Unconstitutional: Key Searches of Residential Doors by Law Enforcement Are Violative of the Fourth Amendment

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 Kendra A. CraftI

Introduction

 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the foundation for all search and seizure issues in criminal law proceedings. In doing so, the Fourth Amendment plays two vital roles in the American legal system. First, the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the individual, extending to “all invasions on the part of the government and its employees on the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”[2] Second, but equally important, the Fourth Amendment provides regulation for government actors. The actors who are typically the subject of Fourth Amendment inquiries are police.[3] The Fourth Amendment is the primary form of legal constraint on police. While most states have their own laws governing search and seizure issues, they are comparatively sparse and are typically skipped over in favor of the Fourth Amendment. The text of the Fourth Amendment guarantees:

 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[4]

 

As the amount of policing in the United States has increased within the past century, so have the number of alleged Fourth Amendment violations committed by law enforcement.[5] These violations have effectuated a substantial set of caselaw that continues to expand with each new issue regarding a Fourth Amendment violation.[6] While the breadth of issues regarding the Fourth Amendment is vast, the basic structure of the inquiry remains the same. Modern Fourth Amendment litigation involves a challenge to the evidence obtained during a search and seizure conducted by police. More particularly, the court examines the means by which the challenged evidence was obtained by police in the course of the investigation or in enforcement of ordinary criminal proceedings. Most often, defendants will seek to exclude, or suppress, the evidence gathered in these searches or seizures.

While certain aspects of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure seem to be well settled within the law, there are still many aspects that remain unresolved. Today, several circuit courts remain split as to whether an unreasonable search occurs within the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and ultimately uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the arrestee’s residence.[7]

This Note considers the conflicting judicial interpretations of statutory language and argues that an unreasonable search occurs within the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key to determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and ultimately uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the arrestee’s residence. Part I provides the history of the Fourth Amendment in criminal proceedings and discusses the evolving rules and standards that are implicated by Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases. Part II examines the circuits’ conflicting interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in cases that involve the use of a key to unlock an arrestee’s residence. Part III explains why an unlawful search occurs when an officer removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key to determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence.

 

I.        The History and Development of Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures

 

The ideals that define the Fourth Amendment, much like the common law itself, have pre-colonial roots. The Fourth Amendment, though often credited to be a result of tensions with the British that spawned the American Revolution, actually originates from British legal theory.[8] The axiom that a man’s home is his castle is represented by the passionate speech of William Pitt to Parliament in 1763, where he argued that:

 

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.[9]

 

Such beliefs did have supporting legal precedent, as exhibited by Entick v. Carrington and the series of accompanying actions against government actors that spanned across the early 1700s.[10] These actions were a result of searches and seizures carried out with general warrants, with the intentions to uncover evidence in connection with the pamphlets of John Wilkes, who criticized the King and his policies.[11] Entick, an associate of Wilkes, sued the government agents for forcibly entering his home, breaking into locked desks and boxes, and seizing evidence from the search.[12] The court agreed with Entick and declared the search, and the general warrant that permitted it, contrary to “all of the comforts of society” and “contrary to the genius of the law of England.”[13] The ruling required that warrants must be issued under statute or other legal precedent in order to be considered valid under the laws of England. Entick is regarded as a “landmark of English liberty” and a guide to understanding the Framers’ intentions in penning the Fourth Amendment.[14]

Though the Fourth Amendment was ratified into the United States Constitution in 1791, it remained predominantly powerless until the ruling of Mapp v. Ohio in 1961.[15] In 1957, police arrived at Ms. Mapp’s home in response to information that she was hiding a fugitive wanted in connection with a recent bombing.[16] After Mapp refused to allow police to enter her home without a warrant, police produced a sheet of paper claimed to be a warrant.[17] An altercation ensued between Mapp and the officers as Mapp tried to read the warrant and police eventually forcibly entered the home.[18] Upon illegally searching the home, police found no evidence of a fugitive. Instead, they found “obscene papers” and Mapp was ultimately charged and convicted of possessing obscene materials.[19] The Supreme Court reversed Mapp’s conviction, holding that evidence that is obtained by illegal means is to be considered inadmissible in state court; this was an extension of the pre-existing rule that prohibited illegal searches in federal court.[20]

Since the ruling of Mapp v. Ohio, there have been countless significant rulings that have added, and occasionally pulled, teeth from the Fourth Amendment. These rulings provide tests and factors to determine whether a search or seizure has occurred within the Fourth Amendment, whether the warrant requirement has been satisfied, and whether there is an exception to the warrant requirement that applies to the particular facts of a case. First, a search must be reasonable. A search may be subjected to the reasonable expectations test as depicted in the concurrence of Katz v. United States.[21] The test consists of two questions: the first is whether there is an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and the second is whether that expectation is objectively reasonable.[22]  A search may also be subjected to the common-law trespass test of Florida v. Jardines, wherein if the government “obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects,” a search has “undoubtedly occurred.”[23] The Katz test and the Jardines test work cohesively together, with neither one maintaining superiority over the other.[24] From Jardines, there is a subset of property tests. The first appears within Jardines itself and is a test to determine whether a physical intrusion has occurred on the curtilage of the home.[25] Under Jardines, a physical intrusion into a protected area that results in the acquisition of information only fails to constitute a search if that intrusion is permitted by a license such as one that is available to other, “normal,” members of the public such as neighbors or solicitors.[26]

The specific test for determining exactly what areas qualify as the curtilage of the home is defined in United States v. Dunn, wherein the court noted that  “the centrally relevant consideration” in determining the extent of a home's curtilage is “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.”[27] The court points to four specific factors, which are: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home;” “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home;” “the nature of the uses to which the area is put;” and “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.”[28] These property rights are not solely for those residences that are owned outright and renters of apartments are also afforded these same rights. The Fourth Amendment places extraordinary value on “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”[29] As the court in United States v. Bain later points out, there is “no reason to expect a different answer when the home is a rented condominium.”[30] While certain issues and tests regarding Fourth Amendment search and seizure seem to be well settled within the law, there are still many aspects that remain unresolved.

 

II.       The Issue of Key Searches and a Circuit Split

 

While certain aspects of Fourth Amendment search and seizure seem to be well settled within the law, there are still many particulars that remain unresolved. One of these particulars is the issue of key searches. A key search occurs when an agent of the government, often a law enforcement officer, removes a key from an arrested person, uses that key to determine whether it unlocks a door to a residence, and ultimately uses that information to obtain a search warrant for the arrestee’s residence.[31] Today, several circuit courts remain split as to whether these events constitute an unreasonable search within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.[32] 

 

A.       United States v. Moses and United States v. Concepcion: Restricting Constitutional Protections to Key Searches of Residential Doors

 

The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Moses held that an officer’s key search was reasonable based on the Fourth Amendment.[33] In 2006, a Tactical Special Enforcement Team began investigating a local street gang known as the “Goodfellas” in connection with drug trafficking and violent crimes.[34] One month later, the team apprehended the leader of the gang, Carl Kotay Graham, who provided officers with information naming Covonti Kwa Moses as a member of the gang.[35] Graham told the officers that Moses had guns and cocaine, amongst other gang-related items, stashed at a “cream-colored duplex” on “Cedar Street.”[36] After arresting Moses for driving with a suspended license and for possession of marijuana, an officer brought Moses back to Cedar Street, where officers used the keys obtained from a search to determine whether one of them unlocked unit A.[37] The key opened unit A and officers conducted a protective sweep of the unit and discovered, in plain view, crack cocaine and marijuana residue.[38]

While still at the scene, another tip was received that Moses was selling crack cocaine from another residence; police also used Moses’ keys to unlock this residence and found more evidence of crack cocaine.[39] Using this information, officers obtained a search warrant and discovered evidence used to charge Moses with possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.[40] Moses appealed these pleadings, arguing that the officers entered the two residences without a warrant. Amongst other arguments, Moses argued that the district court was not entitled to rely on the evidence that the keys in his possession unlocked the doors “because the use of the key was part of the illegal entry into a residence” and the use of the key was the “beginning of an illegal search.”[41] The Fourth Circuit, with very little rationale other than following the lead of other circuits, upheld the conviction, arguing that the “discrete” act of inserting the key into the lock to determine whether it fit did not “offend the Fourth Amendment.”[42]

The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Concepcion held that an officer’s key search was reasonable based on the Fourth Amendment.[43] Gamalier Concepcion consented to a search of his apartment wherein DEA agents found evidence of cocaine.[44] This evidence was used to secure a guilty plea of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute that landed Concepcion with over three years imprisonment; however, Concepcion reversed for appeal an objection as to the validity of his consent to the search of his apartment.[45] Concepcion, in his appeal to the Seventh Circuit argued that his consent was “fruit of two unlawful searches.”[46] After arresting and searching Concepcion, the DEA agents seized his keys and began searching for his apartment. After locating a mailbox with the nameplate “Concepcion,” police inserted one of the keys found on Concepcion to open the exterior door to the apartment.[47] After entering the apartment’s common area, agents used another key to unlock Concepcion’s individual bedspace.[48] After unlocking the door, agents opened the door an inch, closed the door, then locked the door again without looking inside. Concepcion initially denied knowing anything about the apartment, but later relented and signed a consent form for the search of the bedspace.[49] The district court’s opinion held neither the entry into the common area of the apartment nor the insertion of the key into the lock to be an unreasonable search.[50] The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that a search is the invasion of a sphere in which society recognizes reasonable expectations of privacy.[51]

The Seventh Circuit, however, differentiated the entry of the key into the lock as being a much more complicated issue. A keyhole, as explained by the court, is a “potentially protected zone,” as it “contains information—information about who has access to the space beyond.”[52] After acknowledging the already-growing circuit split between the Sixth and First Circuits and the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that because the DEA agents were obtaining information from the inside of the lock, which “is both used frequently by the owner and not open to public view,” the insertion of the key must be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.[53] The Seventh Circuit then qualified the search as reasonable based on a slippery slope analysis. The court reasoned that because Concepcion was properly arrested and searched without a warrant, there should not be a warrant requirement to “learn whether the keys in Concepcion’s possession operate a lock.”[54] The Seventh Circuit concluded by affirming the conviction with the confident assumption that, while an owner of a lock has a privacy interest in the keyhole, that interest is “so small” as to be deemed insignificant.[55]

 

B.       United States v. Bain: Extending Constitutional Protections to Key Searches of Residential Doors

 

More recently, the First Circuit in United States v. Bain has taken a confident step towards the future of the Fourth Amendment.[56] Yrvens Bain was arrested after he emerged from a multi-family unit apartment building. After Bain was searched, police found a set of keys in his possession and subsequently used these keys to open the front door of the building and attempted to open three apartments within the building. After trying and failing to open one apartment on the first floor and another apartment on the second floor, the key finally succeeded in opening a door on the second floor. Police used this information to apply for and secure a warrant to search the apartment; this search produced a firearm and drug paraphernalia.[57] Bain attempted to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers conducted an unlawful search by turning the key in the locks to identify the unit and that there was no probable cause absent that identification. The district court denied this motion and Bain was convicted. The First Circuit found that the turning of a key in a lock is unreasonable and a warrantless search unsupported by “any clear precedent” and that “without the information obtained by turning the key, there was no probable cause to issue a warrant.”[58]

The First Circuit reached this conclusion by citing to United States v. Dunn and holding that, even if the lock on the apartment door is not within the home itself, it is at minimum a part of the curtilage of the home.[59] The court used the Dunn factors to conclude that the lock on a door is sufficiently proximate to the interior of the home, is included within or adjacent to the door’s outer face, is intended by nature to bar unwelcome entry and the invasion of privacy, and that the “very design” of a lock hides its interior from being examined.[60] The court also cited to Jardines, arguing that a physical intrusion into the curtilage to obtain information is a search, unless it is within the “implicit license” which “typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”[61] As the behavior of police was not considered to be within social norms, a search occurred under the Fourth Amendment. While the government referenced United States v. Lyons and United States v. Hawkins to bolster its argument that key searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the court disagreed based upon the specific facts of these cases.[62]

The First Circuit dismissed the government’s citation to other circuit court opinions, like those discussed in previous paragraphs. The court distinguished key searches of car doors from key searches of residential doors, arguing that the Constitutional protections of automobiles are much less strong than that of residences.[63] The court also took aim at the Moses decision for containing no real analysis of the issue.[64] Finally, the court addressed the Seventh Circuits holding in Concepcion, questioning “the logic of justifying a search of this type” by way of the plain view doctrine.[65] The First Circuit referenced the ease by which the government could have obtained other identifying information and questions why it would be necessary to invade the curtilage of the home, rather than using those less invasive means. Conclusively, the court pointed to the fact that the officers invaded the curtilage of Bain’s home for the sole purpose of gaining evidence to use against him in a criminal action and argued that there is “no reason to conclude that the law enforcement-related concerns sufficiently outweighed the privacy-related convers to render this search reasonable.”[66] While the court ultimately falls back on a good-faith exception to the warrant requirement, their initial holding that key searches are violative of the Fourth Amendment has created a circuit split amongst the courts. This split remains unresolved.

 

III.     Key Searches of Residential Doors are a Violation of the Fourth Amendment

 

As indicated by the plain text and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the judicial history surrounding the application of the Fourth Amendment to the home, an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. These arguments will be considered below.

 

A.     The Distinction Between Residential and Non-Residential Key Searches

 

Before an argument for extending the Fourth Amendment to key searches of residential can be made, the distinction between residential and non-residential key searches must be clarified. While the issue of key searches certainly has not been brought up so frequently as to lend itself to a comprehensive solution, it does seem that the circuits have agreed that Fourth Amendment protections will not extend to key searches on car doors or storage units. This decision likely has roots in the automobile exception and the ideals behind it. The automobile exception was first introduced in Carroll v. United States.[67] In Carroll, federal prohibition agents encountered a car on the highway that they had reason to believe was being driven by bootleggers.[68] The agents stopped the car, searched it without a warrant, and discovered bottles of whiskey and gin hidden within the car’s upholstery.[69] In upholding the search, the court created the automobile exception, which permitted searches and seizures of cars stopped alongside the road if obtaining a warrant would not be “reasonably practicable” and the agent has reasonable or probable cause to believe that the automobile has contraband liquor that is being transported.[70] While the specific restrictions of prohibition have long since ended, the automobile exception has not only remained, but has expanded. Courts have extended the automobile exception to allow agents to move and search a vehicle.[71] Courts have also extended the automobile exception to apply to containers within a vehicle, whether owned by the owner of the vehicle or by a passenger.[72] The Supreme Court, in California v. Carney, went so far as to extend the automobile exception to a mobile home.[73] The majority in Carney holds that it is too difficult to draw distinctions between residential and non-residential moveable vehicles and claims that such a task will be “impossible” for officers.[74] Justice Stevens’ dissent, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, pushes back on this assumption and argues that, by looking at the exterior of the mobile home, officers should be able to pick up on “clues” as to whether the mobile home is being used as a residence.[75] Given the Supreme Court’s historical hesitancy to extend stringent Fourth Amendment protections to automobiles and typically non-residential spaces, it is unsurprising to see the circuits follow this line of reasoning to reject, seemingly unanimously, any argument regarding key searches on car doors and storage units.

 

B.  Plain Text and Purpose of the Fourth Amendment

 

The plain text and the purpose of the Fourth Amendment supports the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The text of the Fourth Amendment guarantees:

 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[76]

 

As shown above, the plain text of the Fourth Amendment requires all searches to be reasonable. Even as conceded by many of the courts in previous paragraphs, key searches are typically unreasonable and invade the sense of privacy and security that people value in their homes and, to a lesser extent, in their automobiles. The plain text of the Fourth Amendment fails to lend itself to the assertion that residential key searches are reasonable. Further, the apparent purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as introduced by the Framers of the United States Constitution, was not to allow government to overstep into the lives of its citizens. Looking back to the case of Entick v. Carrington, where the court declared a search, and the general warrant that permitted it, contrary to “all of the comforts of society” and “contrary to the genius of the law of England.”[77] The ruling of Entick, and others like it, which the Framers used as the foundation for the Fourth Amendment, place fervent value on the principles of privacy, freedom, and liberty of the individual. Allowing government actors to circumvent these rights by removing keys from an arrestee, using those keys to determine whether they unlock a door to a residence, and using this information to secure a warrant against the arrestee certainly seems to work against the values secured within the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the plain text and the mere purpose of the Fourth Amendment support the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

 

C.  Judicial History of the Fourth Amendment: The Trend Towards More Stringent Fourth Amendment Protections

 

The judicial history of the Fourth Amendment also supports the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. As explained by the court in Bain, the only precedential case to thoroughly address the issue of a residential key search was the Seventh Circuit in Concepcion. The holding in Concepcion had no constitutional argument or evidence to support its conclusion that residential key searches are per se reasonable. Rather, Concepcion relied on an extension of the plain view doctrine from Arizona v. Hicks, wherein police lawfully entered and searched an apartment and noticed stolen stereo equipment.[78] As the court in Hicks itself notes, warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and there is no reason why an exception to the warrant requirement should require a lesser standard of cause than that needed to obtain an actual warrant. Further, though not mentioned by the court in Concepcion or the court in Bain, the facts of the Hicks seem similar in a different way. In Hicks, the court ultimately holds that, while the plain view doctrine is certainly valid, the officer’s action of physically touching and manipulating the stereo system in order to observe and record the serial number oversteps the bounds of the exception to the warrant requirement and is thus unconstitutional.[79] This excessiveness seems rather comparable to an officer removing a key from an arrested person, transporting the key to a residential door, and inserting and manipulating the key in order to unlock and often open the door. As conceded by many of the circuit opinions within this line of cases, the information needed to obtain a search warrant could possibly be found by other, less intrusive means. If this is true, as Bain hints at, there should be no reason for an officer to take the extra, invasive steps in order to trespass on the curtilage of an arrestee’s home to secure a warrant.

Further, it does not seem to run afoul of any of the relevant constitutional tests to consider residential key searches violative of the Fourth Amendment. As noted by the Court in Kentucky v. King, it is the “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law… that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”[80] As further identified by Florida v. Jardines, a search may also be subjected to the common-law trespass test. In this case, it seems as if the area of the home impacted by a key search falls within the curtilage of the home as defined by Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Dunn. As the Katz test and the Jardines test work cohesively together, with neither one maintaining superiority over the other, we must also assure that the Katz test is satisfied. The test consists of two questions: the first is whether there is an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and the second is whether that expectation is objectively reasonable.[81] It would certainly be difficult to argue that an individual did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the lock on their front door. Under Jardines, a physical intrusion into a protected area that results in the acquisition of information only fails to constitute a search if that intrusion is permitted by a license such as one that is available to other, ‘normal’ members of the public. As normal members of the public, such as neighbors and solicitors, certainly do not have the license to remove a key from an arrestee or use that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, we can conclude that the police do not have the license to do so. Thus, the judicial history of the Fourth Amendment also supports the argument that an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

 

D.  Existing Doctrines Provide Sufficient Exceptions for Law Enforcement

 

Fourth Amendment protections have been continuously evolving since United States v. Mapp. While the Fourth Amendment is no longer the toothless doctrine it once was, there are still multiple exceptions to the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. An underlying concern that seems to be coursing through the opinions of many circuit courts is that of police efficiency. This concern is certainly not a new or novel one. As such, there are numerous exceptions that have been carved out by the courts over the past century. One of the chief exceptions is known as the exigent circumstances doctrine. The exigent circumstances doctrine, along with numerous other exceptions, such as the plain view doctrine, the automobile exception, hot pursuit, and the good faith exception, provide a plethora of protections for efficiency in police administration. Each of these doctrines protect police at the disadvantage of the individual. These doctrines provide sufficient exceptions for law enforcement when conducting otherwise unlawful searches and seizures; the remaining circuits should follow the lead of the First Circuit in finding key searches on residential doors to be unlawful, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances.

