company's stock.[12] To that end, “Enron executives used fraudulent accounting practices to inflate the company's revenues and hide debt in its subsidiaries.”[13] Of course, this scheme was unsustainable, and in 2001 the company filed for bankruptcy.[14] The estimated total losses from the company's downfall were $74 billion.[15] The firm's lower-level employees experienced detrimental impacts from its collapse, as much of their retirement was invested in the company's stock.[16]

The damaging effect, however, extended far beyond the company and its employees to, ultimately, the entire U.S. financial system—a system built on trust.[17] The collapse of Enron diluted that trust.[18] Within the first three months of 2002, more than 30 “Enron-inspired bills” were introduced in Congress.[19] SOX was the result of the legislative process that followed the company's demise.[20] The goal was clear; Congress wanted to restore the diluted trust in the U.S. financial system.[21] The legislation “created strict new rules for accountants, auditors, and corporate officers and imposed more stringent recordkeeping requirements.”[22] Moreover, it sought to enhance the quality of inspection and to enforce federal laws governing publicly traded companies rigorously.[23]

A More Detailed Analysis of the SOX Antiretaliation Provision

A key enforcement mechanism in SOX is its codified protection for whistleblowers—18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The statute reads as follows: 

No [publicly traded company] may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee … because of any lawful act done by the employee . . . (1) to … assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of [federal law].[24] 

Section 1514A allows employees alleging retaliation to seek relief with the Secretary of Labor or, under certain circumstances, in “the appropriate district court of the United States.”[25]

The statute provides that the burdens of proof for a claim of retaliation are “governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49.”[26] The referenced provision sets up a burden-shifting framework, which the Ninth Circuit neatly explains in Coppinger-Martin v. Solis.[27] To avoid dismissal by either the Secretary or District Judge, the whistle-blowing employee must make a prima facie showing of retaliation.[28] The Ninth Circuit explained:

To make a prima facie showing …, an employee's complaint must allege that (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew, actually or constructively, of the protected activity; (3) the employee suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the circumstances raise an inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.[29] 

Once an employee makes a prima facie showing of retaliation, “the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the employee's prima facie case by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected activity.”[30] 

Analysis

A.  Judicial Interpretations of the “Contributing Factor” Element 

As mentioned previously, in August of 2022, the Second Circuit issued Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC.[31] In Murray, the court determined that the “contributing factor” element of section 1514A required a showing of retaliatory intent.[32] In contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that “a whistleblower need not demonstrate the existence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the [employer]” to be successful in a section 1514A claim.[33] The Second Circuit’s “narrow interpretation of section 1514A will make it more challenging for plaintiffs [in that jurisdiction] to prove causation.”[34] 

This section of this Note explores the details of these conflicting approaches. Part A examines the Fifth Circuit's decision in Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Bd., providing insight into the school of thought against an intent requirement. Part B then examines Murray, focusing on the key facts that led the Second Circuit to stray from its sister circuits.

i.  The Fifth and Ninth Circuits Approach Illustrated by Halliburton

The Fifth Circuit in Halliburton articulated the view that proof of a retaliatory or wrongful motive is unnecessary for a successful section 1514A claim.[35] The facts of the Halliburton case are straightforward. The plaintiff, a Haliburton employee, submitted an internal complaint regarding what he felt were “questionable” accounting procedures.[36] At the same time, the plaintiff filed a complaint concerning the same accounting practices with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which led to an SEC investigation.[37] “When Halliburton received the SEC's notice of the investigation, the company inferred” that the plaintiff had, along with his internal complaint, filed a complaint with the SEC.[38]

The SEC instructed Halliburton “to retain certain documents during the pendency of the SEC’s investigation.”[39] Halliburton heeded the SEC's instructions by emailing several of its employees, including many of the plaintiff's colleagues, advising them of the SEC's retention recommendation.[40] The contents of said email are where this case truly begins. It suggested that document retention was necessary because “the SEC [had] opened an inquiry into the allegations of [the plaintiff],” naming the plaintiff.[41] After the email, the plaintiff was treated differently by his co-workers.[42] He felt isolated and “missed work frequently.”[43] Eventually, seeing the situation as untenable, the plaintiff sought and received administrative leave.[44] After the SEC's investigation concluded, in which the SEC determined that “no enforcement action … was recommended,” the plaintiff resigned from Halliburton.[45]

Before his resignation, the plaintiff filed a claim under the antiretaliation provision of SOX.[46] He alleged that “Halliburton retaliated against him . . . by disclosing his identity as the whistleblower.”[47] The Administrative Law Judge and the Administrative Review Board went back and forth several times, disagreeing on whether the plaintiff had satisfied both the “adverse action” and the “contributing factor” elements.[48] Haliburton finally appealed for review by the Fifth Circuit after the Administrative Review Board held that the plaintiff had established liability.[49] The Fifth Circuit addressed both section 1514A elements.[50]

The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by outlining the elements, as it describes them, of a section 1514A claim.[51]

To prevail on an antiretaliation claim …, the employee must prove . . .  that (1) he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, (2) the employer knew that he engaged in the protected activity, (3) he suffered an “adverse action,” and (4) the protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the “adverse action.”[52]

The court briefly acknowledged that the first two elements were not at issue or contested.[53] Moreover, the court agreed with the Administrative Review Board on the “adverse action” element, finding that Halliburton's action met the court's “materially adverse” standard.[54]

Of course, the most critical conversation engaged in by the court, for purposes of this Note, concerned the “contributing factor” element. The court plainly stated its rule, “[A] ‘contributing factor’ is ‘any factor, which alone or in combination with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.’”[55] The court rejected Halliburton's argument that “an employee must prove a ‘wrongfully-motivated causal connection.’”[56]

Consequently, the court determined—relatively easily—that the plaintiff's protected activity, filing the complaints mentioned above, was a “contributing factor” in Halliburton's “adverse action,” the decision to disclose the plaintiff's identity.[57] The court, somewhat sarcastically, remarked, “Given the facts of this case, it is difficult to see how a different outcome could have been possible.”[58] In other words, the court considered it evident that the plaintiff's protected activity affected Halliburton's decision to disclose the plaintiff's identity, and that was all the plaintiff needed to satisfy the “contributing factor” element.[59]

ii.  The Second Circuits Approach Illustrated by Murray.

On the other hand, the Second Circuit in Murray determined that proof of a retaliatory or wrongful motive is, in fact, requisite to a successful section 1514A claim.[60] The plaintiff worked for UBS “as a strategist in its commercial mortgage-backed securities (‘CMBS’) business.”[61] In this role, he was “responsible for performing research and creating reports [to be distributed] to [UBS’s] current and potential clients . . . .”[62] Given the nature of these reports, the SEC required that the plaintiff  “certify [that the reports] were produced independently and that they accurately reflected his own views.”[63] To that end, the plaintiff alleged that several UBS employees encouraged and, in some cases, instructed him to violate the SEC’s certification requirement.[64]

In response to this perceived pressure to disregard the SEC, the plaintiff contacted his supervisor to report the conduct of his co-workers.[65] His supervisor expressed sympathy and acknowledged that the plaintiff was in “a tough position,” but took, essentially, no further action.[66] Later, in another meeting with his supervisor, the plaintiff made a point to discuss the situation further.[67] This time, however, the plaintiff’s concerns were not met with sympathy.[68] Instead, his supervisor indicated that he would not intervene and that the plaintiff needed to continue his work accordingly—in other words, how “the business line [his co-workers] wanted” him to operate.[69] Not long after this second conversation, the plaintiff’s supervisor suggested that either the plaintiff be terminated or assigned to a different position, one “unregulated by the SEC.”[70] Ultimately, UBS terminated the plaintiff’s employment.[71]

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit alleging that “his termination was retaliation for whistleblowing.”[72] UBS rebutted the plaintiff’s claim by offering evidence that, at the time of the plaintiff’s termination, the company was making strategic layoffs due to financial difficulties, which happened to include the plaintiff’s position.[73] The jury sided with the plaintiff, finding UBS liable for retaliation.[74] The appeal to the Second Circuit focused almost entirely on the jury instructions.[75] Specifically, the instruction’s explanation of the “contributing factor” element, which “did not [describe] retaliatory intent as [necessary to] a section 1514A claim.”[76] UBS argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that a plaintiff must show proof of retaliatory intent.[77]

The Second Circuit agreed with UBS, holding that a showing of retaliatory intent is required to satisfy the “contributing factor” element.[78] The court based its holding “on the plain meaning of the statutory language and [its] interpretation of a nearly identical statute . . . .”[79] The court focused its attention primarily on the word “discriminate” and the phrase “because of” in the statutory text.[80] In doing so, it determined that the statute 

[P]rohibits discriminatory actions caused by—or “because of”—whistleblowing, and [that] actions are “discriminat[ory]” [only] when they are based on the employer’s conscious disfavor of an employee for whistleblowing.[81]

Thus, the definition of “discriminatory” ultimately led the court to determine that the statute’s plain text indicated “that retaliatory intent is required to sustain a SOX antiretaliation claim.”[82]

The Second Circuit, albeit in a footnote, acknowledged that its holding was inconsistent with the view of both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.[83] Seemingly to address this divide, the court looked to its interpretation of another statute, the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), to bolster its argument and provide evidence of its alignment with other circuits.[84] According to the court, the statute contains a “nearly identical” antiretaliation provision.[85] The relevant statutory text reads as follows:

A covered railroad carrier “may not discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in any other way discriminate against an employee if such discrimination is due … to the employee’s lawful … act done … to provide information … regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of any [federal law].”[86] 

The court noted that in an earlier case, Tompkins v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 983 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2020), the court determined, “point[ing] to the [statutory] language specifically referencing discrimination,” that some proof of retaliatory intent is necessary to a successful claim under the FRSA.[87] The court noted that both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits agree with its interpretation of the FRSA.[88] Thus, the statute’s plain text and the court’s interpretation of the FRSA compelled the Second Circuit to break from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in interpreting section 1514A.[89] 

B.  The Correct Reading of the Statute Does Not Require a Showing of Retaliatory Intent

“Judges [take] a variety of approaches to resolving the meaning of a statute.”[90] Judges often look to “the ordinary meaning of the statutory text,” the statute’s purpose (i.e., “the broader statutory context”), “the legislative history,” as well as various canons of construction.[91] This Note will analyze section 1514A utilizing each approach, taken one by one. Part A analyses the ordinary meaning of the statute. Part B examines the broader statutory context. Part C discusses the statute's purpose and legislative history. Part D, then, looks to other employer retaliation provisions for guidance.

i.  Analyzing Section 1514A’s Ordinary Meaning

Given the ambiguity of the statute, the ordinary meaning of section 1514A does little to resolve the circuit split. In examining the ordinary meaning, it is worth dissecting the Second Circuit's proposition that "the plain meaning of the statutory language makes clear that retaliatory intent is an element of a section 1514A claim."[92] If such a proposition were true, the inquiry into whether the statute requires a showing of intent would end because, as the court states, "[i]f . . .  statutory language is unambiguous . . . the inquiry [into its meaning] ceases."[93]

The Second Circuit relied on dictionaries to determine that the statute's use of the word "discriminate" necessitated a showing of retaliatory intent.[94] The court also discussed the definition of the phrase “because of.”[95] This phrase and its meaning will be discussed further in section D of this Note. To support its claim, the court cited the definition of "discriminate" in Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary,[96] which defined the term as "[t]o act on the basis of prejudice."[97] In a parenthetical, the court also cited The New Oxford American Dictionary, which similarly provided that to discriminate is to "make an unjust or prejudicial distinction in the treatment of different categories of people."[98] The Second Circuit's interpretation seemingly turned on the inclusion of the word prejudice in both definitions. The court opined that prejudice "requires a conscious decision to act based on a protected characteristic or action."[99]

Such an interpretation is feasible. Beyond the court's reasoning, it finds support in an excerpt from Black's Law Dictionary ("Black's"), which notes that "the current political use of the term[, discrimination] is . . . non-neutral, [and] pejorative."[100] Thus, it would not be inherently inaccurate to describe the "ordinary meaning" of the word as requiring a sort of active disfavor. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's reading of the statute fails to dispense with all ambiguity.  

An ambiguity exists when a statute is "capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways."[101] To that end, reaching a different conclusion is possible by looking only at different definitions. Black's defines "discrimination" as "a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored."[102] Furthermore, Black's provides an excerpt bolstering its definition, which states that "The dictionary sense of 'discrimination' is neutral . . . ."[103] Thus, the text of section 1514A can also be interpreted to prohibit discriminatory actions—actions that result in the "failure to treat all persons equally"—because of whistleblowing.[104] Under this interpretation, the analysis of whether unequal treatment has occurred is neutral and need not consider disparagement or whether it was belittling.[105] Therefore, because the statutory language of section 1514A is ambiguous, further inquiry into its meaning is necessary. 

ii.  Examining the Broader Statutory Context

To that end, the specificity by which Congress identified the applicable burdens of proof under a section 1514A claim and an analysis of said burdens strongly support the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ view that a showing of retaliatory intent is not required. When an interpretation of a statute turns on “the meaning of only a few words,” courts often look to “the full statutory context” for guidance.[106]

Congress was specific in its formulation of how to appropriately enforce section 1514A. Regardless of where the complaint receives review, Congress intended the "burdens of proof which . . . govern[] in the Department of Labor . . . to govern the action."[107] To that end, the Department of Labor regulations provide precise guidelines. According to the regulations:

A [section 1514A] complaint will be dismissed unless the complainant has made a prima facie showing that a protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action alleged in the complaint . . . . [A complaint makes this prima facie showing if it] alleges the existence of facts and either direct or circumstantial evidence . . . [that] give rise to an inference that the respondent knew or suspected that the employee engaged in protected activity and that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. [Allegations of facts and circumstantial evidence, such as] . . . if the complaint shows that the adverse personnel action took place within a temporal proximity after the protected activity, or at the first opportunity available . . ., giv[es] rise to the inference that it was a contributing factor in the adverse action.[108]

The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the "contributing factor" element mirrors the Department of Labor's regulations. The court in Coppinger-Martin took a totality of the circumstances approach, looking to the temporal relationship between the "adverse employment action" and the "protected activity," as well as "dramatic change[s]" in the plaintiff's employment evaluations after the plaintiff engaged in "protected activity."[109] Not only does such an approach match the Department of Labor's articulation of the proof necessary to make a prima facie showing, but it also aligns with the Fifth Circuits' articulation that "any factor, which . . . tends to affect in any way" the employer's "adverse action" is a "contributing factor."[110] Thus, an analysis of the burdens, specifically identified by Congress as part of the statutory scheme, relevant to a section 1514A claim strongly supports the view that a showing of retaliatory intent is not required.

iii.  The Purpose & Legislative History of Section 1514A

Moreover, the purpose of section 1514A as a mechanism to improve corporate accountability strongly supports the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' interpretation of the statute. The legislative history of section 1514A provides critical insight into its purpose. Senator Leahy, a sponsor of the amendment that, in part, became the whistleblower provision, stated in response to Enron, Congress must “make sure that there are adequate doses of accountability in our legal system to prevent such occurrences in the future, and to offer a constructive remedy . . . should they occur.”[111] In that same report, he cleverly remarked that the provision was one of many intended to "ensure that . . . greed does not succeed."[112] In other words, Congress intended section 1514A to act as an important mechanism for accountability and transparency to combat fraud and rebuild trust in the United States economy.

That purported purpose finds additional support in excerpts from the Senate Floor regarding the need for an amendment that included section 1514A. The House passed a version of SOX before the Senate, which failed to include protections for whistleblowers.[113] Senator Boxer, echoing the sentiment of many of her Senate colleagues, considered the House bill "weak and . . . [not capable of] get[ting] the job done."[114] Senator Kohl further articulated this view.[115] He noted, "It is not enough to challenge corporate America to do better [and] [w]e must make clear that there is a cost to engaging in accounting and securities fraud."[116] Boxer felt that including section 1514A provided "the necessary teeth to clamp down on corporate irresponsibility."[117]

The Second Circuit's interpretation of section 1514A rids the provision of its "teeth." It is a simple truth that "an employee rarely is able to produce direct evidence of the retaliatory motive behind an employer's adverse actions."[118] Employees often cannot access the information and documentation necessary to show such an intent. Moreover, most employers, aided by their lawyers, are much too sophisticated to allow for the existence of a "smoking gun." It is hard to imagine how section 1514A could lead to greater accountability and transparency if it enables employers to retaliate against whistleblowing employees as long as they never say as much.

These statements are not mere conjecture. Congress considered the relative sophistication of the parties to a retaliation claim in passing section 1514A.[119] In addressing the patchwork of state laws protecting corporate employees that reported fraud before SOX, the Senate, in a Judiciary Committee Report, recognized that the "vagaries" in state law allowed "most . . .  employers, with help from their lawyers, [to] know exactly what they [could] do to a whistleblowing employee" without violating the law.[120] Requiring a whistleblowing employee to show proof of a retaliatory motive will allow for the resurgence of Congress's problem with existing state laws. Employers will escape liability simply by carefully drafting their communications with a whistleblowing employee to eliminate evidence of a wrongful motive. In short, the Second Circuit's interpretation will allow for instances where greed will succeed.

On the other hand, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' approach to section 1514A gives the provision "teeth." Again, Congress considered whistleblowers a crucial part of ensuring accountability for corporate fraud and greed; Senator Cleveland said, "[i]t is the duty of officers and directors … to blow the whistle when they know there is wrongdoing."[121] Accountability, otherwise, is less likely to occur. Senator Leahy clearly expressed this sentiment, stating, "[Congress] can put whatever criminal law [it] wants on the books but unless there are witnesses who are not scared to help prosecutors prove what happened no one will be held accountable."[122] Employees can only feel safe blowing the whistle if it is clear they will have protection from retaliation. Thus, for SOX to properly "clamp down on corporate irresponsibility,"[123] Section 1514A must stand for the proposition that "[r]egardless of the official’s motives, personnel actions against employees should quite simply not be based on . . . whistleblowing."[124] Thus, the purpose of the provision, to serve as a mechanism to aid in accountability, strongly supports the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' interpretation of the statute.

iv.  Looking to Other Employer Retaliation Provisions for Guidance

Finally, it is important to consider other employer retaliation provisions in interpreting section 1514A. Courts interpret similar statutes similarly unless the text, "legislative history[,] or purpose suggests material differences."[125] Here, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII supports a determination that section 1514A does not require a showing of retaliatory intent. 

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII strongly supports the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ approach. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court determined that "Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the . . . employment action."[126] A showing of but-for causation is, practically speaking, the same as a showing of proof of retaliatory motive. The Court determined that the inclusion of the word "because" in Title VII's retaliation provision "require[d] proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause . . . ."[127] The Second Circuit made a similar argument in Murray.[128] Thus, at first blush, the Supreme Court's understanding of Title VII seemingly supports the Second Circuit's view of section 1514A. After considering the Supreme Court's opinion further, however, it is clear that Nassar actually endorses the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's approach. 

The Nassar Court distinguished Title VII "status-based discrimination claims" from Title VII "unlawful employer retaliation" claims.[129] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 is the relevant statute for status-based claims.[130] On the other hand, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 governs unlawful employer retaliation.[131] Notably, notwithstanding both statutes' inclusion of the word "because," the Court determined that "[a]n employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show" but-for causation.[132] The Court ignored its textualist interpretation of “because” due to Congress's codification of a "burden-shifting and lessened causation framework" in section 2000e-2.[133]

The Nassar Court created a very workable standard—including the word "because" in discrimination and retaliation provisions requires a showing of retaliatory intent or "but-for" causation unless Congress specified otherwise.[134] In section 1514A, Congress did just that.[135] As discussed in detail above, section 1514A(b)(2)(C) provides that claims under section 1514A will operate under a burden-shifting framework.[136] Moreover, the provision, albeit not as directly as section 2000e-2, calls for lessened causation. Section 1514A(b)(1) requires employees to first file complaints under the provision with the Secretary of Labor, and only "if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint" may the employee bring an action in federal district court.[137] Regardless, however, of where the section 1514A claim ultimately receives review, Congress intended the burdens of proof established by the Department of Labor to govern.[138] The Department of Labor's requirement for "causation" is merely a showing that "[t]he circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action."[139] This burden can be satisfied by showing evidence as slight as temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse personnel action.[140] Therefore, it does not require employees to show "proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action."[141] Thus, because Congress specified otherwise, the inclusion of the word "because" in section 1514A does not require a showing of retaliatory intent. 

Conclusion

SOX, especially section 1514A, embodies Congress's attempt to "clamp down"[142] on securities fraud and corporate greed. The whistle-blower provision provides an effective and consistent mechanism for achieving that purpose and providing accountability. To that end, the "contributing factor" element must be interpreted not to require a showing of retaliatory intent. To interpret the statute otherwise rids the provision of its "teeth"[143] and disregards Congress's explicit designation of the burdens of proof applicable to a section 1514A claim.

 

I J.D. Expected 2024, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; BSBA Marketing 2021, University of Louisville

[2] Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Sarbanes-Oxley Act in Perspective ch. 1, pt. 2, § 1:10 (2021–2022 ed. 2021).

[3] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, What Did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do? | Office Hours with Gary Gensler, YouTube (Aug. 2, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJChWPaOMJo [https://perma.cc/2MAE-KPBV].

[4] Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 2, at ch. 14, pt.1, § 14:1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A).

[5] S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 2, 18–19 (2002).

[6] See generally Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 2, at ch. 14, pt. 1, § 14:1 (discussing Senator discourse and multiple case holdings).

[7] See, e.g., Murray v. UBC Securities L.L.C., 43 F.4th 254, 257-258 (2d Cir. 2022); Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010); Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2014).

[8] Murray v. UBC Securities L.L.C., 43 F.4th 254 (2d Cir. 2022); see also Bradley J. Bondi, Cyrus N. Bordbar & Jason M. Ecker, United States: Second Circuit Requires Proof Of Retaliatory Intent In Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Claim, mondaq (Sept. 13, 2022), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/whistleblowing/1229540/second-circuit-requires-proof-of-retaliatory-intent-in-sarbanes-oxley-whistleblower-claim [https://perma.cc/VS9D-AEMU] (discussing how the Second Circuit in Murray created a circuit split).

[9] See Murray, 43 F.4th at 258, 261, n.7.

[10] CNN Editorial Research, Enron Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 12, 2023, 2:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/X3B9-R5Z5].

[11] Adam Hayes, What Was Enron? What Happened and Who Was Responsible, Investopedia (Mar. 28, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/enron.asp#:~:text=Enron%20was%20an%20energy%20company,and%20bankruptcy%20in%20recen t%20history [https://perma.cc/U3CJ-76UM]. 

[12] See id.

[13] Id.

[14] Enron Fast Facts, supra note 10.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.

[18] Id.

[19] Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 2, at ch. 1, pt. 2, § 1:09.

[20] See id.

[21] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.

[22] Will Kenton, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: What it Does to Protect Investors, Investopedia (May 8, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sarbanesoxleyact.asp [https://perma.cc/9DEY-SWD8].

[23] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.

[24] 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2010).

[25] § 1514A(b)(1).

[26] § 1514A(b)(2)(C).

[27] Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010).

[28] 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i).

[29] Coppinger-Martin, 627 F.3d at 750 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b)(1)).

[30] Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C)).

[31] 43 F.4th 254 (2d Cir. 2022).

[32] Id. at 256.

[33] Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Coppinger-Martin, 627 F.3d at 750 (“A prima facie case does not require that the employee conclusively demonstrate the employer’s retaliatory motive.”).

[34] Pinchos (Pinny) Goldberg & Alisha A. Bruce, Second Circuit: SOX Whistleblower Claims Require Retaliatory Intent, Nat’l L. Rev. (Sept. 13, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/second-circuit-sox-whistleblower-claims-require-retaliatory-intent [https://perma.cc/U2MG-DPG2].

[35] Halliburton, 771 F.3d at 263.

[36] Id. at 255–56.

[37] Id. at 255–57.

[38] Id. at 255.

[39] Id.

[40] Id. at 255.

[41] Id.

[42] Id. at 257.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 258.

[50] Id. at 259.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] Id. at 262.

[55] Id. at 263 (quoting Allen v. Admin Rev. Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476, n. 3 (5th Cir. 2008)).

[56] Id.

[57] Id. at 262–63.

[58] Id. at 263.

[59] Id.

[60] Murray v. UBC Securities L.L.C., 43 F.4th 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2022).

[61] Id. at 256.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 256–57.

[65] Id. at 256.

[66] Id. at 257.

[67] Id.

[68] Id. 

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] Id.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id. at 258.

[75] Id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Id. at 258–60.

[79] Id. at 258.

[80] Id at 259.

[81] Id.

[82] Id.

[83] Id. at 261, n.7.

[84] Id. at 260, 261, n.7.

[85] Id. at 260.

[86] Id. at 260 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 20109(a)).

[87] Id. at 261.

[88] Id. at 261, n.7.

[89] Id. at 262–63.

[90] Valerie Brannon, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45153, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends 2 (2018).

[91] Id. at 2–3.

[92] Murray, 43 F.4th at 258–259.

[93] Id. at 259.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Discrimination, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

[101] Ambiguous, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ambiguous [https://perma.cc/98MB-6CZ9] (last visited Mar. 14, 2023).

[102] Discrimination, supra note 100.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.; See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.

[105] Discrimination, supra note 100; Pejorative, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pejorative [https://perma.cc/4AHJ-V7GE] (last visited Mar. 14, 2023).

[106] Brannon, supra note 90, at 25.

[107] S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 19–20 (2002).

[108] 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(1), (3) (2022).

[109] Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 751 (9th Cir. 2010).

[110] Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2014).

[111] S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 11 (2002).

[112] Id. at 2.

[113] See 148 Cong. Rec. S6759 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).

[114] Id.

[115] Id. at S6758 (statement of Sen. Herbert H. Kohl).

[116] Id.

[117] Id. at S6759 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).

[118] Melanie M. Poturica & Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Retaliation: So Many Laws, So Little Time (Speaking of Time, Is Temporal Proximity All a Plaintiff Needs?), casetext (Jun. 30, 2011), https://casetext.com/analysis/retaliation-so-many-laws-so-little-time-speaking-of-time-is-temporal-proximity-all-a-plaintiff-needs [https://perma.cc/5Z9G-Z7YJ].

[119] See S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 17 (2002).

[120] Id. at 19.

[121] 148 Cong. Rec. S6754 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Max Cleland).

[122] Id. at S6768 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).

[123] Id. at S6759 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).

[124] Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2014).

[125] Brannon, supra note 90, at 58 n.588.

[126] Univ. of  Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).

[127] Id. at 352.

[128] See Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, 43 F.4th 254, 259 (2nd Cir. 2022).

[129] Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343, 351–52.

[130] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).

[131] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1972).

[132] Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343.

[133] Id. at 348–50.

[134] Id. at 347–52.

[135] 18 U.S.C § 1514A(b)(2)(C); see S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 13 (2002).

[136] See § 1514A(b)(2)(C).

[137] See § 1514A(b)(1).

[138] S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 19–20 (2002).

[139] 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2)(iv) (2022).

[140] See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(3).

[141] Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).

[142] 148 Cong. Rec. S6759 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).

[143] Id.

The Permissible Scope of Releases Within FELA Claims

The Permissible Scope of Releases Within FELA Claims

Kaylee Secor I

I.  Introduction

The Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), enacted in 1908 and codified as 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, established liability for railroads if the railroad’s negligence causes an employee’s injury or death.[2] Section 5 of FELA provides that “any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter shall to that extent be void[.]”[3] The language in Section 5 creates uncertainty as to whether certain releases of FELA claims are enforceable. A three-way circuit split has developed between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuits concerning whether a release that extinguishes future claims regarding undiagnosed injuries is valid under FELA.[4] The Supreme Court of the United States has failed to rule on this particular issue but has ruled in general that releases are not per se invalid.[5]

This Note discusses the scope of releases and their validity under FELA while arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard for determining whether a release is valid under Section 5.[6] The Third Circuit’s approach seems to allow employers and employees to settle the controversy on their own terms while safeguarding employees from waiving unknown claims. Part II of this Note discusses the history of the Supreme Court’s case law surrounding releases under FELA. Part III analyzes the three-way circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuits and discusses case law that has developed around the split. Finally, Part IV explores why the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard and why it should not adopt the other circuit’s approaches. 

II.  History of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Releases Under FELA

The purpose of FELA, as established by 45 U.S.C. § 51, is to hold every common carrier by railroad liable for the injuries of an employee due to the carrier’s negligence.[7] Also, according to Section 5, any contract that attempts to exempt a common carrier from FELA liability is void.[8]  After FELA was adopted, the Supreme Court of the United States began to set the outer limits of Section 5.[9]

A.  The Supreme Court Upholds the Validity of Section 5 of FELA

In Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartfield R.R. Co., the Supreme Court upheld Section 5 as valid and noted that “if Congress possesses the power to impose that liability … it also possesses the power to insure its efficacy by prohibiting any contract, rule, regulation or device in evasion of it.”[10] Later that same year, in Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington Railroad Co. v. Schubert, the Supreme Court found that an employee’s application for a relief fund membership that stipulated the employee’s receival of benefits constituted a release of all claims against the employer and was invalid under Section 5.[11] The Court reasoned that the stipulation was an attempt by the employer to avoid liability through contract, which violates FELA.[12]

B.  The Supreme Court Determines that Releases are not Per Se Invalid

The Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged an exception to Section 5’s rule against exempting an employer’s liability through contract.[13] In Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the plaintiff brought an action under FELA for injuries that he sustained due to his employer’s alleged negligence.[14] After the plaintiff’s injuries, he signed a release exempting his employer from liability for the injuries he sustained during the accident and in exchange the plaintiff received two hundred and fifty dollars.[15]

In Callen, the Supreme Court held that a release is not a way for an employer to exempt itself from liability but is rather a “means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility.”[16] The Court’s opinion in Callen also acknowledges that when there are controversies surrounding whether liability exists or how much exists, Congress has not said that an employer and its employee cannot settle their dispute without litigation.[17] Thus, a release is not per se invalid and can survive Section 5 if it is executed “as part of a settlement of disputed liability for work-related injuries.”[18]

It is disputed as to what precisely qualifies as “compromising a claimed liability,” but employers and employees can settle their disputes whenever there are controversies surrounding liability.[19] The only “explicit requirement” is that there must be an actual controversy that the employer and employee are trying to settle.[20] The circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and now the Fifth Circuit revolves around what qualifies as a “controversy” as stated in Callen, with each circuit finding the meaning of the word to be slightly different. 

III.  Different Interpretations of the Enforceability of Releases Under FELA

Despite the Supreme Court’s rulings on Section 5 and releases under FELA, there seems to be disagreement on the proper application of this section and what can be included in releases.[21] This disagreement has led to the three-way circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuit.[22] The Sixth Circuit, in Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., created a bright-line rule in which releases are limited to injuries known to the employee at the time the release agreement is signed.[23] The Third Circuit, in Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., rejected the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule and created a “known risk” or “fact-intensive” standard in which releases are limited to “risks which are known to the parties at the time the release is signed.”[24] In an unpublished opinion, Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the Fifth Circuit rejected both standards set forth by the Sixth and Third Circuits and, by looking to the plain language of the release, created a standard with virtually no limits.[25]

A.  The Sixth Circuit’s Bright-Line Rule Allowing for Only Known Injuries Within Releases

In Babbitt, the Sixth Circuit was one of the first circuits to establish a standard to determine whether railroads could absolve themselves from liability of “known or unknown” claims through a general release.[26] The plaintiffs in Babbitt were former employees of Norfolk & Western Railway Company and were seeking damages under FELA.[27] The plaintiffs alleged they experienced hearing loss because of their exposure to excessive noise during their employment.[28]

When the plaintiffs left Norfolk, they signed a “Resignation and Release Agreement,” which was a part of Norfolk’s “Voluntary Separation Program.”[29] The program included early retirement, a “lump sum payment,” and “continuation of health, and other benefits.”[30] Norfolk argued that the Release “was an attempt to settle all claims as part of the cessation of a worker’s employment relationship with the railroad” and that the purpose was for the railroad to “‘buy its peace’” from former employees.[31] Norfolk argued that the Release barred the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs knew of their claims before the Release was signed.[32] On the other hand, the plaintiffs contend that they did not know of their claims until they no longer worked for Norfolk.[33]

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by looking at the language of FELA and, in doing so, the court determined that “the purpose of FELA, as stated in 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 and 55, is to require negligent railroads to assume liability for injuries to employees in the course of their employment.”[34] The court goes on to acknowledge the exception to Section 5, as laid out in Callen, that “FELA claims can have the same effect as any other release, in that it may constitute a settlement or compromise, rather than an attempt to escape liability.[35] Focusing on the release at issue in Callen, the Sixth Circuit found that “the employer and employee executed a contract that settled an actual controversy, i.e., liability for the plaintiff’s specific injuries.”[36]

The Sixth Circuit adopted a rule stating that for a release to be valid it must “reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury,” rather than act as an attempt on the employer’s behalf to extinguish an employee’s future claims arising out of injuries that may be “known or unknown” to the employee.[37] The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Norfolk and remanded the case to the district court because the district court did not determine if the release executed was for the specific injuries regarding the plaintiffs’ hearing loss.[38]

The rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Babbitt is known as the “bright-line rule approach,” meaning that a release can only be valid for “the specific injury at issue and cannot go beyond that specific injury to any other injury or conditions that may later develop.”[39] Other federal circuit courts and lower courts have declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule approach, making this approach one of the least favored outside of the Sixth Circuit.[40]

B.  The Third Circuit’s Fact-Intensive Standard Allowing for Known Injuries and Known Risks Within Releases

Only one year after the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Babbitt, the Third Circuit adopted its own approach in determining whether a release is valid under Section 5 of FELA.[41] In Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the Third Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule and created the initial circuit split by adopting a fact-intensive standard to determine the enforceability of releases.[42] The plaintiffs in Wicker were all injured during their employment at Consolidated Railroad Corporation (Conrail).[43] Most of the plaintiffs signed a release that exempted Conrail from any liability for past or future claims the plaintiffs may have, regardless of whether the claims or injuries were known or unknown by the plaintiffs at the time.[44]

After the plaintiffs signed the releases and left Conrail, they began to experience injuries unrelated to the initial injury for which they signed the release.[45] For example, one plaintiff suffered from a back injury that occurred during his employment and signed a release.[46] The plaintiff testified exposure to toxic chemicals during his employment at Conrail caused him to experience many symptoms, such as “swollen eyes, infected tear ducts, nosebleeds,” etc.[47] The plaintiff claimed that some of the symptoms were present when he signed the release, however, many of the symptoms were developments that occurred after the release was executed.[48]

The plaintiffs each brought a FELA suit against Conrail for alleged exposure to toxic chemicals during the duration of their employment, causing each of them various injuries.[49] Conrail argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred because of the releases that each plaintiff signed.[50] The plaintiffs argued that the releases only barred claims relating to their initial injuries at the time of signing the release and that the releases were not valid under Section 5.[51]

The Third Circuit’s approach involved a compromise between protecting employees’ FELA rights while, at the same time, allowing employers and employees to settle controversies through contracts about potential liability relating to known risks of future injuries.[52] The Third Circuit held that Section 5 is not violated if a release “is executed for valid consideration as part of a settlement, and the scope of the release is limited to those risks which are known to the parties at the time the release is signed.”[53] The Third Circuit goes on to say that claims regarding unknown risks cannot be waived under Section 5 because they “do not constitute ‘controversies,’” as acknowledged in Callen.[54]

The Third Circuit specifies that:

a release that spells out the quantity, location and duration of potential risks to which the employee has been exposed—for example toxic exposure—allowing the employee to make a reasoned decision whether to release the employer from liability for future injuries of specifically known risks does not violate § 5 of FELA.[55]

The court notes, however, that the validity of a release does not turn on the way the release is written, even though a release that specifies the known risks would serve as strong support for the release defense.[56] There was concern that employers could easily write “detailed boiler plate agreements” that “include an extensive catalog of every chemical and hazard known to railroad employment.”[57] In response, the court resorts to an additional “fact-intensive process” that involves discerning the parties’ intent when executing the release.[58] The court goes on to say that “[w]here a specific known risk of malady is not mentioned in the release, it would seem difficult for the employer to show it was known to the employee and that he or she intended to release liability for it.”[59]

The Third Circuit found that the releases in question were not valid because there was no demonstration that the employees knew of the risks that they were exposed to and the releases attempted to settle all the claims against Conrail regardless of whether or not the parties knew about the risks.[60] For example, some of the releases at issue were “short, pro forma waivers,” and did not indicate any negotiation between the parties other than the settlement amount.[61] Other examples of releases that were signed by the plaintiffs were “more detailed, blanket releases” that attempted to exempt Conrail from all potential liabilities.[62] Overall, none of the releases demonstrated that “the employees knew of the actual risks to which they were exposed and from which the employer was being released.”[63]

The court acknowledges that Babbitt’s bright-line rule is more predictable than the fact-intensive standard set forth, however, the court believes that the trial courts are able to apply the fact-intensive process to determine the parties’ intent and whether the release is valid.[64] The standard announced by the Third Circuit in Wicker is known as the “known risk or fact-intensive standard,” meaning that a release is valid if it was a “negotiated settlement of a controversy that is limited to those injuries and risks that are known to the parties’ at the time the release is executed.”[65]

Many lower courts have adopted the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach, making it the more popular standard for determining whether a release is valid under Section 5.[66] Even the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach in Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan.[67] The plaintiff in Sea-Land was an employee who experienced lower back pain while aboard one of Sea-Land’s ships.[68] Sea-Land paid all of the plaintiff's medical expenses, including surgery, however, the plaintiff was deemed permanently disabled and unable to perform his duties.[69] The parties signed a release and a “‘Settlement Agreement Not to Sail or Work’” and in exchange, Sea-Land paid the plaintiff $364,500.[70]

The agreement stated that the plaintiff agreed to “not work, sail and/or navigate, and/or seek to sail, navigate or work, in any capacity, including shore relief, aboard vessels owned, managed, and/or operated by Sea-Land Service, Inc., and/or any of its affiliates and/or subsidiaries, in the future.”[71] If the plaintiff was eventually able to come back to work for Sea-Land, the agreement stated that “he shall do so at his own risk, and the company will bear no responsibility for an illness and/or injuries he may suffer while in service aboard any such vessel.”[72]

Two years later, the plaintiff received a union physical to determine his duty status and was deemed fit for duty, but he did not inform the doctor who performed the physical of his medical history.[73] After the plaintiff returned as an employee at Sea-Land, he reported that he re-injured his back.[74] Sea-Land brought suit to obtain a judgment that declared the agreement between the parties enforceable, so the plaintiff could not seek damages for his re-injured back.[75] The district court found in favor of Sea-Land and ruled that the agreement was enforceable under FELA.[76] Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit arguing that the agreement violates Section 5 of FELA because the agreement “exempts Sea-Land, a common carrier, from liability under the Act by releasing it from future claims.”[77]

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s standard and said that “cases involving the validity of releases are fact-driven.”[78] The court upheld the district court’s decision that the agreement was enforceable because the agreement forbid “future employment by a totally disabled seaman that would expose him to known and unacceptable risks” and since it was a “valid overall settlement of a specific claim of injury,” the agreement does not violate FELA.[79]

C.  The Fifth Circuit’s New and More Expansive Approach to Releases

A new approach has recently emerged from the Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, to determine whether a release is valid, creating a three-way circuit split between the Sixth, Third, and Fifth Circuit.[80] In Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pacific Railroad, the plaintiff was a Union Pacific Railroad (Union) employee and alleged that he encountered exposure to toxic substances while employed there.[81] In 2019, the plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis and cancer and, thereafter, filed a FELA suit against Union.[82] Union argued that the plaintiff’s claims were barred because, in 2012, the plaintiff pursued a toxic tort claim against Union and the two parties signed a release to resolve that claim.[83]

The language of the release agreement stated that the plaintiff accepted payment as a “complete compromise” of all claims against Union as a result of the plaintiff's “alleged illnesses, injuries, cancers, future cancers, diseases, and/or death, or any fears or psychological disorders relating to contracting same, as a result of Alleged Exposures while [Mendoza-Gomez] was employed by [Union].”[84] The release included not only claims that the plaintiff knew of at the time of the release, but also ones that could develop after the release was executed.[85] The plaintiff argued that the release was unenforceable under Section 5 because FELA prohibits employers from extinguishing liability through contracts.[86]

The District Court for the Southern District of Texas declined to adopt either of the approaches in Wicker or Babbitt and instead relied on the language of the release agreement finding the release valid.[87] Citing Callen, the district court determined that “[a]greements that allow parties to settle their claims without litigation is a permissible ‘full compromise’ under Section 55.”[88] In determining whether the release was valid under Section 5, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Callen, stating that “‘a release is not a device to exempt from liability but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility.’”[89] The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s claims were barred because of the release’s “plain language” regarding what the release encompassed.[90]

The plaintiff tried to draw the Fifth Circuit’s attention to Hartman v. Illinois Railroad Co., a district court case that involved a release similar to the one in Mendoza-Gomez.[91] Applying Wicker, the district court in Hartman found that the release was a “‘boiler-plate list of hazards’” and did not bar the plaintiff’s claims.[92] The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s case was distinguishable from Hartman.[93] Since the release was specific to the injuries within the plaintiff’s original toxic tort complaint against Union and the injuries he developed years later, including “cancers” and “future cancers,” the court did not find the release to be a “boilerplate list” of injuries unrelated to the plaintiff’s present claims.[94] The Fifth Circuit, instead, found that the release was a contract and the language of the release governed.[95]

Relatively few cases have discussed the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Mendoza-Gomez, however, in Fisher v. BNSF Railway Co., the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth analyzes the district court’s and Fifth Circuit’s approach to determine the validity of a release.[96] The Court of Appeals of Texas states that the district court granted summary judgment to Union “on the face of the release.”[97] Since the release disclosed future risks on its face, such as cancer relating to asbestos, it was “executed as part of a full compromise of litigation.”[98]

Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s approach appears to determine whether a release is valid by turning to the language “on the face of the release.”[99] Unlike Wicker, there seems to be no fact-finding performed by the court to determine if the release is valid or if it was the intent of the parties to release the possible risks.[100] Instead, the Fifth Circuit seems to rely heavily on Callen’s language that “a release is not a device to exempt from liability but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility.”[101] Under Babbitt, the release at issue in Mendoza-Gomez would not be found valid and under Wicker, the release would at least create a question of fact.[102] Under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, however, the release is found to be completely valid.[103]

The Fifth Circuit’s approach creates a new split in the federal circuit courts by citing to Callen and holding broadly that Section 5 imposes very few limits on FELA claims.[104] The plaintiff in Mendoza-Gomez filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States claiming that the case could resolve the circuit split.[105] This could have been the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to shed some light on the controversy surrounding FELA claims and releases; however, the Petition was dismissed.[106]

 

IV.  The U.S. Supreme Court Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s Fact-Intensive Approach to Resolve the Three-Way Circuit Split

The resolution of the three-way circuit split will substantially affect the outcome of FELA cases in the future. If the Supreme Court adopts one of the circuit’s approaches, it will aid workers and common carriers in determining whether or not the release they are trying to execute is valid. Also, the resolution of the three-way circuit split could significantly affect the way common carriers draft releases.[107] By clarifying the proper standard for FELA releases, the Court could “equip the railroad companies with the knowledge of what language they need to include in a FELA release in order for the release to be deemed valid and to protect the employer from liability in additional suits.”[108] Additionally, by adopting one of the three approaches, the Court would finally end the long debate of whether or not the parties are allowed to release only known injuries, known injuries as well as known risks, or even risks that the plaintiff did not intend to release but were found to be included on the face of the release.

Even though the Supreme Court dismissed Mendoza-Gomez’s petition for review,[109] the issue of what standard applies in determining whether a release is valid under Section 5 still exists. The Supreme Court could still choose to rule on this issue if the opportunity presents itself, and if the Court does choose to address the split, it should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach in Wicker. Wicker’s rationale is the best compromise between the three approaches by allowing employers and employees to “negotiate and settle” their claims without litigation[110] and is the most widely adopted approach by a majority of state and federal courts.[111]

A.  Why the Sixth Circuit’s Bright Line Rule Should Not Be Adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court

Although the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule has some advantages, the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard is superior in many ways. Under Babbitt’s bright line rule, “a release must reflect a bargained-for-settlement of a known claim for a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from injuries known or unknown by him.”[112] It is clear, and acknowledged by the Third Circuit itself, that the bright line approach presented in Babbitt may be easier to apply than Wicker’s fact-intensive standard and has the “benefit of predictability.”[113] In other words, Babbitt’s rule appears predictable because it only allows employees to sign a release for a specific injury that has already occurred and the employer will know when a release will or will not be considered valid.[114]

Even though it may appear that the Sixth Circuit’s approach provides an easier resolution to the enforcement of releases, the result may actually be a “more complicated inquiry into the exact nature and scope of the injury compromised” or have “a chilling effect on the resolution by compromise of any claims.”[115] For example, the effects of exposure to asbestos “may be latent for a considerable period of time.”[116] Under Babbitt’s approach, a new claim would be permitted against the employer for every new manifestation of asbestos exposure, “regardless of the extent of the parties’ awareness of such risks.”[117] This would result in a decrease in settlements because “there would be no incentive” for the employer to compromise.[118] Therefore, Babbitt’s bright-line rule would require injured workers to litigate claims against negligent employers, resulting in employees waiting long periods of time to receive compensation for their injuries as well as more attorney’s fees due to extended litigation.

Additionally, it can be argued that Babbitt’s bright line rule is more protective of workers as compared to the Third Circuit’s standard because of the “unequal bargaining power” between the employer and the employees.[119] Employers and their attorneys obviously will try to obtain a cheaper settlement of known injuries and known risks, and it is argued that plaintiff attorneys “will be quick to settle in order to get their cut of the settlement with no regard to the future liability claims they are releasing.”[120] Yet, there are at least two reasons why this argument fails.

First, plaintiff attorneys will usually want to obtain the highest settlement possible for the plaintiff because they will receive a percentage of the settlement amount. Just because the employer and its attorney attempt to obtain the lowest settlement amount for themselves, it does not follow that the plaintiff and their attorney will not be successful in procuring a higher settlement. By allowing for a settlement of future known risks, the plaintiff would be able to bargain for an amount that would compensate them for the potential development of those risks. To determine an appropriate amount of compensation, the parties could take into account the probability of the plaintiff developing injuries from these known risks and the cost of treatment if they do develop. Therefore, the parties will have full knowledge of the probability and costs of the known risks, which would counteract the issue of “unequal bargaining power.”

The second reason this argument fails is because Wicker’s fact-intensive standard allows courts to thwart the issue of “unequal bargaining power” between the employer and the employee. Even though Wicker’s fact-intensive standard looks to whether it was the intention of the parties to release known risks,[121] the fact-intensive process could reveal if the employer used its “unequal bargaining power” over the employee to coerce them into signing a release that they actually did not want to sign. Courts should be able to recognize coercion through the fact-intensive process and not allow the release to bar the plaintiff’s claims. In other words, Wicker’s standard is just as protective of workers as Babbitt’s bright line rule.

