National Security vs. Constitutional Transparency: Reassessing the Experience and Logic Test
Conor Washburn*
Introduction
In June of 1971, Daniel Ellsberg leaked the “Pentagon Papers,” exposing decades of United States government deception regarding the Vietnam War.[1]
In response, President Nixon formed the “White House Plumbers,” a covert unit tasked with preventing further leaks.[2] The covert unit’s illegal activities, culminating in the Watergate break-in, revealed the executive branch’s misuse of federal agencies for unlawful political surveillance.[3] These abuses prompted investigations that exposed systemic gaps in the oversight of domestic intelligence operations.[4]
In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) to establish a legal framework for foreign intelligence gathering.[5] FISA governs four categories of activity: “(1) electronic surveillance, (2) physical searches, (3) pen registers and trap and trace (PR/TT) devices, . . . [and] (4) the production of certain business records.”[6] Agencies request authorization for these activities through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), a specialized court created to act as a “neutral arbiter of agency requests.”[7] The FISC hearings, in which requests for surveillance are considered, are ex parte and classified; the target of the order is not informed that an order has been issued, nor are they allowed to appear at the hearing, creating a judicial system largely hidden from any kind of oversight.[8]
Concerns about the breadth of this secrecy escalated in 2013, when Edward Snowden disclosed that U.S. intelligence agencies were operating bulk data collection programs, many of which had been approved by the FISC.[9] These revelations, which included warrantless acquisition of phone records and internet communications, raised alarms about the impact of such programs on privacy, free expression, and associational rights.[10] In response, Congress enacted the USA Freedom Act, requiring the Director of National Intelligence to declassify and release FISC opinions containing “significant interpretations” of law, subject to redaction where necessary for national security.[11]
Despite the Freedom Act’s mandate for increased transparency, records from FISC hearings regularly continue to be withheld.[12] Crucially, the USA Freedom Act’s declassification requirements only apply to FISC opinions issued after June 2015, leaving a vast archive of pre-2015 rulings—including those authorizing post-9/11 surveillance expansions—completely inaccessible.[13] This loophole hampers litigation efforts challenging the legality of intelligence programs that have impacted the civil liberties of millions of Americans.[14]
To restore public trust and uphold democratic accountability, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) must implement greater transparency in releasing its rulings to the public. The “experience and logic” test must be reevaluated to better align the government’s national security interests with the public’s right to access critical judicial information affecting their fundamental liberties.
This Note will explore the concept of “secret law” and its impact on democratic participation and judicial oversight; analyze the First Amendment right of access, including its historical foundations and the Supreme Court’s expansion beyond criminal trials; and evaluate conflicting arguments over public access to FISC opinions, contrasting the ACLU’s call for transparency with the government’s national security concerns. It will then examine how FISC’s exceptionalism departs from constitutional norms, assess the “compelling need for secrecy” doctrine as a traditional check on confidentiality, and propose refining the “experience and logic” test by incorporating heightened judicial scrutiny and periodic review to better balance transparency, security, and the public’s right to know.
I. “Secret Law”
“Secret law”—undisclosed legal memos, agency rules, and court opinions—sets binding standards without public scrutiny, limiting democratic participation, weakening legislative and judicial oversight, and enabling unchecked executive power.[15] When legal determinations remain hidden, the executive branch can define the scope of its authority without meaningful review, and higher courts lose the ability to ensure alignment with constitutional guarantees.[16] Secrecy also undermines stare decisis: undisclosed rulings deprive courts and litigants of guidance, producing inconsistent outcomes and eroding the coherence and predictability of the legal system.[17]
The legal analyses drafted by the FISC authorizing the kind of bulk collection programs that were exposed by Edward Snowden are the epitome of secret law. Snowden exposed thousands of classified documents as part of his leaks.[18] Contained in these documents was information about the authorization of programs known as “Prism” and “XKeyscore,” the latter of which the FISC has never declassified a ruling on.[19] The Prism program allowed the National Security Agency (“NSA”), through secret agreements with companies like Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Skype, and Dropbox, to access emails, documents, photos, and other kinds of private data stored on these companies’ servers.[20] The XKeyscore program functioned as the “NSA’s Google” and enabled agents to access a target’s private internet data by being secretly integrated with the physical fiber optic cables that carry the bulk of the world’s internet traffic; all that was required was the target’s email address.[21] Also detailed in these leaked documents was a claim by the NSA that FISA allowed them to secretly collect the phone records of millions of Americans from telecommunication companies like Verizon under its “business records” provision.[22]