 

IV.     Conclusion

 

As indicated by the plain text and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the judicial history surrounding the application of the Fourth Amendment to the home, an officer removing a key from an arrested person, using that key to determine whether it unlocks the door of a residence, and using that information to obtain a search warrant for the residence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Other circuits should follow the lead of the First Circuit in analyzing future key search cases in order to better protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, weighing efficiency needs and other exceptions as required, on an individual case basis.



I J.D. 2022, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.A. in English 2018, University of Kentucky.

[2] Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

[3] Id.

[4]  U.S. Const. amend IV.

[5] See generally, President’s Commission on Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Feb. 1967) (a report from the Johnson Administration, enacting new guidelines for policing and kick-starting the practice of active policing); Cheryl Corley, President Johnson’s Crime Commission Report, 50 Years Later NPR (Oct. 6, 2017 at 7:00 AM) (https://www.npr.org/2017/10/06/542487124/president-johnson-s-crime-commission-report-50-years-later) (discussing the impacts of the 1967 act).

[6] See generally, Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 33 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 5 (2004) (a summarized history of the Fourth Amendment).

[7] See United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).

[8] Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1999). 

[9] Id. at 80.

[10] Id. at 88–89.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626.

[14] Id.

[15] Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

[16] Id. at 644.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 644–45.

[19] Id. at 645.

[20] Mapp, 367 U.S. at 665–60; See also, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 343 (1914) (introduced the exclusionary rule in federal courts).

[21] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring) (conception of the “reasonable expectations” test that is now cited as controlling in modern caselaw).

[22] Id.

[23] Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

[24] United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).

[25] Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3–4 (defining the curtilage as the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home).

[26] Id. at 6 (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)).

[27] United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 295 (1987) (defining the test for curtilage).

[28] Id.

[29] Jardines, 569 U.S. at 4 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

[30] United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing generally to Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961) (rented premises); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (hotel rooms).

[31] Courts have also considered the Constitutionality of key searches in regard to automobiles and storage units, seeming to settle that neither violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1984).

[32] See United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (examples of key search cases on both car doors and residential doors).

[33] U.S. v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008).

[34] Id. at 265.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id at 266.

[38] Id. at 266–67.

[39] Id. at 267.

[40] Id. at 267–268.

[41] Moses, 540 F.3d 263 at 272.

[42] Id.

[43] United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991).

[44] Id.

[45] Id. at 1171.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 1171–72.

[50] United States v. Concepcion, 742 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.III. 1990).

[51] Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).

[52] Id. at 1172.

[53] Id.

[54] Id.

[55] Id. at 1173.

[56] United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).

[57] Id. at 9–10.

[58] Id. at 11.

[59] See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 295 (1987) (defining the test for curtilage).

[60] Bain, 874 F.3d at 15.

[61] Id.

[62] Id. (distinguishing the facts of the current case to the facts of United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1990) and United States v. Hawkins, F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1998), which applied to locks on storage containers, rather than residential locks)).

[63] Id.

[64] Id. (distinguishing from Moses).

[65] Bain, 874 F.3d at 18 (distinguishing from Concepcion).

[66] Id. at 19.

[67] See Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1924).

[68] Id. at 135.

[69] Id. at 136.

[70] Id. at 156.

[71] See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (upholding the decision to move a suspect’s car from the road to the police station for a search).

[72] See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the automobile exception applies to containers within the vehicle if probable cause is present); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that the automobile exception applies to passengers within a vehicle, as passengers should also have a deceased expectation of privacy).

[73] California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1984).

[74] Id. at 386 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 387 (1976)).

[75] Carney, 471 U.S. at 406 (Stevens J., dissenting).

[76] U.S. Const. amend IV.

[77] United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).

[78] Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).

[79] Id.

[80] Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 1, 5 (quoting Bingham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).

[81] United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).


Nexus of Vulnerability: An Expanded View of Drug-Based Coercion

Download a PDF Below:

Ben VanSlyke[I]

[D]rugs are used like weapons—they are used as a tool of mass destruction; as a tool to gain advantage over an already vulnerable victim; and as a tool to disarm a victim due to its power. Drugs are weaponized in the sex trafficking world.[2]

In the last two decades, sex trafficking has received increasing attention throughout the United States and the world.[3] In roughly the same timeframe, the United States has seen a meteoric rise in the use of opioids and related overdoses.[4] Independently, illicit drug trafficking is the largest criminal industry in the world, and human trafficking is the second largest.[5] Each generate billions of dollars of profit per year.[6] Both of these industries are just that: industries. Like any businessperson, criminals seek new markets to expand into, including other criminal markets. For someone already engaged in one industry, the decision to expand into the other is largely financial; if they have the means to spread out their resources for greater profits, it makes sense to do so. This includes by using one to facilitate the other: for example, forcing trafficking survivors to transport or deliver drugs, or using their access to drugs as a means to control a trafficking survivor through addiction.[7]

For too long, these have been seen as distinct issues. Recently, however, practitioners in various fields have begun to recognize the intrinsically intersectional nature of sex trafficking and the opioid crisis. This article seeks to contribute to this dialogue, expanding upon the extreme nature of the vulnerabilities created when these two issues collide, and supporting the application of the criminal law concept of drug-based coercion to civil litigation so as to increase the availability of remedies to survivors of this vicious form of exploitation.

As a preliminary matter, the author acknowledges that some of the assertions and correlating support contained in this article rely on primarily anecdotal information. By nature of the topic and its relatively recent recognition, quantitative analysis of the intersection between sex trafficking and opioids is limited, and even individually both topics are still not completely understood. By incorporating the author’s first-hand experiences working in this arena with corroborating support, qualitative research, information about related topics, and logical inferences, this article seeks to provide a forward-looking analysis of an issue that desperately warrants greater research.

Section I of this article provides relevant background information about the legal theory of drug-based coercion to frame further discussion. Section II identifies risk factors for both addiction and human trafficking and identifies the many ways in which the two coincide. Section III delves deeper into the realities of drug-based coercion and the many horrific forms it can take. In Section IV, the author draws upon his experience litigating civil cases on behalf of trafficking survivors to consider the role of drug-based coercion in the context of civil litigation, as well as to counter foreseeable challenges. Finally, Section V reflects upon the earlier discussions to offer insights and recommendations on this complex topic.

 

I.  Background

 

The legal theory of drug-based coercion is rooted in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).[8] This section provides that “force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means” are sufficient to satisfy the relevant element of a sex trafficking offense.[9] Section 1591(e)(2) proceeds to define coercion as “threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person” or “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person.”[10] The operative term here, “serious harm,” is further defined in Section 1591(e)(5) as “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, . . . that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or continue performing commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.”[11]

This statutory language has been interpreted to conclude that, under Section 1591, a trafficker withholding an individual’s drug supply when that individual suffers from drug addiction—medically referred to as substance use disorder (“SUD”)—constitutes serious harm and thereby constitutes coercion.[12] This includes threatening to withhold the supply, even if it is not actually withheld, so long as the threat is intended to cause the individual to believe that noncompliance will lead to the supply being withheld.[13] In United States v. Fields, for example, a district court found that the “threat of withdrawal sickness constitutes ‘psychological’ harm that is ‘sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.’”[14]

This understanding relies on the concept of special vulnerability. Federal prosecutors have argued in favor of “seeking both an appropriate ‘vulnerability’ jury instruction and sentencing enhancement.”[15] This interpretation is supported by Supreme Court decisions in other contexts.[16] However, to effectively utilize special vulnerability in cases involving sex trafficking, it is important that attorneys understand why people suffering from addiction are uniquely vulnerable to being trafficked. On one hand, given the significant overlap between risk factors for addiction and risk factors for falling prey to sex trafficking, many people who develop addictions are at greater risk of trafficking even before substance use plays a role, and the presence of addiction can flag the likely presence of these other risk factors.[17] On the other hand, once an addiction is established, both the immediate effects of the substance use (i.e., the “high”) and the constant fear of withdrawal symptoms produce additional vulnerability unique to addiction, which only exacerbate any preexisting risk factors.[18] As a result, when addiction and trafficking coincide, the victim is often already vulnerable due to other risk factors and rendered doubly vulnerable by the effects of drug use and addiction. Both of these categories of vulnerability fall within the consideration of section 1591(e)(5), as they are certainly background and circumstantial factors that affect the reasonableness of an individual’s actions in response to coercion by a trafficker, including coercion by threat of withholding their drug supply.[19]

In the context of federal criminal trials—as well as federal civil actions[20]—drug-based coercion is independently established through federal common law.[21] However, this concept is not new. Some states have codified this interpretation of coercion explicitly,[22] and the Uniform Law Commission recommended the adoption of this definition as early as 2013.[23] Further, this model law has been supported by the American Bar Association since 2013.[24]

 

II.  Comparative Risk Factors Of Addiction and Trafficking

 

Through decades of study, numerous factors have been identified as indicators that an individual is at a higher than average risk of developing an addiction.[25] Though non-exhaustive, some of the relevant factors include:

·                  Early substance use;

·                  Early and persistent behavior issues;

·                  Peer substance use;

·                  Poor family structures and/or family conflict;

·                  High availability of substances in the area;

·                  High crime rates in the area; and

·                  Low socioeconomic status.[26]

 

By and large, these risk factors should be unsurprising; it seems intuitive, for example, that individuals who spend significant amounts of time around friends and family who engage in substance use are more likely to do so themselves. However, the fact that these factors are so well-documented lends support to legal theories that rely on this information to demonstrate a client’s vulnerability.

Additionally, researchers have identified that individuals who are survivors of violence or abuse—particularly when the abuse occurred as a child—are statistically much more likely to develop addictions.[27] “A review of studies on associations between childhood sexual and physical abuse and substance use problems concluded that childhood abuse is a factor in the development of substance use problems but the relationship is likely mediated by psychiatric conditions, such as anxiety and depressive disorders.”[28] More generally, “[h]igh rates of trauma exposure have been observed in both male and female substance-using populations.”[29] While the exact process by which these traumatic experiences translate into addiction and related problems remains disputed,[30] the correlation itself is “well-documented.”[31]

Risk factors for sex trafficking are somewhat less clear. Even specifically in regard to child sex trafficking—often the focus of media and legislative attention on the topic—“very little empirical research has been conducted.”[32] Still, there is sufficient information to strongly suggest that many of those most at risk of developing addictions are also at risk of being targeted for sex trafficking.[33] Current information holds that “[t]raffickers disproportionately target at-risk populations including individuals who have experienced or been exposed to other forms of violence (child abuse and maltreatment, interpersonal violence and sexual assault, community and gang violence) and individuals disconnected from stable support networks (runaway and homeless youth, unaccompanied minors, persons displaced during natural disasters).”[34] Specifically, “[a]ccording to reports, 70 percent to 90 percent of commercially sexually exploited youth have a history of child sexual abuse.”[35] “In addition, youth who have experienced dating violence and rape are also at higher-risk for trafficking.”[36] While additional empirical research on this topic is still needed, these risk factors are corroborated by what many service providers have identified on the ground—including the author’s own experiences working with trafficking survivors.

On balance then, there are many factors which simultaneously indicate that an individual is at risk for developing an addiction and being targeted for trafficking. For the purposes of this article, when an individual is presently experiencing or has previously experienced the following, it will be considered an overlapping risk factor:

·         Childhood sexual abuse;

·         Child abuse and neglect generally;

·         Rape or sexual assault;

·         Interpersonal, community, or gang violence;

·         Involvement in the foster care system;

·         Homelessness or running away from home;

·         Family history of addiction;

·         Substance use within the individual’s social group;

·         And family conflict or instability.[37]

 

In addition, as discussed in more detail below, addiction itself will be considered a risk factor for trafficking and vice versa, as both create additional vulnerability to the other.[38] To be clear, some of this overlap relies on inferences, but the inferences are independently supported. For example, although family history of addiction has not typically been identified as a risk factor for human trafficking in academic literature on the topic,[39] family history of addiction does contribute to rates of involvement in foster care,[40] which is a well-documented risk factor for human trafficking.[41]

 

III.  Analysis Of Special Vulnerability Where Addiction and Trafficking Intersect

 

The underpinnings of the drug-based coercion theory are that, in addition to the risk factors for trafficking itself, addiction is essentially a risk factor for trafficking.[42] In other words, the presence of addiction indicates that someone is distinctly vulnerable to being trafficked, separate from, and in addition to, any other trafficking risk factors the person may have. Likewise, if a victim of trafficking is not already struggling with a drug addiction, they may be additionally vulnerable to developing such an addiction. Attorneys know this; indeed, step-by-step guides have been written about how attorneys can lean on this relationship in order to prosecute traffickers.[43] What this section seeks to expand upon is the human experience behind the legal theory: what does this special vulnerability look like?

 

A.  Traffickers use opioids to effectuate control through both the immediate effects of opioids and their control over the survivor’s drug supply, in addition to capitalizing on external factors.

 

i.  Immediate vulnerability: symptoms of the high.

 

One way in which a trafficker can use drugs to exploit a trafficking survivor is through the effects of the drug itself. In an immediate sense, an individual under the influence of opioids is extremely vulnerable to the coercion or control of others by the very nature of opioid use. Short-term effects of opioids include “extreme relaxation”, “drowsiness and clumsiness”, and “confusion”.[44] This is aside from their primary medical purpose as analgesics, or pain relievers.[45] In addition, many users report “an intense rush of pleasure or euphoria” immediately after the opioid takes effect.[46]

For these reasons, drugs can be “used to incapacitate [an individual] so that [she] conforms to the demands of the trafficker.”[47] One survivor described this, saying that her trafficker “used drugs as a method of trying to keep me controllable and docile[.]”[48] Although this angle often receives less attention than the fear of withdrawal discussed below, these effects give traffickers significant leverage by which to exploit their victims.

Common sense indicates that an individual who is relaxed, drowsy, or confused, is more susceptible to manipulation, whether through physical force or not. A trafficker or a “John” can take advantage of someone sedated by opioids in ways that the survivor may resist—or resist more effectively—if they were not under the influence of opioids.[49] Likewise, both the euphoric and analgesic effects of the high can serve as a sort of reprieve in the otherwise bleak situation that survivors are faced with. This incentivizes survivors to take advantage of the drugs available to them, and allows traffickers to frame the drugs they provide as a reward obtained through “compliance.”[50] All the while, this only intensifies the survivor’s addiction and sets them up for further coercion by the trafficker’s ability to withhold the survivor’s drug supply.

ii.  Sustained vulnerability: control over drug supply.

Another mechanism of drug-based coercion—arguably the most prevalent[51]—is to exploit a survivor’s ongoing addiction to opioids.[52] The driving force behind this type of coercion is a survivor’s addiction and consequent fear of withdrawal symptoms. These symptoms include, among other things, muscle and bone pain, increased body temperature, nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, anxiety, sweating, and chills.[53] These symptoms have been aptly described as “flu-like,” but to an extreme degree, sufficient to cause “tremendous physical and psychological distress to the person suffering” from this process.[54] These symptoms generally begin approximately eight to ten hours after the last dose of opioids, and peak after approximately one to three days, before gradually decreasing.[55] From the perspective that traffickers are deliberately subjecting survivors under their control to this excruciating experience by withholding drugs from them, one could appropriately analogize this punishment to torture.[56]

Unsurprisingly, after experiencing these withdrawals one or more times, survivors develop a pervasive fear of having to go through it again. Approximately three to four hours after their last dose, individuals addicted to opioids often become anxious or fearful, experience “cravings,” and engage in “drug-seeking behavior.”[57] “The physical craving the body develops for opioids is profound and unrelenting,”[58] which generates a “powerful fear of withdrawal that causes [the addicted individual] to look for the drug at all costs.”[59] When employed by traffickers as a threatened punishment, the cost is compliance, and trafficking survivors often comply with their traffickers’ demands in order to avoid this severe punishment. One survivor described this coercion, saying that “if I didn’t make a certain amount of money a day, he would not give me any heroin . . . he pretty much controlled me with the drug because he knew I couldn’t function without it. I was dependent on it at that point.”[60]

Addiction, and specifically addiction to opioids, is incredibly challenging to overcome, even under ordinary circumstances.[61] It often requires residential (inpatient) rehabilitation, help from professional therapists, and “medication-assisted treatment.”[62] Many people also rely heavily on peer support from other recovering addicts during their recovery.[63] Moreover, when an individual has a severe addiction to opioids and does not detox properly (i.e., quitting cold-turkey), opioid withdrawals can be fatal.[64] Given the level of control and isolation cultivated by traffickers, survivors struggling from opioid addictions do not have the ability to seek out these supports to pursue sobriety, particularly when—as discussed in the previous section—traffickers may go so far as to force the survivor to take opioids in order to sustain the addiction and perpetuate their control.[65] This is without even taking into account the additional incentive trafficking survivors have to use opioids and other drugs as a means to “numb the pain” of past trauma.[66] The extent to which a trafficking survivor is trapped—both within the trafficking scenario and within their addiction—makes their path to sobriety markedly more difficult than it already is. The power that this gives to traffickers must not be underestimated.

 

iii.  External vulnerability: criminalization and credibility.

 

In addition to the control the trafficker exerts directly through a survivor’s addiction to opioids and other drugs, they take advantage of external factors to further enhance their control. On one hand, “substance abuse camouflages the crime of sex trafficking under a layer of illegal drug possession and other related criminal activity.”[67] A trafficker may capitalize on a survivor’s substance use as a means to “set up the trafficking victim in case she is ever arrested on prostitution and/or prostitution-related charges. If apprehended by law enforcement while under the influence or in possession, drug using victims may lose their credibility or presumed innocence. The trafficker knows that her arrest will distract from her victimization.”[68] On the other hand, in the event that law enforcement seeks to prosecute the trafficker, the survivor’s substance use often hinders their ability to contribute to this prosecution as a witness.[69] Due to the strong anesthetic effects of opioids, “victims often have distorted or insufficient memory of their forced commercial sex acts.”[70] Victims also “report being warned by their trafficker that, because they have a prostitution record, they will never be able to obtain legal employment, and that if they consider filing a report, no one would believe them because they are merely prostitutes.”[71] The same is almost certainly true regarding addiction and drug-related charges. Traffickers utilize every method of control available to them, turning external stigmas about addictions to their advantage is no exception.

