California Shaking Up the Gig Economy: Should Uber and Lyft be Worried?

Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | Oct. 1, 2019 

California Shaking Up the Gig Economy: Should Uber and Lyft be Worried?

Cameron F. Myers[1] 

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Assembly Bill 5 (AB-5) into law.[2]The purpose of AB-5 is to codify the 2018 California Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles[3] and clarify the decision’s application in state law.[4] Ultimately, California hopes to “ensure workers who are currently exploited by being misclassified as independent contractors instead of recognized as employees have the basic rights and protections they deserve under the law…”[5]

In Dynamex, the California Supreme Court established a presumption that a person who performs services for a hiring entity is an employee rather than an independent contractor for purposes of compliance with California wage orders.[6] In order to overcome this presumption, the hiring entity must pass what is commonly referred to as the “ABC” test.[7] The ABC test requires the hiring entity to show: “(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed by the hiring entity.”[8]

 For ridesharing companies such as Uber and Lyft, whose business models hinge on classifying drivers as independent contractors,[9] failure to pass the ABC test would require a fundamental change in their way of doing business.[10] These companies would likely have to exert more control over drivers by telling them where to work, requiring a minimum number of hours per week, scheduling driver shifts, and preventing drivers from working for other rideshare companies.[11] According to Uber, this change would likely lead to drivers only being able to work at times and in areas where the demand for rides exceeds the number of drivers, thereby eliminating the accessibility of the company’s services “in areas of the state that need it most.” [12]

Uber claims that AB-5 does not automatically reclassify drivers from independent contractors to employees.[13]According to Uber’s Chief Legal Officer, Tony West, “arguably the highest bar [in passing the ABC Test] is that a company must prove that contractors are doing work ‘outside the usual course’ of its business.”[14] West argues that several previous rulings have found that drivers work is outside Uber’s usual course of business, which is “serving as a technology platform for several different types of digital marketplaces.”[15] Essentially, West argues that Uber’s usual course of business is providing an electronic app service to drivers, rather than providing rides to passengers.[16]

Regardless of the merits of that argument, it seems clear that Uber and Lyft would prefer not to take their chances with the ABC test.[17] In an effort to meet the California Legislature somewhere in the middle, the two companies have pledged a combined $60 million to a California ballot initiative which would allow drivers to remain independent contractors while also being entitled to certain benefits.[18] Among these benefits include guaranteed earnings above the local minimum wage, access to paid time off and paid sick leave, as well as a legally-protected right to negotiate over earnings.[19]

 [1] Staff Editor, Kentucky Law Journal, Volume 108; J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky College of Law (2021); B.S., University of Kentucky (2018).

[2] Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Legis. Serv., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).

[3] 4 Cal. 5th 903 (Cal. 2018).

[4] Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Legis. Serv., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).               

 [5] Id.

 [6] Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 955 (Cal. 2018) (“The ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees…”).

[7] Id. at 916-17.

[8] Id.

[9] Moving work forward in California, Medium (Aug. 29, 2019), https://medium.com/uber-under-the-hood/moving-work-forward-in-california-7de60b6827b4.

 [10] Id.

[11] Id.

 [12] Id.

[13] Tony West, Update on AB5, Uber Newsroom (Sep. 11, 2019), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/ab5-update/.

 [14] Id.

 [15] Id.

[16] Brad Templeton, If Uber Drivers Become Employees, Can Uber Escape That? Plus How Employees Compete With Robocars, Forbes (Sep. 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradtempleton/2019/09/17/if-uber-drivers-become-employees-can-uber-escape-that-plus-how-employees-compete-with-robocars/#72c7204253fb.

[17] See West, supra note 13.  

 [18] Moving work forward in California, Medium (Aug. 29, 2019), https://medium.com/uber-under-the-hood/moving-work-forward-in-california-7de60b6827b4.

[19] Id.

Proving a Point or Paving the Way: Will Taylor Swift Rerecording Her Masters Bring Needed Change to the Music Industry’s Unconscionable Contracting?

Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | Sept. 26, 2019

Proving a Point or Paving the Way: Will Taylor Swift Rerecording Her Masters Bring Needed Change to the Music Industry’s Unconscionable Contracting? 