The Supreme Court should also not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s bright line rule in Babbitt because it is too restrictive and paternalistic. The Sixth Circuit approach limits the plaintiff’s settlement to only known injuries at the time the release is signed even if both parties would rather settle all future claims.[122] “[I]t is entirely conceivable that both employee and employer could fully comprehend future risks and potential liabilities and, for different reasons, want an immediate and permanent settlement.”[123] The employer obviously would want a permanent settlement to reduce the amount of future liabilities it may be subject to.[124] On the other hand, the employee may want an immediate settlement to get compensation for their potential injuries now, rather than waiting on injuries that may or may not develop in the future.[125]

Other federal and state courts have also adopted the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive approach over the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule, making it the more popular of the two standards among courts.[126] In Jaqua v. Canadian National Railroad, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Michigan adopted Wicker’s standard and stated that “[t]he rationale in Wicker allows the employer and the employee the freedom to negotiate and settle claims, but protects the employee from releasing the employer for unknown liability that was not considered and resolved in an informed manner.”[127] In Loyal v. Norfolk Southern Corp., the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that an industry “that has a number of known occupational risks and diseases, it is important to both the employer and employee to be able to settle potential claims regarding injuries or diseases prior to actual discovery.”[128] Also adopting the Third Circuit’s standard, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Acuff, found that “Babbitt’s rule barring the release of future claims unfairly restricts the ability of an employer and employee to knowingly and voluntarily settle both current and future claims, should the parties so desire.”[129]

Overall, the Supreme Court should not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule because of its many disadvantages. Babbitt’s ruling is too restrictive of the employees' ability to release known risks if they choose to do so.[130] Allowing releases only for known injuries may also decrease the number of settlements that employers will agree to because there is less of an incentive for them to participate in these settlements.[131] This would result in more litigation, causing the injured plaintiff to wait longer for compensation as well as higher attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court should instead adopt the Third Circuit’s approach because it allows the parties to negotiate while still protecting the employee from releasing the employer from unknown risks.[132]

B.  Why the Fifth Circuit’s New and More Expansive Approach Should Not Be Adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court

While the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule is too restrictive and paternalistic, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is on the opposite end of the spectrum by placing barely any restrictions on what can be included in releases.[133] Rather, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas and Fifth Circuit in Mendoza-Gomez found that the release at issue disclosed the future risks of cancer on its face, so it was deemed valid.[134] The Supreme Court should not adopt the Fifth Circuit’s approach because, as compared to the Third Circuit’s standard, it completely undermines the purpose of FELA.

By looking at the language of the release on its face, there is no fact-intensive process conducted, as in Wicker, to determine if the parties actually intended to include certain future claims in the release.[135] According to the Fifth Circuit, the analysis in determining the intentions of the parties “begins and ends with the contract’s express language.”[136] The result of the Fifth Circuit’s approach will likely find a release valid even if there is no evidence that the parties, specifically the plaintiffs, knew of the specific risks they were exposed to. As long as the “express language” of the release provides that the plaintiff accepts a settlement amount as consideration for “full and complete release of any and all claims” resulting from a specific instance, such as exposure to toxic chemicals, then the release will be found valid and the plaintiff’s future claims for any injuries will be barred against the employer.[137]

The Fifth Circuit’s new approach runs contrary to FELA’s purpose of holding common carriers liable to their injured employees.[138] This approach will result in injured workers’ claims being barred because they signed blanket releases in which they were unaware included certain risks. It will encourage employers to write very broad releases, resulting in boilerplate language. The Third Circuit’s approach conducts a fact-intensive process that seeks to determine the parties’ intent, which combats the issues the Fifth Circuit’s approach creates.[139]

Even though the Fifth Circuit’s approach has the advantage of allowing the parties the freedom of contract, like the Third Circuit’s standard, it does not properly protect workers because it does not specifically disallow releases of unknown risks.[140] Since unknown risks could potentially be released under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, undermining the purpose of FELA, the Supreme Court should instead adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard that provides the parties the freedom of contract while protecting workers at the same time.

V.  Conclusion

In sum, to resolve the three-way circuit split the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s fact-intensive standard that allows known risks to be included in FELA releases.[141] Wicker’s standard is the proper compromise between the three approaches as it allows employers and employees to negotiate and settle their claims without litigation,[142] and it is the most widely adopted approach by a majority of state and federal courts.[143] The Third Circuit’s standard allows parties the freedom of contract to determine what is best for themselves, while still adhering to FELA’s purpose by protecting workers by not allowing unknown risks to be waived.[144]


I J.D. Expected 2024, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.S. Political Science 2021, University of Louisville

[2] Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (1908).

[3] 45 U.S.C. § 55.

[4] See Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89, 91 (6th Cir. 1997); Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 690 (3d Cir. 1998); Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022).

[5] Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948).

[6] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 696.

[7] 45 U.S.C. § 51; Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 91.

[8] 45 U.S.C. § 55.

[9] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 696.

[10] Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartfield R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1912).

[11] Phila., Balt., & Wash. R.R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 612 (1912).

[12] Id.

[13] Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89, 92 (6th Cir. 1997); Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948). 

[14] Callen, 332 U.S. at 626.

[15] Id. at 626–27.

[16] Id. at 631.

[17] Id.

[18] Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 92.

[19] Callen, 332 U.S. at 631.

[20] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1998).

[21] Id. at 698.

[22] See Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 89; Wicker, 142 F.3d at 690; Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022).

[23] Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 93.

[24] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[25] See Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 4:19-CV-4742, slip op. at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2021); See Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022).

[26] Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 91, 93.

[27] Id. at 90.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 91.

[35] Id. at 92.

[36] Id.

[37] Id. at 93.

[38] Id.

[39] Brooke Granger, Known Injuries vs. Known Risks: Finding the Appropriate Standard for Determining the Validity of Releases Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1463, 1476 (2015).

[40] Id. at 1477; See e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan, 231 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998) (Third Circuit creates its own standard); Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886–88 (Tex. App. 2022) (declines to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s standard but does not decide on whether to adopt the Third Circuit’s or Fifth Circuit’s approach because the result would be the same regardless of which standard the court chooses to apply).

[41] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[42] Id.

[43] Id. at 692–93.

[44] Id. at 693–94.

[45] Id. at 692–93.

[46] Id. at 692.

[47] Id.

[48] Id. at 692–93.

[49] Id. at 694.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id. at 700–01.

[53] Id. at 701.

[54] Id. (citing Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948)).

[55] Id.

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] Id.

[60] Id. at 701–02.

[61] Id. at 701.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 700–01.

[65] Granger, supra note 39, at 1481–82.

[66] See e.g., Murphy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 574 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Loyal v. Norfolk S. Corp., 507 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ward v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 So. 3d 466, 472–73 (Miss. 2019) (applying the Third Circuit’s standard); Cole v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 803 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Va. 2017) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Sinclair v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 200 P.3d 46, 59 (Mont. 2008) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., v. Acuff, 950 So.2d 947, 960 (Miss. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach); Oliverio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach).

[67] See 231 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2000).

[68] Id. at 849.

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] Id. at 850.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id. at 849.

[78] Id. at 852.

[79] Id. at 852–53.

[80] See Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022).

[81] Id. at *1.

[82] Id.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id.

[86] Id. at *2.

[87] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 4:19-CV-4742, slip op. at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2021).

[88] Id. (citing Callen v. Pa. R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948)).

[89] Mendoza-Gomez, No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3; Callen, 332 U.S. at 631 (1948).

[90] Mendoza-Gomez, No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *2.

[91] Id. at *4 n.1.

[92] Id. (citing Hartman v. Ill. R.R. Co., No. 20-1633, slip op. at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2022).

[93] Id.

[94] Id.

[95] 2022-7061 Mealey’s Daily News Update 3.

[96] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886–88 (Tex. App. 2022).

[97] Id. at 887.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998).

[101] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (citing Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948)).

[102] 2022-7061 Mealey’s Daily News Update 3.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.

[105] Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (No. 22-225); 2022-7061 Mealey’s Daily News Update 3.

[106] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14), cert. dismissed, 143 S. Ct. 420 (2022).

[107] Granger, supra note 39, at 1483.

[108] Id.

[109] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14), cert. dismissed, 143 S. Ct. 420 (2022).

[110] Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).

[111] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. App. 2022).

[112] Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1997).

[113] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1998).

[114] Granger, supra note 39, at 1493.

[115] Oliverio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701–02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).

[116] Id. at 702.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Granger, supra note 39, at 1491.

[120] Id.

[121] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1998).

[122] Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Acuff, 950 So. 2d 947, 960 (Miss. 2006).

[123] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 700.

[124] Id.

[125] Id.

[126] See e.g., Murphy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 574 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Loyal v. Norfolk S. Corp., 507 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ward v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 So. 3d 466, 472–73 (Miss. 2019) (applying the Third Circuit’s standard); Cole v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 803 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Va. 2017) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Sinclair v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 200 P.3d 46, 59 (Mont. 2008) (adopting the Third Circuit’s standard); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., v. Acuff, 950 So. 2d 947, 960 (Miss. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach); Oliverio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (adopting the Third Circuit’s approach).

[127] Jaqua, 734 N.W.2d at 229.

[128] Loyal, 507 S.E.2d at 502.

[129] Acuff, 950 So. 2d at 960.

[130] Id.

[131] Oliverio, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 702.

[132] Jaqua, 734 N.W.2d at 229.

[133] Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Mendoza-Gomez, Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (No. 22-225).

[134] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 887 (Tex. App. 2022).

[135] Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998).

[136] Mendoza-Gomez v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (citing Huckaba v. Ref-Chem, L.P., 892 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2018)).

[137] Id.

[138] 45 U.S.C. § 51.

[139] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[140] Compare Mendoza-Gomez, No. 21-20397, 2022 WL 1117698 at *3 (acknowledging that the analysis “begins and ends with the contract’s express language,” which does not involve the fact-intensive process of determining whether the risk was known or unknown to the plaintiff), with Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701 (stating that “[c]laims relating to unknown risks do not constitute ‘controversies,’ and may not be waived under § 5 of FELA”).

[141] Wicker, 142 F.3d at 701.

[142] Jaqua v. Canadian Nat’l R.R., 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).

[143] Fisher v. BNSF Ry. Co., 650 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. App. 2022).

[144] Wicker, 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d. Cir. 1998).

“Objective Falsity” in Healthcare Fraud and Abuse

“Objective Falsity” in Healthcare Fraud and Abuse  

Adriel E. Wilson I 

Introduction 

There is currently a circuit split on the meaning of “falsity” under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).[2] This paper aims to demonstrate why the Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsity standard in which “a clinical judgment of terminal illness warranting hospice benefits under Medicare cannot be deemed false, for purposes of the False Claims Act, when there is only a reasonable disagreement between medical experts as to the accuracy of that conclusion.”[3] The Supreme Court should adopt this theory for several reasons: (1) the courts actually seem to agree on whether a medical opinion can be deemed untrue, (2) they mainly disagree on the purpose of the documentation requirements and its effect on a falsity determination, (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior because the Supreme Court has explicitly held the FCA is not there to punish garden-variety regulatory infractions,[4] and (4) the presence of uncertainty in medical sciences.[5]

I.  False Claims Act

The civil FCA is located at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 through §3733.[6] This statute aims to protect the “Government from being overcharged or sold shoddy goods or services.”[7] “[N]o specific intent to defraud is required,” thus “knowing” under the statute includes “not only actual knowledge” but also “deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”[8] Additionally, there is a criminal FCA located at 18 U.S.C. § 287.[9] Under this statute, criminal penalties for false claim submissions include fines and imprisonment for a period of up to five years.[10]

Violating the FCA can result in substantial consequences, as the statute permits treble damages, a penalty for each false claim, and exclusion from participation in both Medicaid and Medicare[11]—a possibility that can be ruinous to most medical practices.[12] The aim is to deter these unsafe and abusive practices as much as possible.[13]

II.  “Objective Falsity” under the FCA 

The judicial “objective falsity” standard “requires a false claim to be based on objectively verifiable facts to establish liability under the FCA.”[14] Circuit courts, however, are split as to “whether a difference in expert medical opinion that certain health services are medically necessary”—and therefore payable by the government—is sufficient to establish that the claim for services provided is false or fraudulent under the statute.[15]

       In February 2021, the Supreme Court rejected, without comment, two petitions presenting that exact issue of “whether an expert medical opinion that differs from the defendant’s clinical judgment” is sufficient to establish liability under the FCA’s falsity definition.[16] These petitions are Care Alternatives v. United States et al. and RollinsNelson LTC Corp. v. United States ex rel. Winters.[17]

III.  Circuit Split 

For purposes of clarity throughout this paper, the Eleventh Circuit’s theory will be termed the “objective standard,” meaning there must be a flagrant abuse of the defendant’s medical judgment in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a FCA claim, and reasonable disagreement between medical experts is insufficient.[18] Alternatively, the opposing theory will be termed the “reasonable disagreement standard,” meaning a reasonable disagreement between medical experts is sufficient to support a plaintiff’s FCA claim.[19]

A.  Reasonable Disagreement Standard 

The Third Circuit rejected the objective falsity standard last year in United States ex rel. Druding v. Druding (which became Care Alternatives on appeal).[20] In that case, former employees sued Care Alternatives for allegedly “admit[ing] patients who were ineligible for hospice care and direct[ing] employees to alter patient records to allow for eligibility.”[21] The court focused on whether Care Alternatives’s physicians correctly assessed that their patients were terminally ill (meaning expected to die within six months) and therefore eligible for Medicare and Medicaid to cover their hospice care.[22] The issue presented was whether a physician’s clinical judgment can be considered a legal falsity if it is later challenged by a medical expert with a different judgment.[23] The Third Circuit found that the difference in opinion did create a “genuine dispute of material fact as to falsity” and ruled in favor of the former employees.[24]

B.  Analysis of Care Alternatives Opinion

In Druding, the plaintiffs retained an expert who opined that, based on the forty-seven patient records he examined, the patients were inappropriately certified for hospice care thirty-five percent of the time.[25] He also found “that the medical records were incomplete for at least three patients.”[26] However, Care Alternatives’s expert disagreed and testified that a reasonable physician would have found all of those patients eligible for hospice.[27]

Care Alternatives is a hospice facility, and the Medicare provisions for hospice benefits provide payment for individuals considered terminally ill.[28] The statute requires the individual to be certified accordingly by at least one physician,[29] and regulations promulgated by the Secretary add another requirement for that certification to be accompanied by “clinical information and other documentation that support the medical prognosis” of terminal illness in the medical record.[30]

Care Alternatives sought summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs could not prove the prima facie elements of an FCA claim: “falsity, causation, knowledge, and materiality.”[31] Namely, Care Alternatives contended the plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient evidence of “falsity.”[32] The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that “a mere difference of opinion” between experts regarding the accuracy of the prognosis was insufficient to create a triable dispute of fact as to the element of falsity, which reflected the Eleventh Circuit’s standard.[33] It instead required the plaintiffs to produce evidence of an “objective falsehood, that the physicians’ prognosis of terminal illness was incorrect, in order to prevail on the element of falsity.”[34]

On appeal to the Third Circuit, the main issue was “whether a hospice-care provider’s claim for reimbursement can be considered ‘false’ under the FCA on the basis of medical-expert testimony that opines that accompanying patient certifications did not support patients’ prognoses of terminal illness.”[35] The Third Circuit held the answer is yes, thereby rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s “objective falsity” standard from the previous year.[36] Instead, the court found the plaintiffs’ expert medical testimony created “a genuine dispute of material fact as to the element of falsity.”[37]

The Third Circuit came to this conclusion for two reasons: (1) the district court’s standard “is at odds with the meaning of ‘false’ under the” statute’s text; and (2) the “‘objective’ falsity standard improperly conflates the elements of falsity and scienter.”[38]

First, because Congress did not define “false” under the FCA, the Supreme Court looked to common law for guidance in Escobar, stating that “[a]bsent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.”[39] The Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests “an opinion may be false when the speaker makes an express statement contrary to the opinion he or she actually holds.”[40] Thus, the Third Circuit found that the lower court’s premise—that an opinion is subjective, and a difference of opinion is therefore not enough to show falsity—is inconsistent with the meaning of “false” under the FCA.[41]

The Third Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s determination that “clinical judgments cannot be untrue.”[42] The Third Circuit reasoned that an “opinion…will be deemed untrue…if it is issued without reasonable genuine belief or if it has no basis.”[43] Thus, the court found that “a physician’s judgment may be scrutinized and considered false.”[44] Therefore, a difference of medical opinion is enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding FCA falsity.[45]

Second, the Third Circuit found that the lower court’s “objective falsity” standard conflates the elements of scienter (“knowledge”) and falsity under the statute.[46] The court reasoned that scienter helps limit the possibility that providers would be exposed to FCA liability anytime the government found an expert who disagreed with the certifying physician’s medical prognosis.[47] The Third Circuit wrote, “By requiring ‘factual evidence that Defendant’s certifying doctor was making a knowingly false determination,’ the District Court’s ‘objective’ falsity standard conflates scienter and falsity.”[48]

Thus, the Third Circuit stated that a claim can be proven “false” in two ways: (1) “factually, when the facts contained within the claim are untrue”; and (2) legally, “when the claimant…falsely certifies that it has complied with a statute or regulation the compliance with which is a condition for Government payment.”[49] For legal falsity, the Medicare Health Benefit regulations state two requirements: “(1) that a physician certifies the patient as terminally ill and (2) that clinical information and documentation supporting the prognosis accompany the certification.”[50] The Circuit Court reasoned that the District Court’s standard only found an expert medical opinion to be false when there is a showing proving a violation of factual falsity under avenue (1), while the Circuit Court advanced a standard that finds liability when there has been a violation of either factual falsity under avenue (1) or of legal falsity under avenue (2).[51] Under avenue (2), legal falsity is found, meaning an FCA violation has been committed, when clinical information and other documentation that support the medical prognosis do not accompany the certification.[52] Based on this theory, the Third Circuit held that “disagreement between experts as to a patient’s prognosis may be evidence of [element (2)]; its relevance need not be limited to the accuracy of another physician’s judgment.”[53]

The Third Circuit found support in the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Polukoff, where that court held that FCA falsity can be based on legal falsity, where “falsity is simply a question of whether the claim is reimbursable, that is, compliance with the Medicare reimbursement instructions.”[54] That circuit found the defendant cardiologist’s procedures were “false” due to failure to follow Medicare procedures.[55] Those procedures require certification of the necessity of services and, in some instances, recertification of the continued need for those services that are reasonable and necessary.[56] However, it is worth noting that the facts in that case made the defendant’s conduct appear to be more obviously egregious: the plaintiff physician alleged (1) the defendant performed an unusually large number of the specific cardiac procedure at issue; (2) these procedures violated industry and hospital guidelines; (3) other physicians had objected to defendant’s practice; (4) the medical center (Intermountain) eventually audited the defendant’s practice and reached the conclusion that the guidelines were violated in many of the cases reviewed; and (5) the defendant knew that Medicare and Medicaid would not pay for this cardiac procedure to treat migraines, and he “chose to represent that the procedures had been performed based on indications set forth” in the American Heart Association and American Stroke Association guidelines.[57]

In summation, according to the Third Circuit, “[u]nder a legal falsity theory, a medical opinion that differs from the certifying physician’s opinion is…relevant evidence of the latter requirement, whether there was documentation accompanying the certification that supported the medical prognosis.”[58] The court continued: “[A] difference of medical opinion is enough evidence to create a triable dispute of fact regarding FCA falsity. This does not mean that objectivity is never relevant for FCA liability…[h]owever, we find that objectivity speaks to the element of scienter, not falsity.”[59] Thus, according to the Third Circuit, “scienter” pertains to factual falsity under avenue (1) while “falsity” pertains to legal falsity under avenue (2) when a defendant fails to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements.[60]

Hence, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs’ expert report challenging the defendant’s hospice certifications created a triable issue of material fact for a jury regarding falsity.[61] Again, it is worth noting this does not seem to rise to the level of egregious conduct in the Tenth Circuit case, which the Third Circuit relied upon.

C.  Objective Falsity Standard

In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found the opposite in United States v. AseraCare, Inc.[62] This court determined that a “difference of reasonable opinion” alone is insufficient to establish falsity under the FCA’s objective falsity standard.[63] AseraCare involved nearly identical facts to Care Alternatives, but this court instead adopted an objective standard of falsity, which was affirmed on appeal: “[A] clinical judgment of terminal illness warranting hospice benefits under Medicare cannot be deemed false, for purposes of the False Claims Act, when there is only a reasonable disagreement between medical experts as to the accuracy of that conclusion.”[64]

D.  Analysis of AseraCare Opinion 

Similar to Care Alternatives, in AseraCare, the government alleged the defendants certified patients as “eligible for Medicare’s hospice benefit, and billed Medicare accordingly, on the basis of erroneous clinical judgments that those patients were terminally ill.”[65] The government’s contention depended upon its expert witness’s opinion that the patients at issue were not terminally ill at the time they were certified.[66] The district court granted summary judgment to defendant AseraCare “on the issue of falsity.”[67]

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination “that a clinical judgment of terminal illness warranting hospice benefits under Medicare cannot be deemed false, for purposes of the False Claims Act, when there is only a reasonable disagreement between medical experts as to the accuracy of that conclusion, with no other evidence to prove the falsity of the assessment [italics added].”[68]

After a review of the statute and implementing regulations, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that certification for terminal illness “will be based on the physician’s or medical director’s clinical judgment regarding the normal course of the individual’s illness.”[69] This subjective clinical judgment in light of the patient’s complete medical picture lies at the center of the eligibility inquiry.[70] In fact, the Centers for Medicate and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) has recognized that “predicting life expectancy is not an exact science,” so the prognosis does not have to be proven as a matter of medical fact.[71] Thus, CMS expects “that the certifying physicians will use their best clinical judgment.”[72]

The Government argued that their expert’s testimony created a factual dispute as to whether clinical information and other supporting documentation supported the medical prognosis of the terminally ill.[73] However, the Circuit Court explained that the statutory and regulatory requirements for supporting documentation to accompany the claim is meant to address the CMS mandate that “there must be a clinical basis for a certification.”[74] Therefore, “the physician’s clinical judgment dictates eligibility as long as it represents a reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical records…[and] Congress said nothing to indicate that the medical documentation presented with a claim must prove the veracity of the clinical judgment on an after-the-fact review [by plaintiff’s expert].”[75] The Eleventh Circuit decided CMS’s commentary indicates that well-founded clinical judgments be granted deference.[76]

To support this view further, CMS removed the term “criteria” from a proposed regulation which defined requirements for certification, wishing “to remove any implication that there are specific CMS clinical benchmarks” that must be met to constitute terminal illness.[77] This law is designed to give physicians “meaningful latitude to make informed judgments without fear that those judgments will be second-guessed after the fact by laymen in a liability proceeding.”[78] This does not, as the Government suggests, allow a physician to disregard the patient’s underlying medical condition when making a determination.[79] In fact, CMS retains a “well-established right” to review claims and deny those “it does not consider reasonable and necessary under the statutory standard.”[80]

This begs the question: When can a physician’s clinical judgment regarding a patient’s prognosis be deemed false?[81] The Eleventh Circuit explained that falsehood “can be shown in a variety of ways.”[82] For instance when: (1) “a certifying physician fails to review a patient’s medical records or otherwise familiarize himself with the patient’s condition before” determining he is terminally ill; (2) a plaintiff proves the physician did not subjectively believe his patient was terminally ill; and (3) expert evidence proves that “no reasonable physician could have concluded that a patient was terminally ill given the relevant medical records.”[83] The reason for using this objective falsehood standard is because, “in each of these examples, the clinical judgment on which the claim is based contains a flaw that can be demonstrated through verifiable facts.”[84]

In contrast, a reasonable difference of opinion among physicians that review medical documents after the fact, alone, is insufficient to suggest that the certifying physician’s judgments (or claims based on them) are false under the FCA.[85] The court went on to say that “[a] properly formed and sincerely held clinical judgment is not untrue even if a different physician later contends that the judgment is wrong.”[86] Accordingly, the rule laid down by this circuit is that, in order to properly state a claim under the FCA in the hospice reimbursement context, a plaintiff alleging a patient was falsely certified must show facts and circumstances surrounding the certification “that are inconsistent with the proper exercise of a physician’s clinical judgment.”[87] Where such facts are not shown, the FCA claim must fail as a matter of law.[88]

The court distinguished the hospice context here from Paulus, in which the physician-defendant was convicted of healthcare fraud based on his performance of allegedly unnecessary heart procedures.[89] The difference in that case was that the Government was able to produce expert testimony that the physician blatantly lied.[90] This testimony specifically disputed that the level of blockage displayed by the angiogram test was at the level the defendant claimed that it was.[91] Therefore, opinions are not entirely insulated from scrutiny, as they can trigger liability for fraud “when they are not honestly held by their maker, or when the speaker knows of facts that are fundamentally incompatible with his opinion.”[92] The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this instance was distinct from the situation presented in AseraCare, where the Government’s experts reached differing conclusions merely by weighing certain medical benchmarks differently than the defendants did.[93] In other words, a good-faith medical diagnosis cannot be false, whereas an assertion regarding the degree of a blockage can be “objectively true or false.”[94] Thus, the defendant in Paulus was convicted for a misrepresentation of fact, not for providing an opinion.[95] Essentially, the Government’s expert testimony in that case “suggest[ed] that no reasonable doctor could [have] interpret[ed] the scan” as the defendant-physician did, which indicated Paulus was actually lying.[96] Therefore, it was up to the jury to decide the reliability of the cardiology expert’s testimony attempting to prove his colleague was lying about the scans.[97]

Although the Government expressed concern in AseraCare that an objective falsehood standard would be too difficult for plaintiffs to meet, the court concluded if this is a problem, it is one for Congress or CMS to resolve—not the courts.[98] CMS and Congress could have imposed criteria for eligibility determinations to minimize the role of clinical judgment, but they were instead careful to position the clinical judgment of the physician at the core of the inquiry.[99] Thus, the Eleventh Court held, “absent a showing of an objective and knowing falsehood, the FCA is an inappropriate instrument to serve as the Government’s primary line of defense against questionable claims for reimbursement of hospice benefits.”[100]

However, because the Government was precluded from presenting evidence about some questionable certification practices that AseraCare utilized, the case was remanded.[101] Nine witnesses testified AseraCare had an intentional practice of failing to give physicians accurate, relevant, and complete information regarding patient certifications for hospice when requesting doctors to sign the certifications.[102] For example, one physician had a habit of signing off on certifications prior to reviewing any medical documentation at all.[103] These facts and circumstances presented triable issues of fact regarding the falsity of the specific claims at issue.[104] 

IV.  Supreme Court Guidance 

One previous Supreme Court decision may offer some guidance for the lower courts, but there is still ambiguity since the Court rejected the two more recent petitions.[105] In the 2016 Supreme Court case, Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the Court held that an alleged false claim requires that the claim be “material” to the payment decision made by the government to establish liability under the FCA.[106] It specifically noted that “materiality” is defined in the statute as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”[107] It also held that the FCA is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute,” nor is it a “vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations.”[108]

The Supreme Court’s decisions to deny certiorari are, arguably, consistent with the Escobar decision—and likely with an explicit objective falsity standard—in order to avoid multitudes of “garden variety” claims jamming up the courts.[109] Despite this, the circuits remain split as to their respective approaches to objective falsity, and it is not hard to see why, as the decision did not overtly address this particular question.[110] Thus, it may be worth the Supreme Court hearing the issue.

V. Reconciling the Third and Eleventh Circuits

There are three notable points for reconciling the two circuits and in determining the Eleventh Circuit has the superior analysis: (1) the courts actually seem to agree on whether a medical opinion can be deemed untrue, (2) the courts mainly disagree on the purpose of the documentation requirements and its effect on a falsity determination, and (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior because the Supreme Court has explicitly held the FCA is not there to punish garden-variety regulatory infractions.

First, regarding what the Third Circuit refers to as “factual falsity,” the two circuits seem to agree. Both courts determined medical opinions are not shielded from scrutiny, although the Third Circuit suggested the Eleventh Circuit thought otherwise.[111] Specifically, both circuits determined that an opinion is “false” if it is not genuinely held by the speaker.[112]

Second, the courts seem to mainly disagree on the role the documentation requirements play in the Medicare Hospice Benefit. The Third Circuit found it is evidence of a violation of legal falsity, while the Eleventh Circuit held it is merely there to provide documentation of the doctor’s rationale[113] and address the requirement that a medical basis exist for certification.[114]

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior to the Third Circuit’s because it promotes the considerations addressed in the Supreme Court’s Escobar decision. Akin Gump wrote:

In Escobar, the Court made clear that the FCA is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute…” [or] a “vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations…” Instead, as one recent court summarized… “Escobar rejects a system of government traps, zaps, and zingers that permits the government to retain the benefit of a substantially conforming good or service but to recover the price entirely–multiplied by three–because of some immaterial contractual or regulatory non-compliance.”[115]

Reflecting this sentiment, according to the Eleventh Circuit, “absent a showing of an objective and knowing falsehood, the FCA is an inappropriate instrument to serve as the Government’s primary line of defense against questionable claims for reimbursement of hospice benefits.”[116]

This analysis could even be taken beyond the hospice context for FCA liability to the medical field at large regarding FCA claims. This would work in other contexts for the same reasons it works in the hospice realm. Furthermore, objective falsity is a superior standard because it offers safeguards against patient abuse but also allows leeway for physician autonomy and good-faith clinical judgments, especially in light of medical uncertainties. 

VI. Uncertainty of Medical Sciences and the “Two Schools of Thought” Doctrine

Another reason the objective standard of falsity is preferable is the uncertainty of medical sciences.[117] In an ancillary legal field, medical negligence liability, some states have adopted the “two schools of thought” doctrine.[118] In their article, “Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing, and Legal Liability,” Eric E. Fortress and Marshall B. Kapp wrote: “Health care cost considerations exert[] increasing influence today over clinical decisionmaking. One way to help contain costs while maintaining the quality of health care may be to increase among both physicians and patients an acknowledgment of, and tolerance for, a reasonable degree of medical uncertainty.”[119] Due to the ubiquity of patient-initiated medical malpractice lawsuits, many physicians resort to “defensive medicine,” which is the practice of over-testing and overtreating in order to avoid the threat of liability of this kind.[120] One problem with this, however, is that it can obviously lead to another danger: billing for medically unnecessary tests, which is another type of FCA violation.

The two schools of thought doctrine was articulated in Jones v. Chidester.[121] The main proposition of the doctrine is that if there are two bona fide schools of thought among physicians, then a physician cannot be held liable in negligence for choosing one school of thought over another.[122] The rationale for this theory is if there are two legitimate schools of thought, then a jury of lay persons should not have to decide the better alternative.[123] The jury simply determines whether it believes there are two legitimate schools of thought sufficient to insulate the defendant from liability.[124] Although this is in the medical negligence field, its rationale is applicable to the objective falsity issue for the FCA as well: lay persons are not qualified to determine liability when there are differing opinions between trained medical experts.[125] However, because this is a claim based on a federal statute as opposed to state tort law, the issue should be decided in the preliminary stages by the judge instead as a matter of law, as the Eleventh Circuit explained in AseraCare.

VII. Uniformity Considerations 

Third and finally, the Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s objective standard to promote simplicity and uniformity among the lower courts. The extent to which reasonable minds differ regarding medical opinions can be easily determined with medical experts. If the defendant can find a reputable medical provider who would have followed the defendant’s course of action as well, then this standard allows a judge to resolve the issue before presenting it to a jury—a jury which, as mentioned above, is not qualified to determine which of two medical professionals is “correct.” In contrast, in the egregious situations (such as those discussed above in Polukoff) when it is not possible to find reputable expert medical testimony or other evidence that the defendant’s course of action was reasonable, this would become a triable issue that is better suited for a jury of laypersons. This is much simpler than trying to hash out which of two “reasonable minds” were more reasonable at trial. Furthermore, by decisively laying down this standard, the Supreme Court would provide clarity and uniformity among the lower courts. This would be beneficial for potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and even the courts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s explicit objective falsity standard. This will finally resolve the confusion among lower courts in applying an important federal Act. Furthermore, it is the superior theory for several reasons: (1) the courts actually seem to agree on whether a medical opinion can be deemed untrue, (2) the courts mainly disagree on the purpose of the documentation requirements and its effect on a falsity determination, (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is superior because the Supreme Court has explicitly held the FCA is not there to punish garden-variety regulatory infractions,[126] and (4) the presence of uncertainty in medical sciences.[127]


I J.D., University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law, Class of 2023; Master of Health Administration (MHA), University of Kentucky College of Public Health, Class of 2023.

[2] Foley Hoag LLP, ‘Objective Falsity’ and the FCA: An Ongoing Circuit Split, JD Supra (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/objective-falsity-and-the-fca-an-2164689/ [https://perma.cc/7CTM-DDKW].

[3] Id.; United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. AseraCare Inc.,176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1286 (N.D. Ala. 2016).

[4] Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 194 (2016).

[5] Mark A. Hall, David Orentlicher, Mary Anne Bobinski, Nicholas Bagley, & I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Liability and Treatment Relationships 363–64 (4th ed. 2018).

[6] False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.

[7] Fraud & Abuse Laws, Off. of Inspector Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. (last visited Feb. 15, 2022), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/fraud-abuse-laws/ [https://perma.cc/BC5D-3A5N].

[8] Id.

[9] Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 287.

[10] 18 U.S.C. § 287.

[11] False Claims Act Prevention, Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr. (last visited Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/compliance-office/education-tools/false-claims-act-prevention.aspx [https://perma.cc/A3UV-MRB3].

[12] See Robert L. Vogel, The False Claims Act and its Impact on Medical Practices, Vogel, Slade & Goldstein, LLP (last visited Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.vsg-law.com/blog/the-false-claims-act-and-its-impact-on-medical-practices/ [https://perma.cc/539Q-LDVW].

[13] See THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT & WHY IT MATTERS TO HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, Lewis Brisbois (Oct. 23, 2019), https://lewisbrisbois.com/newsroom/legal-alerts/the-false-claims-act-why-it-matters-to-healthcare-providers [https://perma.cc/JL24-AXUF].

[14] Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Care Alts. v. United States, et al. ex rel. Druding, et al., No. 20-371 (Sep. 16, 2020); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, RollinsNelson LTC Corp., et al., Petitioners v. United States, ex rel. Jane Winters, No. 20-805 (Dec. 3, 2020).

[18] See Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[19] See Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[20] Id.; see United States v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 89–90 (3d Cir. 2020).

[21] Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2; see Care Alt., 952 F.3d at 92.

[22] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 92.

[23] See id. at 95.

[24] Id. at 91, 95.

[25] Id. at 94.

[26] Id.

[27] See id.

[28] Id. at 91–92.

[29] Id. at 92; 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A).

[30] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 93; 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2) (2011).

[31] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 94.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 95.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. (citing United Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999–2000 (2016)).

[40] Id.

[41] See id. at 97.

[42] Id. at 100.

[43] Id. at 95 (citing Herskowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., (857 F.2d 179, 184) (3d Cir. 1988)).

[44] Id. at 100–101.

[45] Id. at 101.

[46] Id. at 96.

[47] Id.

[48] Id. (citing Druding v. Care Alternatives, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 669, 688 (D.N.J., Sept. 26, 2018)).

[49] Id. at 96.

[50] Id. at 100.

[51] See id. at 97.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] Id. (citing United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 742–43 (10th Cir. 2018)).

[55] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 97–98.

[56] Polukoff, 895 F.3d at 735.

[57] Id. at 743.

[58] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 100.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id. at 101.

[62] 938 F.3d 1278,1278 (11th Cir. 2019); see Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[63] AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1278.

[64] Id. at 1281.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Id.

[69] Id. at 1293.

[70] See id.

[71] Id.

[72] Id. at 1294.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id.

[76] Id. at 1295.

[77] Id.

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80] Id.

[81] Id. at 1296.

[82] Id. at 1297.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. 

[86] Id.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2018).

[90] See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1299–1300.

[91] Id. at 1299.

[92] Id. at 1300.

[93] Id.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id. at 1301.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id. at 1305.

[102] Id. at 1303.

[103] Id. at 1305.

[104] Id. at 1304.

[105] See Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[106] Id.; Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 181 (2016).

[107] Universal Health Servs., 579 U.S. at 192–93 (emphasis added).

[108] Id. at 194.

[109] Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 2.

[110] Id.

[111] United States v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 100 (3d Cir. 2020).

[112] Id. at 95; See United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1300 n.13, 1301 n.15 (11th Cir. 2019).

[113] See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1296.

[114] Care Alts., 952 F.3d at 99.

[115] Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 9th Circuit Makes Mandatory Escobar’s Implied False Certification Test, but Fails to Faithfully Follow Escobar’s Directives, Akin Gump (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/9th-circuit-makes-mandatory-escobar-s-implied-false.html [https://perma.cc/P89F-28M3].

[116] AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301.

[117] See Hall, supra note 5, at 363–64.

[118] Id. at 338–40.

[119] Id. at 363–64.

[120] Id. at 364.

[121] 610 A.2d 964, 965 (Pa. 1992); Hall, supra note 5, at 338.

[122] Hall, supra note 5 at 338.

[123] See id. at at 339–40.

[124] Id. at 340.

[125] See id.

[126] Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 194 (2016)

[127] See Hall, supra note 5 at 363–64.

No Such Thing as a Child Prostitute State Lawmakers Need to Enact Safe Harbor Laws to Protect Victims of Child Sex Trafficking

NO SUCH THING AS A CHILD PROSTITUTE

State Lawmakers Need to Enact Safe Harbor Laws to Protect Victims of Child Sex Trafficking

Blair Johnson Stevens I 

Abstract

      The fastest-growing and second-largest criminal enterprise in the world is the buying and selling of people — especially children.[2] Child sex trafficking has been reported in every state in America.[3] The average age of entry into the sex trade is 12–14 years old for females, and it is believed to be even younger for boys and transgender children.[4] Although it is not allowed, in any state, for a child under the age of consent to consent to any type of sexual activity, the majority of states still criminalize sex-trafficked children as prostitutes.[5] Some states have developed Safe Harbor Laws to address the inconsistencies with how children who are exploited for commercial sex are treated in the United States.[6] “A complete Safe Harbor Law (1) prevents minors…from being prosecuted for prostitution and (2) directs juvenile sex trafficking victims to non-punitive specialized services.”[7] These services can range from providing food and shelter to offering mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance with educational opportunities and finding employment.[8]

      States’ child sex trafficking statutes should aim to treat trafficked youth as survivors of trauma rather than perpetrators of the crimes they were made to commit. State lawmakers need to enact Safe Harbor Laws that provide minors with criminal protection from being prosecuted for prostitution, prostitution-related offenses, and status offenses committed as a result of being trafficked. In addition, state lawmakers must address the rate at which minority children are trafficked and arrested. Due to disparate economic situations coupled with the rate at which minority children are disproportionately arrested, Black and Latino children are far more likely to fall victim to being trafficked for commercial sex and subsequently arrested for child prostitution than white children.[9] In short, attitudes and stereotypes about minority children make it so that they are more vulnerable to sex trafficking but less likely to be identified or seen as victims.

Introduction: What Are Safe Harbor Laws?  

       A Safe Harbor Law is a condition of a statute or regulation that indicates that a specific circumstance of behavior will be deemed not to violate a given rule.[10] In other words, a Safe Harbor Law is a provision that grants “protection from liability or penalty if certain conditions are met” and may be included in legislation to “give peace of mind to good-faith actors who might otherwise violate the law on technicalities beyond their reasonable control.”[11] This note will focus specifically on Safe Harbor Laws as they apply to victims of child sex trafficking.

       Every day in the United States, minor children (any child under the age of eighteen) are forced, induced, or coerced into providing commercial sex.[12] “Human trafficking has surpassed the illegal sale of firearms,” and it is expected to surpass the illegal sale of drugs in the coming years.[13] Nevertheless, a staggering amount of child sex trafficking, and human trafficking in general, goes undetected due to the fact that tracing this illegal practice is very challenging.[14] It is estimated that less than half of a percent of cases of human trafficking get identified or reported.[15] In 2018, over half of the active sex trafficking cases in the United States involved only children.[16] In fact, children are four times more likely to be trafficked for sex than adults.[17]

       A trafficked child may be compelled to engage in prostitution and often many other illegal activities.[18] In most states, instead of being treated as a victim, this child is treated as a criminal and faces prosecution.[19] Being arrested and prosecuted undoubtedly further traumatizes child sex trafficking victims. This type of treatment may also cause them to form a deep distrust of law enforcement and the justice system. Additionally, the criminal record that a child victim of sex trafficking incurs serves as a barrier to future educational opportunities, employment, and other prospects. Thus, due to the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the United States, coupled with the harsh punishments minor victims currently face, it is necessary for all states to enact Safe Harbor Laws that protect and assist children who have been exploited for sex. It is also extremely necessary to take into consideration the disproportionate amount of minority children and groups who are trafficked and subsequently prosecuted.

The Federal Law 

       Over the past few decades, the United States has nationally recognized and addressed the need for protecting victims of sex trafficking. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), first enacted in 2000, is the national framework for the federal response to human trafficking, and the law has been reauthorized and updated five times — most recently in January 2019 with bipartisan support.[20] It is now referred to as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).[21] In the 2019 fiscal year, Congress purportedly appropriated $250 million toward these efforts.[22] The TVPRA is based on a three-pronged approach to fighting trafficking— prevention, prosecution, protection.[23] In addition to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, there is the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015.[24] This bill increases compensation and restitution under the federal criminal code for victims of human trafficking and classifies producers of child pornography as engaged in illicit sexual conduct involving human trafficking.[25] Most importantly, for the purposes of this analysis, the bill awards funding to states that combat trafficking and provides protection and assistance for victims of trafficking.[26] Yet, the bill does not offer any sort of general framework or guideline for how this initiative is supposed to be carried out by the states.

       According to the United States Code, when a minor is involved in sex trafficking, Section 1591 of Title 18 does not require proof that the defendant used force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, or any combination of those means, to cause the minor to engage in a commercial sex act.[27] This means that as long as the trafficker is an adult and the victim being trafficked is under the age of eighteen, the intent or ‘willingness’ of the minor does not matter. Thus, according to federal law, minor victims who are involved in sex trafficking cannot be held responsible for their so-called actions, nor should they be prosecuted as criminals. Unfortunately, this does not mean that minor victims cannot be arrested and prosecuted for prostitution at the state level.[28] For example, in 2019, Texas Governor Greg Abbott vetoed a bill “prohibiting minors from being arrested or going to jail for prostitution.”[29] In 2019, the state with the most minors arrested for prostitution-related offenses was Nevada with approximately 110 minors arrested.[30]

The Most Common Judicial Protections Applied to Minor Victims  

       Some state lawmakers “have legislated several criminal protections and civil remedies” in the judicial system for victims of child sex trafficking.[31] “Measures have provided immunity to, diversion from, and affirmative defenses against, criminal prosecution for actions victims were forced to commit by their traffickers.”[32] Some lawmakers have also created mechanisms to vacate or expunge “previous criminal convictions and provide for civil standing and restitution procedures that enable survivors to recover financially from their traffickers.”[33] While civil relief should be granted to survivors, this analysis is a review of the criminal protections granted to minors.

A. Vacation & Expungement  

       Offering the least amount of protection, some states offer child victims of sex trafficking the opportunity to vacate or expunge their criminal record as it relates to them being trafficked. Many trafficked survivors have criminal records as a result of the actions they were forced to commit by their traffickers. At least twenty-nine states have created procedures for trafficking survivors to vacate or expunge criminal records, however, many of these state laws have strict provisions and processes and are limited to specific crimes.[34] Still, some states have less harsh stipulations. For example, the Florida law governing expungements applies to all arrests, charges, and convictions if they occurred when a minor was a victim of trafficking.[35] The Florida law “does not limit the number of arrests or convictions.”[36] Another state, New Mexico, “enables a trafficked survivors’ record to be sealed for non-homicide crimes if their involvement was due to duress, coercion, use of force or fraud.”[37] As mentioned previously, clearing a survivor’s criminal record removes significant barriers to obtaining housing, gaining employment, pursuing education, and restoring certain civic rights.