To obtain these individual phone records, the government had to get a “Section 215” order approved by the FISC.[23] The government’s requests for the orders and the FISC’s ruling on those requests are classified, and in 2012, the FISC approved all 212 requests it received.[24] When it comes to Prism, however, the FISC’s role is limited. The government is not required to go before the FISC to receive authorization for individual surveillance orders.[25] Instead, the FISC is tasked with approving “targeting and minimization” procedures that aim to limit the amount of American citizens’ information that is captured by the program being implemented.[26] As part of its approval process, the FISC reviews whether the agencies’ proposed procedures comply with the Fourth Amendment.[27] The FISC, however, has no authority to periodically review the programs that it approves in order to make sure that the government is complying with its proposed “targeting and minimization” procedures, and both the procedures and FISC orders authorizing them are classified.[28]
In this case, the legal opinions being withheld from the public affect the rights of nearly every American.[29] By limiting knowledge of the legal framework that authorizes intelligence and national security programs, the balance of power erodes, weakening accountability and undermining democratic governance. Beyond the separation of powers, secret law calls into question the perceived legitimacy of government decisions. Citizens who cannot access or understand the rules that govern them may rightfully question whether authorities are acting within their legal bounds, leading to broader disillusionment and reduced civic engagement.[30] Over time, this sense of alienation can become entrenched, resulting in a populace skeptical of both the government’s motives and the fairness of its institutions. As secrecy expands, so too does the risk of surveillance practices creeping beyond their intended limits, redefining civil liberties in ways that the public never consented to and, in many cases, never even knew existed. If left unchecked, this structural opacity risks embedding an unreviewable system of executive power into the legal framework itself.
II. First Amendment Right of Access
The secrecy surrounding FISC opinions is not simply poor policy—it raises legitimate constitutional concerns. In 2020, the FISC ruled that there is no First Amendment right of access to its opinions.[31] While not explicitly stated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) has recognized this right as implicit in the First Amendment.[32] In the landmark Richmond Newspapers case, the Court invalidated a trial judge’s order excluding the public during witness testimony,[33] emphasizing that “the trial has been open to all who cared to observe.”[34] The Court also noted that openness is essential to the proper functioning of a trial, saying that “it gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged . . . decisions based on secret bias or partiality.” [35]
Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co., the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute mandating closed courtrooms during testimony of minor victims in sex crime cases,[36] holding that, “[p]ublic scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact-finding process . . . .”[37] Public access, the Court explained, “fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process.”[38]
A. Expansion of the Right of Access Beyond the Trial
The Supreme Court later expanded on the right of access doctrine in Press-Enterprise I and II, applying the right of access to jury selection and preliminary hearings in criminal cases.[39] In Press-Enterprise I, where most of a six-week jury selection was closed and transcripts were withheld,[40] the Court held that closure must be, “rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness.”[41] Cause, the Court states, means “an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”[42]
Press-Enterprise II extended the right to preliminary hearings,[43] introducing the “experience and logic” test.[44] Under this test, courts first look at whether there has been a “tradition of accessibility” to the type of hearing being conducted.[45] Courts then look at whether access to the hearing “plays a particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process.”[46] Importantly, the Court held that public access could outweigh a limited history of openness.[47] In El Vocero de Puerto Rico, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right of access applies to preliminary hearings in Puerto Rico, rejecting the local court’s reasoning that a small population justified closure.[48] “Experience,” the Court clarified, refers to the tradition in the U.S. as a whole—not the practice of a single jurisdiction.[49]
B. Right of Access Beyond Criminal Proceeding
In the early 2000s, the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment right of access beyond criminal proceedings for the first time.[50] In Ashcroft, the Executive Branch sought to close a deportation hearing by labeling it a “special interest” case.[51] The government argued that the “experience and logic” test applied only to judicial, not administrative proceedings.[52] The Court disagreed, holding that, “[t]he First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event . . . .”[53] The government further argued that closure was justified to prevent “mosaic intelligence” from revealing sensitive investigative details.[54] The Court rejected this argument, stating that the mere possibility of piecing together such information was insufficient, and warning that, “[w]hen government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people.”[55]