Ellen Ray[1]

 Taylor Swift has been a fierce advocate for artists’ rights to own their work in the music industry, but her latest move falls short of the necessary solution to unconscionability in record label contracting. In August, Swift announced she will be rerecording her first five albums in response to the sale of her master recordings by Big Machine Records to Ithaca Holdings in order “to regain artistic and financial control of her material.”[2]

 In standard recording contracts, like Swift’s contract with Big Machine, the record label profits by offering young artists the means to “finance, produce, and sell their creations,” [3] in exchange for the label’s retention of the master recording, the “physical embodiment of the performance”.[4] Because Swift is the primary songwriter on all her songs, she holds a copyright for the use both the lyrics and music, which is distinct from the label’s copyright for production rights.[5]

However, without ownership of the masters, a song cannot be produced and profited off in any meaningful way.[6] For this reason, legal scholars argue that the terms of a recording agreement are “unconscionable as a matter of law,” but due to a lack of litigation on the topic, courts have yet to arbitrate the matter.[7]

A contract is classified as unconscionable when the terms are so one-sided that it presents a lack of meaningful choice for one of the bargaining parties.[8] §208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not explicitly define unconscionability, but provides qualifications to assist judicial analysis subject to a sliding scale test.[9]

 When courts analyze a breach of contract under unconscionability, there must a procedural element, meaning the “bargaining terms” were unfair, and a substantive element, meaning the contract itself had “oppressive terms.”[10] If a court were to find the contract terms unconscionable, it would become voidable.[11]

 Utilizing precedent from similarly-situated music industry cases, like Graham v. Scissor-Tail Inc., would direct the court’s analysis on unconscionability based on the labels retention of the master recording. [12] In Graham, the dispute was between a concert promoter who was a member of a labor union, American Federation of Musicians, and a band, Scissor-Tail.[13] Under the sliding-scale test, the weight of the substantive unconscionability through violations of fundamental fairness and failure to protect the artist’s best interests was coupled with the finding of an adhesion contract, utilized as evidence of procedural unconscionability in the artists lack of “meaningful choice” or “alternative in contracting.”[14] In this sense, the requirements of procedural unconscionability have been broadened. This could counteract the viewpoint that the standard recording contract has become an accepted contract of adhesion, “ingrained into the notion of free contracting,” such that a claim of unconscionability would be against the public policy of the industry. [15]

Swift is well-positioned to fund a breach of contract claim based on unconscionability for a class of artists against their record label and force the issue past settlement proceedings to obtain an adjudication on the issue.[16] This would be a more productive alternative; allowing the courts to decide definitively whether recording contracts are unconscionable. The strength of legal precedent would have a ripple effect in the music industry. 

 [1] Staff Editor, Kentucky Law Journal, Volume 108; J.D. Candidate, The University of Kentucky College of Law (2021); B.A., Centre College (2018).

[2] Anastasia Tsioulcas, Look What They Made Her Do: Taylor Swift To Re-Record Her Catalog, NPR (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/22/753393630/look-what-they-made-her-do-taylor-swift-to-re-record-her-catalog.

[3] Abdullahi Abdullahi, Termination Rights in Music: A Practical Framework for Resolving Ownership Conflicts in Sound Recordings, 2012 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 457, 458 (2012).

[4] In re Antone’s Records, Inc., 445 B.R. 758, 779 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 

[5] Id.

[6] Joe Coscarelli, Taylor Swift Says She Will Rerecord Her Old Music. Here’s How., N.Y. Times (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/arts/music/taylor-swift-rerecord-albums.html.

[7] Ian Brereton, Beginning of a New Age?: The Unconscionability of the “360-Degree” Deal, 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ 167, 168 (2009).

[8] Id. at 172. 

[9] Id.

[10] Abdullahi, supra note 3, at 471. 

[11] Id. at 479.

[12] Graham v. Scissor-Tail Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).

[13] Omar Anorga, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of Unconscionability, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 739, 747-48 (2003).

[14] Id. at 747-49.

[15] Brereton, supra note 6, at 173. 

[16] See Anorga, supra note 12, at 740. 