B.  Affirmative Defense  

       Next, there are affirmative defenses. Most states enable child victims of sex trafficking “to assert an affirmative defense to criminal charges they face as a result of actions they were forced to commit by their traffickers.”[38] An affirmative defense is evidence that, if found credible, negates criminal liability even if it is proved the defendant (more correctly in the cases at hand, the minor victim) committed the acts at issue.[39] Statutes differ in the crimes for which an affirmative defense can be raised, but many only cover prostitution, loitering, and solicitation. Wisconsin allows a victim of sex trafficking to assert an affirmative defense for “any crime he or she committed as a direct result of the trafficking without regard to whether anyone was prosecuted or convicted for trafficking.”[40]

C. Diversion 

       Diversion is a form of pretrial sentencing in which a criminal offender joins a rehabilitation program to help remedy the behavior leading to the arrest, allow the offender to avoid conviction and, in some jurisdictions, avoid a criminal record.[41] Diversion programs often frame these requirements as an alternative to further prosecution.[42] Successful completion of the requirements laid out by the diversion program may result in a dismissal or reduction of charges. Unsuccessful completion of the program may bring back the charges or heighten the penalties involved. Diversion programs have specifically played a key role in rehabilitating youthful offenders.[43] “The concept of [juvenile] diversion is based on the theory that processing certain youth through the juvenile justice system may do more harm than good.”[44] Nevertheless, for child victims of sex trafficking diversion can sometimes mean re-traumatization and further suffering as will be discussed below. As of today, twenty-five states offer some form of a diversion program to child sex trafficking victims.[45]

D. Immunity  

       “Immunity from prosecution,” or full legal immunity, is a status in which an individual cannot be held liable for violating legal obligations of the law.[46] Full immunity from prosecution is not common, and its main purpose is to facilitate societal aims that outweigh the value of imposing liability. Only three states in the country — Montana, New Hampshire, and South Carolina — grant full immunity to child victims of sex trafficking.[47]

The Diversion Debate & Human Trafficking Court  

       As public awareness of human trafficking has increased over the past few decades, human trafficking diversion courts have emerged in the United States.[48] While the title, “human trafficking court”, may sound like a court that’s purpose is to prosecute traffickers, the defendants in these particular courts are not child sex traffickers.[49] The defendants in these courts are the minor victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation whom the government has charged with prostitution and other offenses related to their exploitation.[50] While human trafficking diversion courts may help some survivors heal, other survivors are re-traumatized as a result of the requirement of participation.[51]

       On one hand, there are some glaringly obvious benefits to youth diversion programs. Sex traffickers often target runaway and homeless youth, as well as children who have been abused or neglected. When minors are forced to engage in commercial sex, it places them at risk for prosecution under prostitution laws. By enrolling in a diversion program, children have the opportunity to be provided with their basic needs like food and shelter, and some diversion programs offer mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance with educational opportunities and finding employment.[52]

       On the other hand, there are some pretty harmful consequences of requiring a survivor to enroll in a diversion program. Some programs seem to criminalize the wrong actor, the victim, rather than the trafficker, possibly by requiring an admission of guilt or the entering of a conditional plea.[53] This criminalizes the wrong actor, the survivor, rather than the trafficker. Diversion programs also require the victim to continuously show up in court and appear in front of a judge.[54] Courtrooms can be frightening to some people, especially children.[55] Almost all diversion programs employ rehabilitation courses that the minor victim must complete in order to have their charges removed or reduced. These courses are designed to teach the victim how to change their behavior so that they are not brought into the justice system again. Once again, this philosophy is criminalizing the wrong actor and could easily be equated to victim blaming. Although the recidivism rate for women with prostitution-related offenses nationwide is eighty percent, survivors often do not need to be re-educated in order to leave the sex trade.[56] In reality, most survivors report needing a stable environment, housing, and steady employment.[57]

       In addition, most diversion programs require survivors to participate in random drug screening.[58] While survivors’ issues with substance abuse should definitely be assessed and treated, it is very harmful to require that survivors automatically be drug-free or that they pass random drug screenings to remain enrolled in their respective programs. The reality is that for numerous victims of child sex trafficking, addiction to illegal substances or alcohol was their trafficker’s main source of control over them.[59] In many states’ diversion programs, child victims of sex trafficking are expected to successfully complete the program.[60] If a child victim of sex trafficking does not successfully complete their court-mandated program, possibly due to a failed drug test, they can be removed from the diversion program and prosecuted for their alleged crimes.[61]

Opposition to Safe Harbor Laws

       It is no surprise that society stigmatizes child victims of sex trafficking. Members of society do not always see or consider all of the trauma, hardship, and abuse child victims have endured. Consider the following instance showcasing how a minor girl was treated by law enforcement:

A 13-year-old runaway was gang raped by 10 men for several hours in a Texas apartment last year. When she was rescued, authorities took her to a hospital where she was given a rape kit, which was used along with her account to quickly find two of her assailants, who were charged with felony sexual assault of a child.[62]

Andrea Powell continues:

Now consider the story of another 13-year-old girl, who was sold by a pimp to dozens of men throughout Washington, D.C. She experienced the same pain, fear, trauma, and abuse as the first child. But when an undercover officer, posing as a John, encountered her in a hotel room, she was arrested for prostitution and sent to juvenile jail. The men who bought her (or, more correctly, raped her) walked away free.[63]

Our society labeling one of these girls as a criminal and the other a victim is shameful. No 13-year-old child should face prosecution for prostitution. Ultimately, both children in the above examples were sent to treatment centers.[64] In contrast, though, the second child “had the added trauma of going through the penal system and carrying an arrest record.”[65] Andrea Powell explained:

This difference is based in a deeply rooted misunderstanding that the second girl made “a choice” because she was paid. Since she has a pimp, she is no longer considered a victim of statutory rape and sexual abuse. This misguided notion leads police to arrest more than 1,000 victimized children a year for prostitution – a crime they aren’t even capable of committing.[66]       

     In 2021, the University of Kentucky conducted a study about the state’s current Safe Harbor Laws which revealed that while Kentucky’s Safe Harbor Laws have helped decriminalize sex-trafficked youth in the state, there is still a lack of training and resources for child welfare personnel and judges who work with these youth.[67] The child welfare personnel noted in their interviews that all victims received services including “mental health and trauma counseling, medical evaluations, anti-trafficking victim services, residential placement, placement with alternative caregivers, drug treatment, language services, legal services, and basic needs.”[68] In addition, “40 of the 55 juvenile and family judges from the state replied that they observed “positive changes in practices consistent with the intent of the laws, including: decriminalization of youth; increased penalties for traffickers and buyers; … increased collaboration between service providers; increased training of judges and court personnel; and improved processes for screening and identifying youth victims.”[69]

      Unfortunately, not all responses were in support of Kentucky’s Safe Harbor laws. The findings showed that “[m]ore male judges agreed with statements that criminalized minors involved in commercial sex while more female judges agreed with less punitive interventions for these minors and harsher penalties for buyers and traffickers.”[70] Opposition to Safe Harbor Laws is a prevalent issue among numerous states across America.[71] Not only are child victims of sex trafficking faced with a special type of vulnerability when it comes to being trafficked, but they are also viewed as criminals by the system that is supposed to be in place to help them seek justice. The opposition, subliminally identified in the University of Kentucky study’s findings, is often rooted in racist, sexist, and classist ideologies which will be further examined below.

Race, Class, Gender, and Sexual Orientation  

       When it comes to the demographics of a child who is sex trafficked, those living in poverty are far more likely to succumb to this fate as they may not have any economic option aside from their trafficking situation, or they may be psychologically vulnerable to false promises which could lure them into trafficking.[72] These instances become even greater when it comes to those children who are African American and Latino.

       While the data from child sex trafficking is not exceptionally definitive, we still know it is a prevalent issue affecting American children. We also know it is very prevalent among minority children. For example, “we know that in Louisiana, Black girls account for nearly 49 percent of child sex trafficking victims, though Black girls comprise approximately 19 percent of Louisiana’s youth population ….”[73] Similarly, in King County, Washington, “84 percent of child sex trafficking victims are Black while Black children and adults together only comprise 7% of the general population”.[74]

       Likewise, there is strong evidence from the United States National Human Trafficking Hotline that Latinos are disproportionately represented among child sex trafficking victims, and survivors, in general.[75] The most likely explanation is a broken immigration system that makes immigrants vulnerable to trafficking, whether it be due to their status as undocumented or the feeling that they are indebted to their trafficker if they are here on a temporary work visa, and the reality is that today more than ever before, immigrants that come to the United States are likely to come from Latin America.[76]

       The underlying scheme in both of these situations is racism and power. These factors manifest as discrimination, particularly, but not solely, economic discrimination. Racism has historically and presently fueled policies that stunt the economic opportunity and upward mobility of minority people in the United States for generations.[77] This coupled with the fact that there have always been children who are, for a variety of disturbing reasons, far more likely to be targeted by trafficking operations than others, make minority children an easy target for commercial sex trafficking. For example, homeownership is a primary driver of family wealth in the United States.[78] Racist “redlining” has “kept minority families out of majority-white neighborhoods that might have grown in value by keeping them from getting mortgages.”[79] The resulting poverty and the general unequal protection of minorities under the law have been key risk factors in determining what demographic of children in America are most trafficked.

       Child sex traffickers take full advantage of economic disparity and minority discrimination to entice and bait children into trafficking rings and, ultimately, trap them there, often promising glamorous, or even just comfortable, lives.[80] They will convince children whose families have been cut off from economic opportunity that commercially selling sex is the way to a better future for themselves; traffickers are able to manipulate children into thinking commercially selling sex is the only way to a better future.[81]

       While the economic consequence of racism is the most explicit link between why children of color and minority children are more likely to be trafficked and arrested for prostitution than their white counterparts, it is definitely not the sole reason. The way minorities are treated by American law enforcement also needs to be taken into consideration. In 2018, an examination of arrest data reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by thousands of police departments revealed that “in 800 jurisdictions, black people were arrested at a rate five times higher than white people…”[82] “In 250 jurisdictions, black people were 10 times more likely to be arrested than their white counterparts.”[83] The examination, conducted by ABC News in collaboration with other ABC-owned stations, covered a three-year period that ended in 2018.[84]

      Thus, due to their disparate economic situations coupled with the rate at which they are disproportionately arrested, Black and Latino children are far more likely to fall victim to being trafficked for commercial sex and subsequently arrested for child prostitution than white children. In short, attitudes and stereotypes about minority children make it so that they are more vulnerable to sex trafficking but less likely to be identified or seen as victims.[85]

      This experience of being less likely to be seen as a victim also exists among young boys who are victims of child sex trafficking. In Massachusetts, there is one program that focuses solely on helping male youth and trans females who are sexually exploited.[86] The program’s revenue last year was less than half of the revenue of its sister program for female youth.[87] Both programs were run by the same nonprofit, Roxbury Youthworks, Inc.[88] Prosecuting those who exploit and traffic boys presents another, more difficult challenge. The Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General has only had one case that includes a male victim out of the 62 sex trafficking cases that have been filed since 2012.[89]

    While we know that trafficking affects all demographics, we also know that traffickers frequently target specific individuals. This includes those lacking support from their community, those experiencing financial hardships, those who have experienced violence, and those marginalized by society. “Without adequate community support, youth who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or questioning (LGBTQ) may be at particular risk for sex trafficking.”[90] Individuals who have been trafficked often find it hard to reach out for assistance, especially individuals who fear that “they will be mistreated or not believed because of their gender identity or sexual orientation.”[91] Additionally, “[s]tudies have found that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in detention for prostitution-related offenses and report higher levels of police misconduct than their straight peers.”[92] In Massachusetts alone, since 2018, more than 411 boys, who were concerned to have been victims of commercial sexual exploitation, have been referred to the Department of Children and Families of Massachusetts — this accounts for about 15 percent of the total number of referrals the Department has received.[93] In addition to the 411 boys identified, 109 more youth were identified as trans or non-binary.[94] Jennifer McKim and Phillip Martin indicate that “The state just started collecting this data in 2016, and it is widely considered to be an undercount.”[95] While definitive data is lacking, recent studies show boys are being exploited at much higher rates than what was originally understood.[96]

Argument for Full Legal Immunity from Prostitution, Prostitution-Related Offenses, and Status Offenses  

       One of the key considerations that states assess when it comes to legislating Safe Harbor Laws is whether that state will create full legal immunity from prosecution or create a diversion program. While there is disagreement among experts and variation in the studies reported, Polaris believes that the combination of legal immunity and unrestricted services provides the most legal protection and goes the furthest to ensure that a victim of child sex trafficking receives the benefits and care they require.[97]

       In 2011, the Uniform Law Commission and the American Bar Association urged the American Bar Association delegates to draft a resolution advising states not to charge child sex trafficking victims with prostitution or prostitution-related offenses, and to instead provide them with rehabilitative services.[98] This means unrestrictive services — not those acquired only through successful completion of a diversion program. The preference for the immunity model for child victims of sex trafficking is clearly and unequivocally reflected. Language from the Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act is as follows:

Section 15. Immunity of a Minor

(a) An individual who was a minor at the time of the offense is not criminally liable or subject to [juvenile delinquency proceeding] for [prostitution] and [insert other non-violent offenses] committed as a direct result of being a victim of human trafficking.[99]

       Based on the examination of the evidence gathered, and the discernment of how re-traumatization due to diversion proceedings and requirements can affect a child victim of sex trafficking, state lawmakers should enact Safe Harbor Laws that will provide minors with full legal immunity from being prosecuted for prostitution; prostitution-related offenses such as loitering and solicitation; and status offenses related to conduct arising from being trafficked. In juvenile cases, a "status offense" involves conduct that would not be a crime if it were committed by an adult.[100] Some examples include truancy, violating a city or county curfew, underage possession or consumption of alcohol, and running away or being beyond the control of parents or guardians.[101] These types of offenses are far less likely to present a danger to society than ordinary public offenses.[102] Therefore, child victims of sex trafficking should not be penalized for status offenses committed while under the undue influence and control of their trafficker.

       When child trafficking victims are convicted of prostitution, they are often transferred from the control of a trafficker to the control of the criminal justice system. The right Safe Harbor Laws protect child victims of sex trafficking from unjust criminalization.

Protection From Other Crimes

       Another position some advocates push for is protecting child sex trafficking victims from other types of prosecution for the crimes they commit while under the control of their trafficker. These crimes could range from petty theft, robbery, and grand theft auto — all the way up to crimes such as serious physical assault and homicide. A recent case in which a child victim of sex trafficking was ultimately granted protection from being further punished for the crimes she committed while being trafficked is the case of Cyntoia Brown.[103] Cyntoia Brown, who was a young girl at the time of the alleged murder, spent roughly 15 years in prison for killing and robbing a man in what most have determined to be self-defense.[104] In 2019, she was finally granted clemency by Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam.[105] This was an unusual occurrence in America as black Americans are nearly four times less likely than white criminals to be granted a pardon — even when the type of crime and the severity of the sentence are taken into account.[106] Protection from other crimes has not been heavily researched or reviewed. Further, protection from crimes outside of prostitution-related offenses and status offenses, especially violent crimes, is considered by some to be extreme or dangerous. Still, minor victims of sex trafficking should never be punished for acting in self-defense.

Conclusion

       While some state lawmakers have successfully passed legislation that serves to provide child sex trafficking victims with judicial protections from prosecution for prostitution and various other related offenses, there is still a long way to go. As noted, only some states in America currently grant full legal immunity to child victims of sex trafficking from prosecution for prostitution.[107] There should be no such thing as a child prostitute in America. State lawmakers must enact Safe Harbor Laws that provide child victims of sex trafficking not only with protections from prosecution but also unrestricted services that serve to assist them in rising out of the circumstances that made them susceptible to being sex trafficked in the first place. The providing of these services should not be made contingent upon successful participation in a diversionary program. Rather, rehabilitative services should be offered freely and non-contingently to all sexually exploited youth who wish to receive them. These services should range from providing food and shelter to offering mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance with educational opportunities and finding employment. It is also extremely necessary for state lawmakers to take into consideration the disproportionate amount of minority children and groups who are trafficked and subsequently prosecuted. Ultimately, the combination of legal immunity and unrestricted victim services provides the most legal protection and goes the furthest to ensure that a victim of child sex trafficking receives the benefits and care they require. When child sex trafficking victims are convicted of prostitution, they are often transferred from the control of a trafficker to the control of the criminal justice system. The right Safe Harbor Laws protect child victims of sex trafficking from unjust criminalization.

I J.D., University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law, Class of 2023

[2] See The Statistics, Tabitha’s House, https://tabithashouseint.org/resources/statistics/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V4QJ-FQ7X].

[3] Sex Trafficking Statistics, Guardian Grp., https://guardiangroup.org/sex-trafficking-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D4RY-F98H].

[4] Heather J. Clawson et al., Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature 1, 8–9, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Hum. Servs. (Aug. 29, 2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//43241/index.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5YF-XCP8].

[5] See Safe Harbor: Does Your State Arrest Minors for Prostitution?, Hum. Trafficking Search (Oct. 18, 2018), https://humantraffickingsearch.org/safe-harbor-does-your-state-arrest-minors-for-prostitution/ [https://perma.cc/R3FJ-EZ6F].

[6] See Human Trafficking State Laws, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-trafficking-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7HZB-GEFK].

[7] Fact Sheet: Safe Harbor Laws, Nat’l Council of Jewish Women (Sept. 2016), https://www.ncjw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Fact-Sheet_Safe-Harbor_Updated-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFC2-PE4K].

[8] See Continuum of Services for Pre-arrest Diversion Programs, Cmty. Catalyst, https://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/Continuum-of-Services-FINAL-2.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8VGP-M3RK].

[9] See Bradley Hardy & Trevon Logan, Race and the lack of intergenerational economic mobility in the United States, Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth (Feb. 18, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/race-and-the-lack-of-intergenerational-economic-mobility-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/PUZ5-TAPT]; The Latino Face of Human Trafficking and Exploitation in the United States, Polaris (Apr. 27, 2020), https://polarisproject.org/press-releases/the-latino-face-of-human-trafficking-and-exploitation-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T2S5-M5E5]; Pierre Thomas, John Kelly & Tonya Simpson, ABC News analysis of police arrests nationwide reveals stark racial disparity, ABC News Internet Ventures (June 11, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/abc-news-analysis-police-arrests-nationwidereveals-stark/story?id=71188546 [https://perma.cc/A937-BXVH].

[10] Legal Information Institute, Safe harbor, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/safe_harbor (last visited Nov. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6KY7-8BR5].

[11] Id.

[12] See Child Trafficking Statistics, Child Liberation Found., https://liberatechildren.org/child-trafficking-statistics (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9VVX-AB4P].

[13] Id.

[14] See Priscilla Alvarez, When Sex Trafficking Goes Unnoticed in America, The Atlantic (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/how-sex-trafficking-goes-unnoticed-in-america/470166/ [https://perma.cc/6JY4-HN87].

[15] Child Trafficking Statistics, supra note 12.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] See Human Trafficking of Children in the United States-A Fact Sheet for Schools, Off. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., https://oese.ed.gov/human-trafficking-of-children-in-the-united-states-a-fact-sheet-for-schools/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2022) [https://perma.cc/FG5V-CPSH].

[19] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[20] Kristen Wells, The 2019 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act: A Topical Summary and Analysis of Four Bills, Polaris (2019), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Polaris-TVPRA-2019-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYC5-MHR7].

[21] Id.

[22] See id.

[23] See id.

[24] Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, H.R. Res, 181, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] See Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coercion, 18 U.S.C § 1591 (2020).

[28] See Chelsea Parsons et al., 3 Key Challenges in Combating the Sex Trafficking of Minors in the United States, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/3-key-challenges-in-combating-the-sex-trafficking-of-minors-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/CFD4-L3PU].

[29] Child Victims of Sex Trafficking Can Be Arrested for Prostitution, Neal Davis L. Firm (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.nealdavislaw.com/blog/sex-crimes/child-prostitution-victim-arrests [https://perma.cc/G6TL-3LTL].

[30] Jessica Contrera, Sex-trafficked kids are crime victims. In Las Vegas, they still go to jail., Wash. Post (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/interactive/2021/vegas-child-sex-trafficking-victims-jailed/ [https://perma.cc/8HPV-T4NZ].

[31] Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] See Legal Information Institute, Affirmative Defense, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/48SX-TYMU].

[40] Human Trafficking Statute § 940.302, https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/ocvs/vawa/wcasa-human-trafficking-resource-card-statutes-web.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8XHB-MDBX].

[41] See Legal Information Institute, Diversion, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/diversion (last visited Dec. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/YF6D-C5Y9].

[42] See id.

[43] See What Is Diversion in Juvenile Justice?, Annie E. Casey Found. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.aecf.org/blog/what-is-juvenile-diversion [https://perma.cc/H3T4-7A5U].

[44] Detention Diversion Advocacy, Diversion Programs: An Overview, The Ctr. on Juvenile and Crim. Just. (Sept. 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html [https://perma.cc/MH3J-KX6P].

[45] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[46] See Legal Information Institute, Immunity, Cornell L. Sch., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/immunity (last visited Dec. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D2ZD-65DL].

[47] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

[48] See Human Trafficking Courts, Off. of Just. Programs, https://www.ovcttac.gov/taskforceguide/eguide/6-the-role-of-courts/64-innovative-court-responses/human-trafficking-courts/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5BVV-5ZEK].

[49] See id.

[50] See id.

[51] Elise White et al., Navigating Force and Choice: Experiences in the New York City Sex Trade and the Criminal

Justice System’s Response, Ctr. for Ct. Innovation (Dec. 2017), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2018-03/nyc_sex_trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVE3-8BPY].

[52] Continuum of Services for Pre-arrest Diversion Programs, Cmty. Catalyst, https://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/Continuum-of-Services-FINAL-2.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RK5R-WTBV].

[53] See Emmylou Manwill, Human Trafficking Courts: Diversion To Or From Justice?, Hum. Trafficking Inst., (Apr. 1, 2020) https://traffickinginstitute.org/human-trafficking-courts-diversion-to-or-from-justice/ [https://perma.cc/XZH4-ENUC].

[54] See Gail S. Goodman, Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 Soc’y for Rsch. in Child Dev., no. 5, 1992, at 40–43.

[55] See id. at v.

[56] Paige Pfleger, A Pioneering Ohio Courtroom Helps Trafficking Victims Find Hope, Nat’l Pub. radio (Oct. 7, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/07/767850332/a-pioneering-columbus-courtroom-helps-trafficking-victimsfind-hope [https://perma.cc/P37G-PBPV].

[57] Brendan M. Conner, In Loco Aequitatis: The Dangers of ‘Safe Harbor’ Laws for Youth in the Sex Trades, Wm. & Mary L. Sch. Scholarship Repository 43, 58–61 (2016).

[58] Diversion Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/diversion-programs (last updated Mar. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/BD8P-WAE2].

[59] See Marc O’Neill & Jeremie Barclay, Combating Drug-Facilitated Sex Trafficking of Runaway Youth, Police Chief Mag. (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/combating-drug-facilitated-sex-trafficking-of-runaway-youth/ [https://perma.cc/A7VW-4JTD].

[60] See Manwill, supra note 53.

[61] See id.

[62] Andrea Powell, Children who are prostituted aren’t criminals. So why do we keep putting them in jail?, Wash. Post (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/05/child-prostitutes-arent-criminals-so-why-do-we-keep-putting-them-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/3TA2-4LPH].

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Study Revealed Safe Harbor Laws Increased Protections for Sex-Trafficked Youth, Identified Needs for Agency Support and Judicial Training, Nat’l Inst. of Just. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/study-revealed-safe-harbor-laws-increased-protections-sex-trafficked-youth [https://perma.cc/6JAP-SXSM].

[68] Id.

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] See Powell, supra note 62.

[72] Racial Disparities, COVID-19, and Human Trafficking, Polaris (July 29, 2020), https://polarisproject.org/blog/2020/07/racial-disparities-covid-19-and-human-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/KK5W-8RRG].

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] See The Latino Face of Human Trafficking and Exploitation in the United States, Polaris (Apr. 27, 2020), https://polarisproject.org/press-releases/the-latino-face-of-human-trafficking-and-exploitation-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/5VM9-DUL8].

[76] See id.

[77] See Hardy & Logan, supra note 9.

[78] Homeownership Remains Primary Driver of Household Wealth, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders (Feb. 18, 2021), https://nahbnow.com/2021/02/homeownership-remains-primary-driver-of-household-wealth/ [https://perma.cc/YQ6U-GPD8].

[79] Racial Disparities, COVID-19, and Human Trafficking, supra note 72.

[80] See Human Trafficking in Youth-serving Programs: A Blueprint for Organizations Working with Street Youth, Homeless Youth, and Youth at Risk 9­–11, Fam. & Youth Servs. Bureau, https://www.rhyttac.net/assets/docs/Resources/HumanTraffickingBlueprint-508.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E5S7-UQ65].

[81] See id.

[82] Pierre Thomas, John Kelly, & Tonya Simpson, ABC News analysis of police arrests nationwide reveals stark racial disparity, ABC News Internet Ventures (June 11, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/abc-news-analysis-police-arrests-nationwidereveals-stark/story?id=71188546 [https://perma.cc/NCS9-4SR2].

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] See Racial Disparities, COVID-19, and Human Trafficking, supra note 72.

[86] Jennifer B. McKim & Phillip Martin, Unseen, part 1: The boy victims of the sex trade, GBH (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.wgbh.org/news/national/2021-04-05/unseen-the-boy-victims-of-the-sex-trade-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/8UMN-KQ8N].

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] Id.

[90] Sex Trafficking and LGBTQ Youth, Polaris, https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/LGBTQ-Sex-Trafficking.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V2LY-E5B4].

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] McKim & Martin, supra note 86.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] See Human Trafficking Issue Brief: Safe Harbor Fall 2015, Polaris, https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2015-Safe-Harbor-Issue-Brief.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LB9Y-URLF].

[98] See id.

[99] Id.

[100] See What Are Status Offenses and Why Do They Matter?, The Annie E. Casey Found. (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.aecf.org/blog/what-are-status-offenses-and-why-do-they-matter [https://perma.cc/CEU7-GSC4].

[101] Id.

[102] See id.

[103] Bobby Allyn, Cyntoia Brown Released After 15 Years In Prison For Murder, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 7, 2019, 12:24 PM) https://www.npr.org/2019/08/07/749025458/cyntoia-brown-released-after-15-years-in-prison-for-murder [https://perma.cc/UW36-VV55].

[104] Id.

[105] Id.

[106] See Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons: Presidential Pardons Heavily Favor Whites, ProPublica (Dec. 3, 2011, 11:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/shades-of-mercy-presidential-forgiveness-heavily-favors-whites [https://perma.cc/C4SW-S8DA].

[107] See Human Trafficking State Laws, supra note 6.

The Reciprocity of Conservation and Hunting: Improving Kentucky’s North American Model of Wildlife Conservation 

The Reciprocity of Conservation and Hunting: Improving Kentucky’s North American Model of Wildlife Conservation 

Dustyn Sams I

Introduction

      Some people consider conservation and wildlife management (hunting, fishing, trapping, etc.) divergent practices.[2] Yet, the two of them embrace an intricate theme of reciprocity.[3] In America, dollars from hunter and angler license sales are a major, if not the most significant, source of conservation funding.[4] This inextricable link between conservation and management warrants the reasonable preservation of both practices, not one without the other. The Commonwealth of Kentucky is a great place to start.

        The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife successfully maintains its conservation and management model, but it does articulate a need for additional funding.[5] Further, Kentucky’s existing model emphasizes the preservation of game species but neglects the preservation of non-game species.[6] Hunters are also arguably declining,[7] and the Department’s conservation and management funding is volatile as hunter dollars are its cornerstone.[8] Therefore, Kentucky should adopt a “dual-payer” model of funding that combines its current model with additional funding sources of redistributed agency funds and reallocated taxes.

         In 2001, the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (AFWA) formally adopted the “North American Model of Wildlife Conservation.”[9] One of the AFWA’s key tenants is, “hunters and anglers pay for wildlife conservation and management.”[10] This is called a “user-pays” model.[11] All states employ some form of a user-pays model, including Kentucky.[12] The Commonwealth’s current model includes more than one “user,” a “dual-payer” model, comprised of money from license fees and money from federal and other sources. This model is precarious because it relies heavily on any user-pays model’s largest weakness: that there will always be as many hunters as there are now.

     This article proposes several feasible improvements to Kentucky’s model. One improvement calls for the Kentucky Legislature to amend the Department of Parks enabling statute with express authority to redistribute funds toward activities closer linked to conservation and management efforts. Another improvement calls them to reallocate a portion of the sales tax collected on outdoor equipment to the Department of Fish and Wildlife by statutory amendment. A stronger dual-payer model would ensure a healthy future for Kentucky’s ecosystems and pave the way for other states to adhere to a similar plan. Part II provides an overview of America’s history of wildlife impositions, conservation, and management. Part III uncovers the need for a more stable wildlife conservation and management model in Kentucky. Part IV proposes the details of two amendments to create a strengthened dual-payer model.

I.  America’s History of Wildlife Impositions, Conservation, and Management

       A review of America’s history of wildlife impositions, conservation, and management efforts illuminates its current flavor of wildlife conservation and management. One can divide America’s wildlife conservation and management history into three eras.[13] First, America’s wildlife roamed comparatively undisturbed before America’s birth. Second, human encroachment on wildlife was prevalent at America’s origin. Third, state and federal actors combated exploitation.

A.  Early, Primal Impositions

      Before the colonization of North America, wildlife roamed arguably freer than today.[14] A variety of life inhabited the continent, from wolves, bison, and other fauna to a guild of flora.[15] Scholars often employ one theory, Pleistocene Overkill, to explain the demise of these species.[16] It suggests that native people preyed on these animals to a noticeable detriment.[17]

      From the 1500s to the mid-1600s, North America’s wildlife species were much like those present today.[18] On one hand, scholars believe Native Americans embodied a culture that encouraged minimal wildlife impositions. On the other, though, recent scholarship reveals Native Americans impacted wildlife on a larger scale than previously thought. Regardless, their interference was nominal and primal when compared to the effects of today’s rural municipalities and cityscapes.

B.  Decimation of America’s Wildlife

      The Colonial Age and Westward Expansion fostered a new age of wildlife impositions. Europeans found America rich in wildlife.[19] Deer, elk, moose, and beavers inhabited eastern forests;[20] Bison, antelope, bears, elk, sheep, and moose inhabited the west.[21] Scholars believe colonialists’ arrival to North America initially spiked wildlife populations due to the transmission of diseases to Native Americans, the preeminent cause of wildlife decimation at the time.[22]

       Colonial settlers exploited America’s wildlife by commercializing hunting and fur trapping.[23] As early as 1650, beavers were nearly eliminated from the eastern coast.[24] In 1748, South Carolina records account for a shipment of about 160 thousand deer pelts to Great Britain.[25] Passenger pigeons initially numbered between three and five billion, but by the 1850s, settlers sometimes killed over fifty thousand birds daily.[26]

       Western Expansion created further opportunities for exploitative professions. Forty to seventy million bison and about ten million pronghorns then roamed the western plains.[27] In 1833, the American Fur Company exported over forty thousand bison hides overseas.[28] In 1865, commercial hunters killed about one million bison.[29] By 1871, the number increased five million per year.[30] Around 1900, a census recorded only 540 remaining bison.[31] The onslaught of passenger pigeons progressed too.[32] By then, no pigeons remained in the wild, and passenger pigeons became extinct fourteen years later.[33] The government and public sentiments began recognizing the exploitation of America’s wildlife.[34] This “laid the foundation for the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation.”[35]

C.  Increase in Government Efforts to Conserve and Manage Wildlife

     After taking notice of the country’s unsustainable practices, the federal government and state governments addressed America’s wildlife exploitation.[36] First, the states and Supreme Court addressed conservation and management at a large scale.[37] Later, Congress acted through several statutes.[38]

i.  Rise of State Conservation and Management Efforts and the Supreme Court

       The States and people were the first to address wildlife exploitation. In 1844, the New York Sportsmen’s Club was formed.[39] New York also drafted some of America’s first management laws. Subsequently, state legislatures passed similar laws. Many hunting, conservation, and scientific organizations formed.[40] Some lobbied for stricter exploitation laws and bans on wasteful hunting.[41] In response, states created wildlife commissions and agencies.[42] These entities implemented the practice of collecting money for hunting and angler licenses, thereby establishing user-pays models.[43]

       Kentucky was among the first states to recognize the need for proper conservation and management.[44] As early as 1738, deer-harvest laws applied to the territory that would become the Commonwealth.[45] From the mid-1700s to around the last half of the century, Kentucky’s efforts to conserve wildlife were sporadic.[46] In 1912, The Kentucky Game and Fish Commission was born, which later became the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife.[47]

      The Supreme Court answered challenges regarding wildlife management too.[48] In Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, a seminal natural resource law authority, the Court recognized the public trust doctrine, where the government holds the land under navigable waterways in trust for the public.[49] There, the Court denied a property owner’s attempt to prevent others from taking oysters he claimed.[50] The doctrine bolstered the user-pays model by tacitly encouraging use of wildlife and natural resources by the layperson.

       The Court next affirmed the States’ authority to regulate wildlife. In Geer v. Connecticut, it held the citizens’ common ownership of wildlife imposes a duty of state legislatures to enact laws that will best preserve nature held in trust.[51] There, the defendant challenged a Connecticut penalty for illegally transporting animals to another state.[52] The Court upheld the penalty.[53] This fortified the state ownership doctrine, which emphasizes the states’ sovereignty to conserve and manage wildlife within their borders.[54]

       Later, a new line of cases eroded the state ownership doctrine’s muscle. In Missouri v. Holland, the Court held that States cannot usurp federal statutory authority.[55] There, Missouri challenged the Migratory Bird Act for infringing on its power over wildlife within its borders.[56] This permitted the federal government to implement wildlife management laws within the States. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, the Court held New Mexico’s challenge of the Wild and Free-Roaming Burros Act was invalid because the federal government can govern animals on federal land.[57] In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court held an Oklahoma law that prohibited transporting minnows out of state violated the Commerce Clause, extending federal control further.[58]

      Each of these cases fashioned a canvas for states to implement functional dual-payer models with a user-pays prong. But these states relied heavily on the user-pays license fees. Thus, many states like Kentucky became more, and still are, dependent on hunter and angler dollars than before to support conservation and management efforts.

ii.  Rise of Congress and the President’s Conservation and Management Efforts

      Congress and the President became heavily concerned with exploitation at the turn of the twentieth century. This created the bedrock for many federal wildlife impositions today.

     Congress first addressed habitat protection. In 1891, Congress passed the Forest Reserve Act to prevent exploitative logging.[59] The forests reserved by the Act eventually became the national forests Americans recognize today. For example, the Shoshone National Forest was America’s first federally managed forest service.[60] In 1905, the United States Forestry eventually took over managing reserves from the General Land Office.[61]

       Congress then addressed exploitation of wildlife. In 1900, Congress enacted the Lacey Game and Wild Birds Preservation and Disposition Act.[62] The Act made it unlawful for one to import, export, sell, acquire, or purchase wildlife, fish, and plants transported or sold in violation of U.S. law, or in interstate commerce in violation of state law.[63]

       Congress also turned its attention to wildlife harvesting regulations. In 1918, it passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.[64] Congress believed the measure would increase the “sustainability of populations of all protected migratory bird species.”[65] This Act eliminated the ability of Americans to hunt “migratory birds,” and offered protection to migratory birds’ nests and eggs.[66]

      Although the Act only pertains to birds, its passage was a first domino to subsequent legislation concerning regulating America’s wildlife by federal means.

       President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration pressed a robust wildlife conservation agenda.[67] Roosevelt’s early involvement with the Boone and Crockett Club translated into his presidency years later.[68] By the end of Roosevelt’s presidency, his administration set aside over 230 million acres of American soil as federally protected land, established fifty-five wildlife refuges, and five national parks.[69] Some scholars criticize Roosevelt for usurping power not delegated to the president,[70] but others praise his efforts for reversing America’s wildlife exploitation. Nevertheless, Roosevelt shaped American conservation and management efforts for the long haul.

       Other presidents left their mark on American wildlife. In 1872, President Ulysses S. Grant established the three thousand square mile Yellow Stone National Park.[71] In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson backed the Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.[72]

      Entering the twentieth century, the States, Congress, Supreme Court, and President had created the framework for the world’s leading wildlife conservation and management model, the North American Model. Kentucky still lies at Model’s core. How to retain adequate funding in specific states became a different question.[73]

II.  Current Funding for Kentucky Wildlife Conservation and Management

       Unpredictable revenue streams currently fuel the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife.[74] If reasonable conservation and management is the desired end, then it only helps if funding derives from principles of stability and predictability. Understanding the intricacies of the Department’s funds unveils that it lacks, to a noticeable extent, stabilityand predictability.

        As stated before, Kentucky’s Department of Fish and Wildlife is formally financed through a dual-payer model. Yet, its user-pays component is a dominant source of funding upon which Kentucky relies. In 2005, over 50% of the Department’s budget, excluding federal funding, came from hunting and angler licenses.[75]

      The Department of Fish and Wildlife has expressed their need for more funding to achieve their goals of conserving and managing all of Kentucky’s wildlife, as opposed to species just desirable to take.[76] If funding of the department most closely associated with Kentucky’s wildlife is inadequate, then one cannot expect a status quo of nourished ecosystems. This, combined with the number of arguably declining hunters, is enough to provoke concern. While scholars debate the accuracy of hunter-decline statistics, evidence supports that outdoorsmen and outdoorswomen are becoming older, and a younger generation is not taking their place.[77] Therefore, Kentucky’s wildlife conservation and management efforts are subject to volatility, because such relies too much on hunter and angler dollars. The chance is not worth taking.

       States like Wyoming are prime examples of a working dual-payer model that Kentucky can look to. Wyoming is known for its natural sites, healthy wildlife populations, and prominent state and federal parks.[78] Wyoming’s dual-payer model funds its renowned system of wildlife conservation and management. One prong of its model is a user-pays prong.[79] Like Kentucky, this prong has proved a viable method for funding wildlife conservation and management.[80] Wyoming employs a second prong of robust, diverse funding measures.[81] It includes hefty federal funding, grants, donations, and revenue from state-owned property.[82] It is important to note that Kentucky and Wyoming are distinct states with distinct natural landscapes, politics, and needs. But the states are not so different as to render any ideas Kentucky draws from Wyoming valueless. The proposed Kentucky dual-payer model is less about the specific categories of additional funds and more about establishing several robust sources that fund wildlife conservation and management.

III. The Proposed Kentucky Dual-Payer Model

          For any agency to raise additional funds is difficult alone, and pushback from legislators and voters add to that difficulty. For these reasons, the dual-payer model should derive its funding not from new money but through reallocated and redistributed money. These transfers of money will serve as one “payer” of the dual-payer model, and the money from outdoorsmen licenses, fees, and other contributions will serve as the other “payer.” There are two feasible ways to improve Kentucky’s conservation and management model: (A.) redistributing how portion of the Department of Parks budget is spent; (B.) redirecting tax money already collected from outdoor equipment sales.

A.  Redistributing Money from the Department of Parks to the Department of Fish and Wildlife

        The Department of Fish and Wildlife assumes hands-on conservation and management of Kentucky wildlife, while the Department of Parks is involved more in the administrative side of state parks.[83] The Department of Parks devotes significantly less money each year directly attributable to conserving and managing wildlife than the Department of Fish and Wildlife.[84] Rather, most of the Department of Parks expenditures are allocated toward tourism and outdoor recreation.[85] The Department of Parks has the authority and ability to make more financial contributions in closer relation to Kentucky’s wildlife, but a noticeable portion of its expenditures goes towards projects in closer relation to tourists’ pastimes.[86]

       Tourism is predicated on tourists having something to see. In Kentucky, this means seeing its natural landscapes, fauna, and flora.[87] If the General Assembly passed a law that funneled more of the Department of Parks’ activity into endeavors closer related to conservation and management, it could ensure a more stable future for both nature and tourism.

         The Department of Fish and Wildlife comprises a little under half of Kentucky’s expenditures in the Tourism, Arts, and Heritage Cabinet.[88] The Department currently runs on around 250 million dollars a year.[89] This budget is comprised of state, federal, and other funding sources.[90] The Department spends over 57 million dollars a year.[91] Of that 57 million dollars in expenditures, it spends over half on wildlife management and fisheries management.[92] The Department focuses its other half of expenditures on administration and support, information and education, law enforcement, marketing, engineering, infrastructure, and technology resources.[93] A significant portion fosters a close relationship with Kentucky’s wildlife.[94]

         The Department of Parks comprises a little under half of Kentucky’s expenditures on Tourism, Arts, and Heritage.[95] Currently, the Department of Parks runs on around 100 million dollars a year.[96] This budget is comprised of state, federal, and other funding sources.[97] The Department spends almost its entire budget.[98] Of that 100 million dollars in expenditures, it spends about 64 million on Resort Parks with the vast amount of the money used for the resorts inside the parks.[99] This spending includes golf carts, upgrading fitness equipment, painting buildings, upgrading electric services, and pool repairs.[100] The other portion of the Department’s expenditures supports state cafeterias, administration and staff, recreation parks, and historic sites.[101] Although these improvements are not inherently valueless, the susceptibility of Kentucky’s wildlife conservation and management model outweighs the negatives of this exact allocation. More efficient use of the Department’s funds would not only benefit Kentucky’s wildlife, but sow benefits that the Kentucky natural tourism industry could reap from in the near future.

       The Department of Fish and Wildlife and the Department of Parks are inextricably linked. Although they are their own entities with separate funding and purposes, each department shares many similarities in their day-to-day operations. Each department finds intrinsic value in Kentucky’s nature. The Department of Fish and Wildlife largely manage the fauna and flora within their habitats.[102] The Department of Parks largely maintains the parks where many of Kentucky’s fauna and flora claim habitat.[103] Although their statutory purposes are different, their broader goal of protecting Kentucky’s wildlife renders each department a companion agency to the other.

       In all fairness, there are key distinctions within each Department’s enabling acts. The Department of Fish and Wildlife’s enabling act, KRS § 150.015, emphasizes principles of management and conservation.[104] Section 150.015 lists several of its purposes.[105] First, its purpose is to “protect and conserve” state wildlife.[106] Second, its purpose is to ensure a “permanent and continued supply of the wildlife resources” to “furnish[ ] sport and recreation.”[107] Third, its purpose is to “provide for the prudent taking and disposition of wildlife within reasonable limits.”[108]

         The Department of Parks’ enabling act, KRS § 148.021, hinges on principles of conservation and improving Kentucky state parks.[109] Section 148.021 lists several of its functions and powers.[110] First, the Department “may improve [state] parks by constructing and equipping improvements of facilities in said parks.”[111] Second, the Department “shall exercise all administrative functions of the state relating to the operation of state parks.”[112] Third, the Department has the power to collect fees and acquire more land for state parks.[113]

         Innate in § 148.021’s nature is the legislature’s concern for improving many of the habitats in which wildlife lives.[114] That wildlife is protected by the Department of Fish and Wildlife.[115] Because § 148.021 authorizes the Department of Parks to “improve” state parks,[116] this language could yield the creation of more wildlife research centers than resorts. For example, because the Department must exercise “all administrative functions” relating to the operation of state parks,[117] those efforts could aim towards operation of endangered species advancement projects. Section 148.021 permits the Department to collect land and acquire land for state parks. [118] It should use that authority to acquire such resources for projects like habitat expansion endeavors. The broad language of § 148.021 leaves room for the Department’s funding to be directed toward more meaningful undertakings than its current expenditures reflect. The statute’s vagueness arguably is one of the reasons why the Department of Parks and Department of Fish and Wildlife already have numerous, functional similarities.

       The language of § 148.021 appears broad enough for the Department to funnel expenditures toward more of the activities listed in the previous paragraph. Still, funneling expenditures in this way faces several obstacles. First, the Department of Parks might be hesitant to redistribute money towards tasks that do not fit their traditional responsibilities. Second, the Department might misunderstand a redistribution of expenditures as a “pay cut.” The Department might also face pushback from its constituents. Such obstacles prompt the Department’s need for an explicit statutory trigger to make redistributions more feasible.

        So, tying the Department of Parks’ expenditures closer to wildlife conservation and management efforts first requires the state legislature to amend § 148.021. The amendment will provide a standard to guide the Department. While the legislature might balk at including the standard in a new statute, amending § 148.021, rather than begetting a new creature of authority, might suffice.

        There are many ways to amend § 148.021. First, the legislature could add the phrase “improvement, and perpetuation” to section (1) of the statute: “the Department of Parks shall exercise all administrative functions of the state relating to the operation, improvement, and perpetuation of state parks.” Second, the legislature could add the phrase “and related auxiliaries” to section (3) of the statute: “[t]he [D]epartment may improve [state] parks by constructing and equipping improvements of facilities and related auxiliaries in said parks.” Finally, the legislature could add a third subsection in section (4) that permits the Department to use collected money from fees and charges for use of the parks toward endeavors “directly attributable to the improvement and perpetuation of such state parks.”

           Each amendment would bridge the hurdles legislators might face in promoting wildlife management and conservation with the current act. This is not an exhaustive list of amendments but just a few illustrative references. Moreover, these examples do not cross into the authority of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, as they still cater to the administration of state parks. Yet, the amendments would give the Department of Parks authority that is not so attenuated to render its fiscal resources hopeless, in terms of conservation and management. This explicit authority would be akin to that of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, nonetheless distinct.

           If a statutory standard is not feasible, there are other avenues to provide a more stable future for Kentucky’s wildlife. The governor could issue an executive order to allocate or distribute funds to the Department of Fish and Wildlife to remedy the most direct ecological issues in Kentucky. It might, however, face pushback from legislators, voters, scholars, and/or lawyers. These potential problems might politically force the governor to leave the state budget and expenditures as is.

          Further, Kentucky agencies and executive offices could promulgate their own regulations and govern their expenditure habits to promote wildlife conservation and management. In terms of their authority, some agencies might be better for the job, but any efforts at the agency level could be beneficial. Agencies like the Department of Kentucky Fish and Wildlife and Kentucky Parks could promulgate regulations that create expenditure targets. Relevant government offices, such as the Department for Environmental Protection, Division of Conservation, Office of Consumer and Environmental Protection, and Office of Civil and Environmental Law can also affect Kentucky’s wildlife.[119] However, incentivizing agencies and executive offices would require internal consensus or some other impetus to overcome any hint of agency capture.

         Another way to impact Kentucky’s wildlife is to advocate for the Department of Fish and Wildlife to distribute more funding towards efforts like endangered species rehabilitation programs, population studies, and habitat restoration. The Department currently has a budget of about 250 million but spends only around 57 million a year.[120] Kentuckians and government officials could petition for a change in this spending pattern. Still, changing a department’s spending habits may be easier said than done.

       Even though many avenues for promoting conservation and management of Kentucky’s wildlife exist, it appears an amendment to § 148.021 would face the least, or close to the least, scrutiny. The easier a positive change can be implemented, the faster Kentucky’s wildlife encounters a brighter future. Changing the law is a first step.

      Grassroots movements within Kentucky already espouse initiatives with similar goals to the proposed amendments. Groups like the Audubon Society, Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Iroquois Hunt Club, Kentucky Waterways Alliance, and several others would likely support efforts to better conserve Kentucky wildlife.[121] The groups might differ in their opinions on whether to promote the taking of wildlife, but the amendments this article proposes would prioritize conservation efforts, something they all agree on. At the end of the day, it is prudent to recognize that this amendment only vests authority to the Department of Parks to redistribute funds; that does not mean they will do it. Pressure from constituents, grassroot movements, and government agents will serve as the impetus to implement the reallocation of funds. This is not a foolproof plan, but among the most feasible of plans for the bluegrass state.

       Thus, a stronger dual-payer model would brighten the future of Kentucky’s wildlife. By expanding the scope of § 148.021, the legislature can ensure the Department of Parks works even closer with the Department of Fish and Wildlife. Harmonizing the efforts of both departments would benefit Kentucky’s wildlife, tourism, and the state as a whole.

B.  Diversion from Sales Tax Collected on Outdoor Equipment

       Another way to generate revenue for Kentucky’s wildlife is to divert a portion of taxes the state already collects from outdoor equipment. By diverting outdoor equipment sales tax, the state can circumvent the issues accompanying raising taxes or other revenue collection methods. This money would also mitigate the volatility of Kentucky’s current model.

      Several states have employed different methods to raise additional revenue to fund wildlife conservation and management.[122] Arizona, Colorado, and Maine required their state lotteries to allocate a portion of their revenue to wildlife conservation and management.[123] This model is not viable for Kentucky, as the majority of its lottery funds go towards aiding students pursuing education.[124] Georgia and Pennsylvania allocate a portion of the proceeds from specialty license plate sales toward wildlife conservation and management, a model Kentucky already replicates.[125] Arkansas and Missouri created an additional sales tax which allocates money toward their fish and wildlife agencies.[126] Kentucky’s traditional resistance towards additional taxes, however, makes this particular model unrealistic.[127]

          A diversion of tax money from outdoor equipment sales is more likely to survive political muster than other revenue collection methods employed by other states. Those who use outdoor equipment are arguably more likely than others to be proponents of wildlife conservation and management, as their livelihoods and hobbies rely on healthy Kentucky ecosystems.[128] This suggests they might be more likely to support a redistribution of the taxes they already pay.[129]

       Texas and Virginia have employed models that impose a sales tax on outdoor equipment that returns to specified wildlife conservation and management programs.[130] Those programs embrace the essence of the North American Model, “since [those who purchase outdoor equipment] are likely wildlife users in either the traditional hunting or fishing sense, or as part of an indirect use such as camping, hiking, [and] photographing.”[131] The General Assembly should adopt a model like Texas and Virginia’s. Kentuckians spend millions each year on outdoor activities, many of which likely include the purchase of outdoor equipment.[132] The state imposes a six percent sales tax on such sales.[133] Although the necessary statistics and information are not available to produce an estimated revenue figure, it is feasible that outdoor equipment sales tax would help protect Kentucky’s wildlife.

         The proposed tax distribution would best be imposed through an amendment to KRS § 139.200, Kentucky’s sales tax statute.[134] For many of the reasons listed in part IV section A, an amendment through the legislature would fare better than any alternative. Yet, several challenges follow. The biggest challenge is the Kentucky legislature seems to frown upon earmarking general fund dollars, as compared to other states.[135] In 1954, Kentucky earmarked 46% of its general funds.[136] That percentage dwindled to 16% in 1984 and 12% in 2005.[137] The General Assembly’s engrained hesitancy to earmark general funds[138] might threaten earmarking a portion of the tax collected on outdoor equipment sales. Also, agency directors and voters could raise concerns “that diverting these general fund dollars . . . will negatively impact their ability to function as mandated.”[139]

           Thus, redistributing outdoor equipment tax money yields a benefit to the Commonwealth.