B.  Drug-based Coercion Takes Many Forms.

 

The preceding categories of vulnerability, generated by opioids, illustrate the mechanisms by which traffickers can use these substances to generate control. Out of context, however, these still fail to describe the lived experience of what this looks like. Like any tool, these mechanisms of control can be used in a variety of ways, generating a variety of exploitative relationships. In this section, multiple example scenarios will be described, illustrating how these mechanisms coalesce with the risk factors described above to create powerful forms of coercion.[72]

These scenarios have been fictionalized and simplified to provide greater clarity. While some elements are based on private client interactions, many of the facts have been pulled from publicly available cases and survivor stories.[73] Although these scenarios do not provide an exhaustive account of the myriad ways in which sex trafficking and opioids can intersect, the do illustrate, in general terms some, of the most common examples.

 

i. Opioids can be used to sedate someone and create vulnerability.

 

Ayesha was 16. She had been arguing with her mother—who was raising Ayesha alone—and left the house after it became physical. She called a friend, Bianca, who said that Ayesha could spend a few days with her. Bianca was going to stay with her out-of-town boyfriend for the weekend, and Ayesha tagged along. On the first night, Bianca and her boyfriend smoked heroin, and encouraged Ayesha to try it, with Bianca claiming it helped her when she was stressed. Ayesha tried heroin for the first time, and as promised, she felt very relaxed—a pleasant change, coming from a household full of constant conflict. The next day, Bianca and her boyfriend got in a fight, and the boyfriend made them leave. Not ready to go home, they visited an acquaintance of Bianca’s, who had several friends over. The acquaintance offered them heroin, and they accepted. Once Ayesha and Bianca were high on heroin, barely aware of their surroundings, the acquaintance and his friends raped them. Over the next few days, the acquaintance kept Ayesha and Bianca high, while allowing multiple men to visit, pay him, and rape the two girls.

 Ayesha was faced with several of the risk factors identified above. She had experienced physical abuse at the hands of her mother, and more generally experienced conflict and instability within her family. She ran away from home and took shelter with a friend and gained access to heroin through her social group. This quickly escalated to a situation in which Ayesha was vulnerable and taken advantage of. In a perfect world, Ayesha and Bianca would soon get away from their trafficker—Bianca’s acquaintance—and return home, where their families would ensure they received therapy and other supports. Equally likely, however, they may remain under the control of their trafficker for an extended time or return home to a family that rejects them and leaves them vulnerable to further exploitation in the future.

 

ii.  Opioids can be presented as appealing in order to lure someone into further vulnerability, which can then be exploited.

 

Clara was placed in foster care at the age of 12, after child protective services discovered that her mother was a severe alcoholic, and her father was sexually abusing her while her mother was unconscious. Over the next two years, Clara was moved between foster homes, and at two of them, she was physically assaulted by older girls in the home. After being threatened by someone at her new home, Clara ran away. She went to a nearby park, where she was approached by a man in his twenties expressing romantic interest in her. He took her to a nearby diner for some food and asked about her story. He seemed to care, and Clara was not used to that. He offered to be her boyfriend and take care of her, and she gladly accepted. They were staying at a hotel, and he offered Clara pills that he said would help her relax. She tried them, without knowing they were prescription opioids. She kept taking them, initially at his suggestion, but as she got used to them, she started to enjoy them. After a week, he told her that he needed her help paying for the hotel, and that he could get her dates to make some money. He said she wouldn’t have to do more than kiss the dates, but the first date insisted she have sex. After she told her boyfriend, he said she just needs to figure out how to make it work. The next date did the same thing, and the next, but when she asked to stop her boyfriend grew angry and threatened to hurt her or call the police on her if she didn’t go along with it. Eventually, Clara started taking pills before every date to make them easier.

Clara, too, showed several of the identified risk factors. She had a mother who suffered from addiction before her, and endured childhood sexual abuse at the hands of her father. After entering foster care, she was subjected to interpersonal violence by other residents, and eventually ran away. This left Clara vulnerable to exploitation by an older man who showed her a modicum of kindness to lure her in before trafficking her. If Clara managed to get away from the man soon, she may have been able to return to foster care or enter a short-term rehabilitation program. If not, she likely continued on, becoming more severely addicted and more entrapped in a cycle of abuse, and sooner or later being convicted of prostitution or drug possession.

 

iii.  Traffickers can force survivors under their control to develop an addiction to opioids, which the trafficker can then leverage for further control.

 

Daliyah was a young mother, nineteen with a newborn son. Looking to make money to support herself and her child, she responded to a job posting online. The post advertised for a promotional model, indicating that she would be promoting a product at concerts and other events. Over emails, she discussed pay and travel expenses with the purported manager and disclosed that she was looking for a way to provide for her son. Her mother—who had recovered from her own previous drug addiction and managed to work two jobs and raise Daliyah alone—agreed to take care of her son in the evenings when she was working, so she accepted the job. The day came for her first shift, at a concert in a town a couple of hours away. She met who she thought was her manager, who would be driving her to the event. Instead of a concert venue, however, he took her to a motel in a different city entirely. He told Daliyah that she works for him now, and that if she refuses, he will hurt her son. At gunpoint, Daliyah was forced to take prescription opioids, raped, and trafficked throughout the night and into the early morning. While taking Daliyah home, her trafficker reiterated his threats against her son and told her that she must continue to work for him. Fearing for the safety of her son, not to mention herself, Daliyah complied. Daliyah regularly told her mother that she was going to work, but instead, went with her trafficker and did as she was told.

In Daliyah’s case, the only obvious risk factor is that her mother previously struggled with addiction. However, being raised by a single mother working two jobs, Daliyah was likely often left home alone from a relatively young age, thereby suffering from child neglect despite her mother’s best efforts to care for her. Coupled with her financial vulnerability as a single teenage mother, the trafficker was able to manipulate her into compliance. If Daliyah had refused to comply and gone to the police, she may have escaped trafficking, although her trafficker may well have followed through on his threats before the police caught up with him. While under the trafficker’s control, however, Daliyah likely developed an addiction to the drugs she was forced to take, giving the trafficker even more leverage to control her.

 

iv.  A survivor of trafficking may independently develop an addiction to opioids as a means to escape from the horrific experiences they are forced to endure by their trafficker.

 

Ella was fifteen. Her mother had died when she was twelve, and she lived with her father. Her father had been distant and irritable since her mother’s death, often ignoring Ella or growing angry at her over minor things. Ella started spending a lot of time out of the house, hanging out with friends rather than being at home, and her father never seemed to mind. One day, Ella tagged along with an acquaintance to what she thought was a party. The party turned out to be a house where people sold and used heroin.

Once they arrived, her acquaintance was given heroin seemingly in exchange for bringing Ella along, and the friend retired to a room where he used the heroin and became extremely sedated. Ella attempted to leave, but there was a guard at each door and she was not allowed to. After escalating force was used to prevent her from leaving, Ella was eventually raped by multiple guards in turn. She was kept captive in a room, where various men were allowed to rape her almost every day. With no way to leave and no sign that anyone was coming to help her, Ella started asking the men who came into her room for drugs. If they shared their heroin with her, Ella became quiet and complacent, and this soon became the norm. Once her traffickers caught on, they started keeping her high and selling her even more often. Ella developed a severe addiction to heroin as a means to numb herself to the horrors she was being subjected to.

After the trauma of losing her mother, Ella experienced neglect and verbal abuse from her father. Although not a runaway, Ella actively avoided the constant conflict at home and placed herself in vulnerable situations to avoid it. Moreover, Ella became associated with a heroin addict, who eventually led her into the grasp of her traffickers. Forced to cope with repeated rape and abuse, Ella took advantage of the only accessible way to numb the pain—drugs. In this case, Ella’s experience being trafficked was a risk factor that led to her developing an addiction. If the house was eventually raided by police, they likely treated her as simply another addict and charged her with a drug crime. If not, Ella likely remained in this cycle of abuse until she was no longer useful to her traffickers, or until she overdosed.

 

v.  A trafficker may seek out addicts and target them, due to their likely preexisting increased vulnerability to trafficking, as well as their susceptibility to drug-based coercion.

 

Felicia was a transgender, sixteen year old woman. After coming out to her parents, she was kicked out of the house. Ashamed and not wanting to see her fourteen year old brother at school, Felicia dropped out. Eventually, Felicia was placed in foster care—in a home for boys—where she was made fun of and beaten by the other boys who lived there. Felicia ran away from foster care, seeking to avoid this violence, and took to living on the streets instead, where she eventually developed an addiction.

 Some years later, when Felicia was twenty-five, she heard about a homeless shelter that accepted trans-women and helped them obtain their GED or employment training, but the shelter did not allow anyone addicted to drugs into their program. Determined to turn her life around, Felicia signed herself into a public rehabilitation facility, where she got off of drugs and spent thirty days sober. But after completing rehab, Felicia called the shelter and found that they had filled all of their beds and could not offer her a spot until one opened. Unsure where to go, Felicia left the rehab facility and walked to a nearby park. Meanwhile, a man parked in a car across the street from the rehab facility was watching. He followed her to the park, spoke to her, and said that he has a home for trans-women and that Felicia could stay there. Felicia was delighted and took him up on the offer. However, Felicia soon discovered that these women were doing drugs. She decided to stay, since she had nowhere else to go, and try to resist the temptation to relapse. Two days in, the temptation overwhelmed her, and she did drugs with one of the other women, rekindling her old addiction. She asked the woman how to get more drugs, and she told Felicia to ask the owner. When Felicia asked, he told her to go out with the other woman this evening, and if she did a good job, he would give her the drugs she wanted, but if she didn’t, she would have to leave. Felicia did go out that night, and the other woman showed her how to “walk the track” and solicit commercial sex. Felicia and the other women brought the proceeds to the owner, who gave them drugs and welcomed Felicia to stay as long as she wanted. No longer eligible for the shelter program, and with nowhere else to go, Felicia remained at the house and continued to walk the streets to earn her drugs.

After family conflict in response to coming out as transgender, and after her experiences with violence in foster care, Felicia became a runaway. She fell in with other homeless people suffering from an addiction, and soon developed one herself. After finally getting sober, she was targeted while leaving the rehab facility, and lured into a scenario that capitalized on her recent addiction and made it difficult for her to stay sober. After Felicia relapsed, she was coerced into trafficking in order to both feed her addiction and secure her a place to live. In this way, Felicia’s addiction was a risk factor that led to her being trafficked. If Felicia summoned the willpower to leave this new home and return to rehab—assuming the facility allows people back in—she may have managed to continue her recovery and eventually secure placement in the shelter. If not, Felicia likely continued being trafficked, eventually being arrested while “walking the track” and charged with drug or prostitution offenses.

IV.  Civil Remedies Under 18 U.S.C. § 1595

 

Each of these scenarios is horrific in its own way, and such conduct is rightly prohibited under the laws of the United States and virtually every other nation. Although sex trafficking is generally thought of as a criminal offense,[74] Congress has also enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1595, creating a federal civil cause of action through which survivors of trafficking can seek damages against their trafficker or “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in” sex trafficking.[75] This is the statute upon which much of the civil litigation related to sex trafficking is premised.

 

A.  Civil Remedies Play An Important Role In Meeting The Legislative Objectives Of Protecting Survivors And Fighting Human Trafficking.

 

“It is estimated that human trafficking generates many billions of dollars of profit per year, second only to drug trafficking as the most profitable form of transnational crime.”[76] Given the prevalence and complexity of human trafficking, Congress was right to enact broad measures to combat it. As a supplement to the criminal provisions, the civil cause of action established by 18 U.S.C. § 1595 serves at least two important purposes. First, it allows survivors to seek a measure of recompense that would otherwise be completely unavailable to them, potentially opening doors to recovery in the wake of this horrible crime that would otherwise be closed. Second, it allows for indirect measures to inhibit trafficking that have the potential to have greater widespread impact than the criminal prosecution of any individual trafficker could.

 

i.  This civil remedy can play an important part in a survivor’s healing journey after the trafficking has occurred.

 

Survivors of trafficking experience some of the most complex and all-encompassing barriers of any crime survivors as they try to move on. In an immediate sense, there are crucial supports that these survivors need—from the moment they are free from their trafficker—in order to stabilize and begin to heal.

 

The basic necessities are many, and include providing: (1) an interpreter or translator to make the survivor feel more comfortable and understood [if there are language barriers]; (2) crisis intervention and safety planning to ensure that the impact of the recent trauma is addressed and there is a plan to keep the survivor safe through the duration of the reintegration period; (3) health care, including immediate medical attention, sexual assault evaluations, substance abuse counseling, and other health care to ensure the survivor is well; . . . and (5) food and clothing.[77]

 

The legal system is far too slow-moving for any damages recovered under Section 1595 to fulfill these immediate needs. For better or worse, these needs must continue to be satisfied by service providers, government-funded crime victim programs, and charitable organizations.

       However, once these immediate stabilization needs are met, survivors still face an incredibly diverse array of issues, such as ongoing health needs (including mental health), criminal records, employment challenges, immigration requirements, and more.[78] Many trafficking survivors never have these long-term needs met and continue to suffer from the effects of being trafficked for the rest of their lives.[79]

A network of trafficking survivors conducted a survey of its members on the continuing impacts of their criminal histories alone. Below are some of their responses.

·         “[A] lot of p[ro]spective employers shut down and do not ask for explanations or do not want to listen. Hard to find employment with a criminal record and with no other options for work this could lead to re-trafficking.”[80]

·         “I continue to feel ‘[t]he invisible bars even though I am free[.]’”[81]

·         “[A]s a result of having to register as a sex offender my children were taken away and I lost these children for life.”[82]

·         “After escaping I found that I could not rent an apartment in my own name because of extensive background checks by property management. I always have a roommate and can’t have my name on mailboxes, report problems, or receive deliveries. Sometimes I have to hide from landlords.”[83]

·         “After having ‘escaped’ from my sex trafficker, I have still been enslaved by the charges. Unable to get employment year after year after year resulted in homelessness and suicide attempts.”[84]

·         “One of my charges was for a forgery that involved $28,000 being extracted from a[n account I wrongly believed was dormant]. . . I’ve paid back $10K but will spend the rest of my life paying off the balance.”[85]

 

By and large, these are problems that would be improved if a survivor succeeds in obtaining damages under Section 1595. Whether the survivor has direct debts to pay off, needs the money for housing or education, or wishes to retain an attorney to pursue expungement or child custody, the financial remedies available through civil litigation can make a life-changing difference.

All of these examples result from the narrow situation of criminal convictions and their consequences, but similar needs arise from other scenarios. For example, instead of debts, survivors may have ongoing medical expenses for mental health care or HIV treatment.[86] The costs of human trafficking can continue to impact survivors indefinitely, even after they are no longer being trafficked. Although no amount of money can undo the suffering these survivors have endured, remedies under Section 1595 can help defray these costs and open doors to a brighter future that would otherwise be out of reach.

 

ii. Civil penalties can incentivize action by defendants who have the ability to inhibit human trafficking but escape criminal liability.

 

The ugly truth is that traffickers themselves are not the only ones responsible for the prevalence of human trafficking; many of our businesses turn a blind eye to the ways they and their apparatuses enable trafficking. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is the website Backpage, largely the inspiration for, if not the target of, the controversial 2018 FOSTA-SESTA legislation.[87] The effectiveness of FOSTA-SESTA is hotly contested,[88] and to a lesser extent the relative culpability of Backpage,[89] but what is clear is that the platform provided by Backpage was widely used by sex traffickers.[90] Backpage executives plead guilty to conspiracy charges, but Backpage did not engage in sex trafficking directly; rather, it provided an online communications platform which was used by traffickers to post advertisements to recruit customers.[91]

One of the most egregious instances of this can be seen in the hospitality industry. “Hotels and motels are a common venue for sex trafficking, due to ease of access for buyers, ability to pay in cash and maintain secrecy through finances, and lack of facility maintenance or upkeep expenses.”[92] In one survey, 79% of respondents indicated that their exploitation involved hotels or motels.[93] Hotels have been aware of their involvement in sex trafficking for years.[94] Many have even made public commitments to enacting measures to prevent trafficking from occurring at their properties.[95] Despite these commitments, however, hotels are largely “failing to address the risks of modern slavery in their direct operations and supply chains.”[96] For example, only 14% of anti-trafficking statements by hotel companies report specific approaches or policies for “dealing with the risk of sexual exploitation in their operations and supply chains.”[97] “These failures can be explained by a lack of commitment by hotel companies to prioriti[z]e the elimination of modern slavery[.]”[98]

This is where civil liability under Section 1595 can make a difference. While it is possible for companies like hotels or Backpage to be subjected to criminal sanctions for their role in trafficking,[99] it is rare, and it is often quite difficult for the government to demonstrate criminal liability beyond a shadow of a doubt. Civil liability can fill in this gap and incentivize companies to take meaningful steps toward not allowing traffickers to use their apparatuses to facilitate trafficking, and this incentive can have a significant impact. For example in 2011, Marriott International partnered with ECPAT-USA, a non-profit organization aimed at child trafficking prevention, “to co-develop training to help hotel employees recognize the indicators for human trafficking,” but did not commit to making this training mandatory for its employees—as previously recommended by ECPAT and others—until 2017.[100] Notably, this was in the wake of an increase in attention to the possible liability of hotel chains under Section 1595.[101]

The example of hotels serves to further illustrate once more the interconnectedness of sex trafficking and illicit drugs. Expanding upon the concept that the use of opioids and other drugs is a risk factor for trafficking, and vice-versa, hotels are in a position to see and act on this correlation. If a hotel employee observes signs of drug use on the hotel premises, a red flag should go up and they should wonder whether trafficking is also present. No risk factor is universally present, and questioning the presence of trafficking when drug use is observed will undoubtedly result in false alarms, but it would also lead to the identification of untold numbers of survivors who would otherwise remain invisible. This illustration is not limited to hotels, either. In the same manner, if social media platforms, or the like, isolated patterns that relate to drug sales, these same patterns would almost certainly be utilized by traffickers. Given that both the sex trafficking and the opioid markets are illicit industries, they inherently rely on the same market practices that pervade these industries; the use of these types of business apparatuses is standard procedure in the same way that placing ads on websites is for typical businesses.

 

B.  Drug-based Coercion Is Sufficient To Satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 1595.

 

Under § 1595(a), one of the elements that survivors must prove is that they are, in fact, survivors of sex trafficking before obtaining recovery in the civil context.[102] One means by which a defendant may escape liability, then, is to successfully argue that the plaintiff was not trafficked. There are at least two methods by which defendants might make such an argument. First, they could argue that drug-based coercion simply does not apply in a civil context. Second, they could argue that, because Section 1595 creates a civil cause of action through the incorporation of the criminal offenses defined in the rest of the relevant Chapter,[103] a criminal burden of proof should apply to that element of the civil claim—in other words, that the underlying criminal offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than merely by the preponderance of the evidence. However, both of these arguments fail.

 

i.  Drug-based coercion applies in civil cases.