Nine years later, in litigation brought by the New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”), the Court struck down a New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) policy excluding certain observers from Transit Adjudication Bureau hearings.[56] The NYCTA argued that there was no right of access to such administrative proceedings.[57] The Court disagreed, holding that the right of access does not depend on the branch of government conducting the proceeding, and that the NYCTA failed to show reasonable grounds for limitation.[58]
III. Conflicting Interests
A. The ACLU’s Interest in Disclosure
Similar to the NYCLU, the ACLU argues that the First Amendment gives the public a right to access FISC decisions containing significant legal opinions.[59] These decisions implicate the “privacy, expressive, and associational rights of every American.”[60] After 9/11, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) interpreted sections of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) to authorize surveillance programs that collected mass amounts of Americans’ data.[61] In 2008, Congress amended FISA and authorized FISC to approve targeting procedures which acquired international communications of American citizens—without a warrant—under the guise of targeting foreign nationals.[62]
The FISC has also issued opinions evaluating the legality of similar programs used by the U.S. intelligence community. In 2011, the FISC issued an opinion assessing the legality of the NSA’s use of “about” collection to scan Americans’ communications for specific terms that the government deemed to be associated with its foreign intelligence targets.[63] Two years later, the FISC reexamined and upheld a 2006 authorization allowing bulk collection of domestic call records.[64] Finally, in 2018, the FISC ruled on warrantless searches of international communications databases for U.S. citizens’ information, all of which were classified.[65]
Traditionally, the FISC did not publish any of the decisions it made. Between 1978 and 2013, only two of the FISC’s opinions were ever actually published.[66] It was not until the passage of the USA Freedom Act in 2015 that Congress required the government to conduct a review of all FISC opinions and make available to the public opinions that “include a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law.”[67] The Act’s review process, however, is flawed: it is conducted solely by the executive branch, it excludes pre-2015 opinions (when many bulk collection programs were authorized), is subject to a “national security waiver,” and omits the “experience and logic” test.[68]
Executive-only review raises three problems. First, the branch responsible for surveillance has an inherent bias toward secrecy. Second, without judicial oversight, the executive avoids scrutiny from courts that could check overbroad secrecy claims. Third, the “national security waiver” is vulnerable to abuse. A national security waiver can block the release of a FISC opinion if: (1) the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”), in consultation with the Attorney General (“AG”) determines that it is necessary to protect the U.S., its intelligence sources, or methods, and (2) the DNI issues an unclassified statement, prepared by the AG, summarizing the decision and, “to the extent consistent with national security,” its context.[69] This statement, however, must contain “no part of the opinion of the [FISC] or [FISCR],” which means that the public receives little to no insight into the court’s reasoning or its underlying legal arguments.[70]
B. The Government’s Interest in Secrecy
In 2013, the government opposed the ACLU’s request to publish FISC opinions authorizing mass surveillance programs, arguing that disclosure could jeopardize intelligence activities and that the ACLU failed both prongs of the “experience and logic” test.[71] In evaluating the “experience” prong, the government relied on El Vocero de P.R., which held that “experience” refers to national, not jurisdictional, practice.[72] Because the FISC’s docket consists exclusively of national security matters, it operates primarily in secret, with public access being the exception.[73] The government contends that this makes it fundamentally different from other Article III courts; therefore, the ACLU’s reliance on the tradition of openness in other courts is misplaced.[74]
On the “logic” prong, the government again invoked national security, claiming that openness would hinder—not enhance—the court’s effectiveness by exposing sensitive intelligence gathering methods and targets.[75] On the contrary, opponents argued that public access would promote trust in the judiciary and enhance democratic accountability, thus improving—not hindering—the court’s effectiveness.[76] A brief filed by former intelligence community officials contends that “the trust and confidence of the public and the assurance of strong and credible oversight are critical” in matters of national security, warning that excessive secrecy risks harmful unauthorized leaks.[77]
When another FISC petition for access was reviewed in 2020, the reviewing court asserted that the FISC lacked jurisdiction to hear First Amendment claims, emphasizing that its authority is limited to powers expressly granted by the FISA.[78] One year later, in 2021, this matter was brought before the United States Supreme Court as a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was denied.[79] Justice Gorsuch and Justice Sotomayor dissented from the court’s decision to deny cert, stating: “On the government’s view, literally no court in this country has the power to decide whether citizens possess a First Amendment right of access to the work of our national security courts.”[80] Historically, courts have recognized that all Article III courts have “supervisory power over [their] own records and files,” further bolstering the ACLU’s argument that the FISC can hear right of access cases.[81]
IV. FISC’s Exceptionalism vs. Constitutional Norms