          Any benefit is better than none. America’s historic toil in exploiting its wildlife and natural resources is a reminder of the progress it has made. Kentucky, however, must not forget that America’s complacency with society and technological development has put its nature at risk several times before. Therefore, a redistribution of tax dollars from outdoor equipment sales would give Kentucky’s wildlife another leg up.

IV.  Conclusion

           Most people do not realize the reciprocal, intimate nature of wildlife conservation and management. This misconception especially pertains to how states fund their conservation and management efforts. America has a long history of imposing on its wildlife, which caused many federal and state actors to remedy exploitation. Now, every state employs some version of the North American Model, but funding issues arise in certain states, like Kentucky.[140]

        The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife has indicated a need for more funding to conserve, protect, and manage all wildlife.[141] Although most agencies “need more funds,” the magnitude of importance in conserving and managing Kentucky’s wildlife overrides any hesitancy. Kentucky can employ a similar model to Wyoming’s in creating multiple reliable sources of funding for conservation efforts.[142] Legislative amendments to § 148.021[143] and § 139.200[144] would direct more of Kentucky’s efforts toward conserving and managing its wildlife.

            The goal of this article is to solve foreseeable issues before they gain traction; it is a prophylactic measure. Like with every proposal, there are positives and negatives to Kentucky’s proposed dual-payer model. Not only would a stronger dual-payer model suit Kentucky well, but it would ensure an efficient, stable, predictable, and feasible system of conservation and management for all species, not just game species. After all, an improved model for wildlife conservation and management is better than just an existing good one.

I Dustyn is a Senior Staff Editor of the Kentucky Law Journal. At the time of this article’s publication, Sams is a third-year law student at the University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law. Sams thanks Dr. Nathan A. Coleman, a professor of America’s Founding Era at the University of the Cumberlands, Sams’ former professor, and one of his mentors, for assisting him in revising this article.

[2] See Teresa M. Telecky, Hunting is A Setback to Wildlife Conservation, 29 EARTH ISLAND J. 45, 45–46 (2014).

[3] See generally John F. Organ, Valerius Geist, Shane P. Mahoney, et al., The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation: Technical Review 12-04, THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y & THE BOONE & CROCKETT CLUB 1–5 (Dec. 2012) (demonstrating the reciprocity of hunting and conservation).

[4] Bill O’Brian, Hunters as Conservationists, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.fws.gov/story/hunters-conservationists [https://perma.cc/G8BB-32LR]; Mike Harmon, Examination of Certain Operations and Financial Activity of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, KY. OFF. AUDITOR OF PUB. ACCTS. 6 (Dec. 18, 2018); Division of Fish & Wildlife Funding, IND. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (2021), https://www.in.gov/dnr/fish-and-wildlife/about-us/funding-and-license-sales/#American_System_of_Conservation_Funding_Infographic_text_ [https://perma.cc/68MY-C76Z].

[5] Jonathan Gassett, Wildlife Action Plan, KY. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE RES. (Feb. 5, 2013), https://fw.ky.gov/WAP/Pages/Wildlife-Action-Plan-Full.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZL87-Y7NY].

[6] Id.

[7] David Willms & Anne Alexander, The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation in Wyoming: Understanding It, Preserving It, and Funding Its Future, 14 WYo. L. REV. 659, 684 (2014).

[8] Harmon, supra note 3, at 7.

[9] Willms, supra note 6, at 659–60; Organ, supra note 2, at 1–2.

[10] Willms, supra note 6, at 660.

[11] Id.

[12] Organ, supra note 2, at 6–8.

[13] Willms, supra note 6, at 662.

[14] Id.

[15] Peter Moyle & Mary A. Orland, Humans and Wildlife in America, THE MARINEBIO CONSERVATION SOC’Y, https://www.marinebio.org/creatures/essays-on-wildlife-conservation/3/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4RDF-5LF6].

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] See Robert Brown, A Conservation Timeline: Milestones of the Model’s Evolution, THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y 28–29 (2010), http://wildlifehabitat.tamu.edu/Lessons/Habitat-Concepts-1/Readings/A-Conservation-Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM34-RMKK].

[19] Id. at 28.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 30.

[22] Id. at 28.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] The Passenger Pigeon, SMITHSONIAN INFORMATION, https://www.si.edu/spotlight/passenger-pigeon [https://perma.cc/DQ5H-24EM].

[27] Brown, supra note 17, at 28.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 29.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] The Passenger Pigeon, supra note 25.

[34] Id.

[35] Organ, supra note 2, at 6–10.

[36] See generally Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (demonstrating an instance of state and federal consideration of wildlife exploitation).

[37] See Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[38] 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (1971); 16 U.S.C. § 47 (1906) (repealed 1976).

[39] Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Brown, supra note 17, at 30; Willms, supra note 6, at 660.

[44] See History of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources from Settlement Through 1944, KY. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE RES., https://fw.ky.gov/More/Pages/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/7395-RBNS].

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).

[49] Martin, 41 U.S. at 411.

[50] Id. at 407–18.

[51] Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.

[52] Id. at 519–20.

[53] Id. at 529.

[54] The opinion also articulated dicta, which many scholars use to employ an extended public trust doctrine that applies to property other than land under navigable water. Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (“[T]he power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good”).

[55] Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).

[56] Id. at 417–20.

[57] Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–41, 546 (1976).

[58] Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

[59] 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1891) (repealed 1976); How the United States Started Saving its National Forests, THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, https://www.wilderness.org/articles/article/how-united-states-started-saving-national-forests (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/N663-YA8M].

[60] Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (1918).

[65] Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS., https://www.fws.gov/law/migratory-bird-treaty-act-1918 (last visited Mar. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6GER-2LNB].

[66] Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (1918).

[67] Brown, supra note 17, at 29–30.

[68] Id.

[69] Id.

[70] Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1993).

[71] Brown, supra note 17, at 29.

[72] Id. at 30.

[73] Willms, supra note 6, at 660.

[74] Gassett, supra note 4.

[75] Id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Cynthia Levy, 10 Best National Parks to Visit in the USA, THE TRAVEL (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.thetravel.com/10-best-national-parks-in-usa/ [https://perma.cc/5TSM-N3H4].

[79] Wyoming Game and Fish Commission FY 2022 Budget, JOINT APPROPRIATION COMM. 4–6, https://www.wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2021/02-20211213040-102-GandF-WGFCFY22Budget.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/T7TJ-LDWR].

[80] See generally id. (demonstrating how Wyoming’s funding is dispersed throughout its programs).

[81] Id. at 4–6.

[82] Id. at 1–15.

[83] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[84] Kentucky Spending Search: Search of Current Fiscal Year Spending, KY. TRANSPARENCY (2022), https://transparency.ky.gov/search/Pages/spendingsearch.aspx#/spending [https://perma.cc/6GAJ-V7Q5].

[85] Kentucky State Park’s Improvements: Park Projects, KY. STATE PARKS, https://parks.ky.gov/park_improvements (last visited Mar. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5KMZ-2NTA].

[86] Id.

[87] Kentucky – Nature and Scientific Wonders, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 6, 2007), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/kentucky-nature-and-scientific-wonders-177754574/ [https://perma.cc/2KBF-MDZ6].

[88] Kentucky Spending Search: Search of Current Fiscal Year Spending, supra note 83.

[89] Andy Beshear & John Hicks, 2022-2024 Executive Budget, 1 Team Kentucky 1, 335, https://osbd.ky.gov/Publications/Documents/Budget%20Documents/2022-2024%20Executive%20Budget%20Recommendation/2022-2024%20Executive%20Budget%20-Volume%20I%20(Full%20Version).pdf [https://perma.cc/8452-TTUJ].

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] Id.

[94] See generally id. at 335–36 (explaining the roles of each unit and how it relates to Kentucky’s wildlife).

[95] Kentucky Spending Search: Search of Current Fiscal Year Spending, supra note 83.

[96] Id.

[97] Beshear, supra note 88, at 328.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Kentucky State Park’s Improvements: Park Projects, supra note 84.

[101] Beshear, supra note 88, at 328.

[102] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006).

[103] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[104] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006).

[105] Id.

[106] Id.

[107] Id.

[108] Id.

[109] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[110] Id.

[111] Id.

[112] Id.

[113] Id.

[114] Id.

[115] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.015 (West 2006).

[116] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] See generally Executive Branch, Transparency, https://transparency.ky.gov/accountability/Pages/executive.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) (listing other cabinets that contain agencies supporting Kentucky’s wildlife) [https://perma.cc/2GVL-ESQN].

[120] Beshear, supra note 88.

[121] See generally Bird-Friendly Communities, AUDUBON SOC’Y, https://www.audubon.org/bird-friendly-communities#:~:text=Audubon%27s%20Bird%2Dfriendly%20Communities%20strives,and%20Bird%2Dfriendly%20Buildings%20programs (last visited March 24, 2022) (showing efforts to conserve habitats and bird populations) [https://perma.cc/YLQ7-8KES]; History, KENTUCKIANS FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH, https://kftc.org/#history (last visited March 24, 2022) (showing work throughout Kentucky communities) [https://perma.cc/9MKM-XMUW]; A Kentucky Tradition in Animal Welfare, Community and Conservation, IROQUOIS HUNT CLUB, iroquoishunt.com (last visited March 24, 2022) (demonstrating a Kentucky organization devoted to conservation of historic fox hunting) [https://perma.cc/5T6P-CLXJ]; Who We Are, KY. WATERWAYS ALL., https://www.kwalliance.org/who-we-are.html (demonstrating an organization concerned with preserving Kentucky waterways) (last visited March 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3JPM-3R8J].

[122] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.

[123] Id.

[124]Where’s the Money Go?, KY. LOTTERY, https://www.kylottery.com/apps/about_us/where_the_money_goes.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/6WR4-FRKR].

[125] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.; E.g., Kentucky DU License Plate, DUCKS UNLIMITED, https://www.ducks.org/kentucky/kentucky-license-plate-program (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/N882-CU4Y].

[126] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.

[127] See Teacher Victory: Kentucky House Overrides Tax Increase Veto, CBS NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-house-overrides-tax-increase-veto/ [https://perma.cc/N3FW-VKQJ].

[128] Willms, supra note 6, at 695.

[129] Id. at 695–96.

[130] Id. at 695.

[131] Id.

[132] David Knopf, Scott Lemmons & Barry Adams, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., Kentucky Agricultural Statistics 2020 Annual Bulletin 5–6 (Dec. 2020).

[133] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 139.200 (West 2023).

[134] Id.

[135] See Arturo Pérez, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Earmarking State Taxes 5 (Sep. 2008).

[136] Id.

[137] Id.

[138] See id.

[139] Willms, supra note 6, at 696.

[140] Organ, supra note 2, at 24–25.

[141] Gassett, supra note 4.

[142] Willms, supra note 6, at 694.

[143] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148.021 (West 2006).

[144] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 139.200 (West 2023).

 All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Mergers and Acquisitions

 All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Mergers and Acquisitions

Amanda Guillen[I]

The office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances.[2]

Introduction

      In 2021, “the overall value of Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) stood at $5.8 trillion,” an increase of 64% from 2020.[2] Not only did 2021 have a scorching increase from the prior year, but the sheer dollar amount of $5.8 trillion of M&A activity is worth mentioning as well. $5.8 trillion is the equivalent to the market value of Apple ($3 trillion), Microsoft ($2.5 trillion), and Disney ($0.3 trillion) combined.[3] With the headwinds faced moving into 2022, such as inflation, rising cost of capital, supply chain issues with Ukraine, and geopolitical tensions from US-China[4]… 2022 will still likely reach $4.7 trillion in deal value by year-end, which would make it one of the strongest markets of the past 20 years.

      “Firms engage in mergers because they see a profitable opportunity.”[5] If a firm can purchase another company in the hopes of reducing costs, “the result can be lower prices for consumers and improved overall economic welfare.”[6] This is just one example of how a firm can meet the goal of a profitable opportunity. One of the most significant mergers that impact life today is the growth of the American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T).[7] In 1883, AT&T “adopted a strategy of merging local telephone companies into a national system.[8] The resulting network reduced the costs of interconnecting large numbers of users, and the telephone quickly replaced the telegraph as the communications technology of choice.”[9] Ultimately generating long-term value for shareholders, who provide the capital that allows companies to invest, and innovate, is a fundamental reason for firms engaging in a merger.[10] Bringing us back to present day, with the trending highest volume of M&A activity in history… is this activity still generating value for shareholders?

      It is too early to tell if the flurry of activity from 2021 to 2022 will lead to successful business outcomes. However, data for previous years’ M&A activity is available.[11] Per Harvard Business Review, typically “70%-90% of acquisitions are abysmal failures.”[12] Failure is the state or condition of not meeting a desirable or intended objective and may be viewed as the opposite of success[13]—and it seems a bit harsh to put M&A activity in that category. Because failure may seem fatal, as if it is impossible to climb out of this state of failure. But failure is not fatal. The failure to recognize change to meet the intended objective is fatal.

      This Note begins in Part I with an overview of M&A. This section discusses the original goal of M&A which is to maximize shareholder value. In theory, the shareholder wealth maximization norm[14] is the north star that guides business executives and the law. The shareholder wealth maximation norm sets the intended objective as—the pursuit of increasing share price maximizes the wealth of actual shareholders.[15] Moreover, Part I sets the stage for what is a corporation and M&A. In Part II, this section builds on a case study of recent M&A transactions. Further, this Part goes into the factors that may contribute to challenges seen in M&A. In Part III, this Part proposes using earnout provisions in M&A contracts as a solution for leaders to implement.

 

                              I.              The Measure for Successful M&A—Shareholder Wealth Maximization

      U.S. Corporate law gives control of the corporation in the board of directors and those executives to whom the board properly delegates decision-making authority.[16] The discretionary powers conferred on directors and officers, are to be directed towards a single end; the maximization of shareholder wealth.[17] “Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.”[18] In the landmark Michigan Supreme Court case Dodge v. Ford Motor, Co.:

A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.[19]

“The shareholder wealth maximization norm exerts tremendous influence on both business practice and corporate legal scholarship.”[20] Per eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., corporate management is legally required to pursue profit; it must also seek to maximize the shareholders’ financial interests.[21] As such, publicly traded companies place great importance on their stock share price, which reflects a corporation’s overall financial health. The higher a stock price is, the more ideal a company’s prospects are. The norm and the related focus on share prices rest on two key assumptions: (1) that the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization, as measured by share price, effectively maximizes the wealth of actual shareholders and (2) that the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization, as measured by share price, is socially beneficial.[22] If the share price is not increasing, then the practice should be to change course.

          With the proliferation of M&A activity in recent years, it would be safe to assume that share prices are also increasing. But is all this huge influx of M&A activity providing increased shareholder value or is all that glitters is not gold? 

 

A.         Background

      A corporation is a legal entity.[23] One of the main advantages of a corporation is the benefit of centralized management.[24] Shareholders elect a corporation’s directors, who have the power to manage and oversee the corporation’s business.[25] Shareholders play only a limited governance role, in part because the directors have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation.[26] The directors typically delegate responsibility for daily decisions to corporate officers.[27] The separation between shareholder ownership and managerial control is one of the distinctive features of modern corporations.[28]

      Centralized management has allowed individuals to partake in a comparative advantage. Comparative advantages describe a situation in which an individual can produce a service at a lower opportunity cost than another.[29] Here, a shareholder elects a corporation’s directors so that they can best utilize their time as they see fit. The corporation’s directors produce a more significant financial benefit in the best interests of the corporation. In theory, the corporation’s directors manage a corporation at a lower opportunity cost, compared to an individual shareholder given their knowledge and expertise. 

      While a corporation has many advantages, there are also corresponding disadvantages—agency issues. The corporation, a legal construct, can act only through the agency of human beings.[30] Agency is a consensual relationship between two parties, the “principal” and the “agent.”[31] The principal selects the agent, who agrees to act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.[32]

      In regard to mergers and acquisitions, agency implications could be value destroying when managers engage in opportunistic acquisition reasons for self-interest.[33] Empire building motives, managerial myopia, overconfidence, misaligned incentives, and poor corporate governance can all exacerbate the agency problem.[34] For example, there are various ways that managers can build empires so as to increase the size of their firm, also known as their sphere of control.[35] When managers have larger companies to manage, they are seen as having more power.[36] Managers’ empire building incentives can also be related to their compensation packages, which are often tied to a larger firm size measured by its combined market value.[37] Therefore, mergers and acquisitions are often considered a good candidate for rapidly and effectively increasing firm size.[38] Studies also show that where managerial compensation is based on the acquisition of profits, with no emphasis on long-term incentives, that this would provide managers with perverse incentives to acquire companies so as to increase the size of their firm, despite ultimately leading to deterioration in shareholder value.[39]  

      Another issue between “agents” and “principals” are misuse of resources. “Agents” can use their position to divert the corporation’s funds towards initiatives that the “agent” personally wants to achieve. Breaching fiduciary duties[40], a manager could have the desire to acquire a company as a “pet project,” which may have diminishing returns.[41] The desire to acquire this “pet project” company would devote millions, potentially billions of dollars of financial and human resources that belong to the corporation, but in essence, funds that belong to the shareholders. For example, AOL’s CEO hatched Patch in 2007 while an executive at Google, then convinced AOL to purchase Patch after he took over in 2009.[42] AOL shareholders felt the CEO cling to Patch with a blind paternal love.[43] Over five years, Patch is estimated to cost AOL between $200 million and $300 million to run.[44] “It is easy to see how an agent, having the power to exercise control over assets belonging to the principal, may be tempted to use those assets in a way that benefits the agent’s ego”.[45]  

      This challenge between “agents” and “principals,” it might seem as though the ability to maximize value may never be achieved.[46] Even with the agency issues, the ability to maximize value has been achieved—historically, the stock market has provided around 6% of annual returns over the long term.[47] For most Americans, 6% sounds pretty good. And for most Americans, how much they have to invest is singularly a function of how much they can make from their labor. The American people who owe almost all their wealth to their ability to hold a job and to secure gains in wages—"is true for 99% of Americans”.[48] After putting in a minimum 40 hours of work a week, the fruits of American labor are spent on a house and car payment, student loans, wedding debt, and the leftover cash is put towards a new air conditioner or an on-call plumber. The remainder is invested in a 401(k) plan where the funds are out of reach until the investor reaches the age fifty-nine and a half.[49] It is not a surprise that “…nearly half of all working-age families have zero retirement savings…”[50] For these reasons, it makes sense to question whether this hard-earned money is earning the biggest bang for your buck. If these agency issues were nailed down, could the new normal average returns be 12% or 24%? The sky is the limit.

 

B.         M&A

      M&A involves the buying and selling of corporations.[51]  M&A deals are done from the direction of executives, “who also largely run the deal-making process”.[52] The acquiring company is called the “bidder” or “acquirer”. The “target” is the company that is about to be acquired. Historically, the United States has had a relatively pro takeover regulatory environment.[53]

      With the general economic outlook relatively stable, executive confidence is at an all-time high to pursue acquisitions they have long considered.[54] “Management teams have been dusting off corporate playbooks for potential deals”[55] and to do—acquire companies—than do not. Based on the converging factors, dealmakers find themselves in a sweet spot between the optimism of the market and the bountiful economic landscape. M&A will continue as a central feature of the global corporate landscape. But, the question still remains whether the flurry of activity continues to increase shareholder wealth.[56]

 

II.            Analysis

      This Part examines why M&A activity may not be as valuable as initially intended—increasing shareholder wealth. The first Section discusses M&A impact on shareholder prices by case studies. The second Section discusses inherent finance and legal challenges inherent in M&A deals.

A.       Profitability Analysis of Companies Engaging in M&A

Many scholars have examined the impact of M&A and whether there have been profitable results. In theory, these studies have inherently had several limitations. The main limitation is truly understanding the source of merger gains or losses and gathering this data systematically across companies in similar industries, sizes, and goals. The challenge is clearly correlating that M&A activity is the source of increased share price or if there are other factors involved. Perhaps there could be a new marketing scheme that propelled the stock price, or a competitor left the industry, in which both instances could increase the share price—neither having to do with increased M&A activity. Correspondingly, the reverse is true. Companies could neglect their marketing teams and a competitor enter the market, causing cause share price to decrease—again, these activities would have nothing to do with M&A activity. Because of the difficulty of acquiring the necessary data, scholars have typically taken a case study approach, examining a few mergers within the same of comparable industries.[57]

Studies have been completed over the years conveying evidence that mergers cut deep into the financial red. In general, many large-scale acquisitions of public companies by other public companies result in significant losses for shareholders of acquiring firms.[58] Not only do bidder shareholders lose, but the losses from these deals can be staggering.[59] For example, a study of deals from 1998 to 2001, finds that bidder shareholders lost 12% for every dollar spent on acquisitions, for a total of $240 billion.[60] A study on law firm mergers performed analysis to contradict the conventional wisdom that mergers enhance profitability through increased revenues and reduced costs.[61] The study showed that law firms post-merger revenues were lower relative to competitor firms that than the sum of predecessor firms’ revenues, and cost per lawyer increase markedly.[62] Further, a study of Asian bank mergers found no observable efficiency effects.[63] Another example in the electric power industry, evidence suggests there are no net efficiency gains from M&A.[64] Ultimately, a significant body of recent finance literature finds evidence that many, although not all, acquisitions destroy value for long-term [Bidder] shareholders.[65]

In contrast, there is data showing that mergers suggest that there are efficiency gains. One review suggests that efficiency gains predominated in North American and European bank mergers.[66] Another study reviewed forty-nine studies and found that nearly three-quarters of them showed mergers resulted in price increases.[67] In 2016, Bruce Blonigen and Justin Pierce studied U.S. manufacturing industries that covered companies from the timber to electronics to printing services.[68] Blonigen’s and Pierce’s research demonstrated that the average merger increased market power.[69] These studies contradict the initial case study on companies in the healthcare industry.

Overall, the infamous lawyerly response to whether mergers increase or decrease shareholder value is—it depends. It depends various circumstances that vary according to market composition, industry, geographic location,[70] economics, and available data. Evidence supports each view and the effects of mergers remain in dispute.[71] The idiosyncrasies of the specific companies and sectors limit the ability to generalize the data.[72] Evidence exists that routinely show stock market event studies that find shareholder gains from mergers, at least in the short term.[73] On the other hand, there are studies of actual operating effects that tend to show that gains from mergers are the exception rather than the rule.[74] The best example of the ambivalent results is an economist who attempted to study the effects of all mergers in the world occurring over fifteen years.[75] The result of the study found that only 29.1% of mergers appear to result in efficiency gains, with approximately the same number actually reducing efficiency.[76]

Although the data can be inconclusive as to whether mergers increase or decrease share price, it is important to recognize that the conventional wisdom that mergers enhance profitability should not be assumed.

 

B.      Legal and Finance

This section assesses the factors that may have an impact on shareholder returns for M&A: Legal and Finance.

  i. Legal—Limited Liability for failed M&A Transactions

      In 2015, Microsoft wrote off 96% of the value of the handset business it had acquired from Nokia for $7.9 billion the previous year.[77] If an executive were forced to clear out $7.9 billion from their savings account for a failed business acquisition, would the executive have purchased it in the first place? Likely, not. Instead, the present law shields decision-makers from a potential liability through the business judgment rule leaving shareholders, who are—besides employees—typically harmed the most by failed M&A transactions, largely unprotected.[78] Directors of public corporations are seldom held personally liable for their decision making.[79]

      As part of the common law for at least one hundred and fifty years, the business judgment rule protects directors from liability for business decisions, even those that were ill-chosen and resulted in losses to the corporation.[80] In Wrigley, the Chicago Cubs’ president refused to install field lights for night games at Wrigley Field against the wishes of a shareholder.[81] The shareholder claimed that because the president refused to install field lights for night games leading to lower profits for shareholders.[82] The court held that the judgment of the directors of the corporation enjoys the benefit of a presumption that it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best interests of the corporation they serve.[83] If the decisions are within the “realm of reason,” it generally will be protected.[84]

      The underlying consideration behind the business judgment rule is that the courts’ role is inherently different than a business decisionmaker for a variety of reasons. For example, a judge deciding on a decision after the fact is plagued with hindsight bias.[85] Thus, judges tend to be ill-equipped for reliably second-guessing the quality of business decisions.[86] Additionally, substantive judicial review of business decisions would require significant resources.[87] As a manager in Corporate America, imagine if every time a poor decision was made, the courts were looming close by, reprimanding every step. The business judgment rule expresses a balance between embracing economic freedom and informed risk-taking.[88] It presumes the benefits from entrepreneurial risk-taking exceeds the cost resulting from wrong business decisions.[89] Essentially, the business decision makers at Microsoft, although writing off $7.9 billion in 2015, have led to revenue growth of $800 billion in three years.[90]

          Despite the risks that directors and officers contribute to the failure of M&A transactions, they cannot be held liable under current law. The courts understand that there is no reward with no risk and, as such, shareholders can be rewarded nicely or inadequately. The business judgment rule protects directors and officers from liability which effectually makes acquiring companies a “win-win” because there is minimal risk to the directors but a maximum reward to shareholders.

ii. Finance— 2+2 = 5?

This section begins with the following observation made by an experienced M&A lawyer:

A major merger or acquisition can be a company-defining moment. The right business combination at the right price, with good execution, can reposition the company, accelerate growth and shareholder return, and even change the game for an industry. But a bad deal—whether the failure is rooted in the concept [i.e., the “logic of the deal,” that is, the business justification for the proposed acquisition], the price, or the execution—is probably the fastest legal means of destroying shareholder value.[91] 

      Thus, in order to create shareholder value, the acquirer must purchase the target for a fair price.[92] When an acquirer overpays for a target, spending resources on trying to meet unattainable financial goals can be unsalvageable. If each company A and B is worth $2, then after the merger transaction, per the shareholder wealth maximization theory, it should be worth $5. If A purchases B for $2.5, but the benefits fail to materialize over several years, this acquisition is doomed for failure. Because each year is spent trying to climb out of the financial hole it initially dug itself in. However, zealous business executives continue to search for profitable opportunities in the hopes of increasing shareholder value. But all too often, as seen in the popular press,[93] bidder overpayment and poorly performing corporate acquisitions strike out.

      An example is when Hewlett Packard (“HP”) purchased a British company, Autonomy, for $10.3 billion—a decision that was controversial with HP shareholders who claimed HP was overpaying for Autonomy.[94] A year later, HP announced a write-down of $8.8 billion related to the acquisition due to accounting irregularities.[95] HP was unable to realize the gains it expected from the acquisition.[96] Not only was there no added benefit to the acquisition, but the cherry on top was a large securities class action suit.[97]

      A crucial component that can lead to the success of an M&A transaction begins at the initial due diligence. Due diligence is a thorough analysis and investigation of the target company.[98] A company usually has a corporate development team that provides decision-makers with financial information and assesses the risk and opportunities of engaging in a M&A transaction. Besides risk assessment and valuation, it typically prepares for the composition of the contractual representations and warranties[99] and assesses whether the target company is a profitable opportunity. In complete secrecy, the target provides information to the acquirer about the business, finances, tax, legal, and human resources.[100] Due to the small window for providing this information, acquirer decision-makers rarely receive the information they need to make an informed decision from the target. Additionally, another challenge for the acquirer is the mass of information that would need to be digested in a short timeline to make a well-informed decision, not to mention ensuring that the right questions are asked of the target.

          After collecting information in the due diligence phase, the acquirer uses this information to make a well-informed purchase price for the target. One of the most common methods to assess the value of a company is the discounted cash flow (DCF).[101] DCF models rely on estimates and discounting all future cash flows to determine net present value.[102] The offer amount largely depends on the quality and extent of the available data.[103] The models use assumptions provided by the target and market data to form a purchase price.[104]  The assumptions are the greatest weakness in valuation models because essentially these assumptions predict the future[105]—something that is very challenging to do.

      With a mix of time pressures and assumptions to value the target, this could lead to negative financial consequences in which the acquirer overpays for the target.[106] With the legal and financial challenges at play in an M&A transaction, is there a potential solution for management to engage?

 

III.  An Opportunity for More Shareholder Wealth—A Call to Action

          Part III reflects on the challenges discussed in Part II and provides a solutions to the legal and financial challenges presented, by using earnout provisions to align compensation incentives.

      As shadows cannot exist without light, the corporation’s advantage of a centralized management cannot exist without agency issues.[107] In M&A deals, executive compensation is generally issued for “closing the deal”[108] rather than the financial success of the deal which can often take years. On average, about a quarter of executives in acquired top management teams leave within the first year, a departure rate about three times higher than in comparable companies that haven’t been acquired.[109] An additional 15% depart in the second year, roughly double the normal turnover rate.[110] All too often, after the close of the deal, target executives are either mentally out the door or forcibly ushered out the door by the acquirer. Target executives leave voluntarily after an acquisition for a variety of reasons. A couple of reasons are that target CEOs receive golden parachutes at the time the merger is approved, [111] need a break, or don’t feel needed in the new company.[112] Limited liability, as discussed in Part II, could be a hindrance to shareholder profitability when combined with executives that have no skin in the game.

      During the deal negotiation between the acquirer and target, an earnout provision can create incentives that encourage management to stay after the acquisition. An earnout provision is a contractual payment mechanism in M&A where a relatively large part (often around a third) of the deal consideration is deferred and payable at multiple stages, contingent upon observable measures of the target firm’s future performance.[113] Another benefit of an earnout provision is that it provides continuity for the success after the acquisition. Target leaders can guide the integration of the two companies, rather than leaving abruptly after the close of the transaction. Instead of incentivizing target executives to successfully complete the transaction, the acquirer can negotiate incentives tied to the future success of the integration of the two companies.

An earnout provision emphasizes more skin in the game when it comes to spending the corporations, or shareholders’, assets for an acquisition. Target managers are motivated to remain in the firm and maximize its performance (to receive the deferred payments).[114] Studies convey that earnouts reduce the underlying valuation gap between the merging firms by explicitly linking the target firm’s payment in the acquisition to its future performance.[115] This, in turn, is associated with an increased overall likelihood of merger success (and higher merger synergies).[116] Additionally, the findings suggest higher acquirer gains relative to counterpart M&As without earnouts.[117]

      The financial blinders of overpaying for a company[118] can be reduced when earnout provisions are introduced. The leaders of the target corporation will be incentivized to integrate the two companies successfully when their bonus is tied to completion milestones. Integration is the phase after the transaction closes where employees from the target and acquirer work together to combine the companies. The integration involves constant and cross-communication between all functions in the target and acquirer corporation—legal, human resources, finance, information technology, R&D, and more. The integration phase is a people-intensive activity, and the corporation cannot have a successful conclusion unless they are fully sourced and managed by empowered leaders.

      So, why is it that only 27% of companies utilize an earnout provision?[119] It is quite risky for the acquirer and target—it represents real dollars.[120] An earnout provision could result in the acquirer paying more for the target than the buyer may have originally intended to pay.[121] Additionally, the buyer and seller are at risk for litigation when it comes to the earnout formulae for the acquired business, leading to more expenses.[122] For example, the allocation of overheard costs is a common challenge.[123] Or consider potential disputes over what numbers are included in financial metrics to earn the earnout bonus. Further, goals may not be aligned.[124] For instance, the target’s management may be motivated to maximize earn-out payments, but not necessarily to advance the buyer’s business strategy or interests.[125]

      Unfortunately, earnout provisions are often heavily negotiated and fact specific.[126] In 2013 to 2019, the percentage of transactions with earnouts have been 25% to 27%.[127] This is a steep decline from the upward trend in 2007 to 2011, where the percentage of transactions with earnouts increased from 19% to 38%, respectively.[128] An earnout forces the parties to think about the future, which is a good thing.[129] But, the earnout also keeps an acquisition attorney asleep with one eye open because of the possible dreary outcomes. Lawyers negotiating earnouts on behalf of their clients must have a keen eye for the relative risks and rewards of earnout provisions. As a result, the inclusion of earnout provisions in M&A tends to be the exception rather than the rule.[130] However, using an earnout provision is a tool to provide leadership a tangible action toward climbing an upward mountain of improving insatiable shareholder growth.

 

Conclusion

      This Note uses M&A activity as a lens to examine the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Part I provides the background on corporate M&A and the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Part II examines case studies on M&A activity and trends in share price, and some of the financial and legal reasons for some lackluster deals. Part III provides tangible solutions to improve shareholder wealth—earnout provisions. Overall, this Note reveals that the traditional shareholder wealth maximization is limited and problematic. This Note does not attempt to prove that M&A activity does not further shareholder wealth. But instead, whether shareholders could benefit from leadership decisions that execute on the plans they initially intended. If shareholders are receiving a benefit from M&A activity, could shareholders be receiving more of a benefit?

      When AT&T merged with local telephone companies into a national system, the company changed America and, more importantly, the world.  The ability to receive and send instant communication in this day has propelled our society to a new level of efficiency. Although 1883 was a much simpler time with less globalization and fewer legal rules, one thing remains the same: creating value for shareholders. M&A should be more than just romantic; it should produce a more efficient and valuable product. The idea that M&A could be just romantic rather than real begs the question—is M&A providing a real benefit to shareholders? If not, how can we make it better? Or is M&A activity capped at maximum efficiency?

      For now, the law recognizes shareholder wealth maximization as the only game in town.[131] It is not about to change.[132] Further research could persuade leaders, lawyers, and all those involved with M&A—to do the right thing—for the benefit of shareholders. If these questions are not asked, shareholders will bear the brunt of the loss.        


[ I ] J.D. & M.B.A. Candidate 2023, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.B.A. 2012, University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business. Grateful for the support from my husband Roy Guillen. Special thanks to Professor Alan Kluegel, PhD for guidance and comments.    

[1] Ralph Waldo Emerson, The American Scholar, in Ralph Waldo Emerson Essays & Lectures 51, 63 (Joel Porte ed., 1983).

[2] Niket Nishant, Global M&A Volumes Hit Record High in 2021, Breach $5 Trillion For First Time, Reuters (Dec. 31, 2021, 12:44 AM ), https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/global-ma-volumes-hit-record-high-2021-breach-5-trillion-first-time-2021-12-31/ [perma.cc/J79F-L4W6].

[3] Jack Nickas, Apple Becomes First Company to Hit $3 Trillion Market Value, New York Times (Jan. 3, 2022),  https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/technology/apple-3-trillion-market-value.html.

[4] Les Baird, David Harding, Suzanne Kumar & Andrei Vorobyov, Global M&A Report Midyear 2022, Bain & Co. (Jul. 7, 2022), https://www.bain.com/insights/global-m-and-a-report-midyear-2022/ [https://perma.cc/9ZZ9-CK5X].

[5] Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Mergers May Be Profitable, But Are They Good For The Economy?, Harvard Business Review (Nov. 15, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/mergers-may-be-profitable-but-are-they-good-for-the-economy [https://perma.cc/7BUJ-AXYD].

[6] Id.

[7] David Besanko, David Dranove, Mark Shanley & Scott Schaefer, Economics of Strategy 107 (5th ed. 2010).

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019).

[11] Roger L. Martin, M&A: The One Thing You Need to Get Right, Harvard Bus. Rev. (June 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/ma-the-one-thing-you-need-to-get-right [https://perma.cc/PC7G-M54V].

[12] Id.

[13] Failure, Merriam Webster (1st ed. 2016).

[14] Infra note 15—note 21.

[15] See generally Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 48 Tex. J. Bus. L. at 71 (2019).

[16] See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, 141(a) (2001) (the corporation’s business and affairs “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directions”). All state corporate codes likewise provide for a system of nearly absolute delegation of power to the board of directors, which in turn is authorized to further delegate power to subordinate firm agents. See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 8.01 cmt. (1995) (reviewing statutes).

[17] See Infra note 15 and accompanying text; See supra note 18.

[18] Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1423 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 141 (2d ed. 2009) (“It is well-settled that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.” (citing Dodge for the assertion that corporations should have a “profit-maximizing purpose”).

[19] Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis added); See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (suggests that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder value).

[20] Griffin, supra note 15, at 71.

[21] See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 Bus. Law. 1, 10 (2014).

[22] Id.

[23] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman, Business Organizations: A Contemporary Approach 74 (3rd ed. 2019).

[24] See id. at 77.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] See James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Structure 64 (5th ed. 2009). Comparative Advantage is generally used in terms of goods. In advanced economies, individuals specialize in producing goods where they have a comparative advantage; they then trade to acquire other goods. Specialization enhances the standard of living of a society.

[30] Palmiter, supra note 23, at 220.

[31] Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006); Palmiter, supra note 23,  at 903.

[32] Id.

[33] Scott Fung, Hoje Jo, Shih-Chuan Tsai, Agency Problems In Stock Market-Driven Acquisitions, Emerald Insight, (Oct. 30, 2009) https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/14757700911006958/full/html.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Palmiter, supra note 23,  at 22. “Fiduciary duties seek to protect those who delegate authority against the negligence, disloyalty, or worse of those who exercise this authority on their behalf.”

[41] Net present value is the present value of cash flows at the required rate of return of your project compared to your initial investment. In practical terms, it is a financial metric used to evaluate whether you proceed with a project or not. Generally, a positive net present value means the project is worthwhile. Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Net Present Value, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Nov. 19, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/11/a-refresher-on-net-present-value [https://perma.cc/YXC8-9F9V].

[42] Jeff Brown, Latest CEO Pet Project to Fail: AOL’s Patch, CNBC (Dec. 16, 2013, 3:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/12/16/latest-ceo-pet-project-to-fail-aols-patch.html [https://perma.cc/E27F-ALT5].

[43] Id.

[44] Matt Burns, Patch Hit with Sweeping Layoffs as New Owner Hale Global Restructures, Tech Crunch (Jan. 29, 2014, 11:58 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/01/29/patch-hit-with-sweeping-layoffs-as-new-owner-hale-global-restructures/ [https://perma.cc/8L6D-72V7].

[45] Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928); Max Stul Oppenheimer, Fame: Ownership Implications of Intellectual Property and Agency Law, 30 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 447, 477 (2020).

[46] Solutions to these overarching agency issues are discussed see infra Part III.

[47] Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, A Roadmap to Your Financial Security Through Saving and Investing, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-savings-and-investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2L8-26QU].

[48]  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bit?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1876 (2017).

[49] I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i)(2012). Also applies to IRAs. Id. § 408A(d)(2)(A)(i).

[50] Leo E. Strine, Jr., Supra note 41, at 1880.

[51] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman at 903.

[52] Afra Afsharipour, Bias, Identity and M&A, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 471 (2020).

[53] James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, & Jerold L. Zimmerman at 589. For example, between 1993 and 1999 the value of corporate mergers represented 8.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).

[54] David Gelles, Hostile Takeover Bids for Big Firms Across Industries Make a Comeback, N.Y. Times, (Jun. 12, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/hostile-takeover-bids-for-big-firms-across-industries-make-a-comeback/ [https://perma.cc/FQ2G-9HYP].

[55] See generally Michael J. De La Merced, Mergers Hit a 7-Year High, Propelled by a Series of Blockbuster Deals, N.Y. Times (Jul. 1, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/propelled-by-a-series-of-blockbuster-deals-mergers-hit-a-7-year-high/.

[56] See infra Part II.

[57] Griffin, supra note 15 at 71, 83.

[58] Afra Afsharipour, Revaluating Shareholder Voting Rights in M&A Transactions, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 127, 129 (2017).

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Hugh A. Simons & Nicholas Bruch, Do Mergers Increase Profitability?, L. J. Newsletters (Jan. 2018), https://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2018/01/01/do-mergers-increase-profitability/ [https://perma.cc/5LGR-EMZY].

[62] Id.

[63] Griffin, supra note 15 at 85.

[64] Id.

[65] Theresa H. Maynard, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases, Materials, and Problems 25 (5th ed. 2021).

[66] Griffin, supra note 15 at 84—85.

[67] Id. at 84.

[68] Id. at 86.

[69] Id. at 84.

[70] Id. at 83.

[71] Griffin, supra note 15 at 84.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id. at 85—86.

[76] Id.

[77] Roger L. Martin, M&A: The One Thing You Need to Get Right, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Jun. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/ma-the-one-thing-you-need-to-get-right [https://perma.cc/LY3B-LVWV]; See infra note 111.

[78] Gerrit M. Bechaus, “Comply or Explain”—A Flexible Mechanism to Countervail Behavioral Biases in M&A Transactions, 21 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 183, 187 (2013).

[79] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman at 545.

[80] Id.

[81] Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).

[82] Id. at 777.  

[83] Id. at 779.

[84] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman, supra note 23, at 546.

[85] Bechaus, supra note 71, at 202.

[86] Id.

[87] Id. at 202—203.

[88] Id. at 203.

[89] Id.

[90] Trefis Team, How Microsoft Created $800 Billion in 3 Years—Can it Repeat?, Forbes (Jul. 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/07/06/how-microsoft-created-800-billion-in-3-years--can-it-repeat/?sh=18276507dd1c [https://perma.cc/LVT5-7E5X].

[91] See Ken Smith, The M&A Buck Stops at the Board, 41 Mergers and Acquisitions 48, 49 (Apr. 2006); Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Over-payment Problem, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1018, 1028 (2012); Maynard, supra note 58, at 26 [emphasis added].

[92] See John Callaham, Google Made Its Best Acquisition Nearly 16 Year Ago: Can You Guess What It Was?, Android Authority (May 2021), https://www.androidauthority.com/google-android-acquisition-884194/ [https://perma.cc/9GJB-48FF] (Admittedly, there are exceptions. For example, Google purchased Android for what was considered an exorbitant price at the time. Years later, Google was able to capitalize on the purchase of Android and turn it into a profitable mobile line).

[93] See Robert F. Bruner, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons That Rise Above the Ashes, N.Y. Times 265—291 (2005) (For example, America Online and Time Warner reported a $45 billion write-down in 2003 and then a $100 billion yearly loss.); See also Strife of Brian, Economist (Sep. 7, 2011), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2011/09/17/strife-of-brian [https://perma.cc/V2SY-GSWH] (Countrywide acquisition by Bank America that led to $30 billion in legal settlements and mortgage-related losses.); See, e.g. infra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Fools Rush In: 37 of the Worst Corporate M&A Flops, CBI Insights (Oct. 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/merger-acquisition-corporate-fails/ [perma.cc/MGC4-STT8].

[94] See Afra Afsharipour, Revaluating Shareholder Voting Rights, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 127, 128 (2017).

[95] See id.

[96] See id.

[97] See id.

[98] See Maynard, supra note 58, at 35.

[99] Bechaus, supra note 71, at 195.

[100] Id.  

[101] Id. at 196.

[102] Id.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.

[105] Id.

[106] Id.

[107] Alan Palmiter, Frank Partnoy & Elizabeth Pollman, supra note 23,  at 28. 

[108] Robert Fields, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ISSUES IN M&A SITUATIONS, RMF (2021), https://www.rmfieldslaw.com/post/executive-compensation-and-employee-benefits-issues-in-m-a-situations [https://perma.cc/NQV6-DUCT].

[109] Jeffrey A. Krug, Why Do They Keep Leaving?, Harvard Bus. Rev. (2003), https://hbr.org/2003/02/why-do-they-keep-leaving [https://perma.cc/PY3G-KUUM].

[110] Id.

[111] See Afra Afsharipour, supra note 45, at 481.

[112] See Jeffrey A. Krug, supra note 102.

[113] Jo Danbolt, The Real Effects of Earnout Contracts in M&As, J. of Fin. Research 607 (2021).

[114] Id. at 608.

[115] Id.

[116] Id. at 608—609.

[117] Id. at 609.

[118] Infra Part II.A.ii.

[119] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, Earnout Provisions, BL 2 (2020) (referring to a study completed by the American Bar Association’s Private Target Mergers and Acquisitions Deal Point Studies. Interestingly, 60%-70% of earnout provisions used earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) or revenue as the principal earnout metric).

[120] Id.

[121] 1 M&A Practice Guide § 9.10 (2021).

[122] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, supra note 112 at 5.

[123] 1 M&A Practice Guide § 9.10 (2021).

[124] Id.

[125] Id.

[126] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, supra note 112 at 5.

[127] Id. at  4.

[128] Id.

[129] 1 M&A Practice Guide § 9.10 (2021).

[130] Daniel R. Avery & Goulston & Storrs, supra note 112 at 5.

[131] Jay Coen Gilbert, What eBay’s Court Fight with Craigslist Reveals, Forbes: Corp. Soc. Resp (Sep. 2010), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2010/09/21/what-ebays-court-fight-with-craigslist-reveals/?sh=6db8dccb2dd8 [https://perma.cc/886R-854Q].

[132] Id. 

Not so Lucky in Kentucky: Constitutionality of Kentucky's Slot Machines

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 NOT SO LUCKY IN KENTUCKY: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF KENTUCKY’S SLOT MACHINES 

Ryan Roark [1]

Introduction

                If you ask the average American what Kentucky is known for, the words “horse racing” are a likely answer to follow. Along with “bourbon” and “fried chicken,” Kentucky is interconnected with the horse racing industry and is commonly known as the “Horse Capital of the World.”[2] Gambling has always been an integral part of horse racing in Kentucky ever since tracks began to open in 1875.[3] Fans flock to the betting windows at Churchill Downs, Keeneland, and Red Mile to bet on the races they are spectating, or even other races at different tracks through simulcasting.[4] Patrons pick horses for a multitude of reasons, such as recent horse performance, favorite trainer or jockey, or their favorite color worn by the horse and jockey.[5] The overall economic impact the industry has on Kentucky is extensive, accounting for thousands of jobs and millions in revenue, with wagering revenue accounting for a substantial amount.[6] Wagering is the main appeal for horse racing fans, and it is what has kept the sport alive in an age where professional team sports dominate the sporting industry.[7] With that said, horse racing wagering is the only type of gambling that is legal in the state of Kentucky (excluding charitable gaming and the state lottery) and is regulated by section 528 of the Kentucky statutes and the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission (KHRC).[8]

                While these gambling laws of Kentucky have been explicitly clear, the lines have been blurred recently due to horse racing tracks introducing the Historical Horse Racing Machines (HHR machines) beginning in 2011.[9] These HHR machines resemble the classic “slot machines” that are found in a typical Las Vegas casino with flashing lights, action-themed games, and instant-type betting[10] —the very type of casino-like gaming of chance that is illegal in Kentucky.[11] In fact, in 2020, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled these HHR machines are illegal and do not qualify as pari-mutuel wagering—the cornerstone of what is required for horse racing wagering to be considered legal under Kentucky statutes.[12] In response, the legislature, ignoring the Court’s criteria for what constitutes pari-mutuel wagering, simply adopted a new statutory definition for pari-mutuel wagering, one not shared by anyone outside Kentucky, to allow for the powerful horse industry to continue to exclusively run their slot-like gaming systems.[13] This legislation, Senate Bill 120 (commonly referred to as the “slots bill”), allowing this type of gambling was also passed without a Constitutional Amendment.[14] In other words, Kentuckians did not have any say in the implementation of these highly addictive gambling machines.