 

In no uncertain terms, the precedent established by federal criminal cases such as United States v. Fields,[104] United States v. Mack,[105] United States v. Groce,[106] and others since, carries over to civil lawsuits filed under Section 1595. In other contexts, courts have rightly concluded that federal common law applies under Section 1595,[107] and the same is true in this context. These decisions recognizing drug-based coercion as sufficient for a criminal conviction carry the same weight in regard to civil cases as they do criminal. Even if that were not the case, the arguments that persuaded the courts to accept the theory of drug-based coercion under Section 1591 are equally applicable and persuasive under Section 1595. [108]

In any case, Section 1595 does not create a separate but parallel civil offense of human trafficking; it directly incorporates the criminal offense, thereby incorporating all of the applicable precedent under the offense. Before the question of what satisfies Section 1595 comes the question of what satisfies Section 1591, [109] and that question is settled—drug-based coercion is sufficient to satisfy Section 1591. Logically, then, drug-based coercion must be sufficient to satisfy Section 1595. [110]  

ii.  If a plaintiff in a civil case relies upon a theory of drug-based coercion, the plaintiff need only prove that the drug-based coercion occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

Defendants of Section 1595 claims have already tried to import criminal law standards into civil litigation when it suits them.[111] It is not hard to imagine a defendant making the claim that, because drug-based coercion is a common law doctrine stemming from criminal human trafficking cases, a theory of drug-based coercion should require a heightened burden of proof if applied in a civil case at all. Though it contradicts widely held understandings of the distinction between criminal and civil litigation, such an argument would not be unprecedented.

Section 1595 is one of relatively few civil causes of action that directly incorporate a criminal offense. One of the most common examples of such a structure is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1964.[112] Though RICO is most often discussed in its criminal context, Congress has also authorized a civil cause of action.[113] In a civil RICO case, the Second Circuit concluded that “in the absence of previous convictions a civil plaintiff must carry a burden equal to that in a criminal case in proving that criminal conduct.”[114] However, the Supreme Court resoundingly rejected that reasoning:

 

We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a proceeding under § 1964(c). In a number of settings, conduct that can be punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt will support civil sanctions under a preponderance standard. There is no indication that Congress sought to depart from this general principle here. . . . That the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards or that the consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action are identical to the consequences of a criminal conviction.[115]

 

This statutory configuration closely aligns with the relationship between the civil cause of action authorized by Section 1595 and the criminal offense contained in Section 1591. Following the same reasoning, there is no requirement that the criminal predicate acts described in Section 1591 need to be proved by anything higher than a preponderance of the evidence standard when raised in a civil proceeding under Section 1595. For human trafficking survivors who bring civil lawsuits under Section 1595, given that the other elements are satisfied, proving by a preponderance standard that they were compelled to engage in commercial sex through drug-based coercion is sufficient to succeed on their claim.

 

V.  Implications

 

Today, we have enough information to conclude that there is an inherent relationship between sex trafficking and the opioid crisis. So, what do we do about it? There are a number of implications that follow this conclusion, and these implications must be incorporated into the measures we take to address both sex trafficking and the opioid crisis.

First and foremost, it is essential that education on this topic is promoted at all levels, and throughout both the public and private sectors. This article is not the first to call for this type of education, but it bears repeating. Educating law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges can help to identify trafficking survivors who may be facing criminal charges related to substance abuse or related offenses. Likewise, training provided to hospital staff, rehabilitation centers, and others who work with people suffering from addiction and overdose can allow them to identify survivors in other settings. These trainings should acknowledge that drug use is a risk factor that may indicate the presence of human trafficking. The inverse is also true; if a survivor of trafficking is identified through other means, those interacting with the survivor should bear in mind that the survivor may be suffering from addiction. These trainings should also discuss the unique needs and challenges of survivors who are suffering from addiction and provide resources to help those receiving training respond effectively, empathetically, and nonjudgmentally.

Second, there is a significant need for further research on the interrelationship of sex trafficking and opioids. As discussed in the introduction to this article, there is no shortage of qualitative information on this topic. Some organizations have conducted limited studies to provide what evidence of this overlap can be obtained through firsthand accounts, and this corroborates the relationship that practitioners have observed on the ground. What is lacking, however, is detailed quantitative research. There are practical challenges to obtaining this sort of information on human trafficking in general, as many cases are misreported or not reported at all, but these challenges can—and must—be worked around. Accurate data on this topic could allow for more targeted and effective strategies to combat these issues, and in a very practical sense, both public and private funds significantly follow hard data. This type of research will draw funders’ attention to programs that operate in this nexus and provide services to those affected.

Third, the gradual shift away from law enforcement and toward public health as the lens through which we address the opioid crisis must include the opioid crisis as it intersects with sex trafficking. With the knowledge we now have of the power and pervasiveness of drug-based coercion, there is no conscionable reason that safe harbor provisions should not be expanded. These provisions are designed to protect survivors of trafficking from being prosecuted for the actions they were compelled to undertake at the hands of their trafficker. Various stakeholders have campaigned across the country for states to enact these protections, and have been largely successful, but these campaigns have been too narrow. Given the strong relationship between sex trafficking and opioids, and drugs more generally, state legislatures must expand these provisions. Prostitution is not the only criminal offense survivors are likely to face. Continuing to hold these survivors criminally liable for drug offenses only continues to empower traffickers; this creates an absurd scenario where the trafficker can threaten to call the police and have the survivor arrested. Moreover, safe harbor provisions are often restricted to minors. While minors are even more vulnerable, they are no more culpable for their coerced actions, and adult survivors should not be denied these protections. Additionally, many adult survivors are merely childhood survivors of trafficking or similar abuse that were never identified before reaching adulthood.[116] In any case, viewing survivors’ struggles with addiction through a public health lens, criminalizing them will not achieve the desired results. Even more so than non-trafficked individuals, these survivors desperately need resources that allow them to overcome these challenges and heal. As discussed above, these survivors have complex needs that must be met if they are to shed their vulnerabilities and go on to lead whole and healthy lives.

Fourth, to the extent that the government seeks to use criminal liability in its fight against trafficking or the opioid crisis on a systematic level, it should consider this intersection as a potential route to do so. Federal prosecutions relying on drug-based coercion are one piece of this, but another tool has gone largely unnoticed. Due to the flexibility and anonymity they can provide, hotels and motels in high-crime areas are significantly connected to the worlds of both sex trafficking and illicit drug distribution. While it would be difficult for the government to attach criminal liability to entities such as hotel parent companies, criminal charges have successfully been brought against local hotels and their owners or managers who have turned a blind eye to trafficking on their property. Separately, 18 U.S.C. § 1594 provides for the forfeiture of “any property, real or personal, that was involved in, used, or intended to be used to commit or facilitate” a human trafficking violation.[117] In conjunction, the government could hypothetically prosecute the owners of hotels and motels that implicitly allow trafficking to occur on their property and force them to forfeit the hotel or motel itself. This leads to questions of what to do with it then, and whether it can be avoided that another hotel or motel will open up in its place. At minimum though, large-scale pursuit of forfeitures such as this could stem the flow of both sex trafficking and opioids in the short term, and the sale of forfeited property could fund measures intended to address both issues from the public health perspective.

 

VI.  Conclusion

 

Awareness of the intrinsic connectedness of sex trafficking and the opioid crisis is on the rise. Acknowledging this relationship and addressing both issues accordingly is essential to the effectiveness of our efforts to combat them. Although the concept of drug-based coercion is not yet universally accepted, it has gained significant traction in recent years and attorneys engaged in anti-trafficking work should not be shy to employ it. Nonetheless, attorneys too still have room to learn about this relationship and the severe vulnerability it generates.

Indicative of this room to grow, the legal system has yet to capitalize on the full potential of human trafficking laws in the United States. Some attorneys have sought to help trafficking survivors hold accountable those who contributed to their trafficking through civil remedies. However, this line of litigation is still new and delicate. If successful precedent is established, it may someday be applied on a much broader scale, effectuating real and systemic change. The government too has untapped avenues, including deterring this sort of economic ambivalence through the seizure of property, not to mention the expansion of safe harbor protections for survivors.

Across the board, it is imperative that we learn to see through stigmas and provide nonjudgmental, trauma-informed care to both survivors of trafficking and those struggling to overcome opioid addictions. While the two certainly do not always overlap, the frequency with which they do should serve to illustrate that people are complex and so are their needs. Someone who escapes trafficking but does not receive treatment for addiction may end up re-trafficked because their trafficker can sustain their addiction; someone arrested for what appears to be simple opioid use may really be in the midst of being trafficked. As a society, and especially as attorneys who often make decisions that affect the lives of people in this nexus of vulnerability, we must educate ourselves about the relationship between sex trafficking and opioids if we are to competently work in either area. We can help to end these cyclical traumas, but to do so, we must learn to see past societal stigmas and meet people where they really are.

 

 

 


[I] Ben VanSlyke is an associate attorney at Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., and a member of the firm’s sex trafficking litigation team. Before pursuing law, he worked in the non-profit sector, where he was tasked with identifying and providing services to trafficking survivors as well as serving on an active anti-trafficking taskforce with law enforcement and social service agencies. He also previously worked with an orphanage in Cambodia, providing employment and life-skills training to survivors of trafficking in order to reduce vulnerability to future trafficking.

[2] Jacquelyn C.A. Meshelemiah & Raven E. Lynch, The Cause and Consequence of Human Trafficking: Human Rights Violations 130 (2019).

[3] See generally Ann Wagner & Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes or Prey? The Evolution of Congressional Intent in Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 Harv. J. on Legis. 17, 47–72 (2017) (discussing the evolution of federal sex trafficking legislation from the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015).

[4] See, e.g., Overdose Death Rates, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse fig. 3 (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/TQ66-HGJE] (showing that opioid overdose deaths increased from fewer than 10,000 in 1999 to nearly 50,000 in 2019).

[5] S&T Combatting Human Trafficking Using Social Science, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2019/01/30/st-combatting-human-trafficking-using-social-science [https://perma.cc/JBX4-WA8J].

[6] Id.

[7] Jarod Forget, Violent drug organizations use human trafficking to expand profits, U.S. Drug Enf’t Adm’ (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.dea.gov/stories/2021/2021-01/2021-01-28/violent-drug-organizations-use-human-trafficking-expand-profits [https://perma.cc/6N5E-JY96].

 

[8] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).

[9] Id.

[10] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2).

[11] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5).

[12] United States v. Fields, No. 8:13-CR-198-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 5278499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013) ("[F]ear of severe withdrawal symptoms meets the definition of “serious harm” as defined by the Statute.”).

[13] Id.

[14] Id. (quoting “serious harm” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5)).

[15] Lindsey Roberson & Shan Patel, Prosecuting Sex Trafficking Cases Using a Drug-Based Theory of Coercion, 65 U.S. Att’ys Bull. 175, 183 (2017).

[16] See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952–53 (1988) (holding that an individual who “use[s] or threat[ens] . . . coercion” in an attempt to force another into “involuntary servitude” will face “criminal prosecution”).

[17] See infra Part II.

[18] See infra Part II.

[19] 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2).

[20] See infra Section IV.B.1.

[21] Infra Section IV.B.1.

[22] See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 529.010(6)(c) (LexisNexis 2021) (“‘Force, fraud, or coercion’ includes but is not limited to . . . [f]acilitating, controlling, or threatening to control an individual’s access to a controlled substance . . . .”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1307(C)(1)(e) (LexisNexis 2021) (“Coercion includes . . . [f]acilitating or controlling another person’s access to a controlled substance.”); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 787(a)(2)(d) (2021) (“‘Coercion’ means . . . [c]ontrolling or threatening to control an individual’s access to a controlled substance . . . .”).

[23] Unif. Act on Prevention of & Remedies for Hum. Trafficking § 2(2)(D) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2013) (“‘Coercion’ means . . .  controlling or threatening to control and individual’s access to a controlled substance . . . .”).

[24] Human Trafficking Legislation, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/human-trafficking/trafficking-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/2S6F-F776].

[25] Office of the Surgeon Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health 3-5 to 3-6 tbl.3.1 (2016), https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZSP-LMAK].

[26] Id.

[27] Jane Liebschutz et al., The Relationship Between Sexual and Physical Abuse and Substance Abuse Consequences, 22 J. Substance Abuse Treatment 121, 124 (“[P]ast physical or sexual abuse was significantly associated with more substance abuse consequences . . . . When calculated for different types of violence, there were no differences in substance abuse consequences . . . between physical only vs. sexual with or without physical . . . , whereas there were significant differences between physical only vs. none and sexual only vs. none.”) (internal citations omitted).

[28] Lil Tonmyr & Margot Shields, Childhood Sexual Abuse and Substance Abuse: A Gender Paradox?, 63 Child Abuse & Neglect 284, 290 (2017).

[29] Priscilla Dass-Brailford & Amie C. Myrick, Psychological Trauma and Substance Abuse: The Need for an Integrated Approach, 11 Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 202, 202 (2010).

[30] Tonmyr & Shields, supra note 28, at 289 (“Three explanatory models have been proposed for the link between [childhood sexual abuse] and adolescent substance abuse; PTSD models focusing on the trauma-inducing aspects of child maltreatment, self-dysfunction models, and relationship difficulty models.”). These distinctions focus more on the psychological underpinnings of this link, which are beyond the scope of this article and irrelevant to the legal consideration of risk factors and associated vulnerability.

[31] Id. at 284.

[32] Lisa Fedina et al., Risk Factors for Domestic Child Sex Trafficking in the United States, 34 J. Interpersonal Violence 2653, 2654 (2019).

[33] See Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health, supra note 25, at 3-5 to 3-6 tbl.3.1 (discussing risk factors for drug abuse); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Admin. for Child. & Families, Off. on Trafficking in Persons, Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking 1 (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/otip/fact_sheet_human_trafficking_fy18.pdf [https://perma.cc/E28X-CVCC] (identifying how at-risk populations are most likely to be trafficked). 

[34] Office on Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., OTIP-FS-18-01, Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/otip/fact_sheet_human_trafficking_fy18.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HTQ-S2UE].

[35] Admin. for Child., Youth and Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Guidance to States and Services on Addressing Human Trafficking of Children and Youth in the United States 4 (2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/acyf_human_trafficking_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/575C-UDMD].

[36] Id.

[37] Id. at 3 – 4.

[38] See infra Part III.

[39] See, e.g., West Virginia Sees Increase in ‘Family’ Sex Trafficking Related to Opioid Epidemic, W. Va. Pub. Broad. (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://www.wvpublic.org/news/2018-01-09/west-virginia-sees-increase-in-family-sex-trafficking-related-to-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/66C2-XLX8]. However, some information indicates a potential rise in “familial trafficking” of children by family members seeking to sustain their addiction.

[40] See generally Susie Neilson, More Kids Are Getting Placed In Foster Care Because Of Parents’ Drug Use, NPR (July 15, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/07/15/741790195/more-kids-are-getting-placed-in-foster-care-because-of-parents-drug-use [https://perma.cc/R9CU-CFLJ] (“The number of cases of children entering the foster care system due to parental drug use has more than doubled since 2000 . . . .”)

[41] Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health., supra note 25, 3-5 to 3-6 tbl.3.1.

[42] Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Dep't of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report 32 (20th ed. 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7WP-FTJY].

[43] See generally Roberson & Patel, supra note 15.

[44] Opioids, Alcohol & Drug Found. (Nov. 5, 2021), https://adf.org.au/drug-facts/opioids/#wheel.

[45] Kendra Cherry, Why an Opiate’s Impact on the Brain Can Cause Addiction, verywellmind (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-are-opiates-2795406 [https://perma.cc/L7TU-55GE]; Roberson & Patel, supra note 15, at 175–76.

[46] Camille Renzoni, Exploring Why Opiates Make You Feel Good, The Recovery Village (Aug. 21, 2021),https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/opiate-addiction/exploring-why-opiates-make-you-feel-good/ [https://perma.cc/K66V-T7QY]. It is worth noting that there has been an increase in literature disputing the prevalence of this sort of positive feeling. See, e.g., Nicoletta Lanese, Most People Don’t Actually Feel Euphoric When They Take Opioids, Study Finds, LiveScience (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.livescience.com/opioid-euphoria-mostly-a-myth.html [https://perma.cc/2VUY-JT53]. However, this is still considered a minority view, and detailed scientific studies have connected opioid use to immediate activity within the pleasure centers of the brain. See generally Antoine Bechara et al., A Neurobehavioral Approach to Addiction: Implications for the Opioid Epidemic and the Psychology of Addiction, 20 Psych. Sci. Pub. Int. 96, 101 (2019).

[47] Meshelemiah & Lynch, supra note 2, at 129.

[48] Heather R. Evans, From the Voices of Domestic Sex Trafficking Survivors: Experiences of Complex Trauma & Posttraumatic Growth 102 (May 20, 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (ScholarlyCommons), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=edissertations_sp2 [https://perma.cc/M67D-67MB].

[49] Upper Peninsula Women Drugged, Sex Trafficked in Lower Michigan, WLUC (Jan. 23, 2020, 5:08 AM), https://www.uppermichiganssource.com/content/news/Upper-Peninsula-women-drugged-sex-trafficked-in-Lower-Michigan-567225371.html [https://perma.cc/BSV6-7ANY]. Describing one case of sex trafficking that occurred in Flint, Michigan, the Genesee County Sheriff stated that the traffickers “kept [the survivors] high, so they couldn’t make sound decisions to try to get out.”

[50] Meshelemiah & Lynch, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that “drugs are often used as a reward (for compliance”).

[51] See Hum. Trafficking Inst., 2017 Federal Human Trafficking Report 16 (2017), https://traffickinginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2017-Federal-Human-Trafficking-Report-WEB-Low-Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3W-8E8J].

[52] Emma Eastwood-Paticchio, Addicted to You: Drug Addiction as a Means of Coercion, Trafficking Matters (Jan. 30, 2019), https://traffickinginstitute.org/addicted-to-you-drug-addiction-as-a-means-of-coercion/ [https://perma.cc/7SC6-97KV] (“According to the 2017 Federal Human Trafficking Report, traffickers exploited victims’ substance abuse issues in one third of active criminal sex trafficking cases in 2017, over three times more than traffickers exploited romantic relationships.”); See Hum. Trafficking Inst., 2017 Federal Human Trafficking Report 16 (2017), https://traffickinginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2017-Federal-Human-Trafficking-Report-WEB-Low-Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3W-8E8J].

[53] Leah K. Walker, Opioid Withdrawal: Signs, Symptoms & Addiction Treatment, Am. Addiction Treatment Ctrs. (Jan. 23, 2022), https://americanaddictioncenters.org/withdrawal-timelines-treatments/opiate [https://perma.cc/8KVV-EMMF].

[54] Jeffrey Juergens, What Is Opiate Withdrawal?, Addiction Center (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.addictioncenter.com/opiates/withdrawal-detox/ [https://perma.cc/RA6Y-TRT5].

[55] Id.

[56] See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (defining torture as an act “specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . upon another person within his custody or physical control”).

[57] Juergens, supra note 54.

[58] Roberson & Patel, supra note 15, at 176 (citing Katherine Chon, Human Trafficking and Opioid Abuse, Admin. for Child. & Families: The Family Room Blog (May 17, 2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/8654/20170322021028/https:/www.acf.hhs.gov/blog/2016/05/human-trafficking-and-opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/2XAA-2XV6] (discussing an interview with Dr. Hanni Stoklosa)).