Turning the Tide: Big Pharma Willing to Settle

Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | Sept. 19, 2019

 Turning the Tide: Big Pharma Willing to Settle

Allie McNamara

The opioid epidemic has claimed 47,600 lives in 2017 alone. In 2016 and 2017 more than 130 people every day died due to opioid use.[1] The hardest hit areas include: West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and the District of Colombia.[2]

The crisis began in Maine and worked its way down the Appalachian Mountains, devastating parts of rural Appalachia. Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin, developed the drug in 1995.[3] After obtaining FDA approval, the drug hit the market in 1996. [4] Five years later officials began to inquire about how addictive the medication was, yet the company managed to convince the government that it was not more addictive than other drugs on the market. [5]However, in 2007, Purdue admitted it “deceptively marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse, and less likely to tolerance and withdrawal than other medications.”[6] Purdue hid this evidence. A unanimous decision by a three-judge panel in the Kentucky Court of Appeals on December 14, 2018 held that Purdue must produce records regarding marketing approaches and the level of addictiveness of OxyContin.[7] On August 26, 2019, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied to review this decision, clearing the way for these records to be obtained.[8]

The introduction of opioids greatly altered the healthcare system, creating the fifth vital sign. The fifth vital sign invites providers to ask patients “What is your pain level today?” during each office visit.[9] By custom, a pain level of 7 or more meant that the patient left the office with an opioid prescription.[10]

While public health and legislative efforts have begun to limit the amount of opioids distributed legally, there still exists many illegal efforts to provide pills to those most vulnerable through cash based pill mills. For example, one recent case involved the Tennessee Pain Clinic located outside of Chattanooga, TN.[11] This was no pain clinic, but rather, a front for a pill mill. Federal District Court Judge Wier sentenced a physician involved in the operation to twenty-one years.[12]Over half of this clinic’s customers were from Kentucky.[13] Individuals paid cash, as insurance was not accepted, and individuals transported these medications back into Kentucky to supply local drug dealers.[14] In total, this operation distributed 1.6 million Oxycodone pills to the region.[15] Black market operations such as this are the main driver of the opioid crisis as victims become increasingly desperate for a fix. The disaster has been exacerbated by many individuals who have turned to heroine in hopes of finding a cheaper way to get high.[16] Unfortunately, it is hard to know the exact ingredients of the illicit substances.[17] Many doses of heroine are laced with fentanyl, which is much more deadly than heroin.[18] To put it in perspective, it takes 0.25 milligrams of fentanyl to cause a fatal overdose because it is 50-100 times more potent than morphine.[19]

 It is no surprise that over 2,000 counties, cities, and Native American tribes have filed suit against pharmaceutical companies that make and produce opioids.[20] Suits have also targeted Prescription Benefit Managers (PBMs) and insurance companies in order to obtain the maximum relief for victims and their families.[21] These numerous suits have been consolidated into one scheduled for October 21, 2019 before Judge Polster in Federal District Court in Cleveland, Ohio.

 Judge Polster recently ruled against the drug industry on numerous pre-trial motions. These preliminary rulings have begun a chain reaction on the part of the drug manufactures who opt to settle with plaintiffs in order to be removed from the case and avoid the risk of a court ordered judgment. For example, Mallinckrodt, an Irish company, agreed to settle with two counties in Ohio for $30 million. A DEA report showed that a Mallinckrodt subsidiary, called SpecGX, was the single largest manufacturer of the more than 76 billion opioids distributed across the United States between 2006 and 2012.[22] Additionally, Purdue Pharma is also in settlement negotiations for their role in the opioid crisis. [23] As a part of an approximate $10 billion settlement, Purdue Pharma filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Sunday, September 15, 2019 and the Sackler Family (owners of Purdue) announced their intentions to give up the company which is a part of an approximate $10 billion settlement arrangement. [24]

This willingness to settle comes on the heels of an Oklahoma decision on August 26, 2019, where a judge ordered Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) to pay $572 million for its role in the opioid crisis. The court found that J&J had “engaged in false, deceptive, and misleading marketing” which constituted a public nuisance for adding to the opioid epidemic. Damages were calculated by assessing the predicted dollar amount that would be needed each year to remedy this crisis. 

However, there is a scary realization that many of the victims of this crisis will never see a penny of that relief or future relief. Legal scholars equate opioid settlements to the Master Settlement Agreement with the tobacco industry.[25] That settlement is the result of the largest piece of civil litigation in American history, where the state Attorney Generals of forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories settled with the five largest cigarette manufacturers regarding advertising, marketing, and promotion of cigarettes. The tobacco industry agreed to pay these states billions of dollars annually, yet today, while 16 million Americans suffer from a smoking related illness, less than 3% of the settlement received is spent on smoking cessation efforts, disease prevention, or providing healthcare for the victims.[26]

Is that the fate of the victims of the opioid crisis or will settlement funds be used to create needle exchanges and erect addiction treatment facilities to stop a generation of Americans from premature death?