                This Note concludes the legislation passed redefining the term “pari-mutuel wagering” is unconstitutional because it defies section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution, it is special legislation benefitting only a special interest, and it violates the separation of powers clause. Part I clarifies the factual definition of pari-mutuel wagering and why the HHR machines do not fall under this category. Part II outlines the language of the bill that redefined pari-mutuel wagering and its implications. Part III discusses how this act of legislation violates both section 226, and the separation of powers clause, of the Kentucky Constitution. Part IV addresses the inferior tax structure and clear favoritism of the horse industry. Lastly, Part V examines solutions in terms of why a constitutional amendment is required for expanded gaming such as this, and how legalized gaming should be taxed.

I. What is Pari-Mutuel Wagering? 

                In the state of Kentucky, any wagering on horse racing must be based on a pari-mutuel system.[15] Section 226 of the State Constitution says that “lotteries and gift enterprises are forbidden, . . . and none shall be exercised, and no schemes for similar purposes shall be allowed.” meaning, as Kentucky courts have interpreted, gambling is generally outlawed in the state of Kentucky.[16] There are key exceptions, however, such as the state lottery, charitable gaming and of course, pari-mutuel horse racing.[17]

                Pari-mutuel wagering differs significantly from typical casino or sports wagering in that a bettor is betting against other bettors rather than against the association (“house”), like in a blackjack game, for example.[18] In other words, at any given horse race, there is a pool of money that consists of every bet that has been placed on that current race.[19] This pool of bets also dictates the odds and potential payout of each horse, which provides transparency to every bettor.[20] When the race ends, the pool of money is then disbursed to those with winning bets, and the payout to the winners depends on the final odds just before the race began with lower final odds resulting in a higher payout for the winners.[21]

                If the bettors are only betting amongst themselves, what is in it for the racetrack owners, the horsemen, and horse owners? This is referred to as the “takeout,” which is a percentage of the winnings (usually 10-20% depending on the state and track) distributed among these participants of the race itself and to taxes.[22] Because the rates of the takeout do not change, the winning bettors are essentially paying a cut to the racetrack for putting on the race.[23]

A.      Common Meaning 

                Given that KRS Chapter 230, which regulates pari-mutuel horse racing, does not define the term “pari-mutuel,” Kentucky courts have used a variety of sources to ascertain the commonly understood meaning of the term.[24] For example, the federal Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, which was designed to standardize the practice of off-track betting, described pari-mutuel wagering as "[a]ny system whereby wagers with respect to the outcome of a horserace are placed with, or in, a wagering pool conducted by a person licensed or otherwise permitted to do so under State law, and in which the participants are wagering with each other and not against the operator.”.[25]

                The term “pari-mutuel” comes from the French language with “pari” meaning “to bet” and “mutual” meaning “mutual” or “reciprocal.”[26] In Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky described pari-mutuel as:

[t]he operator of the machine does not bet at all. He merely conducts a game, which is played by the use of a certain machine, the effect of which is that all who buy pools on a given race bet as among themselves; the wagers of all constituting a pool going to the winner or winners. The operator receives 5 per cent. of the wages as his commission. But in selling ordinary pools on horse races the seller does not operate a “machine or contrivance used in betting.” Neither does he bet on a horse race.[27]

In addition, the KHRC’s regulatory definition matches squarely with these historic definitions in providing that it is: “wagering among themselves and not against the association and amounts wagered are placed in one or more designated wagering pools and the net pool is returned to the winning patrons.”[28]

                The Kentucky courts, KHRC, and federal government agreed on the uniform definition. Thus, before the year 2021, “pari-mutuel” inarguably had a factual, universal meaning.

B.      HHR Machines are not Pari-Mutuel Wagering 

                Despite the well-understood meaning of pari-mutuel, Kentucky horse tracks began to push the envelope (or simply throw the envelope away) by introducing the HHR machines in 2011.[29]  “Triple Action Dragons”, “The Enforcer” and “Tiger Lord” are just a few of the hundreds of various HHR slot gaming themes.[30] The machine itself resembles that of a slot machine exactly. Money is inserted. The patron hits a button. Spinning wheels, lights and sounds stimulate each patron.[31] The horse tracks and KHRC justified the inception with the fact that the results produced by the machines were based on previously run races.[32] The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission disagreed, however, and in a 7-0 ruling held the HHR machines did not constitute a pari-mutuel system of wagering.[33]

                In the ruling Justice VanMeter explained that there are two essential elements that must be in place for pari-mutuel wagering, being “patrons are wagering among themselves and not against the association,” and “amounts wagered are placed in one or more designated wagering pools.”[34] 

                In order for patrons to be able to bet among themselves, there must be a discreet, individual event on which wagers are made.[35] For example, all horse races are discrete in that thousands of bettors are able to wager among themselves at the same time, which is absolutely necessary for pari-mutuel wagering to take place. The biggest key to this—as the court explained—is reciprocity.[36] Reciprocity, translated from the French word mutuel, means mutual dependence on another.[37] In wagering, this is the requirement for bettors to have dependence on each other’s bet or to “bet amongst themselves.”[38] In describing this reciprocity, Justice VanMeter stated, “Without providing simultaneous access to one historical horse race to the same group of patrons, no pari-mutuel pool can be created among the patrons in which they are wagering among themselves, setting the odds and the payout.”[39]

In addition to reciprocity, the second prong is that there must be one or more designated wagering pools for the given event.[40] In Family Trust, KHRC contended that because there was an “initial seed pool” created by the racetracks, the pool designation prong was satisfied.[41] The Supreme Court again disagreed stating:

“The betting pools are required to be established only by the patrons. And, as found by the trial court, based on testimony, a possibility exists that one patron could win all of the net pool, which would then require the association to step back in and replenish the seed pool. At such points, the pools are not created by the patrons as required by pari-mutuel wagering.”[42]  

In other words, when it comes to HHR machines, the association is the opposition on the other end of a given bet by a patron, making it impossible for pari-mutuel wagering to exist. Regardless of how the money lost by patrons is organized, the bottom line is that there cannot be a common pool among patrons when only the association establishes the “pool”—which is unavoidable with HHR machines.[43]

II. The “Slots Bill” 

                In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling that HHR machines did not constitute pari-mutuel wagering, the Kentucky General Assembly immediately passed Senate Bill 120 that simply redefined the term “pari-mutuel” under KRS Chapter 230 to fit the KHRC and keep the horse industry’s exclusive slot gaming business alive.[44] The “new” definition provided in KRS Chapter 230 is as follows:

“Pari-mutuel wagering”… means any method of wagering previously or hereafter approved by the racing commission in which one (1) or more patrons wager on a horse race or races, whether live, simulcast, or previously run. Wagers shall be placed in one (1) or more wagering pools, and wagers on different races or sets of races may be pooled together. Patrons may establish odds or payouts, and winning patrons share in amounts wagered including any carryover amounts, plus any amounts provided by an association less any deductions required, as approved by the racing commission and permitted by law. Pools may be paid out incrementally over time as approved by the racing commission.[45] 

It is immediately apparent that the General Assembly completely ignored the factual definition of pari-mutuel. In the paragraph-long definition there is no mention of “patrons wagering among themselves and not against the association” or “wagering generated only by the patrons”—the two key requirements of pari-mutuel wagering the Supreme Court of Kentucky laid out just months prior to this bill.[46] As Martin Cothran for the Family Foundation put it, “the legislature…simply wrote a new definition for pari-mutuel wagering, one not shared by anyone outside Kentucky…rather than the horse tracks and their allies on the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission changing their actions to bring them into alignment with the law, lawmakers simply changed the law to suit a very wealthy and influential special interest.”[47]

                Not only did the legislature disregard the Supreme Court’s requirements of what constitutes pari-mutuel wagering, the substance of the new definition does not resemble what actual pari-mutuel wagering is.[48] Breaking down the first sentence, the statute states, “any method approved by the KHRC in which one or more patrons wager on a horse race.”[49] The key here is that it states “one or more.” [Opposite of what pari-mutuel actually means (wager among others, dependence on each other, reciprocity, etc.), allowing one person to make a bet against the association is exactly what it sounds like—a slot machine bet.[50]]

                The second half of the definition attempts to address the “wagering pool” concept that is necessary for wagering to be pari-mutuel.[51] Remember, it must be a pool established only by the patrons on a discrete, finite event.[52] The legislature completely does away with this requirement as well. Instead of requiring patrons to establish the odds and pool, the bill states the “patrons may establish odds or payouts” giving leeway to the association to establish it themselves.[53] Also, pools “being paid out overtime” are the opposite of a pool created for a discrete event. Essentially, this gives the association authority to handle the wagers however it pleases with zero transparency to the patrons. Even though the legislature uses the term “pool,” this is simply a façade. Just as a typical casino does, the “house” keeps the money lost by patrons and pays that money out over time to their discretion.[54]

                The implication of the bill is that it allows the horsetracks to run casinos (at the discretion of the KHRC, who has every incentive to only bolster the horsetracks) without fear of competition or consequences.[55] Prominent spokesperson of the Kentucky faithful and Kentucky Sports Radio founder, Matt Jones, has recognized the absurdity of the bill. Just after the bill was passed Jones stated, “In Kentucky we now have legal lottery and slot machines, the two worst forms of gambling that are the hardest to win, most regressive and addictive. Meanwhile sports gambling, poker, etc where you actually can win are still illegal. Logic and reason is not our strong suit.”[56] Kentucky voters thought they were electing representatives who would act in their constituents’ best interest—yet, what they got was the legalization of slot machines, which are a regressive tax on lower income individuals and more addictive than any other form of gambling.[57]

III. Section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Separation of Powers 

A.      HRR Machines Violate Section 226.               

 Any proposed expanded form of gambling in Kentucky must pass the scrutiny of section226 of the Kentucky Constitution, which states, “lotteries and gift enterprises are forbidden, and none shall be exercised, and no schemes for similar purposes shall be allowed.”[58] At the time of its adoption the framers of the current Kentucky Constitution understood the term “lottery” to mean a system in which players wager that a particular number will be selected in a random drawing.[59] The seminal case Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club,[60] delineated the scope of the provision and the definition of the term lottery in saying:

A lottery, it is said, is a species of gambling, described as a scheme for the distribution of prizes or things of value, by lot or by chance, among persons who have paid, or agree to pay, a valuable consideration, for the chance to share in the distribution…[61]

The court summarized this definition as comprising four elements “consideration, chance, prize, and means of disbursement.”[62] While pari-mutuel horse race betting clearly involves these four elements, the court still allowed for the exception of this type of gambling.[63] The essence of the holding was the element of skill rather than chance in horse race wagering.[64] The court found that “the clear weight of authority does not sustain the position . . . that the result of a horse race depends on mere chance within the meaning of that term in the definition of a lottery.”[65] At the core of this reasoning was the distinction between gaming, betting, and lotteries. As the court stated, “Gaming, betting, and lotteries are separate and distinct things in law and in fact, and have been recognized consistently as calling for different treatment and varying penalties. The distinctions are well developed, clearly marked, and in most instances rigidly maintained.”[66] To truly understand why the court allowed for pari-mutuel wagering, a dissection of these terms must be done.

                The term “lottery,” as stated before, requires there be consideration, chance, prize, and means of disbursement.[67] Kentucky courts have interpreted this term broadly as any game distributing a prize predominately by chance for consideration.[68] In determining whether a device or system constitutes a lottery, the element of chance is most debated. Kentucky courts have ruled where chance is the “dominant factor” in deciding the outcome, the scheme is deemed a lottery and thus prohibited.[69] This dominant factor approach has prohibited numerous gambling schemes in Kentucky, including pinball machines,[70] promotional enterprises based on theater ticket sales,[71] pyramid schemes,[72] and numbers games.[73] All of these are lotteries in that chance is the predominant factor producing the result.

                Historically, “gaming” refers to individuals participating in playing a game such as cards or dice, with a wager involved, and where chance is the controlling factor of the outcome.[74] The term “has a rather restricted meaning, and applies only to betting upon the result of some game played with cards, dice, machine, wheel, or other contrivance.”[75] Gaming and lotteries are often used interchangeably in that both involve a predominant factor of chance.[76] The term “lottery” is broader in that it encompasses all games of chance, including drawings, raffles, etc.[77] The bottom line is that both lotteries and gaming, because of their predominant factor of chance, are prohibited under section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution.[78]

                The term “betting,” includes all forms of gambling, both legal and illegal in the state of Kentucky.[79] “To bet is to put to hazard a sum ascertained on a future happening of some event then uncertain; to gamble or game for money or other stakes; or to stake or pledge money or property on an event of a contingent issue, or to wager.”[80] The court in McDevitt v Thomas seemed to distinguish the wagering done under a lottery versus that of betting on horses:

[T]he words “betting” and “wagering” have a much broader and more comprehensive meaning than the word “gaming.” They are unrestricted in their scope, and it is immaterial whether the subject of the wager is one denounced or prohibited by statute or not. The subject of a wager may be, and frequently is, a perfectly innocent pastime, or a legally authorized act; such as the test of speed of animals or men, or the result of an election, or it may be based upon a mere matter of opinion or the exercise of judgment, such as the height of a mountain, the width of a river, the distance of an object, or the weight of a given article.[81]

Years later, in Kentucky Jockey Club, the court legally authorized betting on horses, revolving around the idea that a wager is placed on the basis of an exercise of opinion or judgment.[82] That is to say, the betting that is legal under section 226 may not be on the basis of mere chance.[83] Precedent after Kentucky Jockey Club expanded on this concept as the courts began to view these issues under the light of a dominant factor approach.[84] This approach stipulates, “the test of the character of the game is not whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which is the dominating element that determines the results of the game.”[85] This approach was used in the case of Commonwealth v Allen, where the court held that “chance permeated the entire scheme,” rendering it a lottery.[86]

                Applying the holding of Kentucky Jockey Club and its precedents to the present day issue of the HHR machines, it is clear the machines do not constitute legal wagering under section 226.[87] The only way the machines pass the scrutiny of section 226 is if they constitute pari-mutuel horse betting.[88] As discussed in Part I, the 7-0 ruling from the Kentucky Supreme Court answered the question of whether the machines use a pari-mutuel system.[89] The HHR machines do not work under a pari-mutuel system because there is no reciprocity and the patrons do not establish the wagering pools.[90]

                In addition to not being under a pari-mutuel system, the very nature of wagering the HHR machines administer is unlawful under the holding of Kentucky Jockey Club, because the machines constitute a lottery prohibited by section 226.[91] The machines are a lottery as they operate on the basis of chance rather than an exercise of a patron’s judgment, opinion, or skill.[92] To place a bet on an HHR machine a patron merely approaches the machine, inserts money, presses a button, and within seconds either wins or loses.[93] There is no judgment or skill involved and the user experience is the same as playing a slot machine at a casino.[94]

                The KHRC and horse tracks contend that because the machines produce results based on past races they are different from the standard casino slot machine.[95] However, while the mechanism may be different, the effect on the patron wagering is still the same—that is, randomness.[96] HHR machines generate numbers by selecting at random three different races from a database of historical races.[97] Whether or not a machine uses a random number generator or past races does not matter to the patron playing because the end result is that it is still random. There is no opportunity for skill or judgment. In actual horse racing or simulcasting a bettor has the chance to study statistics of each horse, see the horses in real time and learn the tendencies of jockeys and trainers.[98] In HHR gaming, however, these factors are not relevant, nor are they known to the bettor.[99] Ironically, Kentucky horse tracks such as Red Mile, even refer to the HHR system as “gaming”—a word narrowly used for casino games of chance, as previously mentioned.[100] Jordan Scot Flynn Hollander of the UNLV Gaming Law Journal addressed the issue of instant horse machines as it pertains to New Jersey in saying:

The random races that determine the outcome of games played on these devices are based on previously run races, not live races, nor are they based on actual-time simulcasting of those races…while instant horse wagering devices may be based on historical horse races, they are simply not the same as live and simulcast pari-mutuel wagering. They are slot machines with a different kind of random number generator.[101]

The essence of the issue is that the mechanism, in which HHR machines operate, relies on a system of mere chance.[102] The same nature of mere chance that Kentucky Jockey Club distinguished as a lottery that is prohibited under section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution.[103] Despite the HHR machines being in clear violation of this provision of the Kentucky Constitution, the General Assembly decided to circumvent this constitutional restriction on games of chance by redefining the word “pari-mutuel wagering” to include HHR machines.[104]

B.  Violation Of The Separation Of Powers Clause 

                Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution states, “The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.”[105] The idea of separation of powers has always been an integral part of the federal government and national constitution.[106] At the state level, “it is well settled law in the state of Kentucky that one branch of Kentucky’s tripartite government may not encroach upon the inherent powers granted to it by any other branch.”[107] The powers of each branch are also plainly delineated, being that, the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law.[108]

                In the case of the HHR machines, the legislative branch of Kentucky completely ignored the powers of the judiciary. As discussed in Part II, under the slots bill, the General Assembly wrote an entirely new definition for “pari-mutuel,” only months after the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling that HHR machines did not constitute pari-mutuel wagering.[109] Not only does the new definition allow for wagering against the house, instead of among patrons (as required under a pari-mutuel system), it also allows for wagering on previously run races.[110] This provision was for the HHR machines. Even though they use “previously run races” simply as a random number generator, the inclusion of this provision and the elimination of reciprocity and patrons establishing the pools, are all the horse tracks needed to keep the HHR machines running.[111] While the legislature’s job is to make the law, the General Assembly in Kentucky decided it was also under their power to construe, and define it.[112]

                Each branch of government is responsible for their duties and the courts’ deference to the legislative branch has its limits.[113] These limits are in place for the protection of the people and for the courts to be able to construe the law as to it what it means in reference to the Constitution.[114] There is perhaps no better example of these limits on legislative deference in the state of Kentucky than the seminal case in 1989 of Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.[115]

                In Rose, the Supreme Court of Kentucky interpreted section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution which states,  “The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State."[116] The court ruled that the General Assembly did not satisfy the constitutional requirement because it did not provide an efficient school system throughout the state.[117] Representatives of the General Assembly argued that they should have the sole discretionary power to determine whether the school system is constitutionally sufficient.[118] But the Supreme Court stood its ground. Chief Justice Stevens made it clear to the legislature that while the opinions of the legislature are given some weight and deference, the ultimate duty of enforcing the Constitution lies with the judiciary—“it is our sworn duty, to decide such questions when they are before us by applying the constitution.”[119] As Justice Stevens stated the court is charged with the responsibility of holding the legislature accountable to the Constitution and to protect the rights of the people.[120] Expanding on this idea, Justice Stevens stated, “to avoid deciding the case because of ‘legislative discretion,’ ‘legislative function,’ etc., would be a denigration of our own constitutional duty.[121] To allow the General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are constitutional is literally unthinkable.”[122]

                Rose is now viewed as a landmark case because it truly shows how the separation of powers is supposed to work.[123] Immediately after the ruling, the General Assembly acted with tremendous speed, reforming the educational system providing funding across the Commonwealth to public schools.[124] The legislature listened to the judiciary and Kentucky “sustained the most long-lasting, comprehensive education reforms in the nation.”[125]

                Why is this relevant to the case of HHR machines in Kentucky? The holding of Rose revolved around the definition of one word—“efficient.”[126] Before Rose, the legislature thought they had the power to interpret what the word meant in the public school system.[127] Due to incentives such as reelection and seeking to please interest groups, the politicians’ definition of what “efficient” meant did not align with the purpose of section 183 and most importantly, the interest of the people.[128] That is where the judiciary steps in. Where the legislature fails to align with the values, purpose, and interest of the Constitution and its people, the judiciary’s role is to step in and enforce these interests.[129]

In concluding the role of the judiciary in Rose Justice Stevens ended with these powerful words:

The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely the function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be exercised even when such action serves as a check on the activities of another branch of government or when the court's view of the constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the public.[130]

In the case of HHR, the Supreme Court unanimously defined “pari-mutuel” as it applies to section 226 of the Constitution.[131] The purpose of section 226 was to prevent the proliferation of gambling on mere chance throughout the state of Kentucky.[132] Just like in Rose, the court defined what the law meant, protecting the purpose of the Constitution and the interest of the people.[133] Instead of allowing the court to construe what the law means, the legislature took it upon themselves to do just that.[134] The General Assembly decided they had the power to define and construe the law and implemented the new definition—a definition that is not shared by anyone outside the state of Kentucky.[135] A definition that goes against the very purpose of section 226.[136] A definition that allows for the most addictive and regressive form of gambling to be spread throughout the Commonwealth.[137]

IV. The Legislature’s Favoritism of the Horse Racing Industry   

                After the legislature executed the slots bill, the floodgates have opened for the expansion of  gaming in Kentucky. Various gaming machines, referred to as “gray machines” have already begun to show up across the state at gas stations, convenient stores, and bars.[138] Operators of the machines argue they operate just the same as the HHR machines, and in fact, allow for an opportunity of judgment and skill, unlike HHR machines.[139] Instead of merely pressing a button, a player wins a game by tapping the screen on an icon, to match three of the same icons in a row.[140] After all, if the horse racing industry can run machines of chance, why can another company not do the same with games of skill? 

                This is where the true interest of the legislature shows itself. Lawmakers have already began to speak on the issue of gray machines simply because they do not support the horse racing industry like the HHR machines.[141] In fact, the legislature has already proposed a bill outlawing the gray machines.[142] Senate Majority Floor Leader, Damon Thayer, justified his position in opposing the gray machines saying they do not serve a “higher purpose.”[143] Just what is the higher purpose Senator Thayer is referring to? That would be the purpose of HHR, which is to benefit the horse industry, and a very small percentage actually going to the coffers of the state of Kentucky.[144] While the gray machines provide benefits to small business and proceeds to the Fraternal Order of Police, that does not seem to be the “higher purpose” Senator Thayer is looking for.[145] As Linda Blackford of Kentucky’s Herald Leader put it, “Damon Thayer and his allies showed how easy it is to make some formerly illegal slot machines legal and now the gray machine advocates want a shot. The horse people showed them a really good model: Shower your legislators with attention and donations and they will make your slot machines legal, too.”[146]

                The small percentage of HHR going to Kentucky’s General Fund is a result of the appalling tax structure.[147] The tax structure of HHR is the most blatant evidence of the legislature catering to the whims of the horse industry. Currently, the state of Kentucky tax on HHR machines is only 1.5% of the handle, the total amount wagered on the machines by the public.[148] With this minute tax, the actual percentage that is then converted to the Kentucky General Fund is a mere 8% of the gross commission.[149] This is grossly lower than what relative states tax on their slot machines. Slots are taxed at 55% in Pennsylvania, 53.5% in West Virginia, 33% in Ohio, 40% in Indiana, and 50% in Illinois.[150]

Conclusion 

                Putting aside the issue of the constitutionality of HHR machines, the first step Kentucky must take is to tax them. Between the years 2016 to 2021, betting on HHR machines in the state of Kentucky grew 463% with the total amount of $3.6 billion being bet in the year 2021.[151] That is twice what Kentuckians bet on the lottery and live horse racing combined.[152] Yet, the General Fund collected only $15 million in tax revenue in 2020, compared to $274 million from the lottery.[153] As Democratic Representative Tina Bojanowski put it:

Through the backdoor of HHR slot machines, we now have slots in Kentucky. But because of the egregiously low tax rate, we are not seeing the tax revenue we should. We’re paying the social costs of gambling but receiving almost none of the benefit.[154]

If Kentucky simply raised the tax rate to be in the range of other states, $100 million would be raised annually for public investment, like health care and education.[155] The Kentucky legislature needs to act now and get Kentucky its fair share.

                With that being said, the law the legislature passed allowing slot machines explicitly violates section 226 of the Constitution.[156] If this law is here to stay, there is no bound to how far the legislature may go in expanding gaming in the state. As recently as March of 2022, lawmakers have introduced a bill to legalize sports betting that would be regulated by the KHRC.[157] If enacted, this bill would violate section 226, without giving a voice to the people, just as the slots bill did.

                In order to solve this issue, Kentucky should introduce expanded gambling the proper way via a constitutional amendment. Whether it is slot machines in the form of HHR, sports gambling, or casino gambling in general, the only way these forms can be introduced without violating section 226 is through a constitutional amendment.[158] This would put the issue of expanded gambling to a vote, putting it in the hands of the people, rather than the legislature. Stan Cave, a Lexington-based attorney with the Family Foundation, is a proponent of this idea with any form of expanded gambling in Kentucky: “the plain language in Section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution, an opinion of the highest court in Kentucky at the time and two attorney general opinions make clear that a constitutional amendment is required to legalize sports wagering of the types being considered.”[159] A constitutional amendment is also how Kentucky legalized the state lottery in 1988.[160] Even though the lottery was clearly prohibited by section 226, a referendum by the people allowed this narrow exception, and the Kentucky Constitution was amended.[161] It is well founded that the legislature of a state cannot legalize any form of gambling that is within the scope and meaning of a prohibition in the constitution of the state, unless there is an amendment to the state constitution.[162] A look how a similar state has expanded gambling can be used as a model for Kentucky.

                One of Kentucky’s neighboring states, Ohio, is a great example of using a constitutional amendment for casino gambling. Ohio’s gambling laws under the Ohio Constitution were almost identical to that of Kentucky’s in that “[l]otteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, for any purpose whatever, shall forever be prohibited in this State.”[163] In 2009, however, a constitutional amendment was put to a vote and the people in Ohio elected to allow casino gaming.[164] Features of the bill included a tax rate of 33% of all gross casino revenue (with details regarding how the money will be distributed), a requirement of $50 million fee for any casino to open, and creating an Ohio gaming commission whose sole responsibility is to regulate casino gaming in Ohio.[165] Putting the issue of expanded gambling to a vote incentivizes the legislature to provide citizen-focused policies in the bill, as they did Ohio, because its passage is dependent on the peoples’ approval (as a change to the state constitution should be). If the people of Kentucky elect to allow HHR slots, sports gambling, or casinos--vices they know will have great cost to Kentuckians—they no doubt will want their fair share of taxes and an independent gaming commission regulating it. A monopolistic horse racing industry having an entire gambling market to themselves, with the aligned horse racing commission regulating it, is not in the interest of the public. If gaming is going to enter the state, Kentuckians should have the ability to choose if it is done, and how it is done.

 

 


[1] J.D. Expected 2023, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.S. Economics 2019, University of Kentucky

[2]See Horse Capital of the World, Lexington Visitor Ctr., https://www.visitlex.com/ things-to-do/horses/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/5XTM-4U3Q].

[3] John Isaac, Guide to Online Casinos in Kentucky: The Best Kentucky Casino Sites for 2022, Online-Gambling, https://www.online-gambling.com/us/kentucky/casinos/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/WU9M-GAQY].

[4] M. Shannon Bishop, And They're Off: The Legality of Interstate Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Its Impact on the Thoroughbred Horse Industry, 89 Ky. L.J. 711, 712 (2001).

[5] Id.

[6] Economic Impact of the EQUINE INDUSTRY in Kentucky, Kentuckybred.org, https://www.kentuckybred.org/kentucky-equine-industry-impact/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9CRH-6DZU]; J. Shannon Neibergs, Kentucky Parimutuel Revenue Policy Simulator, Gaming Rsch. & Rev. J. 17 (2000).

[7] Horse Racing History, Winning Ponies.com, https://www.winningponies.com/horse-racing-history.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/WW2G-9CYR].

[8] See Kentucky Online Casinos & Real Money Gambling, Lets Gamble USA (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.letsgambleusa.com/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/4CSE-MSPL].

[9] Adam K. Raymond, How decades-old horse races saved a signature kentucky industry, Spectrum News 1 (Apr. 23, 2021), https://spectrumnews1.com/ky/louisville/news/2021/ 04/21/the-rise-of-historical-horse-racing-in-kentucky [https://perma.cc/E253-ZFTG]; Mike Murphy, Kentucky Supreme Court Rules Against Historical Horse Racing, BettingUSA.com (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.bettingusa.com/supreme-court-kentucky-hhr-case/ [https://perma.cc/742C-QDRL].

[10] Id.

[11] Ky. Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).                                                        

[12] Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595, 600–03 (Ky. 2020).

[13] Ky. Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[14] Joe Sonka, Kentucky Senate Passes Bill to Legalize Slot-Like Historical Horse Racing Machines, Louisville Courier J. (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/ news/politics/ky-general-assembly/2021/02/09/senate-passes-bill-legalizing-historical-horse-racing-machines/4455009001/ [https://perma.cc/CR7G-6EAT].

[15] 811 Ky. Admin. Regs. 2:060 (2021).

[16] Ky. Const. § 226, Bishop, supra note 4, at 603.

[17] Jane Block, Legal Betting, Poker & Casinos in Kentucky, Gambling Online (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.gamblingonline.com/laws/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/3N5J-XJ6W].

[18] Pari-Mutuel Betting—What It Is and How It Works, New York Sports Betting https://www.nysportsbetting.com/guide/pari-mutuel/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3MKR-8VEB].

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] What is a Takeout in Horse Betting, Ezhorsebetting (June 16, 2017), https://www.ezhorsebetting.com/what-is-takeout-in-horse-betting/ [https://perma.cc/HVZ6-MZXM]; Paul Bergeron, Why Horse Bettors Should Eye Takeout Rates and Bet Accordingly, PlayUSA (June 2, 2021), https://www.playusa.com/why-horse-bettors-should-eye-takeout-rates/ [https://perma.cc/2XVS-PWRX].

[23] Id.

[24] Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, 620 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Ky. 2020).

[25] International Horseracing Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–515 § 3, 92 Stat. 1811, 1812 (1978).

[26] Pari-Mutuel, Online Etymology Dictionary (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.etymonline.com/word/pari-mutuel [https://perma.cc/UQ4H-YU55].

[27] Commonwealth v. Ky. Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d 987, 991 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931).

[28] 811 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:005 (effective May 31, 2019, the Commission revised its regulations).

[29] Raymond, supra note 9;  Murphy, supra note 9.

[30] Themed Games, Red Mile Gaming & Racing, https://redmileky.com/gaming/themed-games (last visited Oct. 26, 2022) [https://perma.cc/96N6-BCZR].

[31] Brief for Appellant at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-000630-TG).

[32] Id.

[33]  Fam. Tr. Found. of Ky. v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, 620 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Ky. 2020).

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 601.

[37] Reciprocal, Interglot Translation Dictionary, https://www.interglot.com/ dictionary/en/fr/search?q=reciprocal (last visited Oct. 26, 2022) [https://perma.cc/VJJ9-KGW2].

[38] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[39] Id. at 601.

[40] Id. at 600.

[41] Id. at 599.

[42] Id. at 601.

[43] Id.

[44] S. 120, (2021) https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/21RS/sb120.html [https://perma.cc/6S6W-MXXL].

[45] Id.

[46] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[47] SB 120—The Slots Bill Was an Unconstitutional Millionaire’s Stimulus Bill, The Family Foundation (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.kentuckyfamily.org/sb-120-the-slots-bill-was-an-unconstitutional-millionaires-stimulus-bill/ [https://perma.cc/XS5F-6RWZ].

[48] S. 120 § 15, supra note 45 (current/final version).

[49] Id.

[50] WILLSTN-CN § 17:7.

[51] S. 120 § 15, supra note 45.

[52] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[53] S. 120, supra note 45.

[54]  WILLSTN-CN § 17:7.

[55] Jon Friedl, Kentucky Slot Machine Casino Gambling, Professor Slots (Sep. 22, 2021), https://professorslots.com/kentucky-slot-machine-casino-gambling/ [https://perma.cc/9687-M299].

[56] Jennifer Newell, PokerStars Settles with Kentucky After SCOTUS Petition, Legal US Poker Sites (Sep. 27, 2021), https://www.legaluspokersites.com/news/pokerstars-settles-with-kentucky/28193/ [https://perma.cc/3SC8-E84A].

[57] Joseph Bentivegna, Sports Gambling is Another Tax on the Poor and Minorities, CT Viewpoints (Apr. 1, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/category/ct-viewpoints/sports-gambling-is-another-tax-on-the-poor-and-minorities [https://perma.cc/G29L-34T6].

[58] Ky. Const. § 226.

[59] Op. Att’ys Gen. 05–003 (2005).

[60] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id. at 1009.

[64] Id.

[65] Id.

[66] Id. at 994.

[67] Id. at 992.

[68] Otto v. Kosofsky, 476 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Ky. 1971).

[69] Ky. Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[70] A. B. Long Music Co. v. Com., 429 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1968).

[71] Commonwealth v. Malco-Memphis Theatres, Inc., 169 S.W.2d 596 (1943).

[72] Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (1966).

[73] Gilley v. Commonwealth, 229 S.W.2d 60 (1950).

[74] Kimberly C. Simmons, Definitions of "Gambling" and "Gaming", 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 5 (2022).

[75] McDevitt v. Thomas, 114 S.W. 273, 274 (1908).

[76] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[77] Id.

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80] Kimberly C. Simmons, Definitions of "Gambling" and "Gaming"—terms Descriptive of Related Acts, 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 6 (2022).

[81] McDevitt, 114 S.W. at 274.

[82] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[83] Id.

[84] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[85] Kimberly C. Simmons, Definitions and Distinctions Regarding Games of Skill and Games of Chance, 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 2 (2022).

[86] Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1966).

[87] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[88] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[89] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[94] Id.

[95] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[96] Id.

[97] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[98] Factors to Consider When Betting on Horse Racing, The Plaid Horse (July 7, 2021), https://www.theplaidhorse.com/2021/07/07/factors-to-consider-when-betting-on-horse-racing/ [https://perma.cc/5EZH-H5M4].

[99] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[100] Themed Games, Red Mile Gaming & Racing, https://redmileky.com/gaming/themed-games (last visited Dec. 12. 2022) [https://perma.cc/Y8F7-BNVZ].

[101] Jordan Scot Flynn Hollander, And They're Off! Would Instant Horse Wagering in New Jersey Require Voter Approval?, 6 UNLV GAMING L.J. 239 (2016).

[102] Id.

[103] Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 992.

[104] S. 120, supra note 45.

[105] Ky. Const. § 27.

[106] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).

[107] Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Bevin, 575 S.W.3d 673, 681 (Ky. 2019).

[108] Id.

[109] S. 120, supra note 45.

[110] Id.

[111] Brief for Petitioner at 10, Fam. Tr. Found. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020) (No. 2018-SC-0630-TG).

[112] S. 120, supra note 45.

[113] Sonja Ralston Elder, STANDING UP TO LEGISLATIVE BULLIES: SEPARATION OF POWERS, STATE COURTS, AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS, 57 Duke L.J. 755 (2007).

[114] Id.

[115] Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

[116] Ky. Const. § 183.

[117] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.

[118] Id. at 205.

[119] Id. at 209.

[120] Id.

[121] Id.

[122] Id.

[123] Elder, supra note 114.

[124] Id.

[125] Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & Educ. 485 (1999).

[126] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.

[127] Id.

[128] Elder, supra note 114.

[129] Id.

[130] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209.

[131] Fam. Tr. Found., 620 S.W.3d at 600.

[132] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[133] Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209.

[134] Martin Cothran, SB 120 – THE SLOTS BILL – WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MILLIONAIRE’S STIMULUS BILL, The Family Foundation (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.kentuckyfamily.org/sb-120-the-slots-bill-was-an-unconstitutional-millionaires-stimulus-bill/ [https://perma.cc/DC45-8T4Y].

[135] Id.

[136] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[137] Joseph Bentivegna MD, Sports Gambling Is Another Tax on the Poor and Minorities, CT Viewpoints (Apr. 1, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/2021/04/01/sports-gambling-is-another-tax-on-the-poor-and-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/26VR-8Y3A].

[138] Janet Patton & Bill Estep, Unregulated Slot Machines Are Flooding Kentucky. and Police Are Helping, for a Cut, Lexington Herald Leader (Feb. 6, 2022), https://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/article257134862.html.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] H. B. 606 (2022), https://legiscan.com/KY/text/SB213/2022 [https://perma.cc/4482-5K4L].

[143] Patton & Estep, supra note 139.

[144] Linda Blackford, New Slot Machines Show Confusion of Ky’s Gambling Laws. the Answer: Legalize Everything., Lexington Herald Leader, https://www.kentucky.com/ opinion/linda-blackford/article257654873.html ( Feb. 6, 2022).

[145] Patton & Estep, supra note 139.

[146] Blackford, supra note 145.

[147] Jason Bailey, Letter to the Kentucky House of Representatives on Raising the Inadequate Tax Rate on HHR Slot Machines, Kentucky Center for Economic Policy (Feb. 20, 2021), https://kypolicy.org/letter-to-kentucky-house-raising-hhr-slot-machine-tax-rate/ [https://perma.cc/5544-263P].

[148] Id.

[149] Id.

[150] Id.

[151] Tina Bojanowski, Kentucky Lawmakers Must Fix a Tax-Rate Mistake While Protecting Historical Horse Racing, Courier Journal (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2021/02/05/historic-horse-racing-kentucky-should-raise-tax-rate-machines/4412150001/ [https://perma.cc/DS9V-UR4Z].

[152] Id.

[153] Id.

[154] Id.

[155] Id.

[156] S. 120, supra note 45.

[157] H. B. 606 (2022), https://legiscan.com/KY/text/SB213/2022 [https://perma.cc/N2BJ-7RRS].

[158] Legislative Research Commission, House Votes to Take a Gamble on Sports Betting, Times Tribune (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.thetimestribune.com/news/local_news/house-votes-to-take-a-gamble-on-sports-betting/article_20379d67-fd44-5358-bf8d-596e5a23b148.html [https://perma.cc/9XJF-TKLS].

[159] Kentucky: Sports Betting Would Not Require Constitutional Amendment, Yogonet, https://www.yogonet.com/international/news/2019/12/19/51914-kentucky-sports-betting-would-not-require-constitutional-amendment (last visited Dec. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/DE5M-438K].

[160] Kentucky Lottery History, Lottery-tickets.net (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.lottery-tickets.net/kentucky-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/32WY-YZHQ].

[161] Op. Att’ys Gen. 93–58 (1993).

[162] Kimberly C. Simmons, Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Regarding Gaming, Generally, 38 Corpus Juris Secundum 18 (2022).

[163] Ohio Const. art. XV, § 6.

[164] Ohio Casino Approval and Tax Distribution, Amendment 3, Ballotpedia (2009), https://dev.ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Casino_Approval_and_Tax_Distribution,_Amendment_3_ [https://perma.cc/E8AJ-FW4X].

[165] Id.

Unconstitutional: Key Searches of Residential Doors by Law Enforcement Are Violative of the Fourth Amendment

Download a PDF Below:

 Kendra A. CraftI

Introduction

 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the foundation for all search and seizure issues in criminal law proceedings. In doing so, the Fourth Amendment plays two vital roles in the American legal system. First, the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the individual, extending to “all invasions on the part of the government and its employees on the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”[2] Second, but equally important, the Fourth Amendment provides regulation for government actors. The actors who are typically the subject of Fourth Amendment inquiries are police.[3] The Fourth Amendment is the primary form of legal constraint on police. While most states have their own laws governing search and seizure issues, they are comparatively sparse and are typically skipped over in favor of the Fourth Amendment. The text of the Fourth Amendment guarantees:

 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[4]

 

As the amount of policing in the United States has increased within the past century, so have the number of alleged Fourth Amendment violations committed by law enforcement.[5] These violations have effectuated a substantial set of caselaw that continues to expand with each new issue regarding a Fourth Amendment violation.[6] While the breadth of issues regarding the Fourth Amendment is vast, the basic structure of the inquiry remains the same. Modern Fourth Amendment litigation involves a challenge to the evidence obtained during a search and seizure conducted by police. More particularly, the court examines the means by which the challenged evidence was obtained by police in the course of the investigation or in enforcement of ordinary criminal proceedings. Most often, defendants will seek to exclude, or suppress, the evidence gathered in these searches or seizures.

While certain aspects of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure seem to be well settled within the law, there are still many aspects that remain unresolved. Today, several circuit courts remain split as to whether an unreasonable search occurs within the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and ultimately uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the arrestee’s residence.[7]

This Note considers the conflicting judicial interpretations of statutory language and argues that an unreasonable search occurs within the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key to determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and ultimately uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the arrestee’s residence. Part I provides the history of the Fourth Amendment in criminal proceedings and discusses the evolving rules and standards that are implicated by Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases. Part II examines the circuits’ conflicting interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in cases that involve the use of a key to unlock an arrestee’s residence. Part III explains why an unlawful search occurs when an officer removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key to determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence.

 

I.        The History and Development of Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures

 

The ideals that define the Fourth Amendment, much like the common law itself, have pre-colonial roots. The Fourth Amendment, though often credited to be a result of tensions with the British that spawned the American Revolution, actually originates from British legal theory.[8] The axiom that a man’s home is his castle is represented by the passionate speech of William Pitt to Parliament in 1763, where he argued that:

 

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.[9]

 

Such beliefs did have supporting legal precedent, as exhibited by Entick v. Carrington and the series of accompanying actions against government actors that spanned across the early 1700s.[10] These actions were a result of searches and seizures carried out with general warrants, with the intentions to uncover evidence in connection with the pamphlets of John Wilkes, who criticized the King and his policies.[11] Entick, an associate of Wilkes, sued the government agents for forcibly entering his home, breaking into locked desks and boxes, and seizing evidence from the search.[12] The court agreed with Entick and declared the search, and the general warrant that permitted it, contrary to “all of the comforts of society” and “contrary to the genius of the law of England.”[13] The ruling required that warrants must be issued under statute or other legal precedent in order to be considered valid under the laws of England. Entick is regarded as a “landmark of English liberty” and a guide to understanding the Framers’ intentions in penning the Fourth Amendment.[14]

Though the Fourth Amendment was ratified into the United States Constitution in 1791, it remained predominantly powerless until the ruling of Mapp v. Ohio in 1961.[15] In 1957, police arrived at Ms. Mapp’s home in response to information that she was hiding a fugitive wanted in connection with a recent bombing.[16] After Mapp refused to allow police to enter her home without a warrant, police produced a sheet of paper claimed to be a warrant.[17] An altercation ensued between Mapp and the officers as Mapp tried to read the warrant and police eventually forcibly entered the home.[18] Upon illegally searching the home, police found no evidence of a fugitive. Instead, they found “obscene papers” and Mapp was ultimately charged and convicted of possessing obscene materials.[19] The Supreme Court reversed Mapp’s conviction, holding that evidence that is obtained by illegal means is to be considered inadmissible in state court; this was an extension of the pre-existing rule that prohibited illegal searches in federal court.[20]

Since the ruling of Mapp v. Ohio, there have been countless significant rulings that have added, and occasionally pulled, teeth from the Fourth Amendment. These rulings provide tests and factors to determine whether a search or seizure has occurred within the Fourth Amendment, whether the warrant requirement has been satisfied, and whether there is an exception to the warrant requirement that applies to the particular facts of a case. First, a search must be reasonable. A search may be subjected to the reasonable expectations test as depicted in the concurrence of Katz v. United States.[21] The test consists of two questions: the first is whether there is an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and the second is whether that expectation is objectively reasonable.[22]  A search may also be subjected to the common-law trespass test of Florida v. Jardines, wherein if the government “obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects,” a search has “undoubtedly occurred.”[23] The Katz test and the Jardines test work cohesively together, with neither one maintaining superiority over the other.[24] From Jardines, there is a subset of property tests. The first appears within Jardines itself and is a test to determine whether a physical intrusion has occurred on the curtilage of the home.[25] Under Jardines, a physical intrusion into a protected area that results in the acquisition of information only fails to constitute a search if that intrusion is permitted by a license such as one that is available to other, “normal,” members of the public such as neighbors or solicitors.[26]

The specific test for determining exactly what areas qualify as the curtilage of the home is defined in United States v. Dunn, wherein the court noted that  “the centrally relevant consideration” in determining the extent of a home's curtilage is “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.”[27] The court points to four specific factors, which are: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home;” “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home;” “the nature of the uses to which the area is put;” and “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.”[28] These property rights are not solely for those residences that are owned outright and renters of apartments are also afforded these same rights. The Fourth Amendment places extraordinary value on “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”[29] As the court in United States v. Bain later points out, there is “no reason to expect a different answer when the home is a rented condominium.”[30] While certain issues and tests regarding Fourth Amendment search and seizure seem to be well settled within the law, there are still many aspects that remain unresolved.