[59] Lindsey N. Roberson, She Leads a Lonely Life: When Sex Trafficking and Drug Addiction Collide, 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 359, 376 (2017) (citing United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997, 1004 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted)).

[60] Evans, supra note 48, at 102.

[61] Understanding and Overcoming Opioid Abuse, Am. Psych. Ass’n (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.apa.org/topics/substance-use-abuse-addiction/opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/NK9D-97E3].

[62] Id.

[63] See generally Kathlene Tracy & Samantha P. Wallace, Benefits of Peer Support Groups in the Treatment of Addiction, 7 Substance Abuse & Rehab. 143, 152 (2016) (concluding that data regarding the positive effects of peer support groups on addiction recovery is limited but encouraging).

[64] See generally Shane Darke et al., Yes, People Can Die from Opiate Withdrawal, 122 Addiction 199 (2016) (highlighting several instances of withdrawal-caused deaths across the world’s incarcerated population).  

[65] Roberson, supra note 59, at 371.

[66] Id. at 370.

[67] Roberson & Patel, supra note 15, at 177.

[68] Meshelemiah & Lynch, supra note 2, at 129–30.

[69] Sabrina Balmgamwalla, Trafficking in Narratives: Conceptualizing and Recasting Victims, Offenders, and Rescuers in the War on Human Trafficking, 94 Denv. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2016).

[70] Matthew Myatt, The “Victim-Perpetrator” Dilemma: The Role of State Safe Harbor Laws in Creating a Presumption of Coercion for Human Trafficking Victims, 25 Wm. & Mary J. Race Gender & Soc. Just. 555, 568 (2019).

[71] Kate Mogulescu, The Public Defender as Anti-Trafficking Advocate, an Unlikely Role: How Current New York City Arrest and Prosecution Policies Systematically Criminalize Victims of Sex Trafficking, 15 CUNY L. Rev. 471, 482 (2012).

[72] See supra Section III.A.

[73] See generally United States v. Fields, 625 F. App’x 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 2018); Caitlin Johnston, Man Convicted of Human Trafficking Gets 34 Years in Prison, Tampa Bay Times (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/man-convicted-of-human-trafficking-gets-34-years-in-prison/2163311/ [https://perma.cc/JA2K-DRXT]; Lindsay Moore, Police, Survivors Debunk Human Trafficking Kidnapping Myths, MLive (Jan. 16, 2020, 11:08 AM), https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/2020/01/police-survivors-debunk-human-trafficking-kidnapping-myths.html [https://perma.cc/W24P-ZRTR]; Shandra Woworuntu, Shandra Woworuntu: My Life as a Sex-Trafficking Victim, BBC News (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35846207 [https://perma.cc/7Q35-BT3R]; Lex Talamo, Victim: I Was 4 When My Dad Started Trafficking Me, Shreveport Times (May 23, 2016), https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/watchdog/2016/05/23/victims-sex-trafficking-share-their-stories/83538332/ [https://perma.cc/48MW-FHRZ]; Esther Honig, How One Woman Escaped Sex Trafficking and Overcame Her Opioid Addiction, Side Effects Pub. Media (May 23, 2018 4:34 PM), https://www.sideeffectspublicmedia.org/post/how-one-woman-escaped-sex-trafficking-and-overcame-her-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/LE5B-9SFV]; Kristin Detrow, The Link Between Opioid Abuse and Sex Trafficking, Crime Rep. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/17/the-link-between-opioid-abuse-and-sex-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/Z7JE-VL4P]; American Addiction Centers Editorial Staff, Drug Addiction Fuels the Fire of Human Trafficking, Am. Addiction Ctrs. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.rehabs.com/blog/drug-addiction-fuels-the-fire-of-human-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/G5EJ-THAU].

[74] See 18 U.S.C. § 1591; see generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1597.

[75] 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

[76] The United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Alabama, Human Trafficking Task Force, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 11, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdal/human-trafficking-task-force [https://perma.cc/G7FK-SWRG].

[77] Meghan McCann, Nat’l conf. of State Legislatures, Human Trafficking: An Overview of Services and Funding for Survivors 3 (2018).

[78] See generally id. at 3–8.

[79] See generally Evans, supra note 48, at 51–59 (Chapter 4 on the “Post-Trafficking Experience”); Kimberly Mehlman-Orozco, What Happens After a Human Trafficking Victim is ‘Rescued’?, The Hill (July 29, 2016 4:28 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/289709-what-happens-after-a-human-trafficking-victim-is-rescued [https://perma.cc/R5BW-LSZV] (conveying the hardships sex trafficking survivors face using one woman’s story as an example).

[80] Nat’l Survivor Network, National Survivor Network Members Survey: Impact of Criminal Arrest and Detention on Survivors of Human Trafficking 7 (2016).

[81] Id.

[82] Id.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. at 9.

[86] McCann, supra note 77 at 4.

[87] See Liz Tung, FOSTA-SESTA was Supposed to Thwart Sex Trafficking. Instead, it’s Sparked a Movement, PULSE (July 10, 2020), https://whyy.org/segments/fosta-sesta-was-supposed-to-thwart-sex-trafficking-instead-its-sparked-a-movement/ [https://perma.cc/RDS9-EV5X] (“[Although Backpage] was actually shut down by federal authorities before FOSTA-SESTA passed, supporters of the legislation still have implied that it paved the way for the seizure.”).

[88] See, e.g., Daisy Soderberg-Rivkin, The Lessons of FOSTA-SESTA from a Former Content Moderator, Medium (Apr. 8, 2020), https://medium.com/@Daisy_Soderberg_Rivkin/the-lessons-of-fosta-sesta-from-a-former-content-moderator-24ab256dc9e5 [https://perma.cc/VBH5-ZMVQ] (noting the negative impact had on sex workers); Karol Markowicz, Congress’ Awful Anti-Sex-Trafficking Law Has Only Put Sex Workers in Danger and Wasted Taxpayer Money, Bus. Insider (July 14, 2019, 8:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fosta-sesta-anti-sex-trafficking-law-has-been-failure-opinion-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/FCU8-BA3W] (“[T]here’s no evidence that [FOSTA-SESTA] has made any difference whatsoever.”).

[89] See, e.g., Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Secret Memos Show the Government Has Been Lying About Backpage All Along, Reason (Aug. 26, 2019, 12:48 PM), https://reason.com/2019/08/26/secret-memos-show-the-government-has-been-lying-about-backpage/ [https://perma.cc/8TTC-QEH5]. Although Backpage did know that its website was used to advertise sex trafficking and refused to remove all adult content from its website, they actively assisted law enforcement in sex trafficking investigations, going above and beyond their legal requirements, taking the initiative to report particularly concerning posts to law enforcement themselves, providing seminars and trainings to law enforcement on how to effectively utilize Backpage data in their investigations and prosecutions, and providing authentication testimony at trials.

[90] S. Rep. No. 114-214, at 4 (2016).

[91] See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Backpage’s Co-Founder and CEO, As Well As Several Backpage-Related Corporate Entities, Enter Guilty Pleas, (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/backpage-s-co-founder-and-ceo-well-several-backpage-related-corporate-entities-enter-guilty [https://perma.cc/B5JB-WVYR]. Notably, there is dispute as to how culpable Backpage truly was.

[92] Hotel/Motel-Based, Hum. Trafficking Hotline, https://humantraffickinghotline.org/sex-trafficking-venuesindustries/hotelmotel-based [https://perma.cc/J3UH-MZUG].

[93] Polaris, On-Ramps, Intersections, and Exit Routes: A Roadmap for Systems and Industries to Prevent and Disrupt Human Trafficking 12 fig. 1.6 (2018).

[94] See generally Human Trafficking in the Hotel Industry, Polaris Project (Feb. 10, 2016), https://polarisproject.org/blog/2016/02/human-trafficking-in-the-hotel-industry/ [https://perma.cc/SV4V-CPK8]; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Blue Campaign, Hospitality Toolkit (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/blue-campaign/toolkits/hospitality-toolkit-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9K4-FRP7].

[95] See Press Release, Stephen P. Holmes, Chairman of Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., Modern Slavery Statement (June 1, 2018), https://corporate.wyndhamhotels.com/modern-slavery-statement/ [https://perma.cc/R9AW-KTLF]; Press Release, Mark S. Hoplamazian, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hyatt Hotels Corporation, Hyatt Hotels Corp. Hum. Rts. Statement (January 2017), https://about.hyatt.com/content/dam/HyattStories/thrive/Hyatt-Global-Human-Rights-Statement-Modern-Day-Slavery-020117.pdf [https://perma.cc/64XT-QTPL].

[96] Minderoo Foundation’s Walk Free Initiative et al., Beyond Compliance in the Hotel Sector: A Review of UK Modern Slavery Act Statements 2 (2019).

[97] Id. at 4, 14.

[98] Id. at 2.

[99] See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Louisiana Motel Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (July 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louisiana-motel-owner-pleads-guilty-sex-trafficking-case [https://perma.cc/J8PP-G2D9]; Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Backpage’s Co-Founder and CEO, As Well As Several Backpage-Related Corporate Entities, Enter Guilty Pleas, (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/backpage-s-co-founder-and-ceo-well-several-backpage-related-corporate-entities-enter-guilty [https://perma.cc/B5JB-WVYR].

[100] Press Release, ECPAT-USA, ECPAT-USA and Marriott International Announce New Partnership to Protect Children from Trafficking, (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.ecpatusa.org/blog/2018/1/29/ecpat-usa-and-marriott-international-announce-new-partnership [https://perma.cc/ERY5-25KZ].

[101] See generally Shea M. Rhodes, Sex Trafficking and the Hotel Industry: Criminal and Civil Liability for Hotels and their Employees (2015), https://cseinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Hotel_Policy_Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU5B-3SWU]; Gallant Fish, No Rest for the Wicked: Civil Liability Against Hotels in Cases of Sex Trafficking, 23 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 119, 146 (2017); Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553, 555 (1st Cir. 2017); Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 725-27 (11th Cir. 2021).

[102] 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (“An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action . . . .”) (emphasis added).

[103] Id. (“An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action . . . .”) (referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1596).

[104] United States v. Fields, No. 8:13-CR-198-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 5278499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013) (stating “fear of severe withdrawal symptoms meets the definition of ‘serious harm’ as defined by the Statute.”).

[105] U.S. v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074, 1081 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that evidence depicting defendant’s initial cultivation and subsequent exploitation of victims’ drug addictions adequately supported his conviction under Section 1591).

[106] U.S. v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 267 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A] victim’s prior sexual conduct is irrelevant to the sex-trafficking mens rea: ‘whether the victims had previously worked as prostitutes was irrelevant to the required mens rea for the crime.’”) (quoting United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2017).

[107] See, e.g., J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. 20-CV-00155-WHO, 2020 WL 3035794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2020) (“[T]he TVPRA is silent on the issue of indirect [or vicarious] liability, which suggests that the federal common law of agency should apply.”). This holding conforms with the widely-held belief that “statutes are presumed not to disturb the common law, ‘unless the language of the statute [is] clear and explicit for this purpose.’” State Eng'r of Nev. v. S. Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev., 339 F.3d 804, 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia, 464 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1983)). However, some courts may still opt to apply state law. But see K.B. v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels Corp., No. 19-CV-1213-AJ, 2020 WL 8674188, at *9 n.7 (D.N.H. Sept. 28, 2020) ("The TVPRA does not address the issue of indirect or vicarious liability. As the parties both cite primarily to New Hampshire law regarding the franchise relationship, the court does so as well.”).

[108] See supra Part I.

[109] 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Any violation of a criminal offense outlined in 18 U.S.C 77 will satisfy Section 1595. However, the vast majority of sex trafficking cases—as contemplated by this article—take place under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. For the purposes of this Article, I focus on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591.

[110] Section 1595 incorporates Section 1591 (among the other Sections of Chapter 77); Section 1591 includes coercion as sufficient to satisfy the relevant element of a sex trafficking offense; Section 1591 includes threats of serious harm as sufficient to constitute coercion; and the decisions cited above, supra notes 104–106, concluded that drug-based coercion is sufficient to constitute serious harm. As such, following a logical chain of if-then statements: if drug-based coercion constitutes serious harm, then drug-based coercion constitutes coercion; if drug-based coercion constitutes coercion under Section 1591, then drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1591; and if drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1591, then drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1595. The first logical proposition in that chain is true: drug-based coercion constitutes serious harm as defined in Section 1591. Therefore, the conclusion must also be true: drug-based coercion satisfies Section 1595.

[111] See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F.Supp.3d 959, 969–70 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (rejecting defendant’s notion that judicial interpretation of the phrase ‘participation in a venture’ done in the criminal context of Section 1591 should apply to the interpretation of the same phrase done in the civil context of Section 1595).

[112] 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

[113] 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

[114] Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 501-02.

[115] Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (citing the following as examples of other settings where criminal conduct can warrant civil sanctions under a preponderance of the evidence standard: United States. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47–49 (1914)).

[116] See Impact of Trafficking, National Child Traumatic Stress Network, (May 15, 2022) https://www.nctsn.org/what-child-trauma/trauma-types/sex-trafficking/effects.

[117] 18 U.S.C. § 1594(d)(2). However, the success of such an approach would admittedly be uncertain in relation to the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185 (2000).

Probation Ineligibility: A Time For Reconsideration in Kentucky

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Brady Grove[I]

Introduction

In the United States, each state has the authority to shape its own criminal justice and juvenile justice systems.[2] With this regulatory power, states across the country have enacted statutes permitting youths under the age of 18 to be tried as adults for qualifying crimes.[3] In Kentucky, a youthful offender is placed in the jurisdiction of an “adult court” through a mandatory waiver or discretionary transfer. Under the mandatory waiver method, a youth, aged fourteen or older, at the time he or she allegedly utilized a firearm to commit a felony, may be transferred to the Circuit Court and tried as an adult.[4] Under the discretionary transfer method, upon motion of the county attorney, a youth satisfying prescribed statutory requirements may be transferred from the juvenile justice system and tried as an adult.[5] These youthful offenders not only face legal consequences; disruptions to academic development; and social stigma, but also various procedural hurdles.

In Kentucky, upon turning eighteen, youthful offenders still in Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) custody, must return to their sentencing court for an age-eighteen hearing to determine whether he or she will be paroled, released, placed in a treatment program, or incarcerated within a facility operated by the Department of Corrections (Corrections).[6] However, the DJJ and Corrections may together decide to bypass a court ordered incarceration, allowing a youthful offender to remain in the DJJ’s custody until his or her release, parole, or twenty-first birthday.[7] Those allowed to stay may petition the court for probation reconsideration once, upon "completion of a minimum twelve (12) months additional service of sentence."[8] Notably, some courts have declined to extend this amnesty to youthful offenders already barred from probation at their age-eighteen hearing due to the nature of their crime.[9] The Supreme Court of Kentucky has not yet weighed in on the matter.[10] Due to recent developments in sociology and legal philosophy, youthful offenders seeking probation reconsideration should not be prohibited simply because of prior ineligibility at the time of their age-eighteen hearing.         

This Note argues that the Kentucky Legislature should amend KRS § 532.045(2) to permit probationary release for youthful offenders during their probation reconsideration hearing, as prescribed under KRS § 640.075(4). With this modification, the court would receive discretionary latitude in its probation decision, rather than be statutorily mandated to deny the request. Although the crimes in question are extremely serious, the mounting evidence of the negative impact of juvenile incarceration warrants reevaluation of how youthful offenders are treated in Kentucky and the nation at large.

Section I will examine the historical background for youthful offenders in the U.S. and Kentucky; most advancements being quite recent due to increased research and public focus. Section II examines the negative societal impact of current law from a public policy perspective and the implicated federal and state constitutional issues. Last, Section III will propose a statutory solution and appropriate rehabilitation measures for Kentucky that could be adopted by jurisdictions throughout the nation.

I.  Background

A. Juvenile Justice Reform for Youthful Offenders at the National Level

The juvenile justice system has been reactionary to the social and political concerns of the time.[11] The first U.S. juvenile court was established in 1889 due to the dangers of incarcerating children with adults, recognizing the two as being at different developmental stages with different needs.[12] In response to a surge in crime throughout the latter-half of the twentieth century, state governments enacted stricter laws that caused far more juveniles to be tried and sentenced as adults.[13] From 1985 to 2003, twenty-two youthful offenders, between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-eight, received the death penalty for their crimes.[14] Notably, a majority of those twenty-two put to death were members of minority groups.[15]

In 2005, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of death penalty sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.[16] In Roper v. Simmons, an eighteen-year-old sentenced to death for a murder he committed while seventeen-years-old,[17] petitioned the court for postconviction relief, analogizing the execution of youthful offenders to that of the mentally disabled,[18] in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution under Atkins v. Virginia.[19] The Supreme Court agreed, identifying three key differences between juveniles and adults that preclude offenders under the age of eighteen from capital punishment.[20] The first is juveniles’ lack of maturity and responsibility as compared to adults, causing impulsive decision-making.[21] The Court noted that states do not allow juveniles to vote or purchase alcohol for this “comparative immaturity.”[22] The second difference is that juveniles have far less environmental control while adults have the power to avoid criminal activity.[23] The third difference is that juveniles hold malleable ethics and morality with the greater chance of rehabilitation.[24]

The next step was holding that sentencing youthful offenders to life without parole for a non-homicide violated the Eight Amendment. In Graham v. Florida, the Court reasoned that while states can prioritize different criminal justice goals, it is flawed to ignore age, as lesser incentive to demonstrate the rehabilitation ultimately discourages self-improvement efforts by those wanting to reenter society.[25] The most recent major reform is the prohibition of mandatory life-without parole sentences under the Eight Amendment for youthful offenders who committed homicide.

In Miller v. Alabama, the Court reasoned that a mandatory sentence precludes evaluating factors that contribute to culpability and improvement potential such as crime details, mental capacity, and dysfunctional life variables that led to criminal acts.[26] The Court places great importance on the role brain development plays in the legal process, recognizing that juveniles may not face such harsh punishment if they had the maturity to best deal with police and attorneys.[27] The key takeaway is the importance of exercising discretion based on individual factors, no matter the offense.[28] Without this measure, youthful offenders and adults are equally punished for the same crime, regardless of culpability and rehabilitation potential.[29]

While these landmark cases deal with the most serious offenses, the core principles are widely applicable. Society is not bettered by treating youthful offenders equal to adults, even during crime waves. With the social stigma of sexual offenses being arguably stronger than that of serious violent crimes, it is logical to project that reevaluation of youth sex offender treatment will follow from Simmons-Graham-Miller jurisprudence.