[1] Opioid Crisis Fast Facts, Cable News Network (Aug. 28, 2019, 4:15 PM ET) https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/18/health/opioid-crisis-fast-facts/index.html.

[2] Drug Overdose Deaths, The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html.

[3] Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/timeline-selected-fda-activities-and-significant-events-addressing-opioid-misuse-and-abuse.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc. 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570 (W.D. Va. 2007). 

[7] Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Bos. Globe Life Scis. Media. LLC, No. 2016-CA-000710-MR (Ky. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

[8] Alia Paavola, Kentucky Supreme Court Clears Release of Secret Purdue OxyContin Files, Becker’s Hospital Review(Aug. 27, 2019) https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/pharmacy/kentucky-supreme-court-clears-release-of-secret-purdue-oxycontin-files.html.

[9] David W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolutions (May 5, 2017), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/Pain_Std_History_Web_Version_05122017.pdf.

[10] Id.

[11] Bill Estep, ‘Front Writing Narcotics.’ Doctor Gets 21 Years in Prison for Running Pill Mill, Lexington Herald Leader (Aug. 9, 2019, 8:57 PM) https://www.kentucky.com/news/state/kentucky/article233700292.html.

[12] Id. 

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id. 

[16] Heroin Use is Driven by its Low Cost and High Availability, National Institute on Drug Abuse, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/relationship-between-prescription-drug-abuse-heroin-use/heroin-use-driven-by-its-low-cost-high-availability (last updated Jan. 2018). 

[17] Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids Drug Overdose Deaths, National Institute on Drug Abuse,

 https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/infographics/fentanyl-other-synthetic-opioids-drug-overdose-deaths (last updated May 2018). 

[18] Id.

[19] Fentanyl, Centers for Disease Control and Prevetion, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html(last updated May 31, 2019). 

[20] Lenny Bernstein, et al., Mallinckrodt Reaches Settlement with ‘Bellwether’ Counties in Mammoth Opioid Lawsuit, The Washington Post (Sept. 6, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/mallinckrodt-reaches-settlement-with-bellwether-counties-in-mammoth-opioid-lawsuit/2019/09/06/1e8a19f8-d0d9-11e9-b29b-a528dc82154a_story.html.

[21] Karen Appold, Will PBMs Be the Next Target of Opioid Lawsuits?, Managed Healthcare Executive (Mar. 28, 2018) https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/business-strategy/will-pbms-be-next-target-opioid-lawsuits.

[22] Scott Higham, 76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal Data Unmasks the Epidemic, The Washington Post(July 16, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/76-billion-opioid-pills-newly-released-federal-data-unmasks-the-epidemic/2019/07/16/5f29fd62-a73e-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html.

[23] Julia Jones, The Slacker Family Could Give Up Purdue Pharma, Sources Says, Cable News Network (Sept. 10, 2019, 9:30 PM ET) https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/10/us/sackler-family-could-give-up-ownership-of-purdue-pharma/index.html. 

[24] Elizabeth Joseph, Purdue Pharma Files for Bankruptcy as Part of a $10 Billion Agreement to Settle Opioid Lawsuits,Cable News Network (Sept. 16, 2019, 3:50 PM ET) https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/16/us/purdue-pharma-bankruptcy-filing/index.html.

[25] Kathleen Brady, Don’t Let the Opioid Settlement Fritter Away Funds like the Tobacco Settlement Did, STAT (Sept. 12, 2019) https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/12/opioid-settlement-tobacco-settlement/.

[26] Master Settlement Agreement, Public Health Law Center at Mitchell Hamline School of Law, https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/commercial-tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation/master-settlement-agreement.