 

II.       The Issue of Key Searches and a Circuit Split

 

While certain aspects of Fourth Amendment search and seizure seem to be well settled within the law, there are still many particulars that remain unresolved. One of these particulars is the issue of key searches. A key search occurs when an agent of the government, often a law enforcement officer, removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key to determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and ultimately uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the arrestee’s residence.[31] Today, several circuit courts remain split as to whether these events constitute an unreasonable search within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.[32] 

 

A.       United States v. Moses and United States v. Concepcion: Restricting Constitutional Protections to Key Searches of Residential Doors

 

The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Moses held that an officer’s key search was reasonable based on the Fourth Amendment.[33] In 2006, a Tactical Special Enforcement Team began investigating a local street gang known as the “Goodfellas” in connection with drug trafficking and violent crimes.[34] One month later, the team apprehended the leader of the gang, Carl Kotay Graham, who provided officers with information naming Covonti Kwa Moses as a member of the gang.[35] Graham told the officers that Moses had guns and cocaine, amongst other gang-related items, stashed at a “cream-colored duplex” on “Cedar Street.”[36] After arresting Moses for driving with a suspended license and for possession of marijuana, an officer brought Moses back to Cedar Street, where officers used the keys obtained from a search to determine whether one of them unlocked unit A.[37] The key opened unit A and officers conducted a protective sweep of the unit and discovered, in plain view, crack cocaine and marijuana residue.[38]

While still at the scene, another tip was received that Moses was selling crack cocaine from another residence; police also used Moses’ keys to unlock this residence and found more evidence of crack cocaine.[39] Using this information, officers obtained a search warrant and discovered evidence used to charge Moses with possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.[40] Moses appealed these pleadings, arguing that the officers entered the two residences without a warrant. Amongst other arguments, Moses argued that the district court was not entitled to rely on the evidence that the keys in his possession unlocked the doors “because the use of the key was part of the illegal entry into a residence” and the use of the key was the “beginning of an illegal search.”[41] The Fourth Circuit, with very little rationale other than following the lead of other circuits, upheld the conviction, arguing that the “discrete” act of inserting the key into the lock to determine whether it fit did not “offend the Fourth Amendment.”[42]

The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Concepcion held that an officer’s key search was reasonable based on the Fourth Amendment.[43] Gamalier Concepcion consented to a search of his apartment wherein DEA agents found evidence of cocaine.[44] This evidence was used to secure a guilty plea of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute that landed Concepcion with over three years imprisonment; however, Concepcion reversed for appeal an objection as to the validity of his consent to the search of his apartment.[45] Concepcion, in his appeal to the Seventh Circuit argued that his consent was “fruit of two unlawful searches.”[46] After arresting and searching Concepcion, the DEA agents seized his keys and began searching for his apartment. After locating a mailbox with the nameplate “Concepcion,” police inserted one of the keys found on Concepcion to open the exterior door to the apartment.[47] After entering the apartment’s common area, agents used another key to unlock Concepcion’s individual bedspace.[48] After unlocking the door, agents opened the door an inch, closed the door, then locked the door again without looking inside. Concepcion initially denied knowing anything about the apartment, but later relented and signed a consent form for the search of the bedspace.[49] The district court’s opinion held neither the entry into the common area of the apartment nor the insertion of the key into the lock to be an unreasonable search.[50] The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that a search is the invasion of a sphere in which society recognizes reasonable expectations of privacy.[51]

The Seventh Circuit, however, differentiated the entry of the key into the lock as being a much more complicated issue. A keyhole, as explained by the court, is a “potentially protected zone,” as it “contains information—information about who has access to the space beyond.”[52] After acknowledging the already-growing circuit split between the Sixth and First Circuits and the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that because the DEA agents were obtaining information from the inside of the lock, which “is both used frequently by the owner and not open to public view,” the insertion of the key must be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.[53] The Seventh Circuit then qualified the search as reasonable based on a slippery slope analysis. The court reasoned that because Concepcion was properly arrested and searched without a warrant, there should not be a warrant requirement to “learn whether the keys in Concepcion’s possession operate a lock.”[54] The Seventh Circuit concluded by affirming the conviction with the confident assumption that, while an owner of a lock has a privacy interest in the keyhole, that interest is “so small” as to be deemed insignificant.[55]

 

B.       United States v. Bain: Extending Constitutional Protections to Key Searches of Residential Doors

 

More recently, the First Circuit in United States v. Bain has taken a confident step towards the future of the Fourth Amendment.[56] Yrvens Bain was arrested after he emerged from a multi-family unit apartment building. After Bain was searched, police found a set of keys in his possession and subsequently used these keys to open the front door of the building and attempted to open three apartments within the building. After trying and failing to open one apartment on the first floor and another apartment on the second floor, the key finally succeeded in opening a door on the second floor. Police used this information to apply for and secure a warrant to search the apartment; this search produced a firearm and drug paraphernalia.[57] Bain attempted to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers conducted an unlawful search by turning the key in the locks to identify the unit and that there was no probable cause absent that identification. The district court denied this motion and Bain was convicted. The First Circuit found that the turning of a key in a lock is unreasonable and a warrantless search unsupported by “any clear precedent” and that “without the information obtained by turning the key, there was no probable cause to issue a warrant.”[58]

The First Circuit reached this conclusion by citing to United States v. Dunn and holding that, even if the lock on the apartment door is not within the home itself, it is at minimum a part of the curtilage of the home.[59] The court used the Dunn factors to conclude that the lock on a door is sufficiently proximate to the interior of the home, is included within or adjacent to the door’s outer face, is intended by nature to bar unwelcome entry and the invasion of privacy, and that the “very design” of a lock hides its interior from being examined.[60] The court also cited to Jardines, arguing that a physical intrusion into the curtilage to obtain information is a search, unless it is within the “implicit license” which “typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”[61] As the behavior of police was not considered to be within social norms, a search occurred under the Fourth Amendment. While the government referenced United States v. Lyons and United States v. Hawkins to bolster its argument that key searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the court disagreed based upon the specific facts of these cases.[62]

The First Circuit dismissed the government’s citation to other circuit court opinions, like those discussed in previous paragraphs. The court distinguished key searches of car doors from key searches of residential doors, arguing that the Constitutional protections of automobiles are much less strong than that of residences.[63] The court also took aim at the Moses decision for containing no real analysis of the issue.[64] Finally, the court addressed the Seventh Circuits holding in Concepcion, questioning “the logic of justifying a search of this type” by way of the plain view doctrine.[65] The First Circuit referenced the ease by which the government could have obtained other identifying information and questions why it would be necessary to invade the curtilage of the home, rather than using those less invasive means. Conclusively, the court pointed to the fact that the officers invaded the curtilage of Bain’s home for the sole purpose of gaining evidence to use against him in a criminal action and argued that there is “no reason to conclude that the law enforcement-related concerns sufficiently outweighed the privacy-related convers to render this search reasonable.”[66] While the court ultimately falls back on a good-faith exception to the warrant requirement, their initial holding that key searches are violative of the Fourth Amendment has created a circuit split amongst the courts. This split remains unresolved.

 

III.     Key Searches of Residential Doors are a Violation of the Fourth Amendment

 

As indicated by the plain text and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the judicial history surrounding the application of the Fourth Amendment to the home, an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. These arguments will be considered below.

 

A.     The Distinction Between Residential and Non-Residential Key Searches

 

Before an argument for extending the Fourth Amendment to key searches of residential can be made, the distinction between residential and non-residential key searches must be clarified. While the issue of key searches certainly has not been brought up so frequently as to lend itself to a comprehensive solution, it does seem that the circuits have agreed that Fourth Amendment protections will not extend to key searches on car doors or storage units. This decision likely has roots in the automobile exception and the ideals behind it. The automobile exception was first introduced in Carroll v. United States.[67] In Carroll, federal prohibition agents encountered a car on the highway that they had reason to believe was being driven by bootleggers.[68] The agents stopped the car, searched it without a warrant, and discovered bottles of whiskey and gin hidden within the car’s upholstery.[69] In upholding the search, the court created the automobile exception, which permitted searches and seizures of cars stopped alongside the road if obtaining a warrant would not be “reasonably practicable” and the agent has reasonable or probable cause to believe that the automobile has contraband liquor that is being transported.[70] While the specific restrictions of prohibition have long since ended, the automobile exception has not only remained, but has expanded. Courts have extended the automobile exception to allow agents to move and search a vehicle.[71] Courts have also extended the automobile exception to apply to containers within a vehicle, whether owned by the owner of the vehicle or by a passenger.[72] The Supreme Court, in California v. Carney, went so far as to extend the automobile exception to a mobile home.[73] The majority in Carney holds that it is too difficult to draw distinctions between residential and non-residential moveable vehicles and claims that such a task will be “impossible” for officers.[74] Justice Stevens’ dissent, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, pushes back on this assumption and argues that, by looking at the exterior of the mobile home, officers should be able to pick up on “clues” as to whether the mobile home is being used as a residence.[75] Given the Supreme Court’s historical hesitancy to extend stringent Fourth Amendment protections to automobiles and typically non-residential spaces, it is unsurprising to see the circuits follow this line of reasoning to reject, seemingly unanimously, any argument regarding key searches on car doors and storage units.

 

B.  Plain Text and Purpose of the Fourth Amendment

 

The plain text and the purpose of the Fourth Amendment supports the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The text of the Fourth Amendment guarantees:

 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[76]

 

As shown above, the plain text of the Fourth Amendment requires all searches to be reasonable. Even as conceded by many of the courts in previous paragraphs, key searches are typically unreasonable and invade the sense of privacy and security that people value in their homes and, to a lesser extent, in their automobiles. The plain text of the Fourth Amendment fails to lend itself to the assertion that residential key searches are reasonable. Further, the apparent purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as introduced by the Framers of the United States Constitution, was not to allow government to overstep into the lives of its citizens. Looking back to the case of Entick v. Carrington, where the court declared a search, and the general warrant that permitted it, contrary to “all of the comforts of society” and “contrary to the genius of the law of England.”[77] The ruling of Entick, and others like it, which the Framers used as the foundation for the Fourth Amendment, place fervent value on the principles of privacy, freedom, and liberty of the individual. Allowing government actors to circumvent these rights by removing keys from an arrestee, using those keys to determine whether they unlock a door to a residence, and using this information to secure a warrant against the arrestee certainly seems to work against the values secured within the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the plain text and the mere purpose of the Fourth Amendment support the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

 

C.  Judicial History of the Fourth Amendment: The Trend Towards More Stringent Fourth Amendment Protections

 

The judicial history of the Fourth Amendment also supports the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. As explained by the court in Bain, the only precedential case to thoroughly address the issue of a residential key search was the Seventh Circuit in Concepcion. The holding in Concepcion had no constitutional argument or evidence to support its conclusion that residential key searches are per se reasonable. Rather, Concepcion relied on an extension of the plain view doctrine from Arizona v. Hicks, wherein police lawfully entered and searched an apartment and noticed stolen stereo equipment.[78] As the court in Hicks itself notes, warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and there is no reason why an exception to the warrant requirement should require a lesser standard of cause than that needed to obtain an actual warrant. Further, though not mentioned by the court in Concepcion or the court in Bain, the facts of the Hicks seem similar in a different way. In Hicks, the court ultimately holds that, while the plain view doctrine is certainly valid, the officer’s action of physically touching and manipulating the stereo system in order to observe and record the serial number oversteps the bounds of the exception to the warrant requirement and is thus unconstitutional.[79] This excessiveness seems rather comparable to an officer removing a key from an arrested person, transporting the key to a residential door, and inserting and manipulating the key in order to unlock and often open the door. As conceded by many of the circuit opinions within this line of cases, the information needed to obtain a search warrant could possibly be found by other, less intrusive means. If this is true, as Bain hints at, there should be no reason for an officer to take the extra, invasive steps in order to trespass on the curtilage of an arrestee’s home to secure a warrant.

Further, it does not seem to run afoul of any of the relevant constitutional tests to consider residential key searches violative of the Fourth Amendment. As noted by the Court in Kentucky v. King, it is the “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law… that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”[80] As further identified by Florida v. Jardines, a search may also be subjected to the common-law trespass test. In this case, it seems as if the area of the home impacted by a key search falls within the curtilage of the home as defined by Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Dunn. As the Katz test and the Jardines test work cohesively together, with neither one maintaining superiority over the other, we must also assure that the Katz test is satisfied. The test consists of two questions: the first is whether there is an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and the second is whether that expectation is objectively reasonable.[81] It would certainly be difficult to argue that an individual did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the lock on their front door. Under Jardines, a physical intrusion into a protected area that results in the acquisition of information only fails to constitute a search if that intrusion is permitted by a license such as one that is available to other, ‘normal’ members of the public. As normal members of the public, such as neighbors and solicitors, certainly do not have the license to remove a key from an arrestee or use that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, we can conclude that the police do not have the license to do so. Thus, the judicial history of the Fourth Amendment also supports the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

 

D.  Existing Doctrines Provide Sufficient Exceptions for Law Enforcement

 

Fourth Amendment protections have been continuously evolving since United States v. Mapp. While the Fourth Amendment is no longer the toothless doctrine it once was, there are still multiple exceptions to the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. An underlying concern that seems to be coursing through the opinions of many circuit courts is that of police efficiency. This concern is certainly not a new or novel one. As such, there are numerous exceptions that have been carved out by the courts over the past century. One of the chief exceptions is known as the exigent circumstances doctrine. The exigent circumstances doctrine, along with numerous other exceptions, such as the plain view doctrine, the automobile exception, hot pursuit, and the good faith exception, provide a plethora of protections for efficiency in police administration. Each of these doctrines protect police at the disadvantage of the individual. These doctrines provide sufficient exceptions for law enforcement when conducting otherwise unlawful searches and seizures; the remaining circuits should follow the lead of the First Circuit in finding key searches on residential doors to be unlawful, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances.

 

IV.     Conclusion

 

As indicated by the plain text and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the judicial history surrounding the application of the Fourth Amendment to the home, an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Other circuits should follow the lead of the First Circuit in analyzing future key search cases in order to better protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, weighing efficiency needs and other exceptions as required, on an individual case basis.



I J.D. 2022, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.A. in English 2018, University of Kentucky.

[2] Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

[3] Id.

[4]  U.S. Const. amend IV.

[5] See generally, President’s Commission on Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Feb. 1967) (a report from the Johnson Administration, enacting new guidelines for policing and kick-starting the practice of active policing); Cheryl Corley, President Johnson’s Crime Commission Report, 50 Years Later NPR (Oct. 6, 2017 at 7:00 AM) (https://www.npr.org/2017/10/06/542487124/president-johnson-s-crime-commission-report-50-years-later) (discussing the impacts of the 1967 act).

[6] See generally, Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 33 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 5 (2004) (a summarized history of the Fourth Amendment).

[7] See United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).

[8] Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1999). 

[9] Id. at 80.

[10] Id. at 88–89.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626.

[14] Id.

[15] Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

[16] Id. at 644.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 644–45.

[19] Id. at 645.

[20] Mapp, 367 U.S. at 665–60; See also, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 343 (1914) (introduced the exclusionary rule in federal courts).

[21] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring) (conception of the “reasonable expectations” test that is now cited as controlling in modern caselaw).

[22] Id.

[23] Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

[24] United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).

[25] Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3–4 (defining the curtilage as the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home).

[26] Id. at 6 (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)).

[27] United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 295 (1987) (defining the test for curtilage).

[28] Id.

[29] Jardines, 569 U.S. at 4 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

[30] United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing generally to Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961) (rented premises); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (hotel rooms).

[31] Courts have also considered the Constitutionality of key searches in regard to automobiles and storage units, seeming to settle that neither violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1984).

[32] See United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (examples of key search cases on both car doors and residential doors).

[33] U.S. v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008).

[34] Id. at 265.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id at 266.

[38] Id. at 266–67.

[39] Id. at 267.

[40] Id. at 267–268.

[41] Moses, 540 F.3d 263 at 272.

[42] Id.

[43] United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991).

[44] Id.

[45] Id. at 1171.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 1171–72.

[50] United States v. Concepcion, 742 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.III. 1990).

[51] Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).

[52] Id. at 1172.

[53] Id.

[54] Id.

[55] Id. at 1173.

[56] United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).

[57] Id. at 9–10.

[58] Id. at 11.

[59] See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 295 (1987) (defining the test for curtilage).

[60] Bain, 874 F.3d at 15.

[61] Id.

[62] Id. (distinguishing the facts of the current case to the facts of United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1990) and United States v. Hawkins, F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1998), which applied to locks on storage containers, rather than residential locks)).

[63] Id.

[64] Id. (distinguishing from Moses).

[65] Bain, 874 F.3d at 18 (distinguishing from Concepcion).

[66] Id. at 19.

[67] See Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1924).

[68] Id. at 135.

[69] Id. at 136.

[70] Id. at 156.

[71] See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (upholding the decision to move a suspect’s car from the road to the police station for a search).

[72] See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the automobile exception applies to containers within the vehicle if probable cause is present); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that the automobile exception applies to passengers within a vehicle, as passengers should also have a deceased expectation of privacy).

[73] California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1984).

[74] Id. at 386 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 387 (1976)).

[75] Carney, 471 U.S. at 406 (Stevens J., dissenting).

[76] U.S. Const. amend IV.

[77] United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).

[78] Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).

[79] Id.

[80] Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 1, 5 (quoting Bingham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).

[81] United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).


Nexus of Vulnerability: An Expanded View of Drug-Based Coercion

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Ben VanSlyke[I]

[D]rugs are used like weapons—they are used as a tool of mass destruction; as a tool to gain advantage over an already vulnerable victim; and as a tool to disarm a victim due to its power. Drugs are weaponized in the sex trafficking world.[2]

In the last two decades, sex trafficking has received increasing attention throughout the United States and the world.[3] In roughly the same timeframe, the United States has seen a meteoric rise in the use of opioids and related overdoses.[4] Independently, illicit drug trafficking is the largest criminal industry in the world, and human trafficking is the second largest.[5] Each generate billions of dollars of profit per year.[6] Both of these industries are just that: industries. Like any businessperson, criminals seek new markets to expand into, including other criminal markets. For someone already engaged in one industry, the decision to expand into the other is largely financial; if they have the means to spread out their resources for greater profits, it makes sense to do so. This includes by using one to facilitate the other: for example, forcing trafficking survivors to transport or deliver drugs, or using their access to drugs as a means to control a trafficking survivor through addiction.[7]

For too long, these have been seen as distinct issues. Recently, however, practitioners in various fields have begun to recognize the intrinsically intersectional nature of sex trafficking and the opioid crisis. This article seeks to contribute to this dialogue, expanding upon the extreme nature of the vulnerabilities created when these two issues collide, and supporting the application of the criminal law concept of drug-based coercion to civil litigation so as to increase the availability of remedies to survivors of this vicious form of exploitation.

As a preliminary matter, the author acknowledges that some of the assertions and correlating support contained in this article rely on primarily anecdotal information. By nature of the topic and its relatively recent recognition, quantitative analysis of the intersection between sex trafficking and opioids is limited, and even individually both topics are still not completely understood. By incorporating the author’s first-hand experiences working in this arena with corroborating support, qualitative research, information about related topics, and logical inferences, this article seeks to provide a forward-looking analysis of an issue that desperately warrants greater research.

Section I of this article provides relevant background information about the legal theory of drug-based coercion to frame further discussion. Section II identifies risk factors for both addiction and human trafficking and identifies the many ways in which the two coincide. Section III delves deeper into the realities of drug-based coercion and the many horrific forms it can take. In Section IV, the author draws upon his experience litigating civil cases on behalf of trafficking survivors to consider the role of drug-based coercion in the context of civil litigation, as well as to counter foreseeable challenges. Finally, Section V reflects upon the earlier discussions to offer insights and recommendations on this complex topic.

 

I.  Background

 

The legal theory of drug-based coercion is rooted in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).[8] This section provides that “force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means” are sufficient to satisfy the relevant element of a sex trafficking offense.[9] Section 1591(e)(2) proceeds to define coercion as “threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person” or “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person.”[10] The operative term here, “serious harm,” is further defined in Section 1591(e)(5) as “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, . . . that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or continue performing commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.”[11]

This statutory language has been interpreted to conclude that, under Section 1591, a trafficker withholding an individual’s drug supply when that individual suffers from drug addiction—medically referred to as substance use disorder (“SUD”)—constitutes serious harm and thereby constitutes coercion.[12] This includes threatening to withhold the supply, even if it is not actually withheld, so long as the threat is intended to cause the individual to believe that noncompliance will lead to the supply being withheld.[13] In United States v. Fields, for example, a district court found that the “threat of withdrawal sickness constitutes ‘psychological’ harm that is ‘sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.’”[14]

This understanding relies on the concept of special vulnerability. Federal prosecutors have argued in favor of “seeking both an appropriate ‘vulnerability’ jury instruction and sentencing enhancement.”[15] This interpretation is supported by Supreme Court decisions in other contexts.[16] However, to effectively utilize special vulnerability in cases involving sex trafficking, it is important that attorneys understand why people suffering from addiction are uniquely vulnerable to being trafficked. On one hand, given the significant overlap between risk factors for addiction and risk factors for falling prey to sex trafficking, many people who develop addictions are at greater risk of trafficking even before substance use plays a role, and the presence of addiction can flag the likely presence of these other risk factors.[17] On the other hand, once an addiction is established, both the immediate effects of the substance use (i.e., the “high”) and the constant fear of withdrawal symptoms produce additional vulnerability unique to addiction, which only exacerbate any preexisting risk factors.[18] As a result, when addiction and trafficking coincide, the victim is often already vulnerable due to other risk factors and rendered doubly vulnerable by the effects of drug use and addiction. Both of these categories of vulnerability fall within the consideration of section 1591(e)(5), as they are certainly background and circumstantial factors that affect the reasonableness of an individual’s actions in response to coercion by a trafficker, including coercion by threat of withholding their drug supply.[19]

In the context of federal criminal trials—as well as federal civil actions[20]—drug-based coercion is independently established through federal common law.[21] However, this concept is not new. Some states have codified this interpretation of coercion explicitly,[22] and the Uniform Law Commission recommended the adoption of this definition as early as 2013.[23] Further, this model law has been supported by the American Bar Association since 2013.[24]

 

II.  Comparative Risk Factors Of Addiction and Trafficking

 

Through decades of study, numerous factors have been identified as indicators that an individual is at a higher than average risk of developing an addiction.[25] Though non-exhaustive, some of the relevant factors include:

·                  Early substance use;

·                  Early and persistent behavior issues;

·                  Peer substance use;

·                  Poor family structures and/or family conflict;

·                  High availability of substances in the area;

·                  High crime rates in the area; and

·                  Low socioeconomic status.[26]

 

By and large, these risk factors should be unsurprising; it seems intuitive, for example, that individuals who spend significant amounts of time around friends and family who engage in substance use are more likely to do so themselves. However, the fact that these factors are so well-documented lends support to legal theories that rely on this information to demonstrate a client’s vulnerability.

Additionally, researchers have identified that individuals who are survivors of violence or abuse—particularly when the abuse occurred as a child—are statistically much more likely to develop addictions.[27] “A review of studies on associations between childhood sexual and physical abuse and substance use problems concluded that childhood abuse is a factor in the development of substance use problems but the relationship is likely mediated by psychiatric conditions, such as anxiety and depressive disorders.”[28] More generally, “[h]igh rates of trauma exposure have been observed in both male and female substance-using populations.”[29] While the exact process by which these traumatic experiences translate into addiction and related problems remains disputed,[30] the correlation itself is “well-documented.”[31]

Risk factors for sex trafficking are somewhat less clear. Even specifically in regard to child sex trafficking—often the focus of media and legislative attention on the topic—“very little empirical research has been conducted.”[32] Still, there is sufficient information to strongly suggest that many of those most at risk of developing addictions are also at risk of being targeted for sex trafficking.[33] Current information holds that “[t]raffickers disproportionately target at-risk populations including individuals who have experienced or been exposed to other forms of violence (child abuse and maltreatment, interpersonal violence and sexual assault, community and gang violence) and individuals disconnected from stable support networks (runaway and homeless youth, unaccompanied minors, persons displaced during natural disasters).”[34] Specifically, “[a]ccording to reports, 70 percent to 90 percent of commercially sexually exploited youth have a history of child sexual abuse.”[35] “In addition, youth who have experienced dating violence and rape are also at higher-risk for trafficking.”[36] While additional empirical research on this topic is still needed, these risk factors are corroborated by what many service providers have identified on the ground—including the author’s own experiences working with trafficking survivors.

On balance then, there are many factors which simultaneously indicate that an individual is at risk for developing an addiction and being targeted for trafficking. For the purposes of this article, when an individual is presently experiencing or has previously experienced the following, it will be considered an overlapping risk factor:

·         Childhood sexual abuse;

·         Child abuse and neglect generally;

·         Rape or sexual assault;

·         Interpersonal, community, or gang violence;

·         Involvement in the foster care system;

·         Homelessness or running away from home;

·         Family history of addiction;

·         Substance use within the individual’s social group;

·         And family conflict or instability.[37]

 

In addition, as discussed in more detail below, addiction itself will be considered a risk factor for trafficking and vice versa, as both create additional vulnerability to the other.[38] To be clear, some of this overlap relies on inferences, but the inferences are independently supported. For example, although family history of addiction has not typically been identified as a risk factor for human trafficking in academic literature on the topic,[39] family history of addiction does contribute to rates of involvement in foster care,[40] which is a well-documented risk factor for human trafficking.[41]

 

III.  Analysis Of Special Vulnerability Where Addiction and Trafficking Intersect

 

The underpinnings of the drug-based coercion theory are that, in addition to the risk factors for trafficking itself, addiction is essentially a risk factor for trafficking.[42] In other words, the presence of addiction indicates that someone is distinctly vulnerable to being trafficked, separate from, and in addition to, any other trafficking risk factors the person may have. Likewise, if a victim of trafficking is not already struggling with a drug addiction, they may be additionally vulnerable to developing such an addiction. Attorneys know this; indeed, step-by-step guides have been written about how attorneys can lean on this relationship in order to prosecute traffickers.[43] What this section seeks to expand upon is the human experience behind the legal theory: what does this special vulnerability look like?

 

A.  Traffickers use opioids to effectuate control through both the immediate effects of opioids and their control over the survivor’s drug supply, in addition to capitalizing on external factors.

 

i.  Immediate vulnerability: symptoms of the high.

 

One way in which a trafficker can use drugs to exploit a trafficking survivor is through the effects of the drug itself. In an immediate sense, an individual under the influence of opioids is extremely vulnerable to the coercion or control of others by the very nature of opioid use. Short-term effects of opioids include “extreme relaxation”, “drowsiness and clumsiness”, and “confusion”.[44] This is aside from their primary medical purpose as analgesics, or pain relievers.[45] In addition, many users report “an intense rush of pleasure or euphoria” immediately after the opioid takes effect.[46]

For these reasons, drugs can be “used to incapacitate [an individual] so that [she] conforms to the demands of the trafficker.”[47] One survivor described this, saying that her trafficker “used drugs as a method of trying to keep me controllable and docile[.]”[48] Although this angle often receives less attention than the fear of withdrawal discussed below, these effects give traffickers significant leverage by which to exploit their victims.

Common sense indicates that an individual who is relaxed, drowsy, or confused, is more susceptible to manipulation, whether through physical force or not. A trafficker or a “John” can take advantage of someone sedated by opioids in ways that the survivor may resist—or resist more effectively—if they were not under the influence of opioids.[49] Likewise, both the euphoric and analgesic effects of the high can serve as a sort of reprieve in the otherwise bleak situation that survivors are faced with. This incentivizes survivors to take advantage of the drugs available to them, and allows traffickers to frame the drugs they provide as a reward obtained through “compliance.”[50] All the while, this only intensifies the survivor’s addiction and sets them up for further coercion by the trafficker’s ability to withhold the survivor’s drug supply.

ii.  Sustained vulnerability: control over drug supply.

Another mechanism of drug-based coercion—arguably the most prevalent[51]—is to exploit a survivor’s ongoing addiction to opioids.[52] The driving force behind this type of coercion is a survivor’s addiction and consequent fear of withdrawal symptoms. These symptoms include, among other things, muscle and bone pain, increased body temperature, nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, anxiety, sweating, and chills.[53] These symptoms have been aptly described as “flu-like,” but to an extreme degree, sufficient to cause “tremendous physical and psychological distress to the person suffering” from this process.[54] These symptoms generally begin approximately eight to ten hours after the last dose of opioids, and peak after approximately one to three days, before gradually decreasing.[55] From the perspective that traffickers are deliberately subjecting survivors under their control to this excruciating experience by withholding drugs from them, one could appropriately analogize this punishment to torture.[56]

Unsurprisingly, after experiencing these withdrawals one or more times, survivors develop a pervasive fear of having to go through it again. Approximately three to four hours after their last dose, individuals addicted to opioids often become anxious or fearful, experience “cravings,” and engage in “drug-seeking behavior.”[57] “The physical craving the body develops for opioids is profound and unrelenting,”[58] which generates a “powerful fear of withdrawal that causes [the addicted individual] to look for the drug at all costs.”[59] When employed by traffickers as a threatened punishment, the cost is compliance, and trafficking survivors often comply with their traffickers’ demands in order to avoid this severe punishment. One survivor described this coercion, saying that “if I didn’t make a certain amount of money a day, he would not give me any heroin . . . he pretty much controlled me with the drug because he knew I couldn’t function without it. I was dependent on it at that point.”[60]

Addiction, and specifically addiction to opioids, is incredibly challenging to overcome, even under ordinary circumstances.[61] It often requires residential (inpatient) rehabilitation, help from professional therapists, and “medication-assisted treatment.”[62] Many people also rely heavily on peer support from other recovering addicts during their recovery.[63] Moreover, when an individual has a severe addiction to opioids and does not detox properly (i.e., quitting cold-turkey), opioid withdrawals can be fatal.[64] Given the level of control and isolation cultivated by traffickers, survivors struggling from opioid addictions do not have the ability to seek out these supports to pursue sobriety, particularly when—as discussed in the previous section—traffickers may go so far as to force the survivor to take opioids in order to sustain the addiction and perpetuate their control.[65] This is without even taking into account the additional incentive trafficking survivors have to use opioids and other drugs as a means to “numb the pain” of past trauma.[66] The extent to which a trafficking survivor is trapped—both within the trafficking scenario and within their addiction—makes their path to sobriety markedly more difficult than it already is. The power that this gives to traffickers must not be underestimated.

 

iii.  External vulnerability: criminalization and credibility.

 

In addition to the control the trafficker exerts directly through a survivor’s addiction to opioids and other drugs, they take advantage of external factors to further enhance their control. On one hand, “substance abuse camouflages the crime of sex trafficking under a layer of illegal drug possession and other related criminal activity.”[67] A trafficker may capitalize on a survivor’s substance use as a means to “set up the trafficking victim in case she is ever arrested on prostitution and/or prostitution-related charges. If apprehended by law enforcement while under the influence or in possession, drug using victims may lose their credibility or presumed innocence. The trafficker knows that her arrest will distract from her victimization.”[68] On the other hand, in the event that law enforcement seeks to prosecute the trafficker, the survivor’s substance use often hinders their ability to contribute to this prosecution as a witness.[69] Due to the strong anesthetic effects of opioids, “victims often have distorted or insufficient memory of their forced commercial sex acts.”[70] Victims also “report being warned by their trafficker that, because they have a prostitution record, they will never be able to obtain legal employment, and that if they consider filing a report, no one would believe them because they are merely prostitutes.”[71] The same is almost certainly true regarding addiction and drug-related charges. Traffickers utilize every method of control available to them, turning external stigmas about addictions to their advantage is no exception.

B.  Drug-based Coercion Takes Many Forms.

 

The preceding categories of vulnerability, generated by opioids, illustrate the mechanisms by which traffickers can use these substances to generate control. Out of context, however, these still fail to describe the lived experience of what this looks like. Like any tool, these mechanisms of control can be used in a variety of ways, generating a variety of exploitative relationships. In this section, multiple example scenarios will be described, illustrating how these mechanisms coalesce with the risk factors described above to create powerful forms of coercion.[72]

These scenarios have been fictionalized and simplified to provide greater clarity. While some elements are based on private client interactions, many of the facts have been pulled from publicly available cases and survivor stories.[73] Although these scenarios do not provide an exhaustive account of the myriad ways in which sex trafficking and opioids can intersect, the do illustrate, in general terms some, of the most common examples.

 

i. Opioids can be used to sedate someone and create vulnerability.

 

Ayesha was 16. She had been arguing with her mother—who was raising Ayesha alone—and left the house after it became physical. She called a friend, Bianca, who said that Ayesha could spend a few days with her. Bianca was going to stay with her out-of-town boyfriend for the weekend, and Ayesha tagged along. On the first night, Bianca and her boyfriend smoked heroin, and encouraged Ayesha to try it, with Bianca claiming it helped her when she was stressed. Ayesha tried heroin for the first time, and as promised, she felt very relaxed—a pleasant change, coming from a household full of constant conflict. The next day, Bianca and her boyfriend got in a fight, and the boyfriend made them leave. Not ready to go home, they visited an acquaintance of Bianca’s, who had several friends over. The acquaintance offered them heroin, and they accepted. Once Ayesha and Bianca were high on heroin, barely aware of their surroundings, the acquaintance and his friends raped them. Over the next few days, the acquaintance kept Ayesha and Bianca high, while allowing multiple men to visit, pay him, and rape the two girls.

 Ayesha was faced with several of the risk factors identified above. She had experienced physical abuse at the hands of her mother, and more generally experienced conflict and instability within her family. She ran away from home and took shelter with a friend and gained access to heroin through her social group. This quickly escalated to a situation in which Ayesha was vulnerable and taken advantage of. In a perfect world, Ayesha and Bianca would soon get away from their trafficker—Bianca’s acquaintance—and return home, where their families would ensure they received therapy and other supports. Equally likely, however, they may remain under the control of their trafficker for an extended time or return home to a family that rejects them and leaves them vulnerable to further exploitation in the future.

 

ii.  Opioids can be presented as appealing in order to lure someone into further vulnerability, which can then be exploited.

 

Clara was placed in foster care at the age of 12, after child protective services discovered that her mother was a severe alcoholic, and her father was sexually abusing her while her mother was unconscious. Over the next two years, Clara was moved between foster homes, and at two of them, she was physically assaulted by older girls in the home. After being threatened by someone at her new home, Clara ran away. She went to a nearby park, where she was approached by a man in his twenties expressing romantic interest in her. He took her to a nearby diner for some food and asked about her story. He seemed to care, and Clara was not used to that. He offered to be her boyfriend and take care of her, and she gladly accepted. They were staying at a hotel, and he offered Clara pills that he said would help her relax. She tried them, without knowing they were prescription opioids. She kept taking them, initially at his suggestion, but as she got used to them, she started to enjoy them. After a week, he told her that he needed her help paying for the hotel, and that he could get her dates to make some money. He said she wouldn’t have to do more than kiss the dates, but the first date insisted she have sex. After she told her boyfriend, he said she just needs to figure out how to make it work. The next date did the same thing, and the next, but when she asked to stop her boyfriend grew angry and threatened to hurt her or call the police on her if she didn’t go along with it. Eventually, Clara started taking pills before every date to make them easier.

Clara, too, showed several of the identified risk factors. She had a mother who suffered from addiction before her, and endured childhood sexual abuse at the hands of her father. After entering foster care, she was subjected to interpersonal violence by other residents, and eventually ran away. This left Clara vulnerable to exploitation by an older man who showed her a modicum of kindness to lure her in before trafficking her. If Clara managed to get away from the man soon, she may have been able to return to foster care or enter a short-term rehabilitation program. If not, she likely continued on, becoming more severely addicted and more entrapped in a cycle of abuse, and sooner or later being convicted of prostitution or drug possession.

 

iii.  Traffickers can force survivors under their control to develop an addiction to opioids, which the trafficker can then leverage for further control.

 

Daliyah was a young mother, nineteen with a newborn son. Looking to make money to support herself and her child, she responded to a job posting online. The post advertised for a promotional model, indicating that she would be promoting a product at concerts and other events. Over emails, she discussed pay and travel expenses with the purported manager and disclosed that she was looking for a way to provide for her son. Her mother—who had recovered from her own previous drug addiction and managed to work two jobs and raise Daliyah alone—agreed to take care of her son in the evenings when she was working, so she accepted the job. The day came for her first shift, at a concert in a town a couple of hours away. She met who she thought was her manager, who would be driving her to the event. Instead of a concert venue, however, he took her to a motel in a different city entirely. He told Daliyah that she works for him now, and that if she refuses, he will hurt her son. At gunpoint, Daliyah was forced to take prescription opioids, raped, and trafficked throughout the night and into the early morning. While taking Daliyah home, her trafficker reiterated his threats against her son and told her that she must continue to work for him. Fearing for the safety of her son, not to mention herself, Daliyah complied. Daliyah regularly told her mother that she was going to work, but instead, went with her trafficker and did as she was told.

In Daliyah’s case, the only obvious risk factor is that her mother previously struggled with addiction. However, being raised by a single mother working two jobs, Daliyah was likely often left home alone from a relatively young age, thereby suffering from child neglect despite her mother’s best efforts to care for her. Coupled with her financial vulnerability as a single teenage mother, the trafficker was able to manipulate her into compliance. If Daliyah had refused to comply and gone to the police, she may have escaped trafficking, although her trafficker may well have followed through on his threats before the police caught up with him. While under the trafficker’s control, however, Daliyah likely developed an addiction to the drugs she was forced to take, giving the trafficker even more leverage to control her.

 

iv.  A survivor of trafficking may independently develop an addiction to opioids as a means to escape from the horrific experiences they are forced to endure by their trafficker.

 

Ella was fifteen. Her mother had died when she was twelve, and she lived with her father. Her father had been distant and irritable since her mother’s death, often ignoring Ella or growing angry at her over minor things. Ella started spending a lot of time out of the house, hanging out with friends rather than being at home, and her father never seemed to mind. One day, Ella tagged along with an acquaintance to what she thought was a party. The party turned out to be a house where people sold and used heroin.

Once they arrived, her acquaintance was given heroin seemingly in exchange for bringing Ella along, and the friend retired to a room where he used the heroin and became extremely sedated. Ella attempted to leave, but there was a guard at each door and she was not allowed to. After escalating force was used to prevent her from leaving, Ella was eventually raped by multiple guards in turn. She was kept captive in a room, where various men were allowed to rape her almost every day. With no way to leave and no sign that anyone was coming to help her, Ella started asking the men who came into her room for drugs. If they shared their heroin with her, Ella became quiet and complacent, and this soon became the norm. Once her traffickers caught on, they started keeping her high and selling her even more often. Ella developed a severe addiction to heroin as a means to numb herself to the horrors she was being subjected to.

After the trauma of losing her mother, Ella experienced neglect and verbal abuse from her father. Although not a runaway, Ella actively avoided the constant conflict at home and placed herself in vulnerable situations to avoid it. Moreover, Ella became associated with a heroin addict, who eventually led her into the grasp of her traffickers. Forced to cope with repeated rape and abuse, Ella took advantage of the only accessible way to numb the pain—drugs. In this case, Ella’s experience being trafficked was a risk factor that led to her developing an addiction. If the house was eventually raided by police, they likely treated her as simply another addict and charged her with a drug crime. If not, Ella likely remained in this cycle of abuse until she was no longer useful to her traffickers, or until she overdosed.

 

v.  A trafficker may seek out addicts and target them, due to their likely preexisting increased vulnerability to trafficking, as well as their susceptibility to drug-based coercion.

 

Felicia was a transgender, sixteen year old woman. After coming out to her parents, she was kicked out of the house. Ashamed and not wanting to see her fourteen year old brother at school, Felicia dropped out. Eventually, Felicia was placed in foster care—in a home for boys—where she was made fun of and beaten by the other boys who lived there. Felicia ran away from foster care, seeking to avoid this violence, and took to living on the streets instead, where she eventually developed an addiction.

 Some years later, when Felicia was twenty-five, she heard about a homeless shelter that accepted trans-women and helped them obtain their GED or employment training, but the shelter did not allow anyone addicted to drugs into their program. Determined to turn her life around, Felicia signed herself into a public rehabilitation facility, where she got off of drugs and spent thirty days sober. But after completing rehab, Felicia called the shelter and found that they had filled all of their beds and could not offer her a spot until one opened. Unsure where to go, Felicia left the rehab facility and walked to a nearby park. Meanwhile, a man parked in a car across the street from the rehab facility was watching. He followed her to the park, spoke to her, and said that he has a home for trans-women and that Felicia could stay there. Felicia was delighted and took him up on the offer. However, Felicia soon discovered that these women were doing drugs. She decided to stay, since she had nowhere else to go, and try to resist the temptation to relapse. Two days in, the temptation overwhelmed her, and she did drugs with one of the other women, rekindling her old addiction. She asked the woman how to get more drugs, and she told Felicia to ask the owner. When Felicia asked, he told her to go out with the other woman this evening, and if she did a good job, he would give her the drugs she wanted, but if she didn’t, she would have to leave. Felicia did go out that night, and the other woman showed her how to “walk the track” and solicit commercial sex. Felicia and the other women brought the proceeds to the owner, who gave them drugs and welcomed Felicia to stay as long as she wanted. No longer eligible for the shelter program, and with nowhere else to go, Felicia remained at the house and continued to walk the streets to earn her drugs.

After family conflict in response to coming out as transgender, and after her experiences with violence in foster care, Felicia became a runaway. She fell in with other homeless people suffering from an addiction, and soon developed one herself. After finally getting sober, she was targeted while leaving the rehab facility, and lured into a scenario that capitalized on her recent addiction and made it difficult for her to stay sober. After Felicia relapsed, she was coerced into trafficking in order to both feed her addiction and secure her a place to live. In this way, Felicia’s addiction was a risk factor that led to her being trafficked. If Felicia summoned the willpower to leave this new home and return to rehab—assuming the facility allows people back in—she may have managed to continue her recovery and eventually secure placement in the shelter. If not, Felicia likely continued being trafficked, eventually being arrested while “walking the track” and charged with drug or prostitution offenses.

IV.  Civil Remedies Under 18 U.S.C. § 1595

 

Each of these scenarios is horrific in its own way, and such conduct is rightly prohibited under the laws of the United States and virtually every other nation. Although sex trafficking is generally thought of as a criminal offense,[74] Congress has also enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1595, creating a federal civil cause of action through which survivors of trafficking can seek damages against their trafficker or “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in” sex trafficking.[75] This is the statute upon which much of the civil litigation related to sex trafficking is premised.

 

A.  Civil Remedies Play An Important Role In Meeting The Legislative Objectives Of Protecting Survivors And Fighting Human Trafficking.

 

“It is estimated that human trafficking generates many billions of dollars of profit per year, second only to drug trafficking as the most profitable form of transnational crime.”[76] Given the prevalence and complexity of human trafficking, Congress was right to enact broad measures to combat it. As a supplement to the criminal provisions, the civil cause of action established by 18 U.S.C. § 1595 serves at least two important purposes. First, it allows survivors to seek a measure of recompense that would otherwise be completely unavailable to them, potentially opening doors to recovery in the wake of this horrible crime that would otherwise be closed. Second, it allows for indirect measures to inhibit trafficking that have the potential to have greater widespread impact than the criminal prosecution of any individual trafficker could.

 

i.  This civil remedy can play an important part in a survivor’s healing journey after the trafficking has occurred.

 

Survivors of trafficking experience some of the most complex and all-encompassing barriers of any crime survivors as they try to move on. In an immediate sense, there are crucial supports that these survivors need—from the moment they are free from their trafficker—in order to stabilize and begin to heal.

 

The basic necessities are many, and include providing: (1) an interpreter or translator to make the survivor feel more comfortable and understood [if there are language barriers]; (2) crisis intervention and safety planning to ensure that the impact of the recent trauma is addressed and there is a plan to keep the survivor safe through the duration of the reintegration period; (3) health care, including immediate medical attention, sexual assault evaluations, substance abuse counseling, and other health care to ensure the survivor is well; . . . and (5) food and clothing.[77]

 

The legal system is far too slow-moving for any damages recovered under Section 1595 to fulfill these immediate needs. For better or worse, these needs must continue to be satisfied by service providers, government-funded crime victim programs, and charitable organizations.

       However, once these immediate stabilization needs are met, survivors still face an incredibly diverse array of issues, such as ongoing health needs (including mental health), criminal records, employment challenges, immigration requirements, and more.[78] Many trafficking survivors never have these long-term needs met and continue to suffer from the effects of being trafficked for the rest of their lives.[79]

A network of trafficking survivors conducted a survey of its members on the continuing impacts of their criminal histories alone. Below are some of their responses.

·         “[A] lot of p[ro]spective employers shut down and do not ask for explanations or do not want to listen. Hard to find employment with a criminal record and with no other options for work this could lead to re-trafficking.”[80]

·         “I continue to feel ‘[t]he invisible bars even though I am free[.]’”[81]

·         “[A]s a result of having to register as a sex offender my children were taken away and I lost these children for life.”[82]

·         “After escaping I found that I could not rent an apartment in my own name because of extensive background checks by property management. I always have a roommate and can’t have my name on mailboxes, report problems, or receive deliveries. Sometimes I have to hide from landlords.”[83]

·         “After having ‘escaped’ from my sex trafficker, I have still been enslaved by the charges. Unable to get employment year after year after year resulted in homelessness and suicide attempts.”[84]

·         “One of my charges was for a forgery that involved $28,000 being extracted from a[n account I wrongly believed was dormant]. . . I’ve paid back $10K but will spend the rest of my life paying off the balance.”[85]

 

By and large, these are problems that would be improved if a survivor succeeds in obtaining damages under Section 1595. Whether the survivor has direct debts to pay off, needs the money for housing or education, or wishes to retain an attorney to pursue expungement or child custody, the financial remedies available through civil litigation can make a life-changing difference.

All of these examples result from the narrow situation of criminal convictions and their consequences, but similar needs arise from other scenarios. For example, instead of debts, survivors may have ongoing medical expenses for mental health care or HIV treatment.[86] The costs of human trafficking can continue to impact survivors indefinitely, even after they are no longer being trafficked. Although no amount of money can undo the suffering these survivors have endured, remedies under Section 1595 can help defray these costs and open doors to a brighter future that would otherwise be out of reach.

 

ii. Civil penalties can incentivize action by defendants who have the ability to inhibit human trafficking but escape criminal liability.

 

The ugly truth is that traffickers themselves are not the only ones responsible for the prevalence of human trafficking; many of our businesses turn a blind eye to the ways they and their apparatuses enable trafficking. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is the website Backpage, largely the inspiration for, if not the target of, the controversial 2018 FOSTA-SESTA legislation.[87] The effectiveness of FOSTA-SESTA is hotly contested,[88] and to a lesser extent the relative culpability of Backpage,[89] but what is clear is that the platform provided by Backpage was widely used by sex traffickers.[90] Backpage executives plead guilty to conspiracy charges, but Backpage did not engage in sex trafficking directly; rather, it provided an online communications platform which was used by traffickers to post advertisements to recruit customers.[91]

One of the most egregious instances of this can be seen in the hospitality industry. “Hotels and motels are a common venue for sex trafficking, due to ease of access for buyers, ability to pay in cash and maintain secrecy through finances, and lack of facility maintenance or upkeep expenses.”[92] In one survey, 79% of respondents indicated that their exploitation involved hotels or motels.[93] Hotels have been aware of their involvement in sex trafficking for years.[94] Many have even made public commitments to enacting measures to prevent trafficking from occurring at their properties.[95] Despite these commitments, however, hotels are largely “failing to address the risks of modern slavery in their direct operations and supply chains.”[96] For example, only 14% of anti-trafficking statements by hotel companies report specific approaches or policies for “dealing with the risk of sexual exploitation in their operations and supply chains.”[97] “These failures can be explained by a lack of commitment by hotel companies to prioriti[z]e the elimination of modern slavery[.]”[98]

This is where civil liability under Section 1595 can make a difference. While it is possible for companies like hotels or Backpage to be subjected to criminal sanctions for their role in trafficking,[99] it is rare, and it is often quite difficult for the government to demonstrate criminal liability beyond a shadow of a doubt. Civil liability can fill in this gap and incentivize companies to take meaningful steps toward not allowing traffickers to use their apparatuses to facilitate trafficking, and this incentive can have a significant impact. For example in 2011, Marriott International partnered with ECPAT-USA, a non-profit organization aimed at child trafficking prevention, “to co-develop training to help hotel employees recognize the indicators for human trafficking,” but did not commit to making this training mandatory for its employees—as previously recommended by ECPAT and others—until 2017.[100] Notably, this was in the wake of an increase in attention to the possible liability of hotel chains under Section 1595.[101]

The example of hotels serves to further illustrate once more the interconnectedness of sex trafficking and illicit drugs. Expanding upon the concept that the use of opioids and other drugs is a risk factor for trafficking, and vice-versa, hotels are in a position to see and act on this correlation. If a hotel employee observes signs of drug use on the hotel premises, a red flag should go up and they should wonder whether trafficking is also present. No risk factor is universally present, and questioning the presence of trafficking when drug use is observed will undoubtedly result in false alarms, but it would also lead to the identification of untold numbers of survivors who would otherwise remain invisible. This illustration is not limited to hotels, either. In the same manner, if social media platforms, or the like, isolated patterns that relate to drug sales, these same patterns would almost certainly be utilized by traffickers. Given that both the sex trafficking and the opioid markets are illicit industries, they inherently rely on the same market practices that pervade these industries; the use of these types of business apparatuses is standard procedure in the same way that placing ads on websites is for typical businesses.

 

B.  Drug-based Coercion Is Sufficient To Satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 1595.

 

Under § 1595(a), one of the elements that survivors must prove is that they are, in fact, survivors of sex trafficking before obtaining recovery in the civil context.[102] One means by which a defendant may escape liability, then, is to successfully argue that the plaintiff was not trafficked. There are at least two methods by which defendants might make such an argument. First, they could argue that drug-based coercion simply does not apply in a civil context. Second, they could argue that, because Section 1595 creates a civil cause of action through the incorporation of the criminal offenses defined in the rest of the relevant Chapter,[103] a criminal burden of proof should apply to that element of the civil claim—in other words, that the underlying criminal offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than merely by the preponderance of the evidence. However, both of these arguments fail.