B.  An Issue of First Impression in Kentucky

Before its grant of discretionary review in Bloyer v. Commonwealth,[30] the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether youthful offenders may be statutorily precluded from probation, despite its availability under KRS § 640.030.[31] In Commonwealth v. Taylor, a youthful offender convicted of first-degree sodomy and sexual abuse received a twenty-year sentence.[32] The offender was a teenager, while the victim, his younger sister, was a small child.[33] At sentencing, the court classified the youthful offender as a “juvenile sexual offender” and committed him to a treatment program until age twenty-one, as prescribed by state law.[34] Upon turning twenty-one, the youthful offender returned to court and was granted probation in light of his “excellent performance” in the court-mandated program.[35]

However, the Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s decision to grant probation, arguing that KRS § 532.045(2) prohibits probation as a matter of law when the convicted offense is one of the enumerated crimes.[36] The Commonwealth cited KRS § 640.030, mandating that “youthful offenders[s] . . . convicted of a felony offense” receive “the same type of sentencing procedures . . . including probation,” as adult felony offenders.[37] However, the juvenile contended that his classification as a “youthful offender,” and subsequent treatment under KRS § 640.030(4), exempted him from the probation bar located within KRS § 532.045(2).[38] The court found the Commonwealth’s position persuasive and reversed the trial court’s grant of probation. [39] In its decision, the court viewed KRS § 640.030 as a “clear legislative pronouncement” of equal treatment between youthful felony offenders and adult felony offenders.[40]

It is difficult to see how the court could have reached a different conclusion. The statute is unambiguous and allows for a single logical interpretation.[41] However, equal treatment of youthful offenders and adults, as well as the disallowance of discretion, should be avoided. Whether or not granting probation based on treatment program participation was advisable, the trial court was so impressed that they thought it the appropriate time to reintegrate the offender into society.[42] In denying probation as a matter of law, there is far less incentive to make a strong rehabilitative effort.[43] With little incentive to self-improve, it is more likely that the system is releasing offenders back into society in equal or worse condition.[44]

In Bloyer v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed an issue of first impression: whether youthful offenders statutorily barred from probation at their age-eighteen hearing are also barred at their probation reconsideration hearing.[45] At age sixteen, Bloyer pled guilty to multiple sexual offenses, including six counts of incest against his younger siblings, and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment and placed in DJJ custody.[46] At Bloyer’s age-eighteen hearing, the court denied probation and ordered he be transferred to Corrections until his twenty-first birthday.[47] However, the DJJ and Corrections mutually decided to allow Bloyer remain with the DJJ until he reached the age of twenty-one.[48] As this date approached, Bloyer unsuccessfully petitioned the court for probation reconsideration.[49] The trial court found Bloyer ineligible for probation as a matter of law under KRS § 532.045(2), as the offenses clearly met the statutory criteria.[50] On appeal, Bloyer argued that the court violated the Eighth Amendment and Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, prohibiting absolute and arbitrary state power over life, liberty, and property.[51] Bloyer urged the court to consider his unfortunate childhood and substandard intelligence in its analysis.[52]

As to Bloyer’s background, the court believed these factors caused psychological distress but deemed them irrelevant to the issue.[53] The court stated that if Bloyer was legally competent, outside factors do not excuse crime and are immaterial to the question.[54] The constitutional claims were rejected in an equally emphatic fashion.[55] The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment:[56] punishment extremely disproportionate to the offense.[57] The court acknowledges reform trends around youthful offenders, citing Roper, Graham, and Miller, the court refused to view Bloyer’s fifteen-year sentence as an unreasonably severe punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.[58] As Bloyer’s fifteen-year sentence was lower than the statutory maximum for his offenses, the court found no disproportion between Bloyer’s crime and subsequent sentence, thus rejecting his Eighth Amendment argument.[59]

Bloyer’s state constitution claim was met with further skepticism. Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, a broad-sweeping provision prohibiting arbitrary use of state power,[60] requires state actions be “reasonably within the scope of a legitimate public purpose.”[61] Using a rational basis test, the court reasoned that the enumerated offenses were heinous and the legislature had a legitimate purpose in denying probation to protect the public from additional threat, even if assuming youthful offenders are less prone to recidivism than adults.[62] The court concluded its analysis and affirmed the lower court judgment, holding that youthful offenders statutorily ineligible for probation at their age-eighteen hearing, remain ineligible at a hearing for probation reconsideration.[63] Under this ruling, there is no room for judicial discretion or individual consideration at a youthful offender’s probation reconsideration hearing. While this lack of offender-specific analysis is easier to apply uniformly, the potentially positive impact of greater flexibility regarding youthful offenders outweighs this administrative ease.

II.  Concerns with Current Approaches Despite Steps in the Right Direction

       Jurisprudence gradually evolves over time, especially when controversial, as change must occur within the general population and political process. The technical details of criminal procedure can be difficult to understand, especially with each state having its own unique body of law. Though recent years have put greater focus on the treatment of different classes within the justice system, laws on probation eligibility do not command headlines, and violent offenders are not the subjects of public sympathy.

However, advancements in the perception of youthful offenders over past decades have been substantial and in quick succession, placing an increased focus on resolving criminal inequalities and finding efficient, fair solutions that match the goals of today’s society.[64] However, these modifications cannot depend solely on Supreme Court action, as criminal justice statutes are the making of state legislatures.[65] Kentucky should amend the current law by including a youthful offender exception at reconsideration hearings, allowing for judicial discretion regarding probation, as the constitutional issues and public policy concerns render the matter-of-law prohibition outdated and threatening to individual liberty.

A.  Constitutional Issues

The Eighth Amendment guarantees freedom from “cruel and unusual punishment.”[66] This means that no citizen shall be punished excessively. To determine if a punishment meets constitutional muster, courts look to society’s “evolving standards of decency,” weighing the crime’s resulting harm against the sentence’s possible restrictions of life, liberty, and property.[67] Due to this balancing analysis, the figurative line separating unconstitutional, “cruel and unusual punishment[s]” from those that considered proper, may shift with every offense.[68] While harsher punishments may have stronger deterring and incapacitating effects, an individual’s constitutional rights and protections must take precedence.[69]

However, the severity of the punishment imposed should not simply be measured in proportion to the severity of the offense. Especially, as we have come to a greater understanding of the impact a juvenile’s incomplete mental development and emotional maturity, lack of personal identity, peer pressure, and other individualized circumstances, may have on his susceptibility to criminal behavior.[70] Instead, the severity of the punishment should be measured against the offense and the particular perpetrator.[71] These underlying circumstances contribute to one’s self-perception, dominion over their personal environment, ability to understand the consequences and harm of their actions, self-perception, and overall feelings of desperation that results in the offense and “nothing to lose” mentality if caught and punished.[72]

Because some people have been dealt circumstances that make their criminal behavior more understandable, it would be inequitable to judge them on an even plane with those who had all of the power in the world to avoid criminal activity yet chose not to. For example, youthful offenders are severely limited in their capacity to leave crime-ravished neighborhoods or move out of abusive homes.[73] In addition, scientific advancements have shown stark neurological differences between youthful offenders and adult offenders regarding “behavior control.”[74] Unlike adult offenders, youthful offenders are more prone to impulsive action and risk-taking, making them less culpable for their actions and more likely to reform upon reaching mental maturity.[75] Further, several sociological studies previously conducted demonstrate that only a small percentage of youths involved in criminal activity actually develop any lingering pattern of criminal behavior.[76]

       It is here that the separation in reasoning between the Supreme Court over the past two decades and the courts in Taylor and Bloyer expands exponentially. An automatic prohibition of probation for offenders convicted of enumerated offenses removes the judicial discretion surrounding a probation determination.[77] For example, KRS § 532.045(2) requires a court to deny probation to any offender, regardless of age, convicted of a crime as prescribed by the statute.[78] This result may also be mandated in probation reconsideration hearings of youthful offenders, held under KRS§ 640.075(4), regardless of whether the court believes that the individual has been successfully reformed and warrants the probationary release.[79] This lacks the common sense of giving wide deference to the finder of fact and allowing judicial discretion in an area where it is otherwise dominant.

Ultimately, the equal treatment of youthful and adult offenders mandated by KRS § 532.045(2) renders the statute unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment. Although youthful offenders are less culpable, receive far more benefits with probationary release, and are less likely to return to criminal activity upon release, they are mandatorily subject to the same prohibitions as adult offenders. Both youthful and adult offenders operate with the same numerator, but very different denominators. This disproportionality disregards the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham and Miller.

While opponents of this contention argue that the probation prohibition is perfectly proportional in light of the seriousness of the offenses which trigger it, the fact remains that youthful offenders receive punishments equal to that of adult offenders, despite the fact they are of lesser capacity, lesser culpability, and are lesser threats to the public upon release.[80] The disproportion may be slight, the punishment is still excessive when considering the circumstances of the youthful offender. Proportionality can easily be restored by the Kentucky Legislature amending KRS § 532.045, permitting probationary release for youthful offenders seeking it during their probation reconsideration hearing, as prescribed under KRS § 640.075(4).[81] With this statutory leeway, courts may then utilize its judicial discretion in determining whether the youthful offender would be better served by being released on probation.

       The probation prohibition for youthful offenders also violates Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, forbidding the arbitrary and absolute power of the state over life, liberty, and property, absent a compelling state interest.[82] The word “arbitrary,” as relating to government function, is simply defined as a “ruling by absolute authority.”[83] Under KRS § 532.045(2), the absolute authority of the state deprives youthful offenders of their liberty, through its statutory ban on probation.[84]

Opponents of this contention will likely argue that the statutory probation bar for those convicted of deplorable crimes fails to constitute an arbitrary state action that results in an inequity “exceed[ing] the reasonable and legitimate interest of the people.”[85] In their view, a statute enacted to prevent offenders convicted of heinous crimes from reentering society is an appropriately tailored state action to achieve the interest of keeping the public safe from youthful offenders. Therefore, KRS § 532.045(2) does not violate Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution. While this belief may hold true regarding adult offenders, it is not the case for youthful offenders.

While it is likely a reasonable and legitimate state interest to keep this class of adult offenders away from the people due to their greater likelihood of recidivism, no genuine interest exists with respect to youthful offenders. Youthful offenders are considerably less prone to recidivism when given the opportunity to begin rehabilitation before fully maturing.[86] By keeping youthful offenders incarcerated, a greater danger is imposed on the society by the inverse: reducing the likelihood of meaningful rehabilitation, while increasing the chance of recidivism upon post-maturity release.[87]

B.  Public Policy Considerations

From a public policy standpoint, the goals of society are more effectively met by pursuing the rehabilitation of youthful offenders during the development of their psyche. During this period, they are more susceptible to rehabilitative efforts. At its conclusion, the possibility of true reform is greatly reduced. Additionally, public policy dictates society encourage the self-improvement of youthful offenders. As it currently stands, a youthful offender, subject to the probation prohibition, has little incentive to better himself while incarcerated due to the lengthy sentences upon conviction and absence of behavior-based early release. This perpetuates a greater threat of continued criminal activity inside and out of prison confines.

By amending KRS § 532.045(2) to permit probationary release for youthful offenders seeking probation reconsideration pursuant to KRS § 640.075(4), judges are given the discretion to make their determination on whether the individual has demonstrated commitment and responsiveness to rehabilitating themselves, to the point that they are capable and deserving of reintegrating with society. With this statutory modification, the state would both encourage youthful offenders to devote their time spent incarcerated to self-betterment, while also disincentivizing further unlawful behavior while imprisoned and upon eventual release.

Opponents of the proposed amendment will likely argue that public policy demands heinous criminal activity be disincentivized through probation prohibition, regardless of the offender’s age. Furthermore, they note that the state’s legitimate interest in public safety should be prioritized and pursued through deterrence and incapacitation.

However, due to a youthful offender’s incomplete mental development and lack of emotional maturity, youthful offenders are less likely to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions and long-term decision making, rendering a punishment’s deterrence efforts futile and incapacitation efforts temporary at best. A better, more permanent solution can be found in the encouragement of rehabilitation. Under this method, youthful offenders stand a greater chance of reentering society with the faculties necessary to avoid further criminal activity, accomplishing utilitarian goals of betterment to society through youthful offenders thus improving their post-release lives and society as a whole.

III.  Restoring the Balance in Kentucky by Allowing a Fighting Chance

       With the possible rigid judicial interpretation of KRS § 532.045(2),[88] the Kentucky Legislature now has the opportunity to further evolve the way in which youthful offenders are treated by the criminal justice system. Reforming KRS § 532.045(2) to exempt youthful offenders from its application at probation reconsideration hearings, legislators can rectify the statute’s harmful effects by allowing judicial discretion in whether or not to grant probation based on the circumstances of the individual’s life, the commitment the individual has shown to self-improvement, and the probability that probation would best serve the individual towards living a meaningful life as a contributing member of society.

       A probation system, appropriately tailored to the needs of youthful offenders and their communities, seems to be the puzzle that every state is looking to put together. Unfortunately, despite the greater push by many states on this front, jurisdictions have various, inconsistent methods for the collection and publication of empirical data regarding the success of their respective juvenile justice programs, with sparce mention of program success rates for youthful offenders.[89]

For instance, the Kentucky Juvenile Manual, a publication by the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy focused on juvenile justice law throughout the state, includes a section on the parole of youthful offenders but provides no layout of how the program operates or its success rate.[90] However, the “Classification and Placement Manual”, published by the Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice, explains juvenile probation more fully, including the use of placement tiers based on a youthful offender’s ability to function in school, the resources the community is able to provide for their treatment, and the ability of the caregiver to participate in and assist with the program.[91]

There are, however, a few states that keep progressive recidivism data regarding their juvenile justice programs run by the state. For example, in Florida, the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice reported a fifteen percent recidivism rate in 2015.[92] This figure includes juveniles that successfully completed probationary releases, diversion releases, and community programs.[93] While the data on the matter is surprisingly limited, it does seem to indicate a general level of success for state probation programs with natural variation that can be expected from different states with unique problems and resource limitations. Traditional state programs appear to be of adequate quality but given the sensitive nature of the offenses that currently prohibit youthful offenders from probation at age-twenty-one hearings, it is possible that the offerings by the adult and juvenile probation programs will not quite fit the unique needs of youthful offenders.

Following a startling increase in the incarceration rate of minority youth, California shifted incarcerated youthful offenders from state-run juvenile prisons to local rehabilitation centers.[94] A decision made possible after the state was awarded several grants aimed at providing counseling services for trauma, families, substance abuse, situational awareness, and mental health.[95] This reform could serve as an example for other states’ juvenile justice systems, placing the betterment of the youthful offender at the forefront.

In addition, Canada has enacted legislation geared at the rehabilitation and reintegration of youthful offenders.[96] For example, the Youth Criminal Justice Act requires police officers contemplate “extrajudicial measures,” such as referrals to community programs or agencies, before criminally charging a juvenile.[97] However, the social stigma of these programs, in conjunction with their post-imprisonment restrictions, have led to mixed reviews from participants and their families.[98] For example, youthful sexual offenders sentenced to a term of home confinement may be barred from leaving their home, interacting with people below a certain age, or using the internet.[99] Those who violate these restrictions may be detained at the “Young Offender Centre” and placed into isolation for up to seventy-two hours.[100] The province of Alberta has experienced statistical drops in the total youth accused of crimes, total convictions, and the “Youth Crime Severity Index”, in recent years.[101] Those who have found success in these programs attribute it to the programs’ structure, focus on rehabilitation, and the identities of the participants are kept from publication.[102]

The Canadian juvenile justice system’s use of rehabilitative programs for youthful offenders should influence its American counterpart. While this approach may require a significant amount of time and resources from a variety of state actors, the statistical evidence of Alberta’s reduction in total youth crime and serious youth crime should make these contributions worthwhile.[103] The Canadian system has legitimized the goals of youthful offender probation and rehabilitation, which should manifest confidence from American jurisdictions seeking to reform in similar ways.[104]

IV.  Conclusion

In conclusion, KRS § 532.045(2), prohibiting probationary release for youthful offenders seeking probation reconsideration pursuant to KRS § 640.075(4), violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, by imposing cruel and unusual punishment, as well as Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution, by authorizing arbitrary state action without a reasonable and legitimate interest. These constitutional violations, at both the federal and state level, present a significant threat to the liberty of an already vulnerable population, and it is this population of at-risk youth that needs protection and separate consideration the most.

 To protect juveniles from this injustice, the Kentucky Legislature must amend KRS § 532.045(2) to permit probationary release for youthful offenders seeking it during their probation reconsideration hearing under KRS § 640.075(4). This amendment would better serve public policy by incentivizing self-betterment and rehabilitation while incarcerated. By prioritizing rehabilitation and allowing the fighting chance for probation, the state will be providing powerful motivation for youthful offenders to take full advantage of the opportunities to better themselves with the goal of early release, reintegration into society, and living meaningful, contributing lives from that point forward. With these benefits in mind, it is clear that the Kentucky Legislature must take this step. This amendment places the question of probation squarely in the hands of the presiding judge. Under this new method, judges exercise their discretion, weighing the youthful offender’s individual circumstances and propensity for rehabilitation, before determining whether the youthful offender and surrounding community would benefit more from the offender’s reintegration into society or further incarceration.

 



[I] J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law.

[2] Bureau of Just. Stat., The Justice System: What is the Sequence of Events in the Criminal Justice System?, (June 3, 2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/justice-system [https://perma.cc/B8T3-Y3QM].

[3] Nat’l Juv. Def. Ctr., Kentucky, (July 2018), https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/2827-JMPA].

[4] Id.; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (West 2021).

[5] Nat’l Juv. Def. Ctr., supra note 3; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 635.020(2)–(7) (West 2021).

[6] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.030(2) (West 2006).

[7] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.075(1) (West 2002).

[8] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.075(4) (West 2002).

[9] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828, at *10–11 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c) (unpublished decision). After examining this issue of first impression, the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that a youthful offender ineligible for probation at his age-eighteen hearing, remained ineligible at his probation consideration hearing. On June 9, 2021, the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review.

[10] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0473-DG, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 204 (June 9, 2021).

[11] Lynn Cothern, Juveniles and the Death Penalty, Coordinating Council on Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention 9 (Nov. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/184748.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JR-ZAPE].

[12] Id. at 1.

[13] Id.

[14] Executions of Juveniles in the U.S. 1976-2005, Death Penalty Info. Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/juveniles/executions-of-juveniles-since-1976 [https://perma.cc/GPN3-7JHK].

[15] Id. From 1985 to 2003, twenty-two youthful offenders, consisting of eleven African-Americans, ten Caucasians, and one Latino, were executed.

[16] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

[17] Id. at 556.

[18] Id. at 559.

[19] Id.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring the imposition of capital punishment for the mentally disabled).

[20] Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. at 570.

[25] Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).

[26] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477, 489, (2012).

[27] Id. at 477–78.

[28] Id. at 476–77.

[29] Id. at 477.

[30] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0473-DG, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 204 (June 9, 2021).

[31] Commonwealth v. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ky. 1997).

[32] Id. at 421.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 421–22; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(2) (West 2014).

[37] Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 423; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.030(5) (West 2006).

[38] Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 423.

[39] Id.  

[40] Id.

[41] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(2) (West 2014).

[42] Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 421.

[43] See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010). 

[44] See id.

[45] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c) (unpublished decision).

[46] Id. at *3.

[47] Id. at *7.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at *8.

[50] Id.  