“Finder’s Keepers” OR “Theft by Finding”

Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | Sept. 17, 2019

“Finder’s Keepers” OR “Theft by Finding”

 Dalton Stanley

A Pennsylvania couple’s bank account grew from $1,000 to $121,000 overnight.[1] A bank teller had accidently deposited $120,000 into their account![2] Assumedly believing this was a turn of good fortune, they purchased a new car, “two four-wheelers, a camper,” race car components, and gave $15,000 to a friend needing the money.[3] After three weeks and a $107,000 shopping spree, the bank demanded the money be repaid.[4] The Williams told the bank they would consider a repayment plan, but, allegedly, did not return the bank’s calls.[5]

The Williams’ argument of “Finders Keepers, Losers Weepers” is not completely unfounded. Common law dictates that the “finder is entitled to the possession against [everyone] but the true owner.”[6] However, as case law has evolved, the finder has different rights depending on if the property was mislaid, lost, or abandoned.[7] In this case, the $120,000 can arguably be considered “lost” by the bank since the money was unintentionally parted with when the bank mistakenly put it in the Williams’ account.[8] Therefore, the Williams did have proper claim to the $120,000 as the finder, but the bank had the superior claim as the “true owner.” 

 Unsurprisingly, the bank demanded their money back – feeling little obligation to do otherwise according to the way the rule of “Finders Keepers” is defined by the law.[9] The Williams are now facing multiple charges including “theft of property by loss or mislaid.”[10] The corresponding charge under Kentucky Law would be “theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake.”[11] For one to be found guilty for such a crime under Kentucky law, it must be proven that: 

(a) He comes into control of the property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient; and

(b) With intent to deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to have it.[12]

It is likely that the Williams will be deemed to have been in control of the $120,000 when it was deposited into their account, and they admitted that the money “was not theirs.”[13] If there is not a reason to expect such a large deposit, the circumstances may likely support finding that the Williams knew the money was intended to be deposited in another’s account, and that the money must have been “lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake.”[14] By spending the money themselves, it could be argued that the Williams may have implicitly intended to deprive the true owner of the funds, and they may not have taken reasonable measures to restore the property to its true owner.[15]

Despite what one in primary school may see as simply an application of “Finder’s Keepers, Losers Weepers” resulting in a favorable decision for the Williams, under Kentucky law, the Williams could potentially be found guilty of a class C felony.[16]

[1] John Beauge, Couple Who Spent $107,416 Mistakenly Placed in Their Bank Account Headed to Trial, Penn Live (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2019/09/couple-who-spent-107416-mistakenly-placed-in-their-bank-account-headed-to-trial.html.

[2] Lisa Rowan, If the Bank Accidentally Deposits Money in Your Account, Don't Spend It, Lifehacker (Sept. 13, 2019), https://twocents.lifehacker.com/if-the-bank-accidentally-deposits-money-in-your-account-1838048864.

[3] Beauge, supra note 1.

[4] Rowan, supra note 1.

[5] Beauge, supra note 1.

[6] Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 174 S.W. 376, 378 (Mo. 1915).

[7] Joseph J. Simeone, “Finders Keepers, Losers Weepers”: The Law of Finding “Lost” Property in Missouri, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 167, (2009).

[8] Id.; Rowan, supra note 1.

[9] Rowan, supra note 1.

[10] Id.

[11] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 514.050 (West 2019).

[12] Id.

[13] Beauge, supra note 1.

[14] Id.; § 514.050

[15] Id.

[16] § 514.050

Taggart: an (Old) New Standard for Civil Contempt in Bankruptcy Court

Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | Sept. 12, 2019

Taggart: an (Old) New Standard for Civil Contempt in Bankruptcy Court 

B. Gammon Fain[1] 

Earlier this summer, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a ruling that could impact the way creditors interact with debtors after a bankruptcy discharge. In Taggart v. Lorenzen, the Court held that a creditor (or non-debtor, more generally) who violates a bankruptcy discharge can be held in civil contempt if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether or not the creditor acted in violation of the discharge.[2] The case marks a debtor-friendly shift in how bankruptcy courts previously determined whether or not to hold discharge violators in contempt, and more broadly illustrates an application of non-bankruptcy jurisprudence to bankruptcy law.[3]

Taggart has a fairly complex factual background and procedural history. The case began in 2008 when Mr. Taggart was sued in Oregon state court by his business partners for an alleged violation of their LLC’s operating agreement.[4] While that litigation was ongoing, Mr. Taggart filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy[5], which allows debtors to liquidate assets and pay creditors to obtain a bankruptcy discharge. In short, that discharge releases the debtor from all eligible debts accrued before the bankruptcy.[6] Mr. Taggart finished his bankruptcy and obtained a discharge of his debt before the state court trial began.[7]