 

i.  Drug-based coercion applies in civil cases.

 

In no uncertain terms, the precedent established by federal criminal cases such as United States v. Fields,[104] United States v. Mack,[105] United States v. Groce,[106] and others since, carries over to civil lawsuits filed under Section 1595. In other contexts, courts have rightly concluded that federal common law applies under Section 1595,[107] and the same is true in this context. These decisions recognizing drug-based coercion as sufficient for a criminal conviction carry the same weight in regard to civil cases as they do criminal. Even if that were not the case, the arguments that persuaded the courts to accept the theory of drug-based coercion under Section 1591 are equally applicable and persuasive under Section 1595. [108]

In any case, Section 1595 does not create a separate but parallel civil offense of human trafficking; it directly incorporates the criminal offense, thereby incorporating all of the applicable precedent under the offense. Before the question of what satisfies Section 1595 comes the question of what satisfies Section 1591, [109] and that question is settled—drug-based coercion is sufficient to satisfy Section 1591. Logically, then, drug-based coercion must be sufficient to satisfy Section 1595. [110]  

ii.  If a plaintiff in a civil case relies upon a theory of drug-based coercion, the plaintiff need only prove that the drug-based coercion occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

Defendants of Section 1595 claims have already tried to import criminal law standards into civil litigation when it suits them.[111] It is not hard to imagine a defendant making the claim that, because drug-based coercion is a common law doctrine stemming from criminal human trafficking cases, a theory of drug-based coercion should require a heightened burden of proof if applied in a civil case at all. Though it contradicts widely held understandings of the distinction between criminal and civil litigation, such an argument would not be unprecedented.

Section 1595 is one of relatively few civil causes of action that directly incorporate a criminal offense. One of the most common examples of such a structure is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1964.[112] Though RICO is most often discussed in its criminal context, Congress has also authorized a civil cause of action.[113] In a civil RICO case, the Second Circuit concluded that “in the absence of previous convictions a civil plaintiff must carry a burden equal to that in a criminal case in proving that criminal conduct.”[114] However, the Supreme Court resoundingly rejected that reasoning:

 

We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a proceeding under § 1964(c). In a number of settings, conduct that can be punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt will support civil sanctions under a preponderance standard. There is no indication that Congress sought to depart from this general principle here. . . . That the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards or that the consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action are identical to the consequences of a criminal conviction.[115]

 

This statutory configuration closely aligns with the relationship between the civil cause of action authorized by Section 1595 and the criminal offense contained in Section 1591. Following the same reasoning, there is no requirement that the criminal predicate acts described in Section 1591 need to be proved by anything higher than a preponderance of the evidence standard when raised in a civil proceeding under Section 1595. For human trafficking survivors who bring civil lawsuits under Section 1595, given that the other elements are satisfied, proving by a preponderance standard that they were compelled to engage in commercial sex through drug-based coercion is sufficient to succeed on their claim.

 

V.  Implications

 

Today, we have enough information to conclude that there is an inherent relationship between sex trafficking and the opioid crisis. So, what do we do about it? There are a number of implications that follow this conclusion, and these implications must be incorporated into the measures we take to address both sex trafficking and the opioid crisis.

First and foremost, it is essential that education on this topic is promoted at all levels, and throughout both the public and private sectors. This article is not the first to call for this type of education, but it bears repeating. Educating law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges can help to identify trafficking survivors who may be facing criminal charges related to substance abuse or related offenses. Likewise, training provided to hospital staff, rehabilitation centers, and others who work with people suffering from addiction and overdose can allow them to identify survivors in other settings. These trainings should acknowledge that drug use is a risk factor that may indicate the presence of human trafficking. The inverse is also true; if a survivor of trafficking is identified through other means, those interacting with the survivor should bear in mind that the survivor may be suffering from addiction. These trainings should also discuss the unique needs and challenges of survivors who are suffering from addiction and provide resources to help those receiving training respond effectively, empathetically, and nonjudgmentally.

Second, there is a significant need for further research on the interrelationship of sex trafficking and opioids. As discussed in the introduction to this article, there is no shortage of qualitative information on this topic. Some organizations have conducted limited studies to provide what evidence of this overlap can be obtained through firsthand accounts, and this corroborates the relationship that practitioners have observed on the ground. What is lacking, however, is detailed quantitative research. There are practical challenges to obtaining this sort of information on human trafficking in general, as many cases are misreported or not reported at all, but these challenges can—and must—be worked around. Accurate data on this topic could allow for more targeted and effective strategies to combat these issues, and in a very practical sense, both public and private funds significantly follow hard data. This type of research will draw funders’ attention to programs that operate in this nexus and provide services to those affected.

Third, the gradual shift away from law enforcement and toward public health as the lens through which we address the opioid crisis must include the opioid crisis as it intersects with sex trafficking. With the knowledge we now have of the power and pervasiveness of drug-based coercion, there is no conscionable reason that safe harbor provisions should not be expanded. These provisions are designed to protect survivors of trafficking from being prosecuted for the actions they were compelled to undertake at the hands of their trafficker. Various stakeholders have campaigned across the country for states to enact these protections, and have been largely successful, but these campaigns have been too narrow. Given the strong relationship between sex trafficking and opioids, and drugs more generally, state legislatures must expand these provisions. Prostitution is not the only criminal offense survivors are likely to face. Continuing to hold these survivors criminally liable for drug offenses only continues to empower traffickers; this creates an absurd scenario where the trafficker can threaten to call the police and have the survivor arrested. Moreover, safe harbor provisions are often restricted to minors. While minors are even more vulnerable, they are no more culpable for their coerced actions, and adult survivors should not be denied these protections. Additionally, many adult survivors are merely childhood survivors of trafficking or similar abuse that were never identified before reaching adulthood.[116] In any case, viewing survivors’ struggles with addiction through a public health lens, criminalizing them will not achieve the desired results. Even more so than non-trafficked individuals, these survivors desperately need resources that allow them to overcome these challenges and heal. As discussed above, these survivors have complex needs that must be met if they are to shed their vulnerabilities and go on to lead whole and healthy lives.

Fourth, to the extent that the government seeks to use criminal liability in its fight against trafficking or the opioid crisis on a systematic level, it should consider this intersection as a potential route to do so. Federal prosecutions relying on drug-based coercion are one piece of this, but another tool has gone largely unnoticed. Due to the flexibility and anonymity they can provide, hotels and motels in high-crime areas are significantly connected to the worlds of both sex trafficking and illicit drug distribution. While it would be difficult for the government to attach criminal liability to entities such as hotel parent companies, criminal charges have successfully been brought against local hotels and their owners or managers who have turned a blind eye to trafficking on their property. Separately, 18 U.S.C. § 1594 provides for the forfeiture of “any property, real or personal, that was involved in, used, or intended to be used to commit or facilitate” a human trafficking violation.[117] In conjunction, the government could hypothetically prosecute the owners of hotels and motels that implicitly allow trafficking to occur on their property and force them to forfeit the hotel or motel itself. This leads to questions of what to do with it then, and whether it can be avoided that another hotel or motel will open up in its place. At minimum though, large-scale pursuit of forfeitures such as this could stem the flow of both sex trafficking and opioids in the short term, and the sale of forfeited property could fund measures intended to address both issues from the public health perspective.

 

VI.  Conclusion

 

Awareness of the intrinsic connectedness of sex trafficking and the opioid crisis is on the rise. Acknowledging this relationship and addressing both issues accordingly is essential to the effectiveness of our efforts to combat them. Although the concept of drug-based coercion is not yet universally accepted, it has gained significant traction in recent years and attorneys engaged in anti-trafficking work should not be shy to employ it. Nonetheless, attorneys too still have room to learn about this relationship and the severe vulnerability it generates.

Indicative of this room to grow, the legal system has yet to capitalize on the full potential of human trafficking laws in the United States. Some attorneys have sought to help trafficking survivors hold accountable those who contributed to their trafficking through civil remedies. However, this line of litigation is still new and delicate. If successful precedent is established, it may someday be applied on a much broader scale, effectuating real and systemic change. The government too has untapped avenues, including deterring this sort of economic ambivalence through the seizure of property, not to mention the expansion of safe harbor protections for survivors.

Across the board, it is imperative that we learn to see through stigmas and provide nonjudgmental, trauma-informed care to both survivors of trafficking and those struggling to overcome opioid addictions. While the two certainly do not always overlap, the frequency with which they do should serve to illustrate that people are complex and so are their needs. Someone who escapes trafficking but does not receive treatment for addiction may end up re-trafficked because their trafficker can sustain their addiction; someone arrested for what appears to be simple opioid use may really be in the midst of being trafficked. As a society, and especially as attorneys who often make decisions that affect the lives of people in this nexus of vulnerability, we must educate ourselves about the relationship between sex trafficking and opioids if we are to competently work in either area. We can help to end these cyclical traumas, but to do so, we must learn to see past societal stigmas and meet people where they really are.

 

 

 


[I] Ben VanSlyke is an associate attorney at Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., and a member of the firm’s sex trafficking litigation team. Before pursuing law, he worked in the non-profit sector, where he was tasked with identifying and providing services to trafficking survivors as well as serving on an active anti-trafficking taskforce with law enforcement and social service agencies. He also previously worked with an orphanage in Cambodia, providing employment and life-skills training to survivors of trafficking in order to reduce vulnerability to future trafficking.

[2] Jacquelyn C.A. Meshelemiah & Raven E. Lynch, The Cause and Consequence of Human Trafficking: Human Rights Violations 130 (2019).

[3] See generally Ann Wagner & Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes or Prey? The Evolution of Congressional Intent in Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 Harv. J. on Legis. 17, 47–72 (2017) (discussing the evolution of federal sex trafficking legislation from the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015).

[4] See, e.g., Overdose Death Rates, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse fig. 3 (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/TQ66-HGJE] (showing that opioid overdose deaths increased from fewer than 10,000 in 1999 to nearly 50,000 in 2019).

[5] S&T Combatting Human Trafficking Using Social Science, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2019/01/30/st-combatting-human-trafficking-using-social-science [https://perma.cc/JBX4-WA8J].

[6] Id.

[7] Jarod Forget, Violent drug organizations use human trafficking to expand profits, U.S. Drug Enf’t Adm’ (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.dea.gov/stories/2021/2021-01/2021-01-28/violent-drug-organizations-use-human-trafficking-expand-profits [https://perma.cc/6N5E-JY96].

 

[8] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).

[9] Id.

[10] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2).

[11] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5).

[12] United States v. Fields, No. 8:13-CR-198-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 5278499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013) ("[F]ear of severe withdrawal symptoms meets the definition of “serious harm” as defined by the Statute.”).

[13] Id.

[14] Id. (quoting “serious harm” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5)).

[15] Lindsey Roberson & Shan Patel, Prosecuting Sex Trafficking Cases Using a Drug-Based Theory of Coercion, 65 U.S. Att’ys Bull. 175, 183 (2017).

[16] See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952–53 (1988) (holding that an individual who “use[s] or threat[ens] . . . coercion” in an attempt to force another into “involuntary servitude” will face “criminal prosecution”).

[17] See infra Part II.

[18] See infra Part II.

[19] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2).

[20] See infra Section IV.B.1.

[21] Infra Section IV.B.1.

[22] See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 529.010(6)(c) (LexisNexis 2021) (“‘Force, fraud, or coercion’ includes but is not limited to . . . [f]acilitating, controlling, or threatening to control an individual’s access to a controlled substance . . . .”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1307(C)(1)(e) (LexisNexis 2021) (“Coercion includes . . . [f]acilitating or controlling another person’s access to a controlled substance.”); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 787(a)(2)(d) (2021) (“‘Coercion’ means . . . [c]ontrolling or threatening to control an individual’s access to a controlled substance . . . .”).

[23] Unif. Act on Prevention of & Remedies for Hum. Trafficking § 2(2)(D) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2013) (“‘Coercion’ means . . .  controlling or threatening to control and individual’s access to a controlled substance . . . .”).

[24] Human Trafficking Legislation, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/human-trafficking/trafficking-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/2S6F-F776].

[25] Office of the Surgeon Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health 3-5 to 3-6 tbl.3.1 (2016), https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZSP-LMAK].

[26] Id.

[27] Jane Liebschutz et al., The Relationship Between Sexual and Physical Abuse and Substance Abuse Consequences, 22 J. Substance Abuse Treatment 121, 124 (“[P]ast physical or sexual abuse was significantly associated with more substance abuse consequences . . . . When calculated for different types of violence, there were no differences in substance abuse consequences . . . between physical only vs. sexual with or without physical . . . , whereas there were significant differences between physical only vs. none and sexual only vs. none.”) (internal citations omitted).

[28] Lil Tonmyr & Margot Shields, Childhood Sexual Abuse and Substance Abuse: A Gender Paradox?, 63 Child Abuse & Neglect 284, 290 (2017).

[29] Priscilla Dass-Brailford & Amie C. Myrick, Psychological Trauma and Substance Abuse: The Need for an Integrated Approach, 11 Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 202, 202 (2010).

[30] Tonmyr & Shields, supra note 28, at 289 (“Three explanatory models have been proposed for the link between [childhood sexual abuse] and adolescent substance abuse; PTSD models focusing on the trauma-inducing aspects of child maltreatment, self-dysfunction models, and relationship difficulty models.”). These distinctions focus more on the psychological underpinnings of this link, which are beyond the scope of this article and irrelevant to the legal consideration of risk factors and associated vulnerability.

[31] Id. at 284.

[32] Lisa Fedina et al., Risk Factors for Domestic Child Sex Trafficking in the United States, 34 J. Interpersonal Violence 2653, 2654 (2019).

[33] See Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health, supra note 25, at 3-5 to 3-6 tbl.3.1 (discussing risk factors for drug abuse); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Admin. for Child. & Families, Off. on Trafficking in Persons, Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking 1 (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/otip/fact_sheet_human_trafficking_fy18.pdf [https://perma.cc/E28X-CVCC] (identifying how at-risk populations are most likely to be trafficked). 

[34] Office on Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., OTIP-FS-18-01, Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/otip/fact_sheet_human_trafficking_fy18.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HTQ-S2UE].

[35] Admin. for Child., Youth and Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Guidance to States and Services on Addressing Human Trafficking of Children and Youth in the United States 4 (2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/acyf_human_trafficking_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/575C-UDMD].

[36] Id.

[37] Id. at 3 – 4.

[38] See infra Part III.

[39] See, e.g., West Virginia Sees Increase in ‘Family’ Sex Trafficking Related to Opioid Epidemic, W. Va. Pub. Broad. (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://www.wvpublic.org/news/2018-01-09/west-virginia-sees-increase-in-family-sex-trafficking-related-to-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/66C2-XLX8]. However, some information indicates a potential rise in “familial trafficking” of children by family members seeking to sustain their addiction.

[40] See generally Susie Neilson, More Kids Are Getting Placed In Foster Care Because Of Parents’ Drug Use, NPR (July 15, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/07/15/741790195/more-kids-are-getting-placed-in-foster-care-because-of-parents-drug-use [https://perma.cc/R9CU-CFLJ] (“The number of cases of children entering the foster care system due to parental drug use has more than doubled since 2000 . . . .”)

[41] Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health., supra note 25, 3-5 to 3-6 tbl.3.1.

[42] Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Dep't of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report 32 (20th ed. 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7WP-FTJY].

[43] See generally Roberson & Patel, supra note 15.

[44] Opioids, Alcohol & Drug Found. (Nov. 5, 2021), https://adf.org.au/drug-facts/opioids/#wheel.

[45] Kendra Cherry, Why an Opiate’s Impact on the Brain Can Cause Addiction, verywellmind (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-are-opiates-2795406 [https://perma.cc/L7TU-55GE]; Roberson & Patel, supra note 15, at 175–76.

[46] Camille Renzoni, Exploring Why Opiates Make You Feel Good, The Recovery Village (Aug. 21, 2021),https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/opiate-addiction/exploring-why-opiates-make-you-feel-good/ [https://perma.cc/K66V-T7QY]. It is worth noting that there has been an increase in literature disputing the prevalence of this sort of positive feeling. See, e.g., Nicoletta Lanese, Most People Don’t Actually Feel Euphoric When They Take Opioids, Study Finds, LiveScience (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.livescience.com/opioid-euphoria-mostly-a-myth.html [https://perma.cc/2VUY-JT53]. However, this is still considered a minority view, and detailed scientific studies have connected opioid use to immediate activity within the pleasure centers of the brain. See generally Antoine Bechara et al., A Neurobehavioral Approach to Addiction: Implications for the Opioid Epidemic and the Psychology of Addiction, 20 Psych. Sci. Pub. Int. 96, 101 (2019).

[47] Meshelemiah & Lynch, supra note 2, at 129.

[48] Heather R. Evans, From the Voices of Domestic Sex Trafficking Survivors: Experiences of Complex Trauma & Posttraumatic Growth 102 (May 20, 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (ScholarlyCommons), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=edissertations_sp2 [https://perma.cc/M67D-67MB].

[49] Upper Peninsula Women Drugged, Sex Trafficked in Lower Michigan, WLUC (Jan. 23, 2020, 5:08 AM), https://www.uppermichiganssource.com/content/news/Upper-Peninsula-women-drugged-sex-trafficked-in-Lower-Michigan-567225371.html [https://perma.cc/BSV6-7ANY]. Describing one case of sex trafficking that occurred in Flint, Michigan, the Genesee County Sheriff stated that the traffickers “kept [the survivors] high, so they couldn’t make sound decisions to try to get out.”

[50] Meshelemiah & Lynch, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that “drugs are often used as a reward (for compliance”).

[51] See Hum. Trafficking Inst., 2017 Federal Human Trafficking Report 16 (2017), https://traffickinginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2017-Federal-Human-Trafficking-Report-WEB-Low-Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3W-8E8J].

[52] Emma Eastwood-Paticchio, Addicted to You: Drug Addiction as a Means of Coercion, Trafficking Matters (Jan. 30, 2019), https://traffickinginstitute.org/addicted-to-you-drug-addiction-as-a-means-of-coercion/ [https://perma.cc/7SC6-97KV] (“According to the 2017 Federal Human Trafficking Report, traffickers exploited victims’ substance abuse issues in one third of active criminal sex trafficking cases in 2017, over three times more than traffickers exploited romantic relationships.”); See Hum. Trafficking Inst., 2017 Federal Human Trafficking Report 16 (2017), https://traffickinginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2017-Federal-Human-Trafficking-Report-WEB-Low-Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3W-8E8J].

[53] Leah K. Walker, Opioid Withdrawal: Signs, Symptoms & Addiction Treatment, Am. Addiction Treatment Ctrs. (Jan. 23, 2022), https://americanaddictioncenters.org/withdrawal-timelines-treatments/opiate [https://perma.cc/8KVV-EMMF].

[54] Jeffrey Juergens, What Is Opiate Withdrawal?, Addiction Center (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.addictioncenter.com/opiates/withdrawal-detox/ [https://perma.cc/RA6Y-TRT5].

[55] Id.

[56] See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (defining torture as an act “specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . upon another person within his custody or physical control”).

[57] Juergens, supra note 54.

[58] Roberson & Patel, supra note 15, at 176 (citing Katherine Chon, Human Trafficking and Opioid Abuse, Admin. for Child. & Families: The Family Room Blog (May 17, 2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/8654/20170322021028/https:/www.acf.hhs.gov/blog/2016/05/human-trafficking-and-opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/2XAA-2XV6] (discussing an interview with Dr. Hanni Stoklosa)).

[59] Lindsey N. Roberson, She Leads a Lonely Life: When Sex Trafficking and Drug Addiction Collide, 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 359, 376 (2017) (citing United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997, 1004 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted)).

[60] Evans, supra note 48, at 102.

[61] Understanding and Overcoming Opioid Abuse, Am. Psych. Ass’n (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.apa.org/topics/substance-use-abuse-addiction/opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/NK9D-97E3].

[62] Id.

[63] See generally Kathlene Tracy & Samantha P. Wallace, Benefits of Peer Support Groups in the Treatment of Addiction, 7 Substance Abuse & Rehab. 143, 152 (2016) (concluding that data regarding the positive effects of peer support groups on addiction recovery is limited but encouraging).

[64] See generally Shane Darke et al., Yes, People Can Die from Opiate Withdrawal, 122 Addiction 199 (2016) (highlighting several instances of withdrawal-caused deaths across the world’s incarcerated population).  

[65] Roberson, supra note 59, at 371.

[66] Id. at 370.

[67] Roberson & Patel, supra note 15, at 177.

[68] Meshelemiah & Lynch, supra note 2, at 129–30.

[69] Sabrina Balmgamwalla, Trafficking in Narratives: Conceptualizing and Recasting Victims, Offenders, and Rescuers in the War on Human Trafficking, 94 Denv. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2016).

[70] Matthew Myatt, The “Victim-Perpetrator” Dilemma: The Role of State Safe Harbor Laws in Creating a Presumption of Coercion for Human Trafficking Victims, 25 Wm. & Mary J. Race Gender & Soc. Just. 555, 568 (2019).

[71] Kate Mogulescu, The Public Defender as Anti-Trafficking Advocate, an Unlikely Role: How Current New York City Arrest and Prosecution Policies Systematically Criminalize Victims of Sex Trafficking, 15 CUNY L. Rev. 471, 482 (2012).

[72] See supra Section III.A.

[73] See generally United States v. Fields, 625 F. App’x 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 2018); Caitlin Johnston, Man Convicted of Human Trafficking Gets 34 Years in Prison, Tampa Bay Times (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/man-convicted-of-human-trafficking-gets-34-years-in-prison/2163311/ [https://perma.cc/JA2K-DRXT]; Lindsay Moore, Police, Survivors Debunk Human Trafficking Kidnapping Myths, MLive (Jan. 16, 2020, 11:08 AM), https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/2020/01/police-survivors-debunk-human-trafficking-kidnapping-myths.html [https://perma.cc/W24P-ZRTR]; Shandra Woworuntu, Shandra Woworuntu: My Life as a Sex-Trafficking Victim, BBC News (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35846207 [https://perma.cc/7Q35-BT3R]; Lex Talamo, Victim: I Was 4 When My Dad Started Trafficking Me, Shreveport Times (May 23, 2016), https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/watchdog/2016/05/23/victims-sex-trafficking-share-their-stories/83538332/ [https://perma.cc/48MW-FHRZ]; Esther Honig, How One Woman Escaped Sex Trafficking and Overcame Her Opioid Addiction, Side Effects Pub. Media (May 23, 2018 4:34 PM), https://www.sideeffectspublicmedia.org/post/how-one-woman-escaped-sex-trafficking-and-overcame-her-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/LE5B-9SFV]; Kristin Detrow, The Link Between Opioid Abuse and Sex Trafficking, Crime Rep. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/17/the-link-between-opioid-abuse-and-sex-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/Z7JE-VL4P]; American Addiction Centers Editorial Staff, Drug Addiction Fuels the Fire of Human Trafficking, Am. Addiction Ctrs. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.rehabs.com/blog/drug-addiction-fuels-the-fire-of-human-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/G5EJ-THAU].

[74] See 18 U.S.C. § 1591; see generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1597.

[75] 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

[76] The United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Alabama, Human Trafficking Task Force, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 11, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdal/human-trafficking-task-force [https://perma.cc/G7FK-SWRG].

[77] Meghan McCann, Nat’l conf. of State Legislatures, Human Trafficking: An Overview of Services and Funding for Survivors 3 (2018).

[78] See generally id. at 3–8.

[79] See generally Evans, supra note 48, at 51–59 (Chapter 4 on the “Post-Trafficking Experience”); Kimberly Mehlman-Orozco, What Happens After a Human Trafficking Victim is ‘Rescued’?, The Hill (July 29, 2016 4:28 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/289709-what-happens-after-a-human-trafficking-victim-is-rescued [https://perma.cc/R5BW-LSZV] (conveying the hardships sex trafficking survivors face using one woman’s story as an example).

[80] Nat’l Survivor Network, National Survivor Network Members Survey: Impact of Criminal Arrest and Detention on Survivors of Human Trafficking 7 (2016).

[81] Id.

[82] Id.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. at 9.

[86] McCann, supra note 77 at 4.

[87] See Liz Tung, FOSTA-SESTA was Supposed to Thwart Sex Trafficking. Instead, it’s Sparked a Movement, PULSE (July 10, 2020), https://whyy.org/segments/fosta-sesta-was-supposed-to-thwart-sex-trafficking-instead-its-sparked-a-movement/ [https://perma.cc/RDS9-EV5X] (“[Although Backpage] was actually shut down by federal authorities before FOSTA-SESTA passed, supporters of the legislation still have implied that it paved the way for the seizure.”).

[88] See, e.g., Daisy Soderberg-Rivkin, The Lessons of FOSTA-SESTA from a Former Content Moderator, Medium (Apr. 8, 2020), https://medium.com/@Daisy_Soderberg_Rivkin/the-lessons-of-fosta-sesta-from-a-former-content-moderator-24ab256dc9e5 [https://perma.cc/VBH5-ZMVQ] (noting the negative impact had on sex workers); Karol Markowicz, Congress’ Awful Anti-Sex-Trafficking Law Has Only Put Sex Workers in Danger and Wasted Taxpayer Money, Bus. Insider (July 14, 2019, 8:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fosta-sesta-anti-sex-trafficking-law-has-been-failure-opinion-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/FCU8-BA3W] (“[T]here’s no evidence that [FOSTA-SESTA] has made any difference whatsoever.”).

[89] See, e.g., Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Secret Memos Show the Government Has Been Lying About Backpage All Along, Reason (Aug. 26, 2019, 12:48 PM), https://reason.com/2019/08/26/secret-memos-show-the-government-has-been-lying-about-backpage/ [https://perma.cc/8TTC-QEH5]. Although Backpage did know that its website was used to advertise sex trafficking and refused to remove all adult content from its website, they actively assisted law enforcement in sex trafficking investigations, going above and beyond their legal requirements, taking the initiative to report particularly concerning posts to law enforcement themselves, providing seminars and trainings to law enforcement on how to effectively utilize Backpage data in their investigations and prosecutions, and providing authentication testimony at trials.

[90] S. Rep. No. 114-214, at 4 (2016).

[91] See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Backpage’s Co-Founder and CEO, As Well As Several Backpage-Related Corporate Entities, Enter Guilty Pleas, (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/backpage-s-co-founder-and-ceo-well-several-backpage-related-corporate-entities-enter-guilty [https://perma.cc/B5JB-WVYR]. Notably, there is dispute as to how culpable Backpage truly was.

[92] Hotel/Motel-Based, Hum. Trafficking Hotline, https://humantraffickinghotline.org/sex-trafficking-venuesindustries/hotelmotel-based [https://perma.cc/J3UH-MZUG].

[93] Polaris, On-Ramps, Intersections, and Exit Routes: A Roadmap for Systems and Industries to Prevent and Disrupt Human Trafficking 12 fig. 1.6 (2018).

[94] See generally Human Trafficking in the Hotel Industry, Polaris Project (Feb. 10, 2016), https://polarisproject.org/blog/2016/02/human-trafficking-in-the-hotel-industry/ [https://perma.cc/SV4V-CPK8]; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Blue Campaign, Hospitality Toolkit (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/blue-campaign/toolkits/hospitality-toolkit-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9K4-FRP7].

[95] See Press Release, Stephen P. Holmes, Chairman of Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., Modern Slavery Statement (June 1, 2018), https://corporate.wyndhamhotels.com/modern-slavery-statement/ [https://perma.cc/R9AW-KTLF]; Press Release, Mark S. Hoplamazian, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hyatt Hotels Corporation, Hyatt Hotels Corp. Hum. Rts. Statement (January 2017), https://about.hyatt.com/content/dam/HyattStories/thrive/Hyatt-Global-Human-Rights-Statement-Modern-Day-Slavery-020117.pdf [https://perma.cc/64XT-QTPL].

[96] Minderoo Foundation’s Walk Free Initiative et al., Beyond Compliance in the Hotel Sector: A Review of UK Modern Slavery Act Statements 2 (2019).

[97] Id. at 4, 14.

[98] Id. at 2.

[99] See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Louisiana Motel Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (July 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louisiana-motel-owner-pleads-guilty-sex-trafficking-case [https://perma.cc/J8PP-G2D9]; Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Backpage’s Co-Founder and CEO, As Well As Several Backpage-Related Corporate Entities, Enter Guilty Pleas, (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/backpage-s-co-founder-and-ceo-well-several-backpage-related-corporate-entities-enter-guilty [https://perma.cc/B5JB-WVYR].

[100] Press Release, ECPAT-USA, ECPAT-USA and Marriott International Announce New Partnership to Protect Children from Trafficking, (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.ecpatusa.org/blog/2018/1/29/ecpat-usa-and-marriott-international-announce-new-partnership [https://perma.cc/ERY5-25KZ].

[101] See generally Shea M. Rhodes, Sex Trafficking and the Hotel Industry: Criminal and Civil Liability for Hotels and their Employees (2015), https://cseinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Hotel_Policy_Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU5B-3SWU]; Gallant Fish, No Rest for the Wicked: Civil Liability Against Hotels in Cases of Sex Trafficking, 23 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 119, 146 (2017); Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553, 555 (1st Cir. 2017); Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 725-27 (11th Cir. 2021).

[102] 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (“An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action . . . .”) (emphasis added).

[103] Id. (“An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action . . . .”) (referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1596).

[104] United States v. Fields, No. 8:13-CR-198-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 5278499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013) (stating “fear of severe withdrawal symptoms meets the definition of ‘serious harm’ as defined by the Statute.”).

[105] U.S. v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074, 1081 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that evidence depicting defendant’s initial cultivation and subsequent exploitation of victims’ drug addictions adequately supported his conviction under Section 1591).

[106] U.S. v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 267 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A] victim’s prior sexual conduct is irrelevant to the sex-trafficking mens rea: ‘whether the victims had previously worked as prostitutes was irrelevant to the required mens rea for the crime.’”) (quoting United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2017).

[107] See, e.g., J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. 20-CV-00155-WHO, 2020 WL 3035794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2020) (“[T]he TVPRA is silent on the issue of indirect [or vicarious] liability, which suggests that the federal common law of agency should apply.”). This holding conforms with the widely-held belief that “statutes are presumed not to disturb the common law, ‘unless the language of the statute [is] clear and explicit for this purpose.’” State Eng'r of Nev. v. S. Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev., 339 F.3d 804, 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia, 464 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1983)). However, some courts may still opt to apply state law. But see K.B. v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels Corp., No. 19-CV-1213-AJ, 2020 WL 8674188, at *9 n.7 (D.N.H. Sept. 28, 2020) ("The TVPRA does not address the issue of indirect or vicarious liability. As the parties both cite primarily to New Hampshire law regarding the franchise relationship, the court does so as well.”).

[108] See supra Part I.

[109] 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Any violation of a criminal offense outlined in 18 U.S.C 77 will satisfy Section 1595. However, the vast majority of sex trafficking cases—as contemplated by this article—take place under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. For the purposes of this Article, I focus on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591.

[110] Section 1595 incorporates Section 1591 (among the other Sections of Chapter 77); Section 1591 includes coercion as sufficient to satisfy the relevant element of a sex trafficking offense; Section 1591 includes threats of serious harm as sufficient to constitute coercion; and the decisions cited above, supra notes 104–106, concluded that drug-based coercion is sufficient to constitute serious harm. As such, following a logical chain of if-then statements: if drug-based coercion constitutes serious harm, then drug-based coercion constitutes coercion; if drug-based coercion constitutes coercion under Section 1591, then drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1591; and if drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1591, then drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1595. The first logical proposition in that chain is true: drug-based coercion constitutes serious harm as defined in Section 1591. Therefore, the conclusion must also be true: drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1595.

[111] See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F.Supp.3d 959, 969–70 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (rejecting defendant’s notion that judicial interpretation of the phrase ‘participation in a venture’ done in the criminal context of Section 1591 should apply to the interpretation of the same phrase done in the civil context of Section 1595).

[112] 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

[113] 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

[114] Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 501-02.

[115] Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (citing the following as examples of other settings where criminal conduct can warrant civil sanctions under a preponderance of the evidence standard: United States. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47–49 (1914)).

[116] See Impact of Trafficking, National Child Traumatic Stress Network, (May 15, 2022) https://www.nctsn.org/what-child-trauma/trauma-types/sex-trafficking/effects.

[117] 18 U.S.C. § 1594(d)(2). However, the success of such an approach would admittedly be uncertain in relation to the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185 (2000).

Probation Ineligibility: A Time For Reconsideration in Kentucky

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Brady Grove[I]

Introduction

In the United States, each state has the authority to shape its own criminal justice and juvenile justice systems.[2] With this regulatory power, states across the country have enacted statutes permitting youths under the age of 18 to be tried as adults for qualifying crimes.[3] In Kentucky, a youthful offender is placed in the jurisdiction of an “adult court” through a mandatory waiver or discretionary transfer. Under the mandatory waiver method, a youth, aged fourteen or older, at the time he or she allegedly utilized a firearm to commit a felony, may be transferred to the Circuit Court and tried as an adult.[4] Under the discretionary transfer method, upon motion of the county attorney, a youth satisfying prescribed statutory requirements may be transferred from the juvenile justice system and tried as an adult.[5] These youthful offenders not only face legal consequences; disruptions to academic development; and social stigma, but also various procedural hurdles.

In Kentucky, upon turning eighteen, youthful offenders still in Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) custody, must return to their sentencing court for an age-eighteen hearing to determine whether he or she will be paroled, released, placed in a treatment program, or incarcerated within a facility operated by the Department of Corrections (Corrections).[6] However, the DJJ and Corrections may together decide to bypass a court ordered incarceration, allowing a youthful offender to remain in the DJJ’s custody until his or her release, parole, or twenty-first birthday.[7] Those allowed to stay may petition the court for probation reconsideration once, upon "completion of a minimum twelve (12) months additional service of sentence."[8] Notably, some courts have declined to extend this amnesty to youthful offenders already barred from probation at their age-eighteen hearing due to the nature of their crime.[9] The Supreme Court of Kentucky has not yet weighed in on the matter.[10] Due to recent developments in sociology and legal philosophy, youthful offenders seeking probation reconsideration should not be prohibited simply because of prior ineligibility at the time of their age-eighteen hearing.         

This Note argues that the Kentucky Legislature should amend KRS § 532.045(2) to permit probationary release for youthful offenders during their probation reconsideration hearing, as prescribed under KRS § 640.075(4). With this modification, the court would receive discretionary latitude in its probation decision, rather than be statutorily mandated to deny the request. Although the crimes in question are extremely serious, the mounting evidence of the negative impact of juvenile incarceration warrants reevaluation of how youthful offenders are treated in Kentucky and the nation at large.

Section I will examine the historical background for youthful offenders in the U.S. and Kentucky; most advancements being quite recent due to increased research and public focus. Section II examines the negative societal impact of current law from a public policy perspective and the implicated federal and state constitutional issues. Last, Section III will propose a statutory solution and appropriate rehabilitation measures for Kentucky that could be adopted by jurisdictions throughout the nation.

I.  Background

A. Juvenile Justice Reform for Youthful Offenders at the National Level

The juvenile justice system has been reactionary to the social and political concerns of the time.[11] The first U.S. juvenile court was established in 1889 due to the dangers of incarcerating children with adults, recognizing the two as being at different developmental stages with different needs.[12] In response to a surge in crime throughout the latter-half of the twentieth century, state governments enacted stricter laws that caused far more juveniles to be tried and sentenced as adults.[13] From 1985 to 2003, twenty-two youthful offenders, between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-eight, received the death penalty for their crimes.[14] Notably, a majority of those twenty-two put to death were members of minority groups.[15]

In 2005, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of death penalty sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.[16] In Roper v. Simmons, an eighteen-year-old sentenced to death for a murder he committed while seventeen-years-old,[17] petitioned the court for postconviction relief, analogizing the execution of youthful offenders to that of the mentally disabled,[18] in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution under Atkins v. Virginia.[19] The Supreme Court agreed, identifying three key differences between juveniles and adults that preclude offenders under the age of eighteen from capital punishment.[20] The first is juveniles’ lack of maturity and responsibility as compared to adults, causing impulsive decision-making.[21] The Court noted that states do not allow juveniles to vote or purchase alcohol for this “comparative immaturity.”[22] The second difference is that juveniles have far less environmental control while adults have the power to avoid criminal activity.[23] The third difference is that juveniles hold malleable ethics and morality with the greater chance of rehabilitation.[24]

The next step was holding that sentencing youthful offenders to life without parole for a non-homicide violated the Eight Amendment. In Graham v. Florida, the Court reasoned that while states can prioritize different criminal justice goals, it is flawed to ignore age, as lesser incentive to demonstrate the rehabilitation ultimately discourages self-improvement efforts by those wanting to reenter society.[25] The most recent major reform is the prohibition of mandatory life-without parole sentences under the Eight Amendment for youthful offenders who committed homicide.

In Miller v. Alabama, the Court reasoned that a mandatory sentence precludes evaluating factors that contribute to culpability and improvement potential such as crime details, mental capacity, and dysfunctional life variables that led to criminal acts.[26] The Court places great importance on the role brain development plays in the legal process, recognizing that juveniles may not face such harsh punishment if they had the maturity to best deal with police and attorneys.[27] The key takeaway is the importance of exercising discretion based on individual factors, no matter the offense.[28] Without this measure, youthful offenders and adults are equally punished for the same crime, regardless of culpability and rehabilitation potential.[29]

While these landmark cases deal with the most serious offenses, the core principles are widely applicable. Society is not bettered by treating youthful offenders equal to adults, even during crime waves. With the social stigma of sexual offenses being arguably stronger than that of serious violent crimes, it is logical to project that reevaluation of youth sex offender treatment will follow from Simmons-Graham-Miller jurisprudence.

B.  An Issue of First Impression in Kentucky

Before its grant of discretionary review in Bloyer v. Commonwealth,[30] the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether youthful offenders may be statutorily precluded from probation, despite its availability under KRS § 640.030.[31] In Commonwealth v. Taylor, a youthful offender convicted of first-degree sodomy and sexual abuse received a twenty-year sentence.[32] The offender was a teenager, while the victim, his younger sister, was a small child.[33] At sentencing, the court classified the youthful offender as a “juvenile sexual offender” and committed him to a treatment program until age twenty-one, as prescribed by state law.[34] Upon turning twenty-one, the youthful offender returned to court and was granted probation in light of his “excellent performance” in the court-mandated program.[35]

However, the Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s decision to grant probation, arguing that KRS § 532.045(2) prohibits probation as a matter of law when the convicted offense is one of the enumerated crimes.[36] The Commonwealth cited KRS § 640.030, mandating that “youthful offenders[s] . . . convicted of a felony offense” receive “the same type of sentencing procedures . . . including probation,” as adult felony offenders.[37] However, the juvenile contended that his classification as a “youthful offender,” and subsequent treatment under KRS § 640.030(4), exempted him from the probation bar located within KRS § 532.045(2).[38] The court found the Commonwealth’s position persuasive and reversed the trial court’s grant of probation. [39] In its decision, the court viewed KRS § 640.030 as a “clear legislative pronouncement” of equal treatment between youthful felony offenders and adult felony offenders.[40]

It is difficult to see how the court could have reached a different conclusion. The statute is unambiguous and allows for a single logical interpretation.[41] However, equal treatment of youthful offenders and adults, as well as the disallowance of discretion, should be avoided. Whether or not granting probation based on treatment program participation was advisable, the trial court was so impressed that they thought it the appropriate time to reintegrate the offender into society.[42] In denying probation as a matter of law, there is far less incentive to make a strong rehabilitative effort.[43] With little incentive to self-improve, it is more likely that the system is releasing offenders back into society in equal or worse condition.[44]

In Bloyer v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed an issue of first impression: whether youthful offenders statutorily barred from probation at their age-eighteen hearing are also barred at their probation reconsideration hearing.[45] At age sixteen, Bloyer pled guilty to multiple sexual offenses, including six counts of incest against his younger siblings, and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment and placed in DJJ custody.[46] At Bloyer’s age-eighteen hearing, the court denied probation and ordered he be transferred to Corrections until his twenty-first birthday.[47] However, the DJJ and Corrections mutually decided to allow Bloyer remain with the DJJ until he reached the age of twenty-one.[48] As this date approached, Bloyer unsuccessfully petitioned the court for probation reconsideration.[49] The trial court found Bloyer ineligible for probation as a matter of law under KRS § 532.045(2), as the offenses clearly met the statutory criteria.[50] On appeal, Bloyer argued that the court violated the Eighth Amendment and Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, prohibiting absolute and arbitrary state power over life, liberty, and property.[51] Bloyer urged the court to consider his unfortunate childhood and substandard intelligence in its analysis.[52]

As to Bloyer’s background, the court believed these factors caused psychological distress but deemed them irrelevant to the issue.[53] The court stated that if Bloyer was legally competent, outside factors do not excuse crime and are immaterial to the question.[54] The constitutional claims were rejected in an equally emphatic fashion.[55] The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment:[56] punishment extremely disproportionate to the offense.[57] The court acknowledges reform trends around youthful offenders, citing Roper, Graham, and Miller, the court refused to view Bloyer’s fifteen-year sentence as an unreasonably severe punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.[58] As Bloyer’s fifteen-year sentence was lower than the statutory maximum for his offenses, the court found no disproportion between Bloyer’s crime and subsequent sentence, thus rejecting his Eighth Amendment argument.[59]

Bloyer’s state constitution claim was met with further skepticism. Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, a broad-sweeping provision prohibiting arbitrary use of state power,[60] requires state actions be “reasonably within the scope of a legitimate public purpose.”[61] Using a rational basis test, the court reasoned that the enumerated offenses were heinous and the legislature had a legitimate purpose in denying probation to protect the public from additional threat, even if assuming youthful offenders are less prone to recidivism than adults.[62] The court concluded its analysis and affirmed the lower court judgment, holding that youthful offenders statutorily ineligible for probation at their age-eighteen hearing, remain ineligible at a hearing for probation reconsideration.[63] Under this ruling, there is no room for judicial discretion or individual consideration at a youthful offender’s probation reconsideration hearing. While this lack of offender-specific analysis is easier to apply uniformly, the potentially positive impact of greater flexibility regarding youthful offenders outweighs this administrative ease.

II.  Concerns with Current Approaches Despite Steps in the Right Direction

       Jurisprudence gradually evolves over time, especially when controversial, as change must occur within the general population and political process. The technical details of criminal procedure can be difficult to understand, especially with each state having its own unique body of law. Though recent years have put greater focus on the treatment of different classes within the justice system, laws on probation eligibility do not command headlines, and violent offenders are not the subjects of public sympathy.

However, advancements in the perception of youthful offenders over past decades have been substantial and in quick succession, placing an increased focus on resolving criminal inequalities and finding efficient, fair solutions that match the goals of today’s society.[64] However, these modifications cannot depend solely on Supreme Court action, as criminal justice statutes are the making of state legislatures.[65] Kentucky should amend the current law by including a youthful offender exception at reconsideration hearings, allowing for judicial discretion regarding probation, as the constitutional issues and public policy concerns render the matter-of-law prohibition outdated and threatening to individual liberty.

A.  Constitutional Issues

The Eighth Amendment guarantees freedom from “cruel and unusual punishment.”[66] This means that no citizen shall be punished excessively. To determine if a punishment meets constitutional muster, courts look to society’s “evolving standards of decency,” weighing the crime’s resulting harm against the sentence’s possible restrictions of life, liberty, and property.[67] Due to this balancing analysis, the figurative line separating unconstitutional, “cruel and unusual punishment[s]” from those that considered proper, may shift with every offense.[68] While harsher punishments may have stronger deterring and incapacitating effects, an individual’s constitutional rights and protections must take precedence.[69]

However, the severity of the punishment imposed should not simply be measured in proportion to the severity of the offense. Especially, as we have come to a greater understanding of the impact a juvenile’s incomplete mental development and emotional maturity, lack of personal identity, peer pressure, and other individualized circumstances, may have on his susceptibility to criminal behavior.[70] Instead, the severity of the punishment should be measured against the offense and the particular perpetrator.[71] These underlying circumstances contribute to one’s self-perception, dominion over their personal environment, ability to understand the consequences and harm of their actions, self-perception, and overall feelings of desperation that results in the offense and “nothing to lose” mentality if caught and punished.[72]

Because some people have been dealt circumstances that make their criminal behavior more understandable, it would be inequitable to judge them on an even plane with those who had all of the power in the world to avoid criminal activity yet chose not to. For example, youthful offenders are severely limited in their capacity to leave crime-ravished neighborhoods or move out of abusive homes.[73] In addition, scientific advancements have shown stark neurological differences between youthful offenders and adult offenders regarding “behavior control.”[74] Unlike adult offenders, youthful offenders are more prone to impulsive action and risk-taking, making them less culpable for their actions and more likely to reform upon reaching mental maturity.[75] Further, several sociological studies previously conducted demonstrate that only a small percentage of youths involved in criminal activity actually develop any lingering pattern of criminal behavior.[76]

       It is here that the separation in reasoning between the Supreme Court over the past two decades and the courts in Taylor and Bloyer expands exponentially. An automatic prohibition of probation for offenders convicted of enumerated offenses removes the judicial discretion surrounding a probation determination.[77] For example, KRS § 532.045(2) requires a court to deny probation to any offender, regardless of age, convicted of a crime as prescribed by the statute.[78] This result may also be mandated in probation reconsideration hearings of youthful offenders, held under KRS§ 640.075(4), regardless of whether the court believes that the individual has been successfully reformed and warrants the probationary release.[79] This lacks the common sense of giving wide deference to the finder of fact and allowing judicial discretion in an area where it is otherwise dominant.

Ultimately, the equal treatment of youthful and adult offenders mandated by KRS § 532.045(2) renders the statute unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment. Although youthful offenders are less culpable, receive far more benefits with probationary release, and are less likely to return to criminal activity upon release, they are mandatorily subject to the same prohibitions as adult offenders. Both youthful and adult offenders operate with the same numerator, but very different denominators. This disproportionality disregards the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham and Miller.

While opponents of this contention argue that the probation prohibition is perfectly proportional in light of the seriousness of the offenses which trigger it, the fact remains that youthful offenders receive punishments equal to that of adult offenders, despite the fact they are of lesser capacity, lesser culpability, and are lesser threats to the public upon release.[80] The disproportion may be slight, the punishment is still excessive when considering the circumstances of the youthful offender. Proportionality can easily be restored by the Kentucky Legislature amending KRS § 532.045, permitting probationary release for youthful offenders seeking it during their probation reconsideration hearing, as prescribed under KRS § 640.075(4).[81] With this statutory leeway, courts may then utilize its judicial discretion in determining whether the youthful offender would be better served by being released on probation.

       The probation prohibition for youthful offenders also violates Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, forbidding the arbitrary and absolute power of the state over life, liberty, and property, absent a compelling state interest.[82] The word “arbitrary,” as relating to government function, is simply defined as a “ruling by absolute authority.”[83] Under KRS § 532.045(2), the absolute authority of the state deprives youthful offenders of their liberty, through its statutory ban on probation.[84]

Opponents of this contention will likely argue that the statutory probation bar for those convicted of deplorable crimes fails to constitute an arbitrary state action that results in an inequity “exceed[ing] the reasonable and legitimate interest of the people.”[85] In their view, a statute enacted to prevent offenders convicted of heinous crimes from reentering society is an appropriately tailored state action to achieve the interest of keeping the public safe from youthful offenders. Therefore, KRS § 532.045(2) does not violate Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution. While this belief may hold true regarding adult offenders, it is not the case for youthful offenders.