The FISC’s claim that it is unlike other Article III courts echoes the concept of “administrative law exceptionalism”—the mistaken belief that a regulatory field is so unique that general legal principles do not apply.[82] Other specialized tribunals (e.g., the Tax Court) have faced allegations of “administrative exceptionalism.”[83] The FISC stands out, however, for its nearly unreviewable secrecy. By design, it depends on unilateral executive branch certifications and operates without a robust adversarial challenge, conditions that critics have warned can produce bias favoring government submissions.[84]
The Court in Globe Newspapers held that closing judicial process off from the public undermines the “essential component” of transparency in the judicial system, which the Court deemed vital to maintaining public confidence.[85] Likewise, El Vocero de Puerto Rico rejected the notion that constitutional norms vary with a court’s docket when fundamental rights are at stake.[86] Yet, the FISC’s ex parte process and classified publications create a dual legal system: one for national security, another for all else—directly contradicting Boumediene v. Bush, which rejected parallel legal structures even in wartime.[87]
This structural divergence from Article III norms is not merely procedural but existential. Unlike other federal courts, which operate under a presumption of transparency as articulated by Richmond Newspapers, the FISC functions as a constitutional anomaly—a court whose very existence relies on sustained secrecy.[88] Absent adversarial testing, flawed reasoning can calcify into precedent without the safeguards needed to protect fundamental rights. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected blanket security claims used to justify excessive secrecy. In Globe Newspapers, it required evidence-based risks before closing proceedings.[89] Similarly, in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit applied the First Amendment right of access to “special interest” terrorism cases, dismissing the “mosaic” theory for aggregated non-classified details—underscoring that national security claims must be tied to concrete, demonstrable harm.[90]
V. Refining the Experience and Logic Test
The ACLU’s argument for a First Amendment right of access to FISC opinions hinged on the “experience and logic” test articulated in Press-Enterprise II, which asks whether a proceeding has historically been open and whether transparency enhances fairness.[91] The government maintains that national security concerns exempt FISC opinions from this test.[92] The “experience and logic” test can be refined to balance both transparency and security by integrating elements of the “compelling need for secrecy” standard used for grand jury proceedings. Secrecy, while essential for protecting intelligence-gathering techniques and sensitive operations, must be reassessed when FISC opinions directly impact every American’s constitutional rights.
Under this refined approach, secrecy would be the exception, not the rule. [93] Consistent with precedent established by Press Enterprise II and Detroit Free Press, withholding disclosure should require a compelling, particularized showing of a substantial probability of harm, supported by concrete facts rather than vague assertions.[94] Demanding a higher evidentiary standard minimizes the risk of overbroad secrecy and ensures that closed proceedings and redacted decisions are limited to situations where no alternative measure—like partial redactions, in-camera review, or delayed release—would suffice.
While amicus curiae or “amici” have historically provided some check on FISC proceedings, their role is limited: their appointments are discretionary, their access to case information is incomplete, and they cannot seek appellate review.[95] Only the government can appeal an adverse decision of the FISC, thus limiting judicial review to a one-way street.[96] To counter this imbalance, requests for closure or redaction should undergo judicial—not executive—review by an independent panel of judges.[97] This safeguard reinforces the separation of powers and ensures that the executive cannot unilaterally decide what remains secret.
Periodic reassessment is also essential. If redaction or withholding is initially justified, the decision should be revisited at regular intervals to determine whether the threat remains credible. As in Gillispie, the need for secrecy may diminish over time; if the government cannot demonstrate an ongoing particularized risk, the presumption of openness should prevail.[98] Ultimately, this refined approach to the “experience and logic” test respects legitimate security needs while protecting democratic oversight. By requiring particularized evidence of harm, mandating independent judicial review, and limiting secrecy to circumstances where no alternatives suffice, the judiciary would strengthen public trust and uphold the principle that transparency is the rule, not the exception.
Conclusion
The First Amendment right of access continues to serve as a pivotal safeguard for transparency, even in settings where the government asserts national security interests. By strengthening the “experience and logic” test, this Note advances a model in which courts demand specific and imminent evidence of harm before restricting public access. Such a requirement ensures that secrecy remains an exception rather than a default rule, especially when judicial opinions involve fundamental constitutional rights of privacy. Without reform, judicial deference to executive secrecy risks normalizing secret law, eroding public trust, and weakening democratic accountability. A government that operates in secrecy does not just withhold information; it alters the very relationship between the state and its citizens, replacing transparency with unilateral control.