Shortly thereafter, the Oregon trial court entered a judgment against Mr. Taggart, and the plaintiffs sought to collect attorney’s fees and court costs from him.[8] Monies owed from legal judgments are included in the debts eligible for discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy,[9] and Ninth Circuit precedent holds that litigation expenses accrued after a discharge are still discharged if the litigation was filed prebankruptcy.[10]  Still, the plaintiffs argued that Mr. Taggart was liable for their accrued expenses under an exception from the same aforementioned Ninth Circuit case, which holds the debtor liable for litigation fees and costs if the debtor “returns to the fray[11],” or voluntarily continues to litigate disputed debt after a discharge.[12]

 The Oregon state trial court sided with the plaintiffs, holding that Mr. Taggart had “returned to the fray” and was thus liable for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.[13] Taggart then went to the federal Bankruptcy Court and filed a motion for the defendants to be held in contempt for violation of his bankruptcy discharge, and the Bankruptcy Court also sided with the defendants, holding that Taggart had indeed “returned to the fray.”[14] Taggart appealed that decision to the federal District Court, which sided with him, holding that he had not “returned to the fray” and remanding the case to Bankruptcy Court to decide on whether or not to hold the defendants in contempt for violating the discharge.[15]

The Bankruptcy Court then decided to hold the defendants in civil contempt, applying a strict liability standard on the basis that the defendants were aware of the discharge and intended the actions they took in violation of the discharge, regardless of whether or not they were aware of their (non)compliance with the discharge.[16] The defendants appealed, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel vacated the contempt holding.[17] On appeal by Taggart, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the appellate panel, holding that a creditor’s good faith belief that its actions are in compliance with the discharge is sufficient to preclude holding that creditor in contempt of court, even if that good faith belief is unreasonable.[18]

On cert from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the case in October 2017 and following a unanimous decision, released its opinion in June 2019.[19] The Court sided with Taggart, holding that a Bankruptcy Court is authorized to hold a non-debtor in civil contempt for violating a discharge “when there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful under the discharge order.”[20]

The Court’s reasoning is based in an interpretive principle originally coined by Justice Frankfurter: “When a statutory term is ‘obviously transplanted from another legal source,’ it ‘brings the old soil with it.’”[21] Because civil contempt is not a concept unique to the Bankruptcy Code, the “old soil” of previous jurisprudence on civil contempt in other settings also applies to bankruptcy proceedings, the Court explains.[22] In other words, “the bankruptcy statutes incorporate the traditional standards in equity practice for determining when a party may be held in civil contempt for violating an injunction.”[23] From there, the Court pulled the “fair ground of doubt” standard for civil contempt from a case decided in 1885,[24] which is an objective standard, but the Court noted that subjective intent may be considered as a factor in determining whether or not to hold a party in civil contempt.[25] All in all, the Court believes that the Taggart standard “strikes the ‘careful balance between the interests of creditors and debtors’ that the Bankruptcy Code often seeks to achieve.”[26]

The new standard is indeed balanced, but when compared to the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit, the Taggart holding is much friendlier to debtors, as creditors can no longer avoid being held in contempt of court by simply making a claim of good faith, regardless of how reasonable that claim may or may not be. The Court acknowledges this, noting that the Ninth Circuit’s standard could “lead creditors who stand on shaky legal ground to collect discharged debts, forcing debtors back into litigation . . . to protect the discharge that is was the very purpose of the bankruptcy proceeding to provide.”[27]

Despite Taggart’s debtor-friendly appearance, amicus briefs filed by the creditors’ bar were also critical of the Ninth Circuit standard,[28] and creditors appear to be reacting positively to the Taggart decision.[29] Nicole Strickler, an attorney for the National Creditors Bar Association (hereinafter NCBA) and author of the NCBA’s amicus brief to the Court, was quoted in Bloomberg Law acknowledging Taggart as positive for creditors “because it recognizes that reasonable minds may differ, and in such cases, creditors shouldn’t be punished.”[30] In other words, while giving debtors a powerful tool to use against predatory creditors who violate the Bankruptcy Code, Taggart also provides bright line guidance to creditors, thereby enabling law-abiding creditors and their attorneys to be more aware of what can and cannot land creditors in trouble with the courts.