[51] Id. at *24–25.

[52] Id. at *9–10.

[53] Id.

[54] See id.

[55] Id. at *24–31.

[56] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

[57] Bloyer, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828 at *25 (“Though [the Eighth Amendment] does not mention proportionality, [it] nonetheless encompasses a proportionality requirement”) (citation omitted).

[58] Id. at *27.

[59] Id. at *28.

[60] Ky. Const. § 2.

[61] Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1964).

[62] Id. at *31–32.

[63] Id. at *32.

[64] See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of capital punishment on youthful offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on youthful non-homicide offenders); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on all youthful offenders regardless of crime).

[65] Bureau of Just. Stat., supra note 2.

[66] U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

[67] Roper, 543 at 560­–61 (citations omitted).

[68] See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367­–78 (1910) (examining differing judicial opinions on what constitutes excessive punishment).

[69] See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.

[70] Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psych. 1009, 1010–14 (2003).

[71] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012).

[72] See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.

[73] Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted).

[74] Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted).

[75] Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.

[76] Steinberg & Scott, supra note 70, at 1014.

[77] Nancy J. King & Brynn E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 287, 291–92 (2014).

[78] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(4) (West 2014); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d 420 (1997).

[79] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c). (unpublished decision). On June 9, 2021, the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review to determine whether a youthful offender statutorily exempt from probation at his age-eighteen hearing, was also exempt at his probation reconsideration hearing. As of December 29, 2021, no decision has been rendered.

[80] Steinberg & Scott, supra note 70, at 1010.

[81] See Aldon Thomas Stiles, Come July, California Will Swap Juvenile Jails for Reform-Minded Rehab Centers, L.A. Sentinel (Mar. 18, 2021), https://lasentinel.net/come-july-california-will-swap-juvenile-jails-for-reform-minded-rehab-centers.html [https://perma.cc/H6JM-3XXF]; Otiena Ellwand, Breaking the Youth Crime Cycle: New Strategies Aiming to Rehabilitate Young Offenders Have Mixed Results, Edmonton J. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://edmontonjournal.com/news/insight/breaking-the-youth-crime-cycle-new-strategies-aiming-to-rehabilitate-young-offenders-have-mixed-results [https://perma.cc/GR4Q-SDCN].

[82] Ky. Const. § 2.

[83] Arbitrary, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary [https://perma.cc/HRX5-Z26K].

[84] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.045(2) (West 2014).

[85] Kentucky Milk Mktg. and Antimonopoly Com'n v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Ky. 1985).

[86] Steinberg & Scott, supra note 70, at 1014–15.

[87] See id. at 1015–16.

[88] Bloyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000890-MR, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 828 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), review granted, (June 9, 2021) and not published by operation of CR 76.28(4)(c) (unpublished decision).

[89] See Juvenile Justice Services, Juv. Just., Geography, Pol’y, Prac. & Stat., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-justice-services [https://perma.cc/HFD9-Q5L7].

[90] Kentucky Dep’t of Pub. Advoc., Juv. Advoc. Manual 29­–32 (2013), https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender_Resources/Documents/JuvenileManualFINAL060513.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ME-6FHZ].

[91] Kentucky Dep’t of Juv. Just., Classification and Placement Manual (2019), https://djj.ky.gov/200%20Policy%20Manual/Classification%20and%20Placement%20Manual%20040519.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FWM-E4JB].

[92] Juvenile Justice Services, supra note 89.

[93] Id.

[94] Stiles, supra note 81. 

[95] Id.

[96] Government of Canada, The Youth Criminal Justice Act Summary and Background, Government of Canada, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-outils/back-hist.html (last modified July 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9MB7-Z3C2].

[97] Government of Canada, The Youth Criminal Justice Act Summary and Background, Government of Canada, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-outils/back-hist.html (last modified July 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9MB7-Z3C2 ].

[98] See Ellwand, supra note 81.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103] See Id.

[104] Id.

A Strike Against Black Lives Matter: A Batson Violation or Preserving Impartiality


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Andrew Moore [I]

Introduction

We are “a government of laws, not of men.”[2] Yet an impartial, disinterested group of people ultimately stand between the accused and the power of the State to take his or her right to life and liberty away.[3] Our society wants to believe the jury system determines guilt or innocence on impartial and fair fact,[4] but that is not always the case as the jury is made up of people—each coming with biases, beliefs, perceptions.[5] The voir dire is the process the courts use to ensure members of the petit jury, those who determine guilt or innocence, will follow the judge’s instructions and determine the outcome of the case based solely on the facts presented to them at trial.[6] The process differs slightly in federal and state courts as voir dire in federal court is conducted mainly by the judge, whereas, in most state courts the attorneys play a more active role in vetting jurors.[7]

The voir dire is not supposed to be a major part of the trial, but in recent jurisprudence it has come under closer scrutiny. Parties have weaponized the process, particularly prosecutors, by using discriminatory tactics to remove people from the jury pool based off their race, sex, and ethnicity.[8] In order to get into the particular legal questions of this Note, it is important to understand how members of the petit jury are selected or removed from sitting at trial—the ultimate objective to sit, as much as possible, an impartial jury.[9] The first step to seating a jury is a random selection of members from the community.[10] Second, those selected are divided into a smaller group and sent to a courtroom for their specific case.[11] Lastly, the parties then can challenge jurors and try to have jurors they find not to be sympathetic to their side removed.[12] The Supreme Court has clearly opined that voir dire plays an essential part in protecting the defendant’s right to an impartial jury allowing the judge and parties to discover potential bias in a venireperson.[13] An attorney may remove a venireperson by exercising a “challenge for cause” asking the judge to remove the juror for a reason of impartiality or bias or by using a peremptory strike.[14]

A peremptory strike allows an attorney to remove a venireperson from the jury pool for any reason, but they are statutorily limited to a set number.[15] The idea of a peremptory strike is it ensures the parties are given a “fair and impartial jur[y]” by allowing “each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side . . . eliminating extremes of partiality on both sides, thereby assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.”[16] However, recent studies have made it increasingly clear prosecutors use peremptory strikes to create prosecution friendly juries by excluding minorities and women to create a nearly all-white male jury.[17]

As many Americans have begun to take a more active role in confronting systemic racism, Black Lives Matter (BLM) has become a mainstream political and civil rights group seeking change to society, focusing primarily on the judicial system.[18] Parties have begun to inquire into juror’s support of BLM.[19] This inquiry has led to an increase in the use of peremptory strikes to remove supporters of BLM when the judge has refused to remove the juror for cause based on him or her supporting the group.[20] As BLM has become more prevalent in society, it is apparent that questions about a venireperson’s support for the group will become more prevalent.[21] An issue courts now must decide is whether asking venirepersons about BLM and using a peremptory strike to remove the venireperson violates the Equal Protection Clause, or does using a peremptory strike on a BLM supporter provide a race-neutral reason ensuring a fair and impartial jury.[22]

North Carolina upheld the convictions of Black men despite the prosecutor asking a venireperson about their views on BLM and using a peremptory strike to then remove the juror.[23] However, Nevada ordered a new trial after criticizing the prosecutor for asking about BLM saying it was a pretextual reason to remove a Black juror.[24] In State v. Gresham, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision that acknowledged “racial overtones” surrounding the prosecution’s line of questioning, but declined to accept the defense’s Batson challenge “because the . . . question[ing] did not establish purposeful discrimination based on the juror’s race.”[25] California is set to soon rule on a prosecutor peremptorily striking a Black woman for her answering on a questionnaire that she supports BLM.[26]

Part I of this Note reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny to eliminate the use of discriminatory peremptory strikes. Part II looks at how the lower courts and state courts have been expanding Batson. Part III shows how asking BLM impacts a juror’s rights of Equal Protection and First Amendment rights. Part IV discusses how the defendant’s rights to an impartial jury and a juror’s right to be equally protected by the law require courts to not allow parties to ask about supporting BLM because it provides too easy of a pretextual reason to discriminate against minority juror members.

I.  Batson and Its Progeny

In Batson, after the prosecutor used all of his peremptory strikes to remove all Black people from the venire, Mr. Batson, a Black man, was convicted by the jury of second-degree burglary and receiving stolen goods.[27] Mr. Batson argued that the prosecutor had violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right “to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community,” and violated his right to equal protection of the laws.[28] The intention of the Supreme Court in Batson was to make it easier for a defendant to challenge a prosecutor from purposefully removing minorities from the jury when a person of their race stood accused.[29] The Court stated, “The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.”[30] The Court made clear that not only does purposeful discrimination violate the Equal Protection Clause, it also calls into question the defendant’s right to an impartial jury, the constitutional protection from “the arbitrary exercise of power by [a] prosecutor or judge.”[31]

In Batson, the Supreme Court created a three step analysis to use when a party objects to the use of a peremptory strike based on an impermissible stereotype of a venire member.[32] First, the opponent to the strike must establish an “inference of purposeful discrimination” using “all relevant circumstances.”[33] This requires the defendant to establish (a) “that he is a member of a cognizable racial group”; (b) the prosecution has improperly utilized its peremptory strikes to “remove from the venire[,] members of the defendant’s race”; (c) that he “is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate’”; and (d) that the surrounding “facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.”[34] Second, the prosecutor must then provide a race-neutral reason for excusing the juror.[35] Finally, the trial court is to weigh the reason given by the prosecutor based on the totality of the circumstances and decide if the reason or reasons given are true or merely pretextual covering a discriminatory intent.[36]

Batson immediately received criticism as many legal scholars, and a sitting Supreme Court Justice, believed the Court did not do enough to end the discrimination against minorities. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall applauded the Court’s efforts, but predicted discriminatory practices would continue—unless peremptory challenges were eliminated completely.[37] Justice Marshall’s argument for abolishing the peremptory strike in its entirety was it would be too easy for prosecutors to provide a race neutral explanation cover rendering the courts largely ineffective in stopping discrimination.[38] Justice Marshall’s opinion proved accurate as prosecutors and other parties have continually discriminated, consciously or unconsciously, against minorities evidenced by both prosecutors own accounts and statistical analysis.[39]

In subsequent decisions, the Court has explained how “discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at large.”[40] The jury is a well thought out safeguard to the powers of the legal system which allows the people to trust the legal system knowing there is a buffer between them and the oppressive power of the State.[41] In Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme Court expanded Batson by ruling the Equal Protection Clause not only protects defendants from discrimination, but it also protects each individual juror from being discriminated against.[42] The Court recently reaffirmed the importance of extending Batson to each juror saying, “[o]ther than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic process.”[43] Realizing how important the perception of fairness is to the judicial system, the Supreme Court expanded Batson to civil cases seeking to rid the courtroom of “state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.”[44]

The Court repeatedly holds discrimination has no place in the courtroom and hurts society at large, yet the Court continues to reject a growing push to get rid of peremptory strikes. Many legal scholars and activists support Justice Marshall’s argument that peremptory strikes have become a tool for discrimination used to deprive defendant’s right to a fair trial, and the only way to ensure fairness is to completely eliminate the peremptory strike.[45] However, proponents of the peremptory strike remain steadfast in believing the peremptory strike must remain a part of the voir dire process.[46] Courts and proponents of peremptory strikes maintain the benefit of ensuring a fair and impartial trial outweighs the cost of discrimination.[47]

One argument for continuing the use of peremptory strikes is it allows the attorneys, who are most familiar with the facts and best equipped to detect bias, to strike jurors who they know will be prejudice against their client without being able to articulate a for-cause reason.[48]In her concurring opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Justice O’Connor described peremptory strikes as a well-established and needed tradition that allows both sides to feel secure in knowing they will be tried in front of an impartial jury.[49] The issue of peremptory strikes is judged with a balancing test, and proponents of peremptory strikes argue the defendant’s right to a fair and speedy trial is benefited from their use.[50] Peremptory strikes also serve the goal of efficiency and ensuring the voir dire is quick allowing parties to focus on the merits of the case.[51] Lastly, proponents argue peremptory strikes actually protect jurors because it allows the parties to remove them without having to dig too far into the potential juror’s private life offending his or her right to privacy.[52] While there are some benefits of peremptory strikes, the question still remains, do they outweigh the costs of court room discrimination? Should our society tolerate questions “tantamount to interrogating [someone’s] Blackness.”[53]

The Batson decision was a good starting point by the Supreme Court to clean the courtroom of discriminatory practices, but it did not do enough. Our justice system only works if people perceive it to be fair and impartial.[54] The U.S. Constitution is clear on how important the right to a fair trial is before a person’s life, liberty, and property are taken away.[55] The courts appear to be set in keeping the peremptory strike as being a way to ensure a fair jury.[56] However, it appears misplaced to utilize a “mere strategic device” to violate someone’s equal protection rights.[57]

If the courts are to amend their public image, they need to expand Batson to exclude prosecutors from (a) asking questions that clearly target a juror’s race, and (b) striking a potential juror because of their affiliations with groups seeking to advance equality for minorities. Many courts, at both the federal and state level, have already begun to expand Batson to other cognizable groups and expressed a desire to protect a jurors’ First Amendment rights.[58] These cases will illustrate why the courts should not allow questions about affiliations that easily allow for pretextual reason to exclude a juror.

II.  Expanding Batson to Other Cognizable Groups

The lower courts and state courts have wrestled with Batson ever since it was decided. Since then, the courts have had Batson challenges that the Supreme Court could not have envisioned with only a handful reaching the Supreme Court since deciding Batson.[59] Courts now have ruled on many issues involving peremptory strikes and discrimination with the problem being inconsistent on how to apply Batson beyond race, ethnicity, and gender.[60] In the federal system, courts have applied Batson to peremptory strikes used against potential jurors that are members of groups that have traditionally received heightened judicial scrutiny.[61] Additionally, some lower courts have found Batson violations in striking potential jurors because they were “Jews, Italians, whites, and Native Americans.”[62]

The groups that have proven hardest for the courts to decide are groups that an individual chooses to affiliate with or join.[63] Both state and federal courts have drawn a fine line between a permissible strike and a Batson violation. When evaluating the permissibility of a religion-based peremptory challenge, the distinguishing fact appears to be whether the strike was based on religious affiliation, which would be unconstitutional, or on the juror’s religious beliefs or belief system, which is allowed due to beliefs being an indicator of how the juror may decide the case.[64] Then-Judge Alito opined that questioning if someone was a Quaker was fine because it would indicate whether or not she could vote for the death penalty.[65] These distinctions between strikes, due to affiliations, or strikes, due to beliefs, will prove to be the best analogy for determining if asking about BLM is a Batson violation or permissible. Before analyzing the cases that deal with peremptory strikes and affiliations, it is important to see how the courts have dealt with a juror’s group affiliations and for-cause challenges.

A.  For-Cause Removal of Jurors Based on Group Affiliations

In U.S. v. Salamone, the defendant was charged with multiple firearms charges.[66] The trial judge asked venire members if they supported the National Rifle Association (NRA) or had any affiliation with the NRA.[67] The trial court then dismissed one potential juror and five potential alternates from the venire.[68] The Third Circuit discussed how allowing “trial judges and prosecutors to determine juror eligibility based solely on their perceptions of the external associations of a juror” would afford them too much arbitrary power and would call into question the impartiality and fairness of the jury.[69] The court went onto to criticize the government’s argument that someone affiliated with the NRA would not be a fair juror because the case was gun-related.[70] The court pointed out that juror competence is an individual assessment and excluding “for cause of NAACP members [in] enforcement of civil rights statutes, Moral Majority activists from pornography cases, [or] Catholics from cases involving abortion clinics” bears not on their ability to be a juror.[71]

Courts have affirmed trial courts’ decision allowing a former police officer or police officer’s spouses to sit on the jury.[72] In United States v. McIntyre, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied a criminal defendant’s appeal arising from a jury member’s former occupation as a police officer. Citing the trial judge’s “careful and thorough examination” of the former policeman, in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances, the court failed to identify any error requiring judicial relief.[73] This notion has also been applied in the context of federal employees. The Supreme Court ruled employment to the federal government is not grounds for dismissal,[74] and a lower court reasoned that a federal employee could serve as juror even when her employer is a party to the case.[75]

The courts are clear that they do not believe affiliations are enough to dismiss a juror for cause without the trial judge finding the potential juror has actual biasness.[76] Jurors are not to be judged for being part of a group because that does not show if they are competent to fairly decide a trial. These cases dealing with dismissal by a for-cause challenge are illustrative of how courts can protect the right to a fair trial but not infringe upon the rights of the jurors. But why treat peremptory strikes so differently when the potential for discrimination is larger and often changes the outcome of a case?[77]

B.  Peremptory Strikes Based on Religious Affiliations

State and federal courts have struggled to create a consistent rule for evaluating peremptory strikes based on affiliations with a religious group. Again, the deciding factor has been whether the strike was based on religious affiliations or a juror’s belief system.[78] There is a trend of cases where judges allow peremptory strikes based on a juror’s religious activities or beliefs but decline to extend this to religious affiliation.[79] Some states allow jurors to be removed due to the juror’s religious affiliation, reasoning the defendant’s right to having a fair and impartial jury is greater than that of the individual jurors.[80] Comparing two cases will show how inconsistent state courts have been when applying Batson to affiliations which is a problem as the makeup of the jury often determines the outcome of the trial.

In State v. Davis, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove a Black man from jury service due to his affiliation with the Jehovah’s Witness religious group.[81] The trial court asked the prosecutor to state her reason for striking the Black juror after the defense raised a Batson challenge.[82] The prosecutor was upfront saying the juror’s affiliation with Jehovah’s Witness was the sole reason for her strike because “in [her] experience J[e]hovah Witness are reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings in this Court House.”[83] The prosecutor explained, “I would never fail . . . to strike a J[e]hovah Witness,” if she had a peremptory strike still to use at the close of jury selection.[84]

The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Powers v. Ohio.[85] There, the Court examined a claim of “cross-bias” discrimination concerning a white defendant and black juror. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the removed juror’s right to equal protection had been violated, though the defendant’s had not, because (a) “racial discrimination ‘invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law’” and (b) “the juror rejected solely because of skin color ‘suffers a profound personal humiliation.”[86] The Minnesota Supreme Court started their review by asking if the peremptory strike was used to “perpetrate religious bigotry to the extent that the institutional integrity of the jury had been impaired.”[87] The court, like so many other opinions, made sure to emphasize the importance of the peremptory strike and its aid in ensuring a fair trial.[88] The court conceded that some unbiased jurors are excused, but that was outweighed by the need to ensure no biased jurors could influence the decision.[89] The court then highlighted and explained the differences between religious discrimination and race or gender discrimination.[90]

The opinion distinguished Davis with the fact that religion has not faced the same bias that race has in the use of peremptory strikes.[91] The court emphasized how, unlike race, religious affiliations can give insight into one’s beliefs, which provide a good indicator on how one will decide the facts, and the assumption is not based on a bias against the potential juror.[92] Lastly, the court stressed that “religious affiliation (or lack thereof) is not as self-evident as race or gender,” which would complicate voir dire and invade a jurors right to privacy.[93] In denying certiorari, Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning stating a juror is much more easily discriminated against due to self-evident characteristics.[94] She also discussed how extending Batson to religious affiliation would complicate the voir dire and posed some practical concerns.[95]

In State v. Fuller, a case factually similar to Davis, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided to not allow jurors to be excused for their religious affiliations.[96] Here, a prosecutor struck two jurors due to their religious practices.[97] One juror was struck for wearing what the prosecutor described as a “Muslim ‘garb’ (‘a skull cap or rather long outer garment’),” and the other was struck due to his work as a missionary which indicated to the prosecutor that both jurors would favor the defendant.[98] On review, the Court opined that this was a blanket stereotype of an individual which the law sought to eliminate.[99] While the court agreed that finding a biased belief would be enough to remove a juror, removal based solely on a stereotype would frustrate the goals of peremptory strikes and could not be permitted.[100] Following, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with two federal opinions that religious affiliations are part of a cognizable group and may not be the basis for a peremptory strike.[101]

These two cases illustrate the difficulty jurors’ affiliations pose in the voir dire process. Trial courts are forced into balancing the protected rights of the defendant and the potential juror. Some argue that because the defendant’s life, liberty, and property are on the line, attorneys should be able to ask about affiliations and strike jurors based on them to ensure a fair trial.[102] While others argue, asking about group affiliations has become another way for parties to discriminate against jurors they find to not be sympathetic to their side.[103] The problem with allowing questions about group affiliations is they give parties pretextual reason to exclude potential jurors who are part of cognizable groups. Lawyers, primarily prosecutors, have proved to be quite good at providing race-neutral reasons for excluding jurors that are but a mere pretext to race.[104] The ability to ask about jurors’ affiliations to groups who are socially and politically active should be a violation of their First Amendment rights and will undoubtedly be used to target minorities. The next section of this Note will look at how asking about BLM is harmful to defendants, the venire member, and society as a whole.