Specialized courts like the FISC should not function as extensions of the executive. Judicial—not executive—control over secrecy decisions is essential to maintaining checks and balances. Detroit Free Press stands as a reminder that broad invocations of “national security” cannot substitute meaningful oversight: “A government operating in the shadow of secrecy stands in complete opposition to the society envisioned by the Framers . . . .”[99] In essence, maintaining open proceedings encourages accountability and public confidence in the rule of law. Adopting a heightened standard for closure or redaction can balance national security needs with public access. Requiring independent judicial review, particularized proof of harm, and periodic reassessment promotes transparency without compromising legitimate security needs. As Justice Brennan observed, “People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.”[100]
* J.D. Expected 2026, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law; MBA 2026, University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics; B.S. Political Science, minor in Legal Studies 2022, Murray State University. I would like to thank Eleri, my wife, for reading this Note and providing me with her feedback, my family for supporting me in all that I do, and the KLJO team for their efforts in helping to edit this piece.
[1] See Pentagon Papers, Watergate and Trials, UMassAmherst,
[2] Id.
[3] See Malcolm Farnsworth, Watergate Chronology, Watergate.info, https://watergate.info/chronology [https://perma.cc/6X3B-YVX4] (last visited Oct. 22, 2024) (describing the political events that took place after the Watergate break-in); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the University of Chicago Law School and Alumni Association: Watergate Legislation in Retrospect (Apr. 25, 1980), in Dep’t of Justice NCJRS Virtual Library, 1980, at 1, 1–2.
[4] Civiletti, supra note 3, at 1–2.
[5] Andreas Kuersten, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11451, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (2024).
[6] Id.
[7] FISA & Section 702 FAQs, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_national_security/resources/fisa-section-702/faq [https://perma.cc/K8GG-Y9VB] (last visited Mar. 3, 2026); see also Kuersten, supra note 5 (describing the purpose of FISC).
[8] Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), Epic, https://epic.org/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-fisc [https://perma.cc/3WJR-HPTS] (last visited Oct. 23, 2024).
[9] Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, What the Revelations Mean for You, Guardian (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1 [https://perma.cc/QG8V-V6LP].
[10] See Motion of ACLU for the Release of Court Records, In re Opinions and Orders of this Court Containing Novel or Significant Interpretations of Law (FISC Oct. 18, 2016).
[11] See id. (explaining Congress’ response with the USA FREEDOM Act); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), supra note 8.
[12] Charlie Hogle & Alex Abdo, The Public Should Have Access to the Surveillance Court’s Opinions, Just Sec. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/75809/the-public-should-have-access-to-the-surveillance-courts-opinions [https://perma.cc/WNG3-TRLM].
[13] Id.
[14] See id. (explaining how the FISC and its appellate court have refused to consider First Amendment motions).
[15] Secret Law, Brennan Ctr. for Just., https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/protect-liberty-security/transparency-oversight/secret-law [https://perma.cc/8BJK-9SNZ] (last visited Jan. 3, 2025); see Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2019) (arguing shifts “in regulatory policy has been undertaken with low-visibility strategies,” which enables unchecked executive authority).
[16] See Noll & Revesz, supra note 15, at 100; Elizabeth Goitein, Secret Law is Not the Solution to an Overbroad Surveillance Authority, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (June 11, 2024), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/secret-law-not-solution-overbroad-surveillance-authority [https://perma.cc/6W5T-LDJ8]; Bruce Fein, Constitutional Peril: The Life and Death Struggle for Our Constitution and Democracy 44 (2008).
[17] Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent 4–5 (2017).
[18] 15 Top NSA Spy Secrets Revealed by Edward Snowden, Spyscape, https://spyscape.com/article/15-top-nsa-spy-secrets-revealed-by-snowden [https://perma.cc/CWC4-AU3S] (last visited Feb. 25, 2025).
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Are They Allowed to Do That? A Breakdown of Selected Government Surveillance Programs, Brennan Ctr. For Just. (July 15, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/are-they-allowed-do-breakdown-selected-government-surveillance-programs [https://perma.cc/UL43-LJZM].
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] Hogle & Abdo, supra note 12.
[30] See Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 95–96 (2010).
[31] Meenakshi Krishnan, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Petition Clause: Rethinking the First Amendment Right of Access, 130 Yale L.J. 723, 723 (2021).
[32] Christopher Dunn, Column: Rediscovering the First Amendment Right of Access (New York Law Journal), NYCLU (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.nyclu.org/commentary/column-rediscovering-first-amendment-right-access-new-york-law-journal [https://perma.cc/TVK7-RQM7].
[33] Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
[34] Id. at 564.
[35] Id. at 569.
[36] Globe Newspaper Co., v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1982).
[37] Id. at 606.