 The case is also worth noting because it serves as an example of the “[rejection of] bankruptcy exceptionalism,” which is “the using of bankruptcy policy to resolve questions . . . relating to disputes in bankruptcy.”[31] In other words, a bankruptcy exceptionalist would advocate against the importing of general jurisprudence to a bankruptcy case, and Taggart does exactly that. Some legal scholars see bankruptcy exceptionalism as more of a problem than others,[32] but only time will tell whether or not Taggart is the beginning of a larger trend in bankruptcy jurisprudence. Legal scholars aside, it appears that for now, bankruptcy practitioners are willing to forego bankruptcy exceptionalism, as both the creditors’ and debtors’ bars are seeming to welcome the clarity provided by Taggart.[33] 

All in all, the Taggart decision handed down by the Supreme Court this summer provides useful and important guidance to bankruptcy lawyers and their clients, both on the creditor and debtor sides. As lower courts begin to apply and interpret the Taggart standard, a clearer picture should emerge of how the ruling will impact bankruptcy law practice, but most of the decision’s effects will be felt in the consumer bankruptcy arenas of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, where most discharge disputes tend to arise.[34] For now, debtors should take note and keep watch of predacious creditors seeking to collect debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge, as Taggart provides those debtors with a more assured remedy. On the flip side, creditors should be careful to know exactly what debt is and is not discharged at the end of a bankruptcy, as they could find themselves in quick trouble for seeking to collect a discharged debt under this new standard. 

[1] Staff Editor, Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 108;  J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky College of Law (2021); B.A. Political Science, University of Kentucky (2018); B.A. Integrated Strategic Communication, University of Kentucky (2018) 

[2] 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1799 (2019). 

[3] See Id. 

[4] See Sherwood Park Bus. Ctr. v. Taggart, 341 P.3d 96, 220-21 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).

[5] Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1799. 

[6] See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(1), 726 (2019). 

[7] Taggart, 139 S. Ct at 1800. 

[8] Id. 

[9] 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2019). 

[10] Taggart, 139 S. Ct at 1800 (citing in re Ybarra, 424 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

[11] Id. 

[12] In re Ybarra, 424 F.3d at 1023 (citing in re Fostvedt, 823 F.2d 305, 306 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also 4 Collier on Bankr. P. 524.02 (16th, 2019).

[13] Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1800. 

[14] Id. 

[15] Id. 

[16] See in re Taggart, 522 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. D. Or. 2014).  

[17] Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1800. 

[18] Lorenzen v. Taggart, 888 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018). 

[19] Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1795. 

[20] Id. at 1801 (emphasis added). 

[21] Id. (citing Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columb. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)).

[22] Id. 

[23] Id. 

[24] Id. at 1801-02 (quoting California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)). 

[25] Id. at 1802. 

[26] Id. at 1804 (citing Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 129 (2014)). 

[27] Id. at 1803. 

[28] Brief for the National Creditors Bar Association as Amicus Curiae In Support of Respondents, Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019) (No. 18-489) (“. . . the NCBA asks this Court to adopt the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that found contempt sanctions were inappropriate because Respondents had a reasonable, objective, good faith basis for lacking knowledge of the applicability of the discharge . . . .”).

[29] See Diane Davis, Supreme Court Clarifies When Creditors Can Collect in Bankruptcy, Bloomberg L.: Bankruptcy L. (June 3, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/supreme-court-clarifies-when-creditors-can-collect-in-bankruptcy.

[30] Id. 

[31] Bruce A. Markell, The Not-So-Terrible “Ts”: Tempnology and Taggart, 39 Bankr. L. Letter 7 (2019). 

[32] Compare Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 384 (2012) with Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 605 (2008). 

[33] See supra notes 28-30. 

[34] Charles M. Tatelbaum and Kadeem G. Ricketts, Creditors Beware – Bankruptcy Courts Now May Hold Creditors in Contempt, Law.com: Daily Business Review (July 15, 2019), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2019/07/15/creditors-beware-bankruptcy-courts-now-may-hold-creditors-in-contempt/?slreturn=20190812181456.