While it is likely a reasonable and legitimate state interest to keep this class of adult offenders away from the people due to their greater likelihood of recidivism, no genuine interest exists with respect to youthful offenders. Youthful offenders are considerably less prone to recidivism when given the opportunity to begin rehabilitation before fully maturing.[86] By keeping youthful offenders incarcerated, a greater danger is imposed on the society by the inverse: reducing the likelihood of meaningful rehabilitation, while increasing the chance of recidivism upon post-maturity release.[87]

B.  Public Policy Considerations

From a public policy standpoint, the goals of society are more effectively met by pursuing the rehabilitation of youthful offenders during the development of their psyche. During this period, they are more susceptible to rehabilitative efforts. At its conclusion, the possibility of true reform is greatly reduced. Additionally, public policy dictates society encourage the self-improvement of youthful offenders. As it currently stands, a youthful offender, subject to the probation prohibition, has little incentive to better himself while incarcerated due to the lengthy sentences upon conviction and absence of behavior-based early release. This perpetuates a greater threat of continued criminal activity inside and out of prison confines.

By amending KRS § 532.045(2) to permit probationary release for youthful offenders seeking probation reconsideration pursuant to KRS § 640.075(4), judges are given the discretion to make their determination on whether the individual has demonstrated commitment and responsiveness to rehabilitating themselves, to the point that they are capable and deserving of reintegrating with society. With this statutory modification, the state would both encourage youthful offenders to devote their time spent incarcerated to self-betterment, while also disincentivizing further unlawful behavior while imprisoned and upon eventual release.

Opponents of the proposed amendment will likely argue that public policy demands heinous criminal activity be disincentivized through probation prohibition, regardless of the offender’s age. Furthermore, they note that the state’s legitimate interest in public safety should be prioritized and pursued through deterrence and incapacitation.

However, due to a youthful offender’s incomplete mental development and lack of emotional maturity, youthful offenders are less likely to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions and long-term decision making, rendering a punishment’s deterrence efforts futile and incapacitation efforts temporary at best. A better, more permanent solution can be found in the encouragement of rehabilitation. Under this method, youthful offenders stand a greater chance of reentering society with the faculties necessary to avoid further criminal activity, accomplishing utilitarian goals of betterment to society through youthful offenders thus improving their post-release lives and society as a whole.

III.  Restoring the Balance in Kentucky by Allowing a Fighting Chance

       With the possible rigid judicial interpretation of KRS § 532.045(2),[88] the Kentucky Legislature now has the opportunity to further evolve the way in which youthful offenders are treated by the criminal justice system. Reforming KRS § 532.045(2) to exempt youthful offenders from its application at probation reconsideration hearings, legislators can rectify the statute’s harmful effects by allowing judicial discretion in whether or not to grant probation based on the circumstances of the individual’s life, the commitment the individual has shown to self-improvement, and the probability that probation would best serve the individual towards living a meaningful life as a contributing member of society.

       A probation system, appropriately tailored to the needs of youthful offenders and their communities, seems to be the puzzle that every state is looking to put together. Unfortunately, despite the greater push by many states on this front, jurisdictions have various, inconsistent methods for the collection and publication of empirical data regarding the success of their respective juvenile justice programs, with sparce mention of program success rates for youthful offenders.[89]

For instance, the Kentucky Juvenile Manual, a publication by the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy focused on juvenile justice law throughout the state, includes a section on the parole of youthful offenders but provides no layout of how the program operates or its success rate.[90] However, the “Classification and Placement Manual”, published by the Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice, explains juvenile probation more fully, including the use of placement tiers based on a youthful offender’s ability to function in school, the resources the community is able to provide for their treatment, and the ability of the caregiver to participate in and assist with the program.[91]

There are, however, a few states that keep progressive recidivism data regarding their juvenile justice programs run by the state. For example, in Florida, the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice reported a fifteen percent recidivism rate in 2015.[92] This figure includes juveniles that successfully completed probationary releases, diversion releases, and community programs.[93] While the data on the matter is surprisingly limited, it does seem to indicate a general level of success for state probation programs with natural variation that can be expected from different states with unique problems and resource limitations. Traditional state programs appear to be of adequate quality but given the sensitive nature of the offenses that currently prohibit youthful offenders from probation at age-twenty-one hearings, it is possible that the offerings by the adult and juvenile probation programs will not quite fit the unique needs of youthful offenders.

Following a startling increase in the incarceration rate of minority youth, California shifted incarcerated youthful offenders from state-run juvenile prisons to local rehabilitation centers.[94] A decision made possible after the state was awarded several grants aimed at providing counseling services for trauma, families, substance abuse, situational awareness, and mental health.[95] This reform could serve as an example for other states’ juvenile justice systems, placing the betterment of the youthful offender at the forefront.

In addition, Canada has enacted legislation geared at the rehabilitation and reintegration of youthful offenders.[96] For example, the Youth Criminal Justice Act requires police officers contemplate “extrajudicial measures,” such as referrals to community programs or agencies, before criminally charging a juvenile.[97] However, the social stigma of these programs, in conjunction with their post-imprisonment restrictions, have led to mixed reviews from participants and their families.[98] For example, youthful sexual offenders sentenced to a term of home confinement may be barred from leaving their home, interacting with people below a certain age, or using the internet.[99] Those who violate these restrictions may be detained at the “Young Offender Centre” and placed into isolation for up to seventy-two hours.[100] The province of Alberta has experienced statistical drops in the total youth accused of crimes, total convictions, and the “Youth Crime Severity Index”, in recent years.[101] Those who have found success in these programs attribute it to the programs’ structure, focus on rehabilitation, and the identities of the participants are kept from publication.[102]

The Canadian juvenile justice system’s use of rehabilitative programs for youthful offenders should influence its American counterpart. While this approach may require a significant amount of time and resources from a variety of state actors, the statistical evidence of Alberta’s reduction in total youth crime and serious youth crime should make these contributions worthwhile.[103] The Canadian system has legitimized the goals of youthful offender probation and rehabilitation, which should manifest confidence from American jurisdictions seeking to reform in similar ways.[104]

IV.  Conclusion

In conclusion, KRS § 532.045(2), prohibiting probationary release for youthful offenders seeking probation reconsideration pursuant to KRS § 640.075(4), violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, by imposing cruel and unusual punishment, as well as Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, by authorizing arbitrary state action without a reasonable and legitimate interest. These constitutional violations, at both the federal and state level, present a significant threat to the liberty of an already vulnerable population, and it is this population of at-risk youth that needs protection and separate consideration the most.

 To protect juveniles from this injustice, the Kentucky Legislature must amend KRS § 532.045(2) to permit probationary release for youthful offenders seeking it during their probation reconsideration hearing under KRS § 640.075(4). This amendment would better serve public policy by incentivizing self-betterment and rehabilitation while incarcerated. By prioritizing rehabilitation and allowing the fighting chance for probation, the state will be providing powerful motivation for youthful offenders to take full advantage of the opportunities to better themselves with the goal of early release, reintegration into society, and living meaningful, contributing lives from that point forward. With these benefits in mind, it is clear that the Kentucky Legislature must take this step. This amendment places the question of probation squarely in the hands of the presiding judge. Under this new method, judges exercise their discretion, weighing the youthful offender’s individual circumstances and propensity for rehabilitation, before determining whether the youthful offender and surrounding community would benefit more from the offender’s reintegration into society or further incarceration.

 



[I] J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law.

[2] Bureau of Just. Stat., The Justice System: What is the Sequence of Events in the Criminal Justice System?, (June 3, 2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/justice-system [https://perma.cc/B8T3-Y3QM].

[3] Nat’l Juv. Def. Ctr., Kentucky, (July 2018), https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/2827-JMPA].

[4] Id.; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (West 2021).

[5] Nat’l Juv. Def. Ctr., supra note 3; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 635.020(2)–(7) (West 2021).

[6] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.030(2) (West 2006).

[7] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.075(1) (West 2002).

[8] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.075(4) (West 2002).

[9] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828, at *10–11 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c) (unpublished decision). After examining this issue of first impression, the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that a youthful offender ineligible for probation at his age-eighteen hearing, remained ineligible at his probation consideration hearing. On June 9, 2021, the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review.

[10] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0473-DG, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 204 (June 9, 2021).

[11] Lynn Cothern, Juveniles and the Death Penalty, Coordinating Council on Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention 9 (Nov. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/184748.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JR-ZAPE].

[12] Id. at 1.

[13] Id.

[14] Executions of Juveniles in the U.S. 1976-2005, Death Penalty Info. Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/juveniles/executions-of-juveniles-since-1976 [https://perma.cc/GPN3-7JHK].

[15] Id. From 1985 to 2003, twenty-two youthful offenders, consisting of eleven African-Americans, ten Caucasians, and one Latino, were executed.

[16] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

[17] Id. at 556.

[18] Id. at 559.

[19] Id.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring the imposition of capital punishment for the mentally disabled).

[20] Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. at 570.

[25] Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).

[26] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477, 489, (2012).

[27] Id. at 477–78.

[28] Id. at 476–77.

[29] Id. at 477.

[30] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0473-DG, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 204 (June 9, 2021).

[31] Commonwealth v. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ky. 1997).

[32] Id. at 421.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 421–22; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(2) (West 2014).

[37] Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 423; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.030(5) (West 2006).

[38] Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 423.

[39] Id.  

[40] Id.

[41] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(2) (West 2014).

[42] Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 421.

[43] See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010). 

[44] See id.

[45] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c) (unpublished decision).

[46] Id. at *3.

[47] Id. at *7.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at *8.

[50] Id.  

[51] Id. at *24–25.

[52] Id. at *9–10.

[53] Id.

[54] See id.

[55] Id. at *24–31.

[56] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

[57] Bloyer, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828 at *25 (“Though [the Eighth Amendment] does not mention proportionality, [it] nonetheless encompasses a proportionality requirement”) (citation omitted).

[58] Id. at *27.

[59] Id. at *28.

[60] Ky. Const. § 2.

[61] Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1964).

[62] Id. at *31–32.

[63] Id. at *32.

[64] See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of capital punishment on youthful offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on youthful non-homicide offenders); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on all youthful offenders regardless of crime).

[65] Bureau of Just. Stat., supra note 2.

[66] U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

[67] Roper, 543 at 560­–61 (citations omitted).

[68] See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367­–78 (1910) (examining differing judicial opinions on what constitutes excessive punishment).

[69] See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.

[70] Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psych. 1009, 1010–14 (2003).

[71] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012).

[72] See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.

[73] Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted).

[74] Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted).

[75] Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.

[76] Steinberg & Scott, supra note 70, at 1014.

[77] Nancy J. King & Brynn E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 287, 291–92 (2014).

[78] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(4) (West 2014); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d 420 (1997).

[79] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c). (unpublished decision). On June 9, 2021, the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review to determine whether a youthful offender statutorily exempt from probation at his age-eighteen hearing, was also exempt at his probation reconsideration hearing. As of December 29, 2021, no decision has been rendered.

[80] Steinberg & Scott, supra note 70, at 1010.

[81] See Aldon Thomas Stiles, Come July, California Will Swap Juvenile Jails for Reform-Minded Rehab Centers, L.A. Sentinel (Mar. 18, 2021), https://lasentinel.net/come-july-california-will-swap-juvenile-jails-for-reform-minded-rehab-centers.html [https://perma.cc/H6JM-3XXF]; Otiena Ellwand, Breaking the Youth Crime Cycle: New Strategies Aiming to Rehabilitate Young Offenders Have Mixed Results, Edmonton J. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://edmontonjournal.com/news/insight/breaking-the-youth-crime-cycle-new-strategies-aiming-to-rehabilitate-young-offenders-have-mixed-results [https://perma.cc/GR4Q-SDCN].

[82] Ky. Const. § 2.

[83] Arbitrary, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary [https://perma.cc/HRX5-Z26K].

[84] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(2) (West 2014).

[85] Kentucky Milk Mktg. and Antimonopoly Com'n v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Ky. 1985).

[86] Steinberg & Scott, supra note 70, at 1014–15.

[87] See id. at 1015–16.

[88] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c) (unpublished decision).

[89] See Juvenile Justice Services, Juv. Just., Geography, Pol’y, Prac. & Stat., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-justice-services [https://perma.cc/HFD9-Q5L7].

[90] Kentucky Dep’t of Pub. Advoc., Juv. Advoc. Manual 29­–32 (2013), https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender_Resources/Documents/JuvenileManualFINAL060513.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ME-6FHZ].

[91] Kentucky Dep’t of Juv. Just., Classification and Placement Manual (2019), https://djj.ky.gov/200%20Policy%20Manual/Classification%20and%20Placement%20Manual%20040519.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FWM-E4JB].

[92] Juvenile Justice Services, supra note 89.

[93] Id.

[94] Stiles, supra note 81. 

[95] Id.

[96] Government of Canada, The Youth Criminal Justice Act Summary and Background, Government of Canada, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-outils/back-hist.html (last modified July 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9MB7-Z3C2].

[97] Government of Canada, The Youth Criminal Justice Act Summary and Background, Government of Canada, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-outils/back-hist.html (last modified July 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9MB7-Z3C2 ].

[98] See Ellwand, supra note 81.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103] See Id.

[104] Id.

A Strike Against Black Lives Matter: A Batson Violation or Preserving Impartiality


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Andrew Moore [I]

Introduction

We are “a government of laws, not of men.”[2] Yet an impartial, disinterested group of people ultimately stand between the accused and the power of the State to take his or her right to life and liberty away.[3] Our society wants to believe the jury system determines guilt or innocence on impartial and fair fact,[4] but that is not always the case as the jury is made up of people—each coming with biases, beliefs, perceptions.[5] The voir dire is the process the courts use to ensure members of the petit jury, those who determine guilt or innocence, will follow the judge’s instructions and determine the outcome of the case based solely on the facts presented to them at trial.[6] The process differs slightly in federal and state courts as voir dire in federal court is conducted mainly by the judge, whereas, in most state courts the attorneys play a more active role in vetting jurors.[7]

The voir dire is not supposed to be a major part of the trial, but in recent jurisprudence it has come under closer scrutiny. Parties have weaponized the process, particularly prosecutors, by using discriminatory tactics to remove people from the jury pool based off their race, sex, and ethnicity.[8] In order to get into the particular legal questions of this Note, it is important to understand how members of the petit jury are selected or removed from sitting at trial—the ultimate objective to sit, as much as possible, an impartial jury.[9] The first step to seating a jury is a random selection of members from the community.[10] Second, those selected are divided into a smaller group and sent to a courtroom for their specific case.[11] Lastly, the parties then can challenge jurors and try to have jurors they find not to be sympathetic to their side removed.[12] The Supreme Court has clearly opined that voir dire plays an essential part in protecting the defendant’s right to an impartial jury allowing the judge and parties to discover potential bias in a venireperson.[13] An attorney may remove a venireperson by exercising a “challenge for cause” asking the judge to remove the juror for a reason of impartiality or bias or by using a peremptory strike.[14]

A peremptory strike allows an attorney to remove a venireperson from the jury pool for any reason, but they are statutorily limited to a set number.[15] The idea of a peremptory strike is it ensures the parties are given a “fair and impartial jur[y]” by allowing “each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side . . . eliminating extremes of partiality on both sides, thereby assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.”[16] However, recent studies have made it increasingly clear prosecutors use peremptory strikes to create prosecution friendly juries by excluding minorities and women to create a nearly all-white male jury.[17]

As many Americans have begun to take a more active role in confronting systemic racism, Black Lives Matter (BLM) has become a mainstream political and civil rights group seeking change to society, focusing primarily on the judicial system.[18] Parties have begun to inquire into juror’s support of BLM.[19] This inquiry has led to an increase in the use of peremptory strikes to remove supporters of BLM when the judge has refused to remove the juror for cause based on him or her supporting the group.[20] As BLM has become more prevalent in society, it is apparent that questions about a venireperson’s support for the group will become more prevalent.[21] An issue courts now must decide is whether asking venirepersons about BLM and using a peremptory strike to remove the venireperson violates the Equal Protection Clause, or does using a peremptory strike on a BLM supporter provide a race-neutral reason ensuring a fair and impartial jury.[22]

North Carolina upheld the convictions of Black men despite the prosecutor asking a venireperson about their views on BLM and using a peremptory strike to then remove the juror.[23] However, Nevada ordered a new trial after criticizing the prosecutor for asking about BLM saying it was a pretextual reason to remove a Black juror.[24] In State v. Gresham, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision that acknowledged “racial overtones” surrounding the prosecution’s line of questioning, but declined to accept the defense’s Batson challenge “because the . . . question[ing] did not establish purposeful discrimination based on the juror’s race.”[25] California is set to soon rule on a prosecutor peremptorily striking a Black woman for her answering on a questionnaire that she supports BLM.[26]

Part I of this Note reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny to eliminate the use of discriminatory peremptory strikes. Part II looks at how the lower courts and state courts have been expanding Batson. Part III shows how asking BLM impacts a juror’s rights of Equal Protection and First Amendment rights. Part IV discusses how the defendant’s rights to an impartial jury and a juror’s right to be equally protected by the law require courts to not allow parties to ask about supporting BLM because it provides too easy of a pretextual reason to discriminate against minority juror members.

I.  Batson and Its Progeny

In Batson, after the prosecutor used all of his peremptory strikes to remove all Black people from the venire, Mr. Batson, a Black man, was convicted by the jury of second-degree burglary and receiving stolen goods.[27] Mr. Batson argued that the prosecutor had violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right “to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community,” and violated his right to equal protection of the laws.[28] The intention of the Supreme Court in Batson was to make it easier for a defendant to challenge a prosecutor from purposefully removing minorities from the jury when a person of their race stood accused.[29] The Court stated, “The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.”[30] The Court made clear that not only does purposeful discrimination violate the Equal Protection Clause, it also calls into question the defendant’s right to an impartial jury, the constitutional protection from “the arbitrary exercise of power by [a] prosecutor or judge.”[31]

In Batson, the Supreme Court created a three step analysis to use when a party objects to the use of a peremptory strike based on an impermissible stereotype of a venire member.[32] First, the opponent to the strike must establish an “inference of purposeful discrimination” using “all relevant circumstances.”[33] This requires the defendant to establish (a) “that he is a member of a cognizable racial group”; (b) the prosecution has improperly utilized its peremptory strikes to “remove from the venire[,] members of the defendant’s race”; (c) that he “is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate’”; and (d) that the surrounding “facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.”[34] Second, the prosecutor must then provide a race-neutral reason for excusing the juror.[35] Finally, the trial court is to weigh the reason given by the prosecutor based on the totality of the circumstances and decide if the reason or reasons given are true or merely pretextual covering a discriminatory intent.[36]

Batson immediately received criticism as many legal scholars, and a sitting Supreme Court Justice, believed the Court did not do enough to end the discrimination against minorities. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall applauded the Court’s efforts, but predicted discriminatory practices would continue—unless peremptory challenges were eliminated completely.[37] Justice Marshall’s argument for abolishing the peremptory strike in its entirety was it would be too easy for prosecutors to provide a race neutral explanation cover rendering the courts largely ineffective in stopping discrimination.[38] Justice Marshall’s opinion proved accurate as prosecutors and other parties have continually discriminated, consciously or unconsciously, against minorities evidenced by both prosecutors own accounts and statistical analysis.[39]

In subsequent decisions, the Court has explained how “discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at large.”[40] The jury is a well thought out safeguard to the powers of the legal system which allows the people to trust the legal system knowing there is a buffer between them and the oppressive power of the State.[41] In Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme Court expanded Batson by ruling the Equal Protection Clause not only protects defendants from discrimination, but it also protects each individual juror from being discriminated against.[42] The Court recently reaffirmed the importance of extending Batson to each juror saying, “[o]ther than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic process.”[43] Realizing how important the perception of fairness is to the judicial system, the Supreme Court expanded Batson to civil cases seeking to rid the courtroom of “state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.”[44]

The Court repeatedly holds discrimination has no place in the courtroom and hurts society at large, yet the Court continues to reject a growing push to get rid of peremptory strikes. Many legal scholars and activists support Justice Marshall’s argument that peremptory strikes have become a tool for discrimination used to deprive defendant’s right to a fair trial, and the only way to ensure fairness is to completely eliminate the peremptory strike.[45] However, proponents of the peremptory strike remain steadfast in believing the peremptory strike must remain a part of the voir dire process.[46] Courts and proponents of peremptory strikes maintain the benefit of ensuring a fair and impartial trial outweighs the cost of discrimination.[47]

One argument for continuing the use of peremptory strikes is it allows the attorneys, who are most familiar with the facts and best equipped to detect bias, to strike jurors who they know will be prejudice against their client without being able to articulate a for-cause reason.[48]In her concurring opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Justice O’Connor described peremptory strikes as a well-established and needed tradition that allows both sides to feel secure in knowing they will be tried in front of an impartial jury.[49] The issue of peremptory strikes is judged with a balancing test, and proponents of peremptory strikes argue the defendant’s right to a fair and speedy trial is benefited from their use.[50] Peremptory strikes also serve the goal of efficiency and ensuring the voir dire is quick allowing parties to focus on the merits of the case.[51] Lastly, proponents argue peremptory strikes actually protect jurors because it allows the parties to remove them without having to dig too far into the potential juror’s private life offending his or her right to privacy.[52] While there are some benefits of peremptory strikes, the question still remains, do they outweigh the costs of court room discrimination? Should our society tolerate questions “tantamount to interrogating [someone’s] Blackness.”[53]

The Batson decision was a good starting point by the Supreme Court to clean the courtroom of discriminatory practices, but it did not do enough. Our justice system only works if people perceive it to be fair and impartial.[54] The U.S. Constitution is clear on how important the right to a fair trial is before a person’s life, liberty, and property are taken away.[55] The courts appear to be set in keeping the peremptory strike as being a way to ensure a fair jury.[56] However, it appears misplaced to utilize a “mere strategic device” to violate someone’s equal protection rights.[57]

If the courts are to amend their public image, they need to expand Batson to exclude prosecutors from (a) asking questions that clearly target a juror’s race, and (b) striking a potential juror because of their affiliations with groups seeking to advance equality for minorities. Many courts, at both the federal and state level, have already begun to expand Batson to other cognizable groups and expressed a desire to protect a jurors’ First Amendment rights.[58] These cases will illustrate why the courts should not allow questions about affiliations that easily allow for pretextual reason to exclude a juror.

II.  Expanding Batson to Other Cognizable Groups

The lower courts and state courts have wrestled with Batson ever since it was decided. Since then, the courts have had Batson challenges that the Supreme Court could not have envisioned with only a handful reaching the Supreme Court since deciding Batson.[59] Courts now have ruled on many issues involving peremptory strikes and discrimination with the problem being inconsistent on how to apply Batson beyond race, ethnicity, and gender.[60] In the federal system, courts have applied Batson to peremptory strikes used against potential jurors that are members of groups that have traditionally received heightened judicial scrutiny.[61] Additionally, some lower courts have found Batson violations in striking potential jurors because they were “Jews, Italians, whites, and Native Americans.”[62]

The groups that have proven hardest for the courts to decide are groups that an individual chooses to affiliate with or join.[63] Both state and federal courts have drawn a fine line between a permissible strike and a Batson violation. When evaluating the permissibility of a religion-based peremptory challenge, the distinguishing fact appears to be whether the strike was based on religious affiliation, which would be unconstitutional, or on the juror’s religious beliefs or belief system, which is allowed due to beliefs being an indicator of how the juror may decide the case.[64] Then-Judge Alito opined that questioning if someone was a Quaker was fine because it would indicate whether or not she could vote for the death penalty.[65] These distinctions between strikes, due to affiliations, or strikes, due to beliefs, will prove to be the best analogy for determining if asking about BLM is a Batson violation or permissible. Before analyzing the cases that deal with peremptory strikes and affiliations, it is important to see how the courts have dealt with a juror’s group affiliations and for-cause challenges.

A.  For-Cause Removal of Jurors Based on Group Affiliations

In U.S. v. Salamone, the defendant was charged with multiple firearms charges.[66] The trial judge asked venire members if they supported the National Rifle Association (NRA) or had any affiliation with the NRA.[67] The trial court then dismissed one potential juror and five potential alternates from the venire.[68] The Third Circuit discussed how allowing “trial judges and prosecutors to determine juror eligibility based solely on their perceptions of the external associations of a juror” would afford them too much arbitrary power and would call into question the impartiality and fairness of the jury.[69] The court went onto to criticize the government’s argument that someone affiliated with the NRA would not be a fair juror because the case was gun-related.[70] The court pointed out that juror competence is an individual assessment and excluding “for cause of NAACP members [in] enforcement of civil rights statutes, Moral Majority activists from pornography cases, [or] Catholics from cases involving abortion clinics” bears not on their ability to be a juror.[71]

Courts have affirmed trial courts’ decision allowing a former police officer or police officer’s spouses to sit on the jury.[72] In United States v. McIntyre, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied a criminal defendant’s appeal arising from a jury member’s former occupation as a police officer. Citing the trial judge’s “careful and thorough examination” of the former policeman, in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances, the court failed to identify any error requiring judicial relief.[73] This notion has also been applied in the context of federal employees. The Supreme Court ruled employment to the federal government is not grounds for dismissal,[74] and a lower court reasoned that a federal employee could serve as juror even when her employer is a party to the case.[75]

The courts are clear that they do not believe affiliations are enough to dismiss a juror for cause without the trial judge finding the potential juror has actual biasness.[76] Jurors are not to be judged for being part of a group because that does not show if they are competent to fairly decide a trial. These cases dealing with dismissal by a for-cause challenge are illustrative of how courts can protect the right to a fair trial but not infringe upon the rights of the jurors. But why treat peremptory strikes so differently when the potential for discrimination is larger and often changes the outcome of a case?[77]

B.  Peremptory Strikes Based on Religious Affiliations

State and federal courts have struggled to create a consistent rule for evaluating peremptory strikes based on affiliations with a religious group. Again, the deciding factor has been whether the strike was based on religious affiliations or a juror’s belief system.[78] There is a trend of cases where judges allow peremptory strikes based on a juror’s religious activities or beliefs but decline to extend this to religious affiliation.[79] Some states allow jurors to be removed due to the juror’s religious affiliation, reasoning the defendant’s right to having a fair and impartial jury is greater than that of the individual jurors.[80] Comparing two cases will show how inconsistent state courts have been when applying Batson to affiliations which is a problem as the makeup of the jury often determines the outcome of the trial.

In State v. Davis, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove a Black man from jury service due to his affiliation with the Jehovah’s Witness religious group.[81] The trial court asked the prosecutor to state her reason for striking the Black juror after the defense raised a Batson challenge.[82] The prosecutor was upfront saying the juror’s affiliation with Jehovah’s Witness was the sole reason for her strike because “in [her] experience J[e]hovah Witness are reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings in this Court House.”[83] The prosecutor explained, “I would never fail . . . to strike a J[e]hovah Witness,” if she had a peremptory strike still to use at the close of jury selection.[84]

The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Powers v. Ohio.[85] There, the Court examined a claim of “cross-bias” discrimination concerning a white defendant and black juror. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the removed juror’s right to equal protection had been violated, though the defendant’s had not, because (a) “racial discrimination ‘invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law’” and (b) “the juror rejected solely because of skin color ‘suffers a profound personal humiliation.”[86] The Minnesota Supreme Court started their review by asking if the peremptory strike was used to “perpetrate religious bigotry to the extent that the institutional integrity of the jury had been impaired.”[87] The court, like so many other opinions, made sure to emphasize the importance of the peremptory strike and its aid in ensuring a fair trial.[88] The court conceded that some unbiased jurors are excused, but that was outweighed by the need to ensure no biased jurors could influence the decision.[89] The court then highlighted and explained the differences between religious discrimination and race or gender discrimination.[90]

The opinion distinguished Davis with the fact that religion has not faced the same bias that race has in the use of peremptory strikes.[91] The court emphasized how, unlike race, religious affiliations can give insight into one’s beliefs, which provide a good indicator on how one will decide the facts, and the assumption is not based on a bias against the potential juror.[92] Lastly, the court stressed that “religious affiliation (or lack thereof) is not as self-evident as race or gender,” which would complicate voir dire and invade a jurors right to privacy.[93] In denying certiorari, Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning stating a juror is much more easily discriminated against due to self-evident characteristics.[94] She also discussed how extending Batson to religious affiliation would complicate the voir dire and posed some practical concerns.[95]

In State v. Fuller, a case factually similar to Davis, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided to not allow jurors to be excused for their religious affiliations.[96] Here, a prosecutor struck two jurors due to their religious practices.[97] One juror was struck for wearing what the prosecutor described as a “Muslim ‘garb’ (‘a skull cap or rather long outer garment’),” and the other was struck due to his work as a missionary which indicated to the prosecutor that both jurors would favor the defendant.[98] On review, the Court opined that this was a blanket stereotype of an individual which the law sought to eliminate.[99] While the court agreed that finding a biased belief would be enough to remove a juror, removal based solely on a stereotype would frustrate the goals of peremptory strikes and could not be permitted.[100] Following, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with two federal opinions that religious affiliations are part of a cognizable group and may not be the basis for a peremptory strike.[101]

These two cases illustrate the difficulty jurors’ affiliations pose in the voir dire process. Trial courts are forced into balancing the protected rights of the defendant and the potential juror. Some argue that because the defendant’s life, liberty, and property are on the line, attorneys should be able to ask about affiliations and strike jurors based on them to ensure a fair trial.[102] While others argue, asking about group affiliations has become another way for parties to discriminate against jurors they find to not be sympathetic to their side.[103] The problem with allowing questions about group affiliations is they give parties pretextual reason to exclude potential jurors who are part of cognizable groups. Lawyers, primarily prosecutors, have proved to be quite good at providing race-neutral reasons for excluding jurors that are but a mere pretext to race.[104] The ability to ask about jurors’ affiliations to groups who are socially and politically active should be a violation of their First Amendment rights and will undoubtedly be used to target minorities. The next section of this Note will look at how asking about BLM is harmful to defendants, the venire member, and society as a whole.

III.  Black Lives Matter Protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”[105] The idea that our justice system can survive racial stereotypes is a farce. People are looking for reassurance that they will be treated equally under the law. The ultimate danger of continuing to allow parties to ask racially charged questions is people will lose faith in the justice system.[106] The American democratic experience is built on the idea people will not be targeted for their beliefs or for whom they affiliate with.[107] It is a good thing for society when citizens actively seek to participate in the democratic process. Jury duty has been repeatedly recognized by the courts as one of the best ways for someone to participate in that process.[108] This means the court needs to be seen as a protector serving in the democratic process, not an agent for carrying out blanket stereotypes preventing participation.

While many people may feel jury duty is a waste of time or an extreme annoyance, there are some who look at jury duty as one of the best means to participating in the democratic process. The Supreme Court in 2019 said, “[o]ther than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic process.”[109] Many people, like Crishala Reed, are excited to serve as a jury member and participate in the judicial system.[110] Ms. Reed went into the courtroom excited to be on the jury serving her community, but her hopes were cut short when a prosecutor used a preemptive strike to remove her from the jury pool after she said she supported BLM.[111] In response, Ms. Reed said, “‘I felt targeted . . . [i]t was a life-changing experience for me, personally.’”[112]

Her story illustrates how hurtful and embarrassing discrimination in the voir dire can be. As the Supreme Court recognized, not only is the right of the defendant implicated in discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, but the image of the justice system is tarnished, and the individual juror’s right has been infringed.[113] The justice system works best when the system is perceived as inclusive and fair, not excluding people based on their affiliations.[114] Courts are running into the danger of turning trials into a show of who supports what group. If obvious racially charged questions are allowed to persist, people will lose faith in the judicial system.

One of the problems with allowing a party to question someone’s support of BLM is that it is hard for a venire person to fully answer that question. It is safe to assume a majority of people will agree each person’s individual life matters and would affiliate with a group that promotes that general idea. However, the juror may not necessarily support all the beliefs that BLM supports. Allowing the question about supporting BLM, gives prosecutors an easy way to ask a question which allows them to get their preferred jury—mostly white males.[115]

Another harm with asking about BLM is it has great potential to infringe on an individual’s fundamental rights. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees an individual equal treatment under the law and provides protection for an individual when he or she seeks to exercise a fundamental right.[116] A party removing a venireperson for supporting BLM has the effect of a judge enforcing a stereotype that infringes on the right of the individual to assemble and affiliate with whomever they want. An affiliation with a group is not a good enough reason to remove someone from participating in the democratic process, and courts have not allowed removal based solely on affiliation.[117]

We want people to feel free to participate in democracy, whether that be by voting, serving in the jury, or seeking change through engaging in intellectual debate and activism. BLM has become a mainstream movement for seeking such change. No one should be barred from serving because they are exercising rights so dear and precious to our democracy. Let alone being barred by the very system supposed to protect those rights. If people are worried that questions about BLM will create impartial juries, there are already readily available safeguards and procedures in place that will ensure the jury stays as fair as possible. The safeguard is allowing for questions that go to someone’s beliefs, but not allowing questions on affiliations that perpetuate and enforce stereotypes. The good news is courts already have a workable framework with cases dealing with religious groups, and other well-known groups, which will allow them to determine these apparent conflicting rights.

IV.  Solutions

Legal scholars and practitioners propose many ways to stop discrimination from being a factor in picking a jury. On one extreme, there are people who argue for an out right end to the use of peremptory strikes to pick a jury.[118] Opponents of the peremptory strike join Justice Marshall in his Batson concurrence, arguing that as long as the peremptory strike is allowed, parties will abuse it to discriminate against jurors. While this may be the best way to ensure against discrimination, there are two main issues with this argument. Firstly, the accused is the one with his or her life and liberty at stake, and his or her attorney needs to have all the tools available to them to ensure a fair trial. Secondly, too many Justices and judges believe in the peremptory strike and are unwilling to end the practice all together.[119] Therefore, this is not a good or viable solution as of now.

However, there are two solutions which would allow courts to more effectively police and stop the use of discriminatory peremptory strikes. One is to follow the Nevada Supreme Court’s Cooper v. State analysis and question the relevance of such questions.[120] The other is to rework the framework of Batson to discourage the use of questions asking about affiliations with socially active groups.[121]

In Cooper v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the appeal of a criminal defendant convicted of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, and some domestic violence related charges.[122] During voir dire, the prosecutor asked venirepersons if they had a strong opinion about BLM.[123] On appeal, the court found a Batson violation, thus vacating and remanding.[124] The court noted how the question itself was problematic with “indisputable racial undertones” and had little-to-no relevance to the case.[125] Combined with the fact that the prosecutor used 40% of its peremptory strikes to remove two of three jurors Black jurors from jury was enough to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.[126]

This is a good approach to eliminating discrimination from the voir dire. One, if there are no racial issues at stake in the case, then the question about affiliating with BLM should be outright barred. As several cases discussed in this Note have shown, affiliations do not reflect on a juror’s ability to fairly decide a case.[127] Questions about one’s beliefs could still be allowed to ensure an impartial jury, but beliefs are always relevant to a case whereas affiliations usually are not. After questions about support for BLM alerted the Nevada Supreme Court to possible discrimination, the Court took appropriate action by scrutinizing the statistics of Black Jurors being removed.[128} If a party wants to ask about BLM and like groups, an appellate court should then be more willing to find a Batson violation when the statistics show a pattern of discrimination not the usual deference to the trial court. This is a good approach for how to evaluate Batson violations where there are no racial implications, but unfortunately, racial issues are relevant in cases like the O.J. Simpson case or the Derek Chauvin trial.[129] This is where a slight reworking of Batson comes into play.

To show a Batson violation, a party alleging a violation must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination to remove a juror with the trial judge considering all the relevant circumstances.[130] The burden will then be on the opposing party to provide a race neutral reason for removing the juror.[131] Then, the prosecutor needs to offer a non-discriminatory based explanation that is a race neutral explanation for removing the juror.[132]

When a party asks questions about one’s views of BLM, the courts should assume a prima facie case has been made by the party challenging the peremptory strike. No further evidence should be needed to show discrimination. After all, even if one is removed from the jury, the damage to the court’s image can have lasting effects.[133] Once the court allows the challenge to the peremptory strike, the burden on the party exercising the peremptory strike should be raised to a level not satisfied by general explanations for the use of the strike which often reflect racial stereotypes.[134] General explanations should not be accepted because they do not provide a “neutral explanation”[135] to a specific question that targets one fundamental right to association. The courts have a “duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”[136] The prosecutor should need to give an explanation as to what answer the juror gave that called into question his or her credibility to be impartial. They need to be able to articulate a plausible reason for bias, which should be more than just not liking the demeanor or appearance of the venireperson.[137] The right to freely assemble and affiliate is a treasured right we hold in our society. It is upsetting to allow people to be removed from a jury simply because they affiliate or support a group for social change.

If the court is worried about prejudice slipping into the jury, the court is always free to remove a juror for cause. This is where looking to precedent on removal for religious reasons will help. If the venireperson were to give an answer that his belief would affect his judgment, a for-cause challenge would remove him or her. Questions that go towards a general belief system are clearly allowed. But questions that make jurors feel singled out, discriminated against or amount “to interrogating their Blackness” have no place in voir dire.[138]

V. Conclusion

Courts can still easily administer a fair trial without allowing for questions that ask about a venireperson’s support or affiliation with a group. The rights of the defendant to an impartial jury cuts both ways in this argument. A party is entitled to a fair and impartial jury whose beliefs should be found out in voir dire, but a party can easily do that by asking about beliefs not affiliations. However, by allowing for questions about BLM a defendant’s right to a fair trial is much more likely to be infringed because when a prosecutor is able to sit a predominately white jury, they are more likely to get a conviction.[139] The rights of all the people involved a case, the defendant and jurors, are harmed when discrimination creeps into the court.[140] The court system is an integral part of our society that needs to have a clean, clear perception for society to believe in equitable justice. The benefits of having a trial free of racial prejudice are obvious. The courts should take an affirmative step in clearing out racial prejudice by not allowing questions about BLM and similar groups when there are many alternative questions to find out one’s belief.


[I] JD Expected 2022, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.S. in Finance, 2014, Mississippi College.

[2] Richard Samuelson, A Government of Laws, Not Men, 17 Claremont Rev. Books: J. Pol. Thought And Statesmanship,45, 46 (2017) (reviewing Richard Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic: The One, the Few, and the Many (2016) and Luke Mayville, John Adams and the Fear of American Oligarchy (2016)) (quoting John Adams on the foundation of the American republic).

[3] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).

[4] Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991).

[5] Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 843, 847 (2015).

[6] Id. at 845.

[7] Id.

[8] Batson, 476 U.S. at 88 (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court has only recognized peremptory challenges based solely upon the cognizable characteristics of race and gender as unconstitutional. However, this Note, will also examine lower court and state court rulings of challenges based on sexual orientation, religion, and certain group affiliations.

[9] Michael L. Neff, In Defense of Voir Dire: Legal History and Social Science Demand Appropriate Voir Dire, 17 Ga. Bar J. 14, 15 (2011) (quoting Thomas Jefferson “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever imagined yet by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”).

[10] Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019).

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] J.E.B, 511 U.S. at 143–44.

[14] Mark E. Wojcik, Extending Batson to Peremptory Challenges of Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 40 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2019).

[15] Id.

[16] J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor J., concurring) (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990)).

[17] Elisabeth Semel et al., Whitewashing the Jury Box: How California Perpetuates the Discriminatory Exclusion of Black and Latinx Jurors, 13 (2020).

[18] Abbie Vansickle, You Can Get Kicked Out of a Jury Pool for Supporting Black Lives Matter: But is it Legal? A California Appeals Court is Going to Decide, The Marshall Project (Jul. 7, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/07/you-can-get-kicked-out-of-a-jury-pool-for-supporting-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/EYL2-4ZUR].

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

[23] State v. Campbell, 846 S.E.2d 804, 806-07, 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020).

[24] Cooper v. State, 432 P.3d 202, 206 (Nev. 2018).

[25] See State v. Gresham, No. A15-1691, 2016 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1104, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

[26] Vansickle, supra note 18.

[27] Batson, 476 U.S. at 82–83.

[28] Id. at 83.

[29] Id. at 85–86.

[30] Id. at 86 (citation omitted).

[31] Id.

[32] Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

[33] Id.; Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2019) (stating defendants may use statistical evidence of peremptory strikes used against black prospective jurors compared to white prospective jurors, evidence of disparate questioning and investigation of black and white jurors, a comparative analysis of those struck and left on the case, prosecutions reason for striking the juror, relevant history from past case, and other relevant circumstances showing racial discrimination.).

[34] Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Following its decision in Batson, the Supreme Court has broadened the scope of this element. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 401, 415 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant may assert a claim of purposeful discrimination in jury selection, irrespective of whether he and the excluded jurors were of the same racial group); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (holding that private parties in a civil suit are barred from racially discriminatory peremptory strikes); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant is barred from racially discriminatory peremptory strikes); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 129, 146 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause).

[35] Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

[36] Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.

[37] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).

[38] Id. at 105–06.

[39] Semel, supra note 17, at 36.

[40] Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).

[41] Id. at 406–07.

[42] Id. at 409.

[43] Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).

[44] J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).

[45] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); Semel, supra note 17, at 36.

[46] See A.C. Johnstone, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration of the Batson Rule, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F.441, 452–55 (1998).

[47] J.E.B, 511 U.S. at 146–51 (1994) (O’Connor J., concurring) (arguing that gender-based peremptory strikes should be barred from government use but preserved for civil litigants and criminal defendants); Johnstone, supra note 46, at 461; see Michael L. Neff, In Defense of Voir Dire: Legal History and Social Science Demand Appropriate Voir Dire, 17 Ga. Bar J. 14, 18, 20 (2011).

[48] Johnstone, supra note 46, at 444.

[49] J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor J., concurring).

[50] Johnstone, supra note 46, at 459.

[51] Id. at 444.

[52] Id. at 445.

[53] Andrew Karpan, When Can a Juror Say Black Lives Matter?, LAW 360, (Aug. 9, 2020 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1299398 [https://perma.cc/D4RR-YSQS].

[54] J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136–37.

[55] See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

[56] See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147–48 (O’Connor J., concurring) (describing the benefits of peremptory strikes); See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98–99.

[57] Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror’s Speech and Association Rights, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 567, 570 (1996).

[58] U.S. Const. amend. I.

[59] Johnstone, supra note 46, at 452–55 (1998); Bader, supra note 57, at 570.

[60] United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing how different states have treated peremptory strikes based on religious affiliations and beliefs); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling a strike based upon a juror’s sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection Clause); Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 595 (D.C. 2001), vacated, 863 A.2d 821 (D.C. 2004) (finding that a juror’s affiliation to a religious activist was a race-neutral reason to remove the juror); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to peremptory strikes based on religious affiliations).

[61] Mark E. Wojcik, Extending Batson to Peremptory Challenges of Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 40 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2019).

[62] Id. at 12.

[63] See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 666–67 (2d Cir. 2003); DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510.

[64] Brown, 352 F.3d at 666-67; DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510–11; United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta how “[i]t would be improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis of his being a Catholic, a Jew, a Muslim, etc.,” but a strike due to a belief even a religious one would be proper.).

[65] Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005).

[66] United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 2003).

[67] Id. at 1220.

[68] Id. at 1218.

[69] Id. at 1225.

[70] Id. at 1225–56.

[71] Id.

[72] United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 697–98 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 1976) (concluding that a juror’s status as wife of a policeman did not instantaneously justify a just-cause challenge); Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970).

[73] McIntyre, 997 F.2d at 697–98.

[74] Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 950, 171–72 (1950).

[75] United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) (“government employment alone is not . . . enough to trigger the [implied bias] rule under which an employee is disqualified from serving as a juror in a case involving her employer.”).

[76] See United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 102 (1982)).

[77] Semel, supra note 17, at 11–13.

[78] United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir. 2003).

[79] See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 669 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999); Thorson v. State, 721 So.2d 590, 595 (Miss. 1998).

[80] See Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993).

[81] Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768.

[82] Id.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. at 769 (“[I]n Powers, . . . the Court sustained the Batson challenge [not] on the theory that the defendant’s equal protection rights were violated; rather, the decision was based on an equal protection violation of the excused juror’s rights.”) (citations omitted).

[86] Id. at 769.

[87] Id. at 770.

[88] Id.

[89] Id.

[90] Id. at 771.

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] Id.

[94] Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994) (Ginsburg J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

[95] Id.

[96] State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1140 (N.J. 2004).

[97] Id. at 1144.

[98] Id.

[99] Id. at 1147.

[100] Id. at 1143, 1147.

[101] Id. at 1144–46. See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998).

[102] See Johnstone, supra note 46, at 461–62.

[103] Bader, supra note 57, at 621.

[104] Semel, supra note 17, at 44.

[105] Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 835, 835

(1993).

[106] Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).

[107] See Bader, supra note 57, at 621.

[108] Flowers v. Mississippi 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019); see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).

[109] Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.

[110] Vansickle, supra note 18.

[111] Id.

[112] Id.

[113] Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991); Wojcik, supra note 14, at 15.

[114] See Bader, supra note 57, at 570.

[115] See Cooper v. State, 432 P.3d 202, 206 (Nev. 2018) (comparing asking about Black Lives Matter to asking about feelings about O.J. Simpson’s murder trial when there were no relevant racial issues in the case).

[116] U.S. Const. amend. XIV. § 1; Bader, supra note 57, at 593.

[117] See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 666–67 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998).

[118] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).

[119] Id. at 98 (“the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures”); J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor J., concurring) (“[t]he principal value of the peremptory is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries.”).

[120] Cooper v. State, 432 P.3d 202, 206 (Nev. 2018).

[121] See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98 (outlining the Batson burden-shifting framework).

[122] Cooper, 432 P.3d at 204.

[123] Id. at 206.

[124] Id. at 20607.

[125] Id. at 206.

[126] Id. at 206–07.

[127] United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 697–98 (10th Cir. 1993).

[128] Compare Cooper, 432 P.3d at 204–05, with State v. Campbell, 846 S.E.2d 804, 807–11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (holding the prosecutor using 75% of their peremptory strikes to remove Black jurors and asking about Black Lives Matter was not enough to find a Batson violation).

[129] Rory Carroll, OJ Simpson: An Eternal Symbol of Racial Division – Or Has America Moved On?, The Guardian, Oct. 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/01/oj-simpson-prison-release-america-race-debate; Adrian Florido, Half of the Jury in the Chauvin Trial is Nonwhite. That’s Only Part of the Story, NPR, (Mar. 25, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/25/980646634/half-of-the-jury-in-the-chauvin-trial-is-non-white-thats-only-part-of-the-story [https://perma.cc/DN5P-B79D].

[130] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).

[131] Id. at 97.

[132] Id.

[133] Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).

[134] See Semel, supra note 17, at 14. (discussing racial and ethnic stereotypes California prosecutors relied on when using peremptory strikes to excuse Black and Latino jurors).

[135] Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

[136] Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.           

[137] Semel, supra note 17, at 16.

[138] Karpan, supra note 53.

[139] See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019). The case is an example of how a different jury make up will affect the verdict of the trial.

[140] Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).