III.  Black Lives Matter Protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”[105] The idea that our justice system can survive racial stereotypes is a farce. People are looking for reassurance that they will be treated equally under the law. The ultimate danger of continuing to allow parties to ask racially charged questions is people will lose faith in the justice system.[106] The American democratic experience is built on the idea people will not be targeted for their beliefs or for whom they affiliate with.[107] It is a good thing for society when citizens actively seek to participate in the democratic process. Jury duty has been repeatedly recognized by the courts as one of the best ways for someone to participate in that process.[108] This means the court needs to be seen as a protector serving in the democratic process, not an agent for carrying out blanket stereotypes preventing participation.

While many people may feel jury duty is a waste of time or an extreme annoyance, there are some who look at jury duty as one of the best means to participating in the democratic process. The Supreme Court in 2019 said, “[o]ther than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic process.”[109] Many people, like Crishala Reed, are excited to serve as a jury member and participate in the judicial system.[110] Ms. Reed went into the courtroom excited to be on the jury serving her community, but her hopes were cut short when a prosecutor used a preemptive strike to remove her from the jury pool after she said she supported BLM.[111] In response, Ms. Reed said, “‘I felt targeted . . . [i]t was a life-changing experience for me, personally.’”[112]

Her story illustrates how hurtful and embarrassing discrimination in the voir dire can be. As the Supreme Court recognized, not only is the right of the defendant implicated in discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, but the image of the justice system is tarnished, and the individual juror’s right has been infringed.[113] The justice system works best when the system is perceived as inclusive and fair, not excluding people based on their affiliations.[114] Courts are running into the danger of turning trials into a show of who supports what group. If obvious racially charged questions are allowed to persist, people will lose faith in the judicial system.

One of the problems with allowing a party to question someone’s support of BLM is that it is hard for a venire person to fully answer that question. It is safe to assume a majority of people will agree each person’s individual life matters and would affiliate with a group that promotes that general idea. However, the juror may not necessarily support all the beliefs that BLM supports. Allowing the question about supporting BLM, gives prosecutors an easy way to ask a question which allows them to get their preferred jury—mostly white males.[115]

Another harm with asking about BLM is it has great potential to infringe on an individual’s fundamental rights. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees an individual equal treatment under the law and provides protection for an individual when he or she seeks to exercise a fundamental right.[116] A party removing a venireperson for supporting BLM has the effect of a judge enforcing a stereotype that infringes on the right of the individual to assemble and affiliate with whomever they want. An affiliation with a group is not a good enough reason to remove someone from participating in the democratic process, and courts have not allowed removal based solely on affiliation.[117]

We want people to feel free to participate in democracy, whether that be by voting, serving in the jury, or seeking change through engaging in intellectual debate and activism. BLM has become a mainstream movement for seeking such change. No one should be barred from serving because they are exercising rights so dear and precious to our democracy. Let alone being barred by the very system supposed to protect those rights. If people are worried that questions about BLM will create impartial juries, there are already readily available safeguards and procedures in place that will ensure the jury stays as fair as possible. The safeguard is allowing for questions that go to someone’s beliefs, but not allowing questions on affiliations that perpetuate and enforce stereotypes. The good news is courts already have a workable framework with cases dealing with religious groups, and other well-known groups, which will allow them to determine these apparent conflicting rights.

IV.  Solutions

Legal scholars and practitioners propose many ways to stop discrimination from being a factor in picking a jury. On one extreme, there are people who argue for an out right end to the use of peremptory strikes to pick a jury.[118] Opponents of the peremptory strike join Justice Marshall in his Batson concurrence, arguing that as long as the peremptory strike is allowed, parties will abuse it to discriminate against jurors. While this may be the best way to ensure against discrimination, there are two main issues with this argument. Firstly, the accused is the one with his or her life and liberty at stake, and his or her attorney needs to have all the tools available to them to ensure a fair trial. Secondly, too many Justices and judges believe in the peremptory strike and are unwilling to end the practice all together.[119] Therefore, this is not a good or viable solution as of now.

However, there are two solutions which would allow courts to more effectively police and stop the use of discriminatory peremptory strikes. One is to follow the Nevada Supreme Court’s Cooper v. State analysis and question the relevance of such questions.[120] The other is to rework the framework of Batson to discourage the use of questions asking about affiliations with socially active groups.[121]

In Cooper v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the appeal of a criminal defendant convicted of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, and some domestic violence related charges.[122] During voir dire, the prosecutor asked venirepersons if they had a strong opinion about BLM.[123] On appeal, the court found a Batson violation, thus vacating and remanding.[124] The court noted how the question itself was problematic with “indisputable racial undertones” and had little-to-no relevance to the case.[125] Combined with the fact that the prosecutor used 40% of its peremptory strikes to remove two of three jurors Black jurors from jury was enough to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.[126]

This is a good approach to eliminating discrimination from the voir dire. One, if there are no racial issues at stake in the case, then the question about affiliating with BLM should be outright barred. As several cases discussed in this Note have shown, affiliations do not reflect on a juror’s ability to fairly decide a case.[127] Questions about one’s beliefs could still be allowed to ensure an impartial jury, but beliefs are always relevant to a case whereas affiliations usually are not. After questions about support for BLM alerted the Nevada Supreme Court to possible discrimination, the Court took appropriate action by scrutinizing the statistics of Black Jurors being removed.[128} If a party wants to ask about BLM and like groups, an appellate court should then be more willing to find a Batson violation when the statistics show a pattern of discrimination not the usual deference to the trial court. This is a good approach for how to evaluate Batson violations where there are no racial implications, but unfortunately, racial issues are relevant in cases like the O.J. Simpson case or the Derek Chauvin trial.[129] This is where a slight reworking of Batson comes into play.

To show a Batson violation, a party alleging a violation must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination to remove a juror with the trial judge considering all the relevant circumstances.[130] The burden will then be on the opposing party to provide a race neutral reason for removing the juror.[131] Then, the prosecutor needs to offer a non-discriminatory based explanation that is a race neutral explanation for removing the juror.[132]

When a party asks questions about one’s views of BLM, the courts should assume a prima facie case has been made by the party challenging the peremptory strike. No further evidence should be needed to show discrimination. After all, even if one is removed from the jury, the damage to the court’s image can have lasting effects.[133] Once the court allows the challenge to the peremptory strike, the burden on the party exercising the peremptory strike should be raised to a level not satisfied by general explanations for the use of the strike which often reflect racial stereotypes.[134] General explanations should not be accepted because they do not provide a “neutral explanation”[135] to a specific question that targets one fundamental right to association. The courts have a “duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”[136] The prosecutor should need to give an explanation as to what answer the juror gave that called into question his or her credibility to be impartial. They need to be able to articulate a plausible reason for bias, which should be more than just not liking the demeanor or appearance of the venireperson.[137] The right to freely assemble and affiliate is a treasured right we hold in our society. It is upsetting to allow people to be removed from a jury simply because they affiliate or support a group for social change.

If the court is worried about prejudice slipping into the jury, the court is always free to remove a juror for cause. This is where looking to precedent on removal for religious reasons will help. If the venireperson were to give an answer that his belief would affect his judgment, a for-cause challenge would remove him or her. Questions that go towards a general belief system are clearly allowed. But questions that make jurors feel singled out, discriminated against or amount “to interrogating their Blackness” have no place in voir dire.[138]

V. Conclusion

Courts can still easily administer a fair trial without allowing for questions that ask about a venireperson’s support or affiliation with a group. The rights of the defendant to an impartial jury cuts both ways in this argument. A party is entitled to a fair and impartial jury whose beliefs should be found out in voir dire, but a party can easily do that by asking about beliefs not affiliations. However, by allowing for questions about BLM a defendant’s right to a fair trial is much more likely to be infringed because when a prosecutor is able to sit a predominately white jury, they are more likely to get a conviction.[139] The rights of all the people involved a case, the defendant and jurors, are harmed when discrimination creeps into the court.[140] The court system is an integral part of our society that needs to have a clean, clear perception for society to believe in equitable justice. The benefits of having a trial free of racial prejudice are obvious. The courts should take an affirmative step in clearing out racial prejudice by not allowing questions about BLM and similar groups when there are many alternative questions to find out one’s belief.


[I] JD Expected 2022, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; B.S. in Finance, 2014, Mississippi College.

[2] Richard Samuelson, A Government of Laws, Not Men, 17 Claremont Rev. Books: J. Pol. Thought And Statesmanship,45, 46 (2017) (reviewing Richard Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic: The One, the Few, and the Many (2016) and Luke Mayville, John Adams and the Fear of American Oligarchy (2016)) (quoting John Adams on the foundation of the American republic).

[3] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).

[4] Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991).

[5] Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 843, 847 (2015).

[6] Id. at 845.

[7] Id.

[8] Batson, 476 U.S. at 88 (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court has only recognized peremptory challenges based solely upon the cognizable characteristics of race and gender as unconstitutional. However, this Note, will also examine lower court and state court rulings of challenges based on sexual orientation, religion, and certain group affiliations.

[9] Michael L. Neff, In Defense of Voir Dire: Legal History and Social Science Demand Appropriate Voir Dire, 17 Ga. Bar J. 14, 15 (2011) (quoting Thomas Jefferson “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever imagined yet by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”).

[10] Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019).

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] J.E.B, 511 U.S. at 143–44.

[14] Mark E. Wojcik, Extending Batson to Peremptory Challenges of Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 40 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2019).

[15] Id.

[16] J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor J., concurring) (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990)).

[17] Elisabeth Semel et al., Whitewashing the Jury Box: How California Perpetuates the Discriminatory Exclusion of Black and Latinx Jurors, 13 (2020).

[18] Abbie Vansickle, You Can Get Kicked Out of a Jury Pool for Supporting Black Lives Matter: But is it Legal? A California Appeals Court is Going to Decide, The Marshall Project (Jul. 7, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/07/you-can-get-kicked-out-of-a-jury-pool-for-supporting-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/EYL2-4ZUR].

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

[23] State v. Campbell, 846 S.E.2d 804, 806-07, 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020).

[24] Cooper v. State, 432 P.3d 202, 206 (Nev. 2018).

[25] See State v. Gresham, No. A15-1691, 2016 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1104, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

[26] Vansickle, supra note 18.

[27] Batson, 476 U.S. at 82–83.

[28] Id. at 83.

[29] Id. at 85–86.

[30] Id. at 86 (citation omitted).

[31] Id.

[32] Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

[33] Id.; Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2019) (stating defendants may use statistical evidence of peremptory strikes used against black prospective jurors compared to white prospective jurors, evidence of disparate questioning and investigation of black and white jurors, a comparative analysis of those struck and left on the case, prosecutions reason for striking the juror, relevant history from past case, and other relevant circumstances showing racial discrimination.).

[34] Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Following its decision in Batson, the Supreme Court has broadened the scope of this element. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 401, 415 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant may assert a claim of purposeful discrimination in jury selection, irrespective of whether he and the excluded jurors were of the same racial group); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (holding that private parties in a civil suit are barred from racially discriminatory peremptory strikes); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant is barred from racially discriminatory peremptory strikes); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 129, 146 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause).

[35] Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

[36] Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.

[37] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).

[38] Id. at 105–06.

[39] Semel, supra note 17, at 36.

[40] Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).

[41] Id. at 406–07.

[42] Id. at 409.

[43] Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).

[44] J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).

[45] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); Semel, supra note 17, at 36.

[46] See A.C. Johnstone, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration of the Batson Rule, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F.441, 452–55 (1998).

[47] J.E.B, 511 U.S. at 146–51 (1994) (O’Connor J., concurring) (arguing that gender-based peremptory strikes should be barred from government use but preserved for civil litigants and criminal defendants); Johnstone, supra note 46, at 461; see Michael L. Neff, In Defense of Voir Dire: Legal History and Social Science Demand Appropriate Voir Dire, 17 Ga. Bar J. 14, 18, 20 (2011).

[48] Johnstone, supra note 46, at 444.

[49] J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor J., concurring).

[50] Johnstone, supra note 46, at 459.

[51] Id. at 444.

[52] Id. at 445.

[53] Andrew Karpan, When Can a Juror Say Black Lives Matter?, LAW 360, (Aug. 9, 2020 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1299398 [https://perma.cc/D4RR-YSQS].

[54] J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136–37.

[55] See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

[56] See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147–48 (O’Connor J., concurring) (describing the benefits of peremptory strikes); See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98–99.

[57] Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror’s Speech and Association Rights, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 567, 570 (1996).

[58] U.S. Const. amend. I.

[59] Johnstone, supra note 46, at 452–55 (1998); Bader, supra note 57, at 570.

[60] United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing how different states have treated peremptory strikes based on religious affiliations and beliefs); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling a strike based upon a juror’s sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection Clause); Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 595 (D.C. 2001), vacated, 863 A.2d 821 (D.C. 2004) (finding that a juror’s affiliation to a religious activist was a race-neutral reason to remove the juror); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to peremptory strikes based on religious affiliations).

[61] Mark E. Wojcik, Extending Batson to Peremptory Challenges of Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 40 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2019).

[62] Id. at 12.

[63] See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 666–67 (2d Cir. 2003); DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510.

[64] Brown, 352 F.3d at 666-67; DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510–11; United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta how “[i]t would be improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis of his being a Catholic, a Jew, a Muslim, etc.,” but a strike due to a belief even a religious one would be proper.).

[65] Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005).

[66] United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 2003).

[67] Id. at 1220.

[68] Id. at 1218.

[69] Id. at 1225.

[70] Id. at 1225–56.

[71] Id.

[72] United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 697–98 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 1976) (concluding that a juror’s status as wife of a policeman did not instantaneously justify a just-cause challenge); Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970).

[73] McIntyre, 997 F.2d at 697–98.

[74] Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 950, 171–72 (1950).

[75] United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) (“government employment alone is not . . . enough to trigger the [implied bias] rule under which an employee is disqualified from serving as a juror in a case involving her employer.”).

[76] See United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 102 (1982)).

[77] Semel, supra note 17, at 11–13.

[78] United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir. 2003).

[79] See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 669 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999); Thorson v. State, 721 So.2d 590, 595 (Miss. 1998).

[80] See Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993).

[81] Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768.

[82] Id.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. at 769 (“[I]n Powers, . . . the Court sustained the Batson challenge [not] on the theory that the defendant’s equal protection rights were violated; rather, the decision was based on an equal protection violation of the excused juror’s rights.”) (citations omitted).

[86] Id. at 769.

[87] Id. at 770.

[88] Id.

[89] Id.

[90] Id. at 771.

[91] Id.

[92] Id.

[93] Id.

[94] Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994) (Ginsburg J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

[95] Id.

[96] State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1140 (N.J. 2004).

[97] Id. at 1144.

[98] Id.

[99] Id. at 1147.

[100] Id. at 1143, 1147.

[101] Id. at 1144–46. See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998).

[102] See Johnstone, supra note 46, at 461–62.

[103] Bader, supra note 57, at 621.

[104] Semel, supra note 17, at 44.

[105] Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 835, 835

(1993).

[106] Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).

[107] See Bader, supra note 57, at 621.

[108] Flowers v. Mississippi 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019); see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).

[109] Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.

[110] Vansickle, supra note 18.

[111] Id.

[112] Id.

[113] Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991); Wojcik, supra note 14, at 15.

[114] See Bader, supra note 57, at 570.

[115] See Cooper v. State, 432 P.3d 202, 206 (Nev. 2018) (comparing asking about Black Lives Matter to asking about feelings about O.J. Simpson’s murder trial when there were no relevant racial issues in the case).

[116] U.S. Const. amend. XIV. § 1; Bader, supra note 57, at 593.

[117] See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 666–67 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998).

[118] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).

[119] Id. at 98 (“the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures”); J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor J., concurring) (“[t]he principal value of the peremptory is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries.”).

[120] Cooper v. State, 432 P.3d 202, 206 (Nev. 2018).

[121] See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98 (outlining the Batson burden-shifting framework).

[122] Cooper, 432 P.3d at 204.

[123] Id. at 206.

[124] Id. at 20607.

[125] Id. at 206.

[126] Id. at 206–07.

[127] United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 697–98 (10th Cir. 1993).

[128] Compare Cooper, 432 P.3d at 204–05, with State v. Campbell, 846 S.E.2d 804, 807–11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (holding the prosecutor using 75% of their peremptory strikes to remove Black jurors and asking about Black Lives Matter was not enough to find a Batson violation).

[129] Rory Carroll, OJ Simpson: An Eternal Symbol of Racial Division – Or Has America Moved On?, The Guardian, Oct. 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/01/oj-simpson-prison-release-america-race-debate; Adrian Florido, Half of the Jury in the Chauvin Trial is Nonwhite. That’s Only Part of the Story, NPR, (Mar. 25, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/25/980646634/half-of-the-jury-in-the-chauvin-trial-is-non-white-thats-only-part-of-the-story [https://perma.cc/DN5P-B79D].

[130] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).

[131] Id. at 97.

[132] Id.

[133] Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).

[134] See Semel, supra note 17, at 14. (discussing racial and ethnic stereotypes California prosecutors relied on when using peremptory strikes to excuse Black and Latino jurors).

[135] Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

[136] Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.           

[137] Semel, supra note 17, at 16.

[138] Karpan, supra note 53.

[139] See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019). The case is an example of how a different jury make up will affect the verdict of the trial.

[140] Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).