Apple, Angry Birds, and Antitrust: The Direct Purchasing Requirement’s Survival

Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | Sept. 5, 2019

Apple, Angry Birds, and Antitrust: The Direct Purchasing Requirement’s Survival

 Jacob Sherman[1]

In 2018, Google Play Store users downloaded 75.5 billion apps while App Store users downloaded 29.6 billion apps.[2]Google Play Store users may have downloaded twice as many apps as App Store users, but the App Store almost doubled Google Play Store’s revenue.[3] Last year, the Google Play Store made $24.8 billion in revenue while the App Store made $46.6 billion in revenue.[4]  The disparity in revenue, Killian Bell argues, is twofold.[5] First, it is easier to download and install pirated games on Android (the operating system that houses the Google Play Store), so many developers charge nothing for their apps.[6] Second, users of iOS (the operating system that houses the App Store) are more willing to pay for their downloads.[7] At least, some of them are. 

In 2011, four iPhone owners sued Apple Inc., the owner of the App Store, alleging the company unlawfully monopolized who could sell apps.[8] The plaintiffs argue that “they have ‘paid more for their iPhone apps than they would have paid in a competitive market.’” [9] Apple attempted to dismiss the case, arguing the plaintiffs did not have standing under Illinois Brick because they were not direct purchasers.[10]

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were direct purchasers.[11] Kavanaugh, writing for the five Justice majority, reasoned that the plaintiffs were direct purchasers because they bought apps directly from Apple.[12] To do so, Kavanaugh relied on the facts of Illinois Brick.[13]

 In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois sued the Illinois Brick Company alleging the company fixed prices.[14] Illinois Brick was a brick manufacturer and distributor.[15] Primarily, Illinois Brick Company sold bricks to masonry contractors.[16]The masonry contractors would then submit bids to general contractors.[17] Finally, the general contractors would submit bids to Illinois.[18] The court held that Illinois could not bring an antitrust claim, only a direct purchaser could do so.[19]For Justice Kavanaugh, Illinois Brick created a simple rule. Direct purchasers have standing.[20]

Apple and the dissent argue that Illinois Brick’s reasoning prohibits consumers down the chain of consumption—to whom the overcharges are passed—from suing.[21] Apple maintains the defendants are downstream purchasers for two factual reasons.[22] First, independent developers set the app price, not Apple.[23] Second, Apple takes a 30% cut of the price.[24] These facts combined mean developers, in theory, could pass on the cost to consumers.[25]

The majority rejects Apple’s pass on argument for three reasons. [26] First, permitting another set of plaintiffs to sue makes antitrust enforcement easier.[27] Second, the difficulty in determining costs should not prohibit this plaintiff from suing.[28] Third, Illinois Brick did not bar different classes of injured parties from suing, it only barred indirect purchasers.[29] In other words, Apple cannot rid itself of a monopoly suit just by claiming it is potentially liable for a monopsony suit.[30] After rejecting Apple’s argument, the court held that the plaintiffs are direct purchasers.[31]

 While Illinois Brick was upheld, the direct purchasing requirement may be nearing its end.[32] Justice Gorsuch, and 30 states as amici, reasoned that Illinois Brick may not further antitrust policy.[33] However, before Illinois Brick is overturned, Gorsuch has a few questions.[34] Apple Inc. v. Pepper may clearly determine whether the plaintiffs are direct purchasers, but the future for online retailers and Illinois Brick is murky.[35]

 [1] Staff Editor, Kentucky Law Journal, Volume 108; J.D. Candidate, The University of Kentucky College of Law (2021).

[2] Killian Bell, App Store Made Almost Twice as Much as Google Play in 2018, Cult of Mac.com (January 18, 2019, 6:15 AM) https://www.cultofmac.com/601492/app-store-google-play-revenue-2018/.

[3] Id.

[4] Id. 

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019).

[9] Id.

[10] Id. 

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 1520.

[13] See id. at 1521-22.

[14] Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1977).

[15] Id. at 726. 

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1521.

[20] Id. 

[21] Id. at 1525-26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

[22] Id. at 1521-22 (majority opinion); Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1527-28 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

[23] Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1527-28 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 1528. 

[26] Id. at 1524 (majority opinion). 

[27] Id. 

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 1525.

[30] Id. 

[31] Id. 

[32] See id. at 1530-31 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 

[33] Faegre Baker Daniels, Future of Antitrust Class Actions Foreshadowed in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, JD Supra.com (May 24, 2019, 11:45 AM) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/future-of-antitrust-class-actions-21288/.

[34] Id.

[35] Daniels, supra note 33.