[38] Id.
[39] Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
[40] Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510.
[41] Id. at 509.
[42] Id. at 510.
[43] Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 10.
[44] Id. at 9.
[45] Id. at 10.
[46] Id. at 11.
[47] Id. at 12–13.
[48] El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993).
[49] Id. at 150.
[50] Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
[51] Id. at 683.
[52] Id. at 694.
[53] Id. at 695.
[54] Id. at 709.
[55] Id. at 683, 709.
[56] N.Y.C.L. Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 2012).
[57] Id. at 289–90.
[58] Id. at 290.
[59] Rohini Kurup, Civil Liberties Groups Ask Supreme Court to Make FISC Opinions Public, LAWFARE (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/civil-liberties-groups-ask-supreme-court-make-fisc-opinions-public [https://perma.cc/WMN4-RRLF].
[60] Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Mandamus, In re Opinions and Orders of the FISC Containing Novel or Significant Interpretations of Law, at 3 (U.S. 2021) [hereinafter Opinions]; RCFP Backs Supreme Court Petition Concerning Access to FISC Decisions, Reps. Comm. For Freedom of The Press (May 27, 2021), https://www.rcfp.org/briefs-comments/aclu-v-united-states [https://perma.cc/3Z7B-9E6G].
[61] Opinions, supra note 60, at 3.
[62] See id.
[63] Id. at 4; See All About "About" Collection, Elec. Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/pages/about-collection#:~:text=That%20term%20refers%20to%20the,identifier%20used%20by%20a%20target [https://perma.cc/WBC5-SAWD].
[64] Opinions, supra note 60, at 4.
[65] Id.
[66] Id.
[67] Id. at 5 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a)).
[68] See id.
[69] Declassification of Significant Decisions, Orders, and Opinions, 50 U.S.C. § 1872 (2015).
[70] See id.
[71] Brief for the United States at 4, 14–15, In re Ord. of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, at *1–2 (FISA Ct. Sep. 13, 2013).
[72] Id. at 5; El Vocero de P.R. (Caribbean Int'l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 146, 150 (1993).
[73] Brief for the United States, supra note 71, at 6.
[74] Id. at 7–8.
[75] Id. at 10–11.
[76] Motion of The American Civil Liberties Union, The American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and The Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records at 9, In re Ord. of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064 (FISA Ct. 2013).
[77] Jameel Jaffer & Patrick Toomey, A New Consensus Around Transparency and National Security Surveillance, ACLU (June 1, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/a-new-consensus-around-transparency-and-national-security-surveillance [https://perma.cc/M823-3QN5]; Brief of Former Government Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, Am. C.L. Union v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 22 (2021) (No. 20-1499).
[78] See In re Opinions and Orders by the FISC addressing bulk collection of Data under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. FISCR 20-01, 8-12 (F.I.S.C.R. Apr. 24, 2020) (denying a movant’s petition for review of a decision of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rejecting a movant’s First Amendment claims because the FISC lacked jurisdiction to hear the same).
[79] ACLU v. United States, No. 20–1499, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (order denying certiorari).
[80] Id.
[81] Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); see also Hogle & Abdo, supra note 12 (noting that the FISC and FISCR have inherent authority over the management of and public access to their own records).
[82] Christopher J. Walker, The Stages of Administrative Law Exceptionalism, Yale L.J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-stages-of-administrative-law-exceptionalism [https://perma.cc/FYN6-BMKS].
[83] Id.
[84] John O. Tyler, Jr., FISA vs the Constitution, Houston Christian Univ. (July 24, 2018), https://hc.edu/news-and-events/2018/07/24/fisa-vs-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/Y44R-6VYR].
[85] Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
[86] El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993).
[87] See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764–66 (2008).
[88] Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573, 575–581 (1980).
[89] See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609–610.
[90] Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2002).
[91] See Opinions, supra note 60, at 4; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
[92] See Orders Issued, supra note 71, at 3, 5.
[93] See Richmond Newspapers Inc., 448 U.S. at 573 (noting, by negative implication, that secrecy should not be presumed).
[94] Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 13–14; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 706–707.
[95] Chris Baumohl, Reforming 702: Strengthening FISA Amici, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. (Mar. 2, 2023), https://epic.org/reforming-702-strengthening-fisa-amici [https://perma.cc/AYT5-RFLE].
[96] Id.
[97] See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (emphasizing that courts have power over their own files).
[98] See State v. Gillispie, 181 N.E.3d 614, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021).
[99] Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710.
[100] Richmond Newspapers Inc., 448 U.S. at